Publications citing U. T. Place.
223 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 2 .

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Livanios, V. (2021). Manifestation and unrestricted dispositional monism. Acta Analytica. doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00476-y
[Abstract]Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Luce, D. R. (1966). Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophical Studies, 17(1), 1-7. doi:10.1007/BF00452165
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malatesti, L. (2012). The knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malatesti, L. (2013). Zombies, the uniformity of nature, and contingent physicalism: A sympathetic response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena, 12(2), 245–259.
[Abstract]Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book Filozofija (2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malcolm, N. (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue, III, 115-125
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Reprinting collections]  

Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature. I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
[Abstract]Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies (which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  

Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
[Abstract]The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]  

Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2,) 127-145. doi:10.1080/00048406812341111
[Abstract]My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements
[Citing Place (1956)]  

McKitrick, J. A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174. doi:10.1080/713659629
[Abstract]Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Michel, M. (2019). The mismeasure of consciousness: A Problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1239–1249. doi:10.1086/705509
[Abstract]As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(3), 159-176. doi:10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x
[Abstract]Objective: In the past decade, much has been written about the hard problem of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.
Methods: Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.
Results: The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the NCC acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to the hard problem, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.
Conclusion: In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.

[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  

Mills, J. (2022). A Critique of Materialism. In J. Mills (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem (Chapter 1). Routledge
[Abstract]In the boon of medical, scientific, and technological progress, materialism has gained increasing explanatory power in deciphering the enigma of mind. But with the proliferation and acceptance of cognitive science, psychic reality has been largely reduced to a physical ontology. In this chapter, the author explores the ground, scope, and limits to the materialist framework and shows that while bio-neurochemical-physiology is a necessary condition for mental functioning, it is far from being a sufficient condition for adequately explaining the human being. This becomes especially significant when examining the question of selfhood, freedom, personal autonomy, and the phenomenal quality of the lived experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (2000). A proposal for the development of a mental vocabulary, with special reference to pretence and false belief. In P. Mitchell, & K. Riggs (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 51-80). Psychology Press.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Moore, J. (1995). Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction. The Behavior Analyst, 18, 33–49. doi:10.1007/BF03392690
[Abstract]The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf

Morris, E. K. (1997). Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis. The Psychological Record, 47, 529-542. doi:10.1007/BF03395245
[Abstract]Recent conceptual work in behavior analysis has argued that the discipline is not mechanistic, but contextualistic, in world view. This argument has been contested, however, and a mechanism-contextualism debate has ensued. In taking the side of contextualism, I offer four reflections on the controversy. These concern (a) confusions concerning Pepper’s purpose in writing his book and its place in the debate, (b) misunderstandings about the meanings of context and contextualism, (c) the pragmatic implications of theories of truth in world views other than contextualism, and (d) the evolution of ontology from mechanism to contextualism. In the end, behavior analysis may benefit from this debate by evolving as a world view unto its own for its science of behavior. The two-the world view and the science-are inexorably interrelated.
[Citing Place (1994c)]  [Citing Place (1996q)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Reviews]  

Mørch, H.H. (2020). Does dispositionalism entail panpsychism? Topoi, 39, 1073–1088. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
[Abstract]According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
Files added, see Download
1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf  Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Myin E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2044. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044
[Abstract]The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of consciousness studies, 23(5-6), 80-104. penultimate draft
[Abstract]In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Myin, E., & Loughlin, V. (2018). Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness. In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness (pp. 202-215). Routledge.
[Abstract]According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally  extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Nagel, T. (1965). Physicalism. The Philosophical Review, 74(3), 339–356. doi:10.2307/2183358
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29).
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
[Abstract]This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1967). What are perceptual reports about? Psychological bulletin, 67(4), 249–272. doi:10.1037/h0024320
[Abstract]This article presents a discussion of some methodological and substantive issues associated with the use of reports in perceptual experiments. The distinction between "report" and "response" is first clarified and a definition of report behavior is proposed. The relation of reference (aboutness) is next considered in the context of phenomenal vs. cognitive reports. At a less level, two pairs of contrasting proposals on the referents of perceptual reports are used to bring earlier questions to focus. One pair stems from philosophical approaches to the question of this article. The other arises in a current controversy concerning what psychophysical scales measure. A brief discussion of the role of e's own perceptual experience is followed by a review of methods for establishing report validity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 435-67. doi:10.2307/1422567
[Abstract]Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Nichols, C. (1983) Neurobiology and Social Theory: Some Common and Persistent Problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13(2), 207-234. doi:10.1177/004839318301300207
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Owen, J. L. (2002). A retrospective on behavioral approaches to human language: And some promising new developments. American Communication Journal, 5(3).
[Abstract]Early schools of behaviorism, namely, "classical" and "methodological," hold only limited implications for studies in human language behavior. In contrast, contemporary radical behaviorism is not only relevant, but it is dramatically more so due to its recent breakthroughs in the area of relational frame theory. Unfortunately, the few articles on behaviorism found in communication journals deal primarily with classical and methodological behaviorisms. References to radical behaviorism are rare, superficial, and out of touch with recent developments. A major purpose of this article is to draw some sharp distinctions among the three major behaviorisms: "classical," "methodological," and "radical"; and, to capture each of their unique perspectives on human language behavior. A second purpose is to show how radical behaviorism-especially in light of its recent progress in relational frame theory-provides the basis for a comprehensive behavioral theory of complex human language behavior. In doing so, it also provides a viable alternative to the cognitive theories that continue to dominate the field of communication studies.
[Citing Place (1997a) in context]  

