Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004(12). ndpr.nd.edu/news/identifying-the-mind-selected-papers-of-u-t-place/
Download: Armstrong (2004) Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind - Selected Papers of U.T. Place.pdf
Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967)]
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf
Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1999). Critical notice of Tim Crane, ed. Dispositions: A debate by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place. doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10715993
Download: Bigelow & Pargetter (1999) Critical Notice of Dispostions - A Debate.pdf
Bird, A. (2001). Review of DAVID ARMSTRONG, CHARLIE MARTIN, and ULLIN PLACE, edited by TIM CRANE Dispositions: A Debate and STEPHEN MUMFORD Dispositions. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.137
Download: Bird (2001) Review of Armstrong et al Dispositions.pdf
Blackburn, S. (1996). The fertile comma [Review of the book 'Dispositions: A Debate' by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place].
Catania, A.C. (2002). The verbal behavior of Ullin T. Place. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 3(1), 1-5. doi:10.1080/15021149.2002.11434199
Ullin Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the perseverance and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2002) The Verbal Behavior of Ullin T. Place.pdf
Catania, A.C. (2003). Ullin T. Place: A life in verbal behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 173-180. behavior.org/resources/130.pdf
Ullin T. Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the dignity, perseverance, and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2003) Ullin T. Place - A Life in Verbal Behavior.pdf
Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Is reply to]  [Is replied by]
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf
Dickins, T. (2002). A behaviourist's perspective on the origins of language. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 4(1), 31-42.
The article discusses behaviorist's perspective on the origins of language. The Massive Modularity Hypothesis has been a feature of recent approaches within Evolutionary Psychology (EP). EP sees its task as that of explaining the proximate psychological mechanisms that have been selected to resolve ultimate adaptive problems during the ancestry of species. The discrete nature of adaptive problems affords a discretely organized cognition. Sidman Stimulus Equivalence (SSE) is a kind of stimulus equivalence. SSE is defined as the formation of equivalence classes with reference to the formal properties of a mathematical equivalence set which are reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. These properties are best explained with reference to the laboratory procedures used to induce them.
Dickins, T. (2021). Tom Dickins about Ullin Place on Twitter.
I attended various talks by Ullin Place. He used to sit and read from an MS and occasionally pause for long periods of time and then write fairly copious notes in the margins correcting himself. Once done the talk would continue taking a different line than previously suggested.
— Behavioural Science Lab Middlesex (@BSL_MDX) January 15, 2021
Dickins, T., & Dickins, D. (2001). Symbols, stimulus equivalence and the origins of language. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 221-244. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759429
Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account of language acquisition has led to a modular and distinctly nativist psychology of language (cf. Pinker, 1994, 1997; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Little has been said about the role or nature of learning mechanisms in the evolution of language. Although Place does not provide any defense of a behaviorist linguistic ontogeny, this is no reason to rule out his phylogenetic speculations. We aim to outline Place's evolutionarily parsimonious view of symbol origins and their relation to stimulus equivalence. We applaud Ullin Place for bringing symbols into focus within the broader discipline of language origins and suggest that he has raised an interesting set of questions to be discussed in future work.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g)]
Download: Dickins (2001) Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.pdf
Dilworth, J. (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40.
The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. By using U. T. Place's intentional analysis of dispositions a dispositional analysis of perceptual representation is developed.
Download: Dilworth (2005) The Reflexive Theory of Perception.pdf
Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182.
Graham, G. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place, 1924 - 2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74-77, Memorial Minutes (pp. 116-117). American Philosophical Association.
Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.34.08gra
This chapter celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's "Is consciousness a brain process" appeared in the The British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and brain processes" appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review. These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind.
This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness) and what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the consciousness mind is and where it can, and can't, rely on cognitive science.
The grain project is the scientific program in cognitive science that involves investigating the causal roles associated with phenomenal consciousness at several levels of detail or resolution.
We argue that even if the causal grain of phenomenal consciousness were to become fully understood within cognitive science, various theoretical options concerning qualia that are presently live theoretical options in philosophical discussion would all still remain live theoretical options.
[Is replied by]
Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759428
Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf
Leigland, S. (2000). Remembering Ullin Place. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 99-100. doi:10.1007/BF03392003
Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf
Lewis, H. (2001). Ullin Place and Mind-Brain Identity. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 32-38.
The article presents an account of philosopher Ullin Place's contribution to the philosophy of mind. Ullin's project to demonstrate the reality and adaptive utility of the personality-transformation induced by mystical experience was thus the motor of his choice of undergraduate and postgraduate subjects of study. According to him the phenomenon of conscious experience which appears in the self-reports of human subjects and for whose existence those reports are the objective evidence is an integral and vital part of the causal mechanism in the brain which transforms input into output, stimulus into response, thereby controlling the interaction between the organism and its environment.
Marr, M. J. (2003). The what, the how, and the why: The explanation of Ernst Mach. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 181-192. www.jstor.org/stable/27759457
Download: Marr (2003) The What, the How, and the Why - The Explanation of Ernst Mach.pdf
Martin, C. B. (2000). A remembrance of an event - Foreword to "The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation" by Ullin T. Place. Brain and Mind, 1, 27. doi:10.1023/A:1010091822636
Download: Martin (2000) A Remembrance of an Event.pdf
McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.
Mitchell, N. (Host). (2006, September 23). The mind-body problem Down Under [Audio podcast episode]. In All in the mind. ABC Radio National. https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/allinthemind/the-mind-body-problem-down-under/3347916 Last retrieved November 18, 2020
Mind. Brain. Are they the same thing, or is the mind something special? The conundrum has perplexed us for centuries. Descartes' split the two - into a spiritual, soul-like mind and fleshly, material brain. But in 1956 a group of 'renegade' Oxford graduates Down Under, now international stars in philosophy, launched a challenge. Consciousness and the brain were united, and any talk of mental spooks and ghosts in the machine was out...almost. Now in their 80s, David Armstrong and Jack Smart join Natasha Mitchell and others to reminisce on taking Descartes to task.
