See also Publications citing U. T. Place and Publications citing “Is conscious a brain process”

ABC Adelaide (2022-06-27). A Brain in a Jar as a Philosophical Statement [Radio Interview]. Drive, a daily (weekdays) radio program of ABC Radio Adelaide.
[Abstract]Jules Schiller of ABC Adelaide interviewed Thomas Place about his father's brain on display in a museum of the University of Adelaide.
Download: ABC Adelaide (2022) A Brain in a Jar as a Philosophical Statement.mp3

Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004(12).
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Armstrong (2004) Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind - Selected Papers of U.T. Place.pdf

Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
[Abstract]In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967)]  
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf

Bickle, J. (2000). Editor's note. Brain and Mind, 1, 25. doi:10.1023/A:1010015620339
Download: Bickle (2000) Editor's Note.pdf

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1999). Critical notice of Tim Crane, ed. Dispositions: A debate by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place. doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10715993
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Bigelow & Pargetter (1999) Critical Notice of Dispostions - A Debate.pdf

Bird, A. (2001). Review of DAVID ARMSTRONG, CHARLIE MARTIN, and ULLIN PLACE, edited by TIM CRANE Dispositions: A Debate and STEPHEN MUMFORD Dispositions. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.137
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Bird (2001) Review of Armstrong et al Dispositions.pdf

Blackburn, S. (1996). The fertile comma [Review of the book 'Dispositions: A Debate' by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place].
[Reviewed publication(s)]  

Catania, A.C. (2002). The verbal behavior of Ullin T. Place. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 3(1), 1-5. doi:10.1080/15021149.2002.11434199
[Abstract]Ullin Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the perseverance and courage with which he faced its end.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  
Download: Catania (2002) The Verbal Behavior of Ullin T. Place.pdf

Catania, A.C. (2003). Ullin T. Place: A life in verbal behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 173-180.
[Abstract]Ullin T. Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the dignity, perseverance, and courage with which he faced its end.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  
Download: Catania (2003) Ullin T. Place - A Life in Verbal Behavior.pdf

Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf

Dickins, T. E. (2002). A behaviourist's perspective on the origins of language. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 4(1), 31-42.
[Abstract]The article discusses behaviorist's perspective on the origins of language. The Massive Modularity Hypothesis has been a feature of recent approaches within Evolutionary Psychology (EP). EP sees its task as that of explaining the proximate psychological mechanisms that have been selected to resolve ultimate adaptive problems during the ancestry of species. The discrete nature of adaptive problems affords a discretely organized cognition. Sidman Stimulus Equivalence (SSE) is a kind of stimulus equivalence. SSE is defined as the formation of equivalence classes with reference to the formal properties of a mathematical equivalence set which are reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. These properties are best explained with reference to the laboratory procedures used to induce them.

Dickins, T. E. (2021). Tom Dickins about Ullin Place on Twitter.
[Abstract]I attended various talks by Ullin Place. He used to sit and read from an MS and occasionally pause for long periods of time and then write fairly copious notes in the margins correcting himself. Once done the talk would continue taking a different line than previously suggested. — Behavioural Science Lab Middlesex (@BSL_MDX) January 15, 2021

Dickins, T. E., & Dickins, D. W. (2001). Symbols, stimulus equivalence and the origins of language. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 221-244. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account of language acquisition has led to a modular and distinctly nativist psychology of language (cf. Pinker, 1994, 1997; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Little has been said about the role or nature of learning mechanisms in the evolution of language. Although Place does not provide any defense of a behaviorist linguistic ontogeny, this is no reason to rule out his phylogenetic speculations. We aim to outline Place's evolutionarily parsimonious view of symbol origins and their relation to stimulus equivalence. We applaud Ullin Place for bringing symbols into focus within the broader discipline of language origins and suggest that he has raised an interesting set of questions to be discussed in future work.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g )]  
Download: Dickins (2001) Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.pdf