Palmer, D. C. (1999). A Call for Tutorials on Alternative Approaches to the Study of Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 16, 49-55.
[Citing Place (1992a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Chomsky's Nativism Reconsidered The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17, 51-56
[Citing Place (1992a)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky's Appraisal of Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Half Century of Misunderstanding. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 253-67. doi:10.1007/BF03392134
[Abstract]The history of the writing of Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Chomsky’s review (1959), and MacCorquodale’s rebuttal (1970) are briefly summarized. Chomsky’s recent reflections on his review are analyzed: Chomsky’s refusal to acknowledge the review’s errors or its aggressive tone is consistent with his polemical style but comes at a minor cost in consistency and plausibility. However, his remarks about the place of Skinner’s work in science reveal misunderstandings so great that they undercut the credibility of the review substantially. The gradual growth in the influence of Skinner’s book suggests that its legacy will endure.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2007). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/15021149.2007.11434280
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account?  There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated.  Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2008). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8, 161-175.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
[Abstract]Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Papineau, D. (2020). The problem of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. Towards the end I shall also say some things about the Where? question. As for the What? question, a few brief introductory remarks will have to suffice.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Passmore, J. A. (1966). A hundred years of philosophy (second edition). Duckworth.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Pernu T. K. (2017). The five marks of the mental. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
[Abstract]The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Pessoa Jr., O. (2021). The colored-brain thesis. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 84-93. doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  

Pika, S., Nicoladis, E., & Marentette, P. (2009). How to order a beer: Cultural differences in the use of conventional gestures for numbers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(1), 70-80. doi:10.1177/0022022108326197
[Abstract]It is said that conventional gestures for numbers differ by culture. Conventional gestures are thought to imply consistency of form both across and within individuals. The present study tests the consistency of finger gestures of 60 participants of three different cultures and in three different mother tongues in nine different hypothetical scenarios. The first subject of analysis is whether participants differentiate between counting and signaling. The second subject is the consistency of gestures within and between groups. The third is how participants depict the number 1. Result show that most people use the same gestures for counting and signaling. In addition, Germans and English Canadians show relatively low degrees of individual differences whereas French Canadians show relatively high degrees of individual variability. Furthermore, only the Germans use the thumb to indicate the number 1, whereas the two North American cultures use the index finger. The present data suggest that finger gestures of some cultures clearly qualify as conventional gestures whereas others do not. It is suggested that the development of conventional gestures is influenced by cultural exposure, which can even result into the loosening of conventions.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018) Neural Correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1269. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269
[Abstract]One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  

Polger, T. W. (2011). Are sensations still brain processes? Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1–21.
[Abstract]Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, ‘‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’’ It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s (1959) text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Smart discussed as well as some that he did not anticipate. Finally, I offer a brief manifesto for the identity theory, providing a small list of the claims that I believe the contemporary identity theorist should accept. As it turns out, these are more or less the ones that Smart defended fifty years ago.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Powell, J. P. (1969). The brain and consciousness: a reply to Professor Burt. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 27-28.
[Abstract]This article presents a criticism of C. Burt's article. Essentially, Burt's "mental field" theory is questioned in terms of its plausibility and scientific status. It is argued that the "astonishing complexity of the brain may well baffle us, but our lack of understanding can scarcely be ameliorated by mystery-mongering.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Puccetti, R. (1964). Science, analysis, and the problem of mind. Philosophy, 39(149), 249-259. doi:10.1017/S0031819100055625
[Citing Place (1960)]  