Download: Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.mp3 Audio file  Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.pdf Transcript
Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf
Mortensen, C. (2015). The Brain of Ullin T. Place [Brochure for the display of Place's brain in the Abbie Museum of Anatomy, University of Adelaide]. www.adelaide.edu.au/uni-collections/collections/UC_Brain_of_UT_Place_Brochure_PRINT_2018.pdf
Download: Mortensen (2015) The Brain of Ullin T Place.pdf
Mumford, S. (1998). Book review of Dispositions: a Debate by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place and edited with introduction by Tim Crane. Philosophical Quarterly, 48(193), 548-550. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00123
Download: Mumford (1998) Book Review of Dispositions - a Debate.pdf
Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]
Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29). www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.029
This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf
Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185. www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0913/ijsrp-p2125.pdf
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf
Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Nath, S. (2014a). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Nath, S. (2014b). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Palmer, D. C. (2000a). Dedication Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 5.
[This dedication is followed by The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994]
Download: Palmer (2000) Dedication Ullin Place 1924-2000.pdf
Palmer, D. C. (2001). Behavioural interpretations of cognition. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 39-45.
Download: Palmer (2001) Behavioural Interpretation of Cognition.pdf
Potrč, M. (1995). U. T. Place. The British founder of physicalism: from behaviorism to connectionism. In Jaakko Hintikka & Klaus Puhl (Eds.), The British tradition in 20th century philosophy. Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 14th to 21th August 1994, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellscha
Dualism recognized the existence of inner mental processes and states, but without any material or physical foundation. Behaviourism, on the contrary, even if it did not deny their existence, refused to attribute any explanatory role to inner states and processes. In the British Journal of Psychology, in 1956, Place published a paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, There, he advocated a form of physicalism which steers a middle course between dualism and behaviourism. Mental processes were considered to be literally inside the body and identical with material/physical processes in the brain. It is well known that dualism was seriously undermined by this theory. But it is less well known that Place held his theory to be compatible with behaviourism. He draws a distinction between mental processes which he thinks are processes in the brain and mental states which he thinks, following Ryle (1949), are dispositions to talk and behave in a variety of broadly specifiable ways. The identity theory as applied to mental processes is seen as complementing rather than replacing Ryle's behaviourism. The exclusion of mental states allows Place to avoid the difficulties which confront the attempt to extend type identity theory to cover propositional attitudes, and which have led many to adopt the token identity version. Unlike token identity physicalism which regards any attempt to establish psycho-physical correlations as futile, Place's version of type identity theory predicts such correlations across individuals in the case of mental processes and within individuals in the case of mental states. This, combined with an emphasis which comes from his background in behaviourist psychology on learning as the primary source of mental/behavioural dispositions, makes it easy for Place (1991) to embrace connectionism which he regards as entirely compatible with behaviourism. He does not emphasize the compatibility between type identity theory and connectionism, probably because this point is obvious to him. There is no analogous way of establishing links with brain science in the case of token identity theory.
Download: Potrc (1995) U T Place - The British Founder of Physicalism - from Behaviorism to Connectionism.pdf
Potrč, M. (2000). In memoriam - Ullin Thomas Place. Acta Analytica, 15(25), 7-18.
Reed, P. (2001). Editorial: Ullin Place, 1924-2000. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 155-157. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759424
Download: Reed (2001) Editorial - Ullin Place, 1924-2000.pdf
Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]
Sekatskaya, M.A., & Kuznetsov, A. (2018). The Philosophy of Ullin Place. From Mysticism to Materialism [in Russian]. Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School
of Economics, II(4), 181-192. doi:10.17323/2587-8719-2018-ii-4-181-192
Ullin Place was an extraordinary person. From his early interest in mysticism he later turned to anthropology, which in turn brought him to logical behaviorism. While working on the improvement of logical behaviorism Place formulated the thesis of mindbrain identity, and has thereby founded the identity theory, which is still one of the most influential approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time Place continued to see himself as Gilbert Ryle's follower; he insisted that the ongoing discussions about the metaphysics of consciousness are meaningless because the philosophical problem is already solved and the time for empirical research has come. The paper shows how Place's biography was interrelated with the development of his materialistic philosophy, how his article "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" relates to the rest of his work, and how this article has influenced the debates in philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century.
Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [15 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [Reprinting collections]
Smart, J. J. C. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Pelican Record, 41, 123-124. [Corpus Christi College, Oxford]
Smart, J. J. C. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 432
Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/
Smith, D. E. (2000) A memory of Ullin.
Download: Smith (2000) A Memory of Ullin.pdf
Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4703_f0d504246b1f883cd588a350bb6f438a.pdf
U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf
Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149. www.jstor.org/stable/41236095
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]
Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf
Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]
Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf
Tartaglia, J. (2005). Place, Ullin Thomas (1924-2000). In S. Brown (Ed.)., The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers (pp. 785-789). Bristol: Thoemmes. doi:10.5040/9781350052437-0328
Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Related]
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf
Valentine, E. (2000). Ullin Place (1924-2000). History & Philosphy of Psychology, 2,(1), 72-74.
Wetherick, N.E. (2000). U. T. Place (1924-2000). The Psychologist, 13, 233.
Ylikoski, P. (1999). Review of Dispositions: A Debate. D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place Tim Crane, editor London: Routledge, 1996, viii 197 pp. doi:10.1017/S0012217300010258
Download: Ylikoski (1999) Review of Dispositions - A Debate.pdf