Dilworth, J. (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40.
[Abstract]The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. By using U. T. Place's intentional analysis of dispositions a dispositional analysis of perceptual representation is developed.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  
Download: Dilworth (2005) The Reflexive Theory of Perception.pdf

Fantl, J. (1997). Review of D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place, 'Dispositions: A Debate'.
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Fantl (1997) Review of Disposition - A Debate.pdf

Ford, S. (2010). What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Queensland.
[Abstract]This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.
CHAPTER 8 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - OUTLINE 131 CHAPTER 9 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - DISCUSSION 137 9.1 Truthmakers for Dispositional Properties 137 9.2 The Causal Role of the Microstructure 140 9.3 Summary and Conclusions 141
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996e)]  [Citing Place (1996f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182. doi:10.1023/A:1010032528485
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1992d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Graham, G. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place, 1924 - 2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74-77, Memorial Minutes (pp. 116-117). American Philosophical Association.

Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.34.08gra
[Abstract]This chapter celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's "Is consciousness a brain process" appeared in the The British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and brain processes" appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review. These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness) and what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the consciousness mind is and where it can, and can't, rely on cognitive science. The grain project is the scientific program in cognitive science that involves investigating the causal roles associated with phenomenal consciousness at several levels of detail or resolution. We argue that even if the causal grain of phenomenal consciousness were to become fully understood within cognitive science, various theoretical options concerning qualia that are presently live theoretical options in philosophical discussion would all still remain live theoretical options.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Gusman, S. (2016). The Phenomenological Fallacy and the Illusion of Immanence: Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology Against Mental Reification. Diametros, (48), 18-37.
[Abstract]Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions. On a final note, I compare the criticism to the views of Metzinger, a contemporary analytic philosopher who uses the phenomenological fallacy to accuse his adversaries.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  

Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf

Keane, D. (2022-06-26). Philosopher UT Place donates brain to University of Adelaide after dedicating his life to studying the mind. ABC News (
Download: Keane (2022) Philosopher UT Place donates brain to University of Adelaide after dedicating his life to studying the mind - ABC News.pdf

Leach, S. (2019). U. T. Place and the mystical origin of modern physicalism. Think, 18(53), 75-78. doi:10.1017/S1477175619000228
[Abstract]An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  

Leigland, S. (2000). Remembering Ullin Place. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 99-100. doi:10.1007/BF03392003
Download: Leigland (2000b) Remembering Ullin Place.pdf

Leigland, S. (2000). A contingency interpretation of Place’s contingency anomaly in ordinary conversation. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 161-165. doi:10.1007/BF03392962
[Abstract]A verbal phenomenon often reported in the research literature of conversation analysis is reviewed. The phenomenon involves the observation that spoken sentences often receive consequences from listeners, and that the effect of these consequences appears to be variability in sentence emission, whereas the absence of such consequences appears to produce response persistence. If the speaker's sentences function as units of  verbal behavior and the listener's responses function as reinforcers, the effect seems to run  contrary to reinforcement contingency effects observed in the laboratory, where reinforcement produces response differentiation and extinction produces an increase in response variability and a decrease in the response class previously selected by reinforcement. An interpretation of the conversation phenomenon is presented, employing standard reinforcement contingencies for which the behavioral dynamics involved may be seen when speaker's sequence of sentences is construed as a behavior chain.
[Citing Place (1991a)]  [Citing Place (1997a)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  
Download: Leigland (2000a) A Contingency Interpretation of Place's Contingency Anomaly in Ordinary Conversation.pdf

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Lewis, H. (2001). Ullin Place and Mind-Brain Identity. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 32-38.
[Abstract]The article presents an account of philosopher Ullin Place's contribution to the philosophy of mind. Ullin's project to demonstrate the reality and adaptive utility of the personality-transformation induced by mystical experience was thus the motor of his choice of undergraduate and postgraduate subjects of study. According to him the phenomenon of conscious experience which appears in the self-reports of human subjects and for whose existence those reports are the objective evidence is an integral and vital part of the causal mechanism in the brain which transforms input into output, stimulus into response, thereby controlling the interaction between the organism and its environment.

Marr, M. J. (2003). The what, the how, and the why: The explanation of Ernst Mach. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 181-192.
Download: Marr (2003) The What, the How, and the Why - The Explanation of Ernst Mach.pdf

Martin, C. B. (2000). A remembrance of an event - Foreword to "The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation" by Ullin T. Place. Brain and Mind, 1, 27. doi:10.1023/A:1010091822636
Download: Martin (2000) A Remembrance of an Event.pdf

McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Meynell, H. (1973). The mental and the physical. The Heythrop Journal, 14(1), 35-46. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00695.x
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mitchell, N. (Host) (2006, September 23). The mind-body problem Down Under [Audio podcast episode]. In All in the mind. ABC Radio National. Last retrieved November 18, 2020
[Abstract]Mind. Brain. Are they the same thing, or is the mind something special? The conundrum has perplexed us for centuries. Descartes' split the two - into a spiritual, soul-like mind and fleshly, material brain. But in 1956 a group of 'renegade' Oxford graduates Down Under, now international stars in philosophy, launched a challenge. Consciousness and the brain were united, and any talk of mental spooks and ghosts in the machine was out...almost. Now in their 80s, David Armstrong and Jack Smart join Natasha Mitchell and others to reminisce on taking Descartes to task.
Download: Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.mp3 Audio file  Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.pdf Transcript

Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf

Mortensen, C. (2015). The Brain of Ullin T. Place [Brochure for the display of Place's brain in the Abbie Museum of Anatomy, University of Adelaide].
The brain of Ullin T Place is held by the Vernon-Roberts Museum (of which the Abbie Anatomy Collection is a part), which is located on the Ground Floor of Helen Mayo South of the University of Adelaide. The brain is displayed in the front display window and can be viewed during teaching hours, no appointment required.
Download: Mortensen (2015) The Brain of Ullin T Place.pdf

Mumford, S. (1998). Book review of Dispositions: a Debate by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place and edited with introduction by Tim Crane. Philosophical Quarterly, 48(193), 548-550. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00123
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Book Review of Dispositions - a Debate.pdf

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
Files added, see Download
1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf  Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29).
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185.
[Abstract]U. T. Place is rightly called the forerunners of Physicalism or Identity Theory of Mind. But he also claims himself to be a behaviourist. Like the behaviourist he believed that mental events can be elucidated purely in terms of hypothetical propositions about behaviour. These can also be elucidated by the reports of the first person’s experiences. He has many arguments in favour of behaviourism for which he is called a behaviourist. In this article I shall give a glimpse of behaviourism, particularly of logical behaviourism and then explain the circumstances under which Place is called a behaviourist.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
[Abstract]The identity theory of mind came into existence as a reaction to the theory of Behaviourism. This theory is advocated and developed by different  philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. According to this theory, certain physical states of brain are identical to mental states. In others words, this theory holds that the so-called mental phenomena like thoughts, feelings, wishes and the rest are identical with the bodily states and processes. Thus to have some specific kind of thought is to have some kind of specific states and processes of bodily cells, typically brain cells. When we say that someone is in a certain mental state, it implies that in the cerebral cortex of the brain of that person, certain physical event is going on. The person concerned may not be aware of the happenings of the brain but these two states are not merely correlated with each other rather these two are one and the same event in the literal sense. Thus this theory asserts that everything mental is physical. But though it speaks of mental states it does not assert that these are not physical. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. These problems are the problem of identity, the problem of co-existence and the problem of consciousness. But in this paper I will discuss the problem of identity and the problem of co-existence and subsequently efforts will be made to solve these problems from materialist point of view.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
[Abstract]In the history of philosophy different philosophers have extended their efforts to give a solution of mind body problem. In modern period Rene Descartes explained the mind –body problem from the dualistic point of view. Behaviourism, on the other hand, does not believe [in] the existence of [the] mind. This theory emphasises only on behaviour. But none could give a satisfactory solution of the problem. Identity theory of mind also attempted to give a solution from the materialistic point of view. This theory is developed by U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart,H. Feigl and some other thinkers. This theory came into existence as a reaction to the behaviourism. The main thesis of the theory is - the mental states and processes and the brain states and processes are  identical. Before the establishment of his own theory Smart tries to answer some of the possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory. But this does not mean that Smart accepts Place‟s theory to the full extent. Rather he claims that his arguments for identity theory is very much different from that of Place and this he very sharply stated in his article “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959). In this paper I shall try to explore some possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory as well as answers given by Smart and subsequently tries to show the issues on which Smart agrees with Place. Finally, efforts will be made to highlight Smart‟s difference from that of Place and his own view on the Identity Theory.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  [Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
[Abstract]Identity theory of mind occupies an important place in the history of philosophy of mind. According to his theory mental events are nothing but physical events in the brain. This theory came into existence as a reaction of behaviourism and developed by U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, H. Feigl and others. But there is a debate among the profounder of the theory and this is- whether it is said about concrete particulars, (e.g., individual instances of occurring in particular subject at particular times), or about a kind to which such concrete particulars belong. With this question two answers are found and they are called Type identity and Token identity. According to token identity theory, every concrete particular that falls under a mental kind can be identified with some physical happenings. Type identity theory, on the other hand, holds that mental kinds themselves are physical kinds. Thus in this article I shall try to delineate the different arguments given by the profounder of this theory in favour of both the theories and finally show that which one is stronger than the others.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Dedication Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 5.
[Abstract][This dedication is followed by The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994]
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  [Citing Place (1992c)]  
Download: Palmer (2000) Dedication Ullin Place 1924-2000.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2000). In memoriam Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 95-98. doi:10.1007/BF03392002
Download: Palmer (2000) In Memoriam Ullin Place.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2001). Behavioural interpretations of cognition. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 39-45.
Download: Palmer (2001) Behavioural Interpretation of Cognition.pdf

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64.
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Potrč, M. (1995). U. T. Place. The British founder of physicalism: from behaviorism to connectionism. In Jaakko Hintikka & Klaus Puhl (Eds.), The British tradition in 20th century philosophy. Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 14th to 21th August 1994, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellscha
[Abstract]Dualism recognized the existence of inner mental processes and states, but without any material or physical foundation. Behaviourism, on the contrary, even if it did not deny their existence, refused to attribute any explanatory role to inner states and processes. In the British Journal of Psychology, in 1956, Place published a paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, There, he advocated a form of physicalism which steers a middle course between dualism and behaviourism. Mental processes were considered to be literally inside the body and identical with material/physical processes in the brain. It is well known that dualism was seriously undermined by this theory. But it is less well known that Place held his theory to be compatible with behaviourism. He draws a distinction between mental processes which he thinks are processes in the brain and mental states which he thinks, following Ryle (1949), are dispositions to talk and behave in a variety of broadly specifiable ways. The identity theory as applied to mental processes is seen as complementing rather than replacing Ryle's behaviourism. The exclusion of mental states allows Place to avoid the difficulties which confront the attempt to extend type identity theory to cover propositional attitudes, and which have led many to adopt the token identity version. Unlike token identity physicalism which regards any attempt to establish psycho-physical correlations as futile, Place's version of type identity theory predicts such correlations across individuals in the case of mental processes and within individuals in the case of mental states. This, combined with an emphasis which comes from his background in behaviourist psychology on learning as the primary source of mental/behavioural dispositions, makes it easy for Place (1991) to embrace connectionism which he regards as entirely compatible with behaviourism. He does not emphasize the compatibility between type identity theory and connectionism, probably because this point is obvious to him. There is no analogous way of establishing links with brain science in the case of token identity theory.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1989d)]  [Citing Place (1994a)]  
Download: Potrc (1995) U T Place - The British Founder of Physicalism - from Behaviorism to Connectionism.pdf

Potrč, M. (2000). In memoriam - Ullin Thomas Place. Acta Analytica, 15(25), 7-18.
[Abstract]Ullin Thomas Place is known as the Australian materialist who introduced the thesis of type identity. But his work is of [a] much larger spectrum, involving behaviorism, connectionism, dispositions, natural laws, picture theory of meaning and consciousness. Place's relationship with Slovenia is reviewed, beginning with some personal memories.
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1977a)]  

Reed, P. (2001). Editorial: Ullin Place, 1924-2000. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 155-157. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
Download: Reed (2001) Editorial - Ullin Place, 1924-2000.pdf

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38.
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]  

Schneider, S. (2001). Identity theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[Abstract]Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. The earliest advocates of Type Identity—U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart, respectively—each proposed their own version of the theory in the late 1950s to early 60s. But it was not until David Armstrong made the radical claim that all mental states (including intentional ones) are identical with physical states, that philosophers of mind divided themselves into camps over the issue. Over the years, numerous objections have been levied against Type Identity, ranging from epistemological complaints to charges of Leibniz’s Law violations to Hilary Putnam’s famous pronouncement that mental states are in fact capable of being “multiply realized.” Defenders of Type Identity have come up with two basic strategies in response to Putnam’s claim: they restrict type identity claims to particular species or structures, or else they extend such claims to allow for the possibility of disjunctive physical kinds. To this day, debate concerning the validity of these strategies—and the truth of Mind-Brain Type Identity—rages in the philosophical literature.
Central-State Materialism is falsely attributed to Place and Smart. It is Armstrong who defended this. The alternative of Central-State Materialism is the Two Factor theory as defended by Place, see, e.g., Place (2000d).
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1969)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Sekatskaya, M.A., & Kuznetsov, A. (2018). The Philosophy of Ullin Place. From Mysticism to Materialism [in Russian]. Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics, II(4), 181-192. doi:10.17323/2587-8719-2018-ii-4-181-192
[Abstract]Ullin Place was an extraordinary person. From his early interest in mysticism he later turned to anthropology, which in turn brought him to logical behaviorism. While working on the improvement of logical behaviorism Place formulated the thesis of mindbrain identity, and has thereby founded the identity theory, which is still one of the most influential approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time Place continued to see himself as Gilbert Ryle's follower; he insisted that the ongoing discussions about the metaphysics of consciousness are meaningless because the philosophical problem is already solved and the time for empirical research has come. The paper shows how Place's biography was interrelated with the development of his materialistic philosophy, how his article "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" relates to the rest of his work, and how this article has influenced the debates in philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century.

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24).,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
[Abstract]The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1999) Ullin Thomas Place [obituary]
Obituary written by professor J. J. C. (“Jack”) Smart in November 1999 at the request of Ullin Place; to be read at the latter’s funeral. Because he lived in Australia, it was impossible for Jack to attend the funeral. This obituary was likely used as input by Harry Lewis, a former Leeds colleague in the Department of Philosophy, in his contribution “An account of Ullin’s academic career” to the funeral in January 2000.
Download: Smart (1999) Obituary.pdf

Smart, J. J. C. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Pelican Record, 41, 123-124. [Corpus Christi College, Oxford]

Smart, J. J. C. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 432

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007).
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Smart (2007) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Smith, D. E. (2000) A memory of Ullin.
Download: Smith (2000) A Memory of Ullin.pdf

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202.
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149.
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989c)]  
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2005). Place, Ullin Thomas (1924-2000). In S. Brown (Ed.)., The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers (pp. 785-789). Bristol: Thoemmes. doi:10.5040/9781350052437-0328

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2002a)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Valentine, E. (2000). Ullin Place (1924-2000). History & Philosphy of Psychology, 2,(1), 72-74.

Wetherick, N.E. (2000). U. T. Place (1924-2000). The Psychologist, 13, 233.

Ylikoski, P. (1999). Review of Dispositions: A Debate. D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place Tim Crane, editor London: Routledge, 1996, viii 197 pp. doi:10.1017/S0012217300010258
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Ylikoski (1999) Review of Dispositions - A Debate.pdf