Raimondi, A. (2021). Crane and the mark of the mental. Analysis, 81(4), 683–693. doi.:10.1093/analys/anab035
[Abstract]Brentano’s (1874) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998], 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes’s challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane’s representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Raz, A., & Donchin, O. (2003). A zetetic’s perspective on gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 237-238.
[Abstract]Charmed by Corballis’s presentation, we challenge the use of mirror neurons as a supporting platform for the gestural theory of language, the link between vocalization and cerebral specialization, and the relationship between gesture and language as two separate albeit coupled systems of communication. We revive an alternative explanation of lateralization of language and handedness.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Rego, F. (2021). Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? In P. Á. Gargiulo, & H. L. Mesones Arroyo (Eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry (Vol. IV, 73-88). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_8
[Abstract]In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Renz, G. (2021). What is God’s Power?. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(3). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3295
[Abstract]Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Roberts, H. (1967). The Construction of Consciousness. Psychological Reports, 20(1), 99–102. doi:10.2466/pr0.1967.20.1.99
[Abstract]Consciousness is analyzed after a brief review of some aspects of the present stage of understanding of consciousness. Discerned as its elements are brain configurations, in principle as described by Wolfgang Koehler or D. O. Hebb, and which are functionally termed “schemata.” Basic schemata represent, that is, are activated by and associated with, environmental, somatic, and psychic conditions. Self, being, and relation schemata are defined. Primal and self consciousness (collectively basic consciousness), relational consciousness, and metaconciousness (conciousness of consciousness) are formulated as organizations of schemata.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and sense: A critique of contemporary materialism. Cambridge University Press
[Abstract]Published in 1982 by CUP  it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, Z., Maley, C., & Piccinini, G (2015). Is Consciousness a spandrel? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365-383. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.10
[Abstract]Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Rollins, C. D. (1967). Are mental events actual physical? In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 21-37). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ros, A. (1997). Reduktion, Identität und Abstraktion. Philosophie der Psychologie Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um die These von der Identität physischer und psychischer Phänomene. In M. Astroh, D. Gerhardus & G. Heinzmann (Eds.), Dialogisches Handeln. Eine Festschrift für Kuno Lorenz (pp. 403-425). Spektrum Verlag. Republished in: e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie, 2007, 7.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Schlicht, T. (2022}. Minds, Brains, and Deep Learning: The development of Cognitive Science through the lens of Kant’s approach to cognition. H. Kim, & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence. DeGruyter.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]  

Schouten, M., & Looren de Jong, H. (2007). Mind matters; The roots of reductionism In M. Schouten, & H. Looren de Jong (Eds.), The matter of the mind: Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Blackwell Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Shaffer, J. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy, 58, 813-822.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
[Abstract]Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a )]  

Shaw, J. (2021). Feyerabend Never Was an Eliminative Materialist: Feyerabend’s Meta-Philosophy and the Mind–Body Problem. In K. Bschir & J. Shaw (Eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays (pp. 114-131). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108575102.007
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind cite Feyerabend as an early proponent of eliminative materialism, or the thesis that there are no mental processes. This attribution, I argue, is incorrect. Rather, Feyerabend only showed that common objections against materialism presuppose problematic meta-philosophical commitments. In this paper, I show how Feyerabend’s meta-philosophy leads him to the conclusion that the mind-body problem admits of many different solutions which are to be sorted out as science progresses. Moreover, I show how Feyerabend’s view evolves from a methodological to an ethical view on what a proper solution to the mind-body problem would entail.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation: Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming. Psychological Review, 91(4), 417–447. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.91.4.417
[Abstract]Attempts a rapprochement between J. J. Gibson's (1961) ecological optics and a conviction that perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming are similarly guided by internalizations of long-enduring constraints in the external world. Phenomena of apparent motion illustrate how alternating presentations of 2 views of an object in 3-dimensional space induce the experience of the simplest rigid twisting motion prescribed by kinematic geometry—provided that times and distances fall within certain lawfully related limits on perceptual integration. Resonance is advanced as a metaphor for not only how internalized constraints such as those of kinematic geometry operate in perception, imagery, apparent motion, dreaming, hallucination, and creative thinking, but also how such constraints can continue to operate despite structural damage to the brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Sklar, L. (1967). Types of inter-iheoretic reduction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18(2), 109–124.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skokowski, P. (2022). Sensing Qualia. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405
[Abstract]Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind — Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory — will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24).,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
[Abstract]The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Slezak P. P. (2002) Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech. [Comments to Carruthers: The Cognitive Functions of Language.] Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 699-700 doi:10.1017/S0140525X02490127 Link Text
[Abstract]The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak P. P. (2002). The tripartite model of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 239 - 270. doi:10.1080/0951508021000006085 Link Text
[Abstract]Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak P. P. (2008). The 'Hard' Problem and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 30, 525 Link Text
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-vu all over again. [Commentary to Pylyshyn’s article: Mental Imagery]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 209–210.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). Thinking about thinking: language, thought and introspection. Language & Communication, 22, 353–373. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00012-5 Link Text
[Abstract]I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think ‘in’ language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor’s ‘language of thought’. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the ‘imagery debate’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2018). Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously. Philosophy93(4), 529-555. doi:10.1017/S0031819118000232 Link Text
[Abstract]In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1957) Plausible reasoning in philosophy. Mind, 66(261), 75-78.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 252-254.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [20 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963), Philosophy and scientific realism. Routledge and Kegan Paul
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1966). Philosophy and scientific plausibility. In P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Mind, matter and method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl (pp. 377-390). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1959)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [5 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1989). C. B. Martin: A biographical sketch. In J. Heil (Ed. ), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 1-3). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Snowdon, P. F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 137-158). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149.
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2002)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf