Publications citing U. T. Place.
367 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 2 .

Eilifsen, C. & Arntzen, E. (2017). Effects of Immediate Tests on the Long-Term Maintenance of Stimulus Equivalence Classes. The Psychological Record, 67(4), 447-461. doi:10.1007/s40732-017-0247-y
[Abstract]It has been suggested that stimulus equivalence is a central component of language and symbolic behavior. When teaching symbolic behavior, the goal is often to achieve a more or less permanent alteration of an individual's behavioral repertoire. As such, it seems important to assess not only variables affecting the establishment of stimulus equivalence but also variables affecting continued stimulus control exerted by stimulus equivalence class members over time. The current study investigated the role of the test for stimulus equivalence on the long-term maintenance of stimulus equivalence classes. Using one-to-many conditional discrimination training, 24 adult participants were taught to respond in line with three five-member stimulus classes. One group of 12 participants immediately completed a test for stimulus equivalence, and 12 other participants did not receive such a test. All 24 participants were subsequently tested for trained and derived relations under extinction conditions 2 and 4 weeks later without any further exposure to the contingencies of the conditional discrimination training. Results showed no differences between the two groups, with four participants in each group responding in accordance with both trained conditional discriminations and stimulus equivalence in the 4-week test. Six additional participants did, however, display systematic conditional performance during retention tests only partly consistent with the experimenter-defined classes.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Eilifsen, C., & Arntzen, E. (2021) Mediated Generalization and Stimulus Equivalence Perspectives on Behavior Science, 44, 1–27. doi:10.1007/S40614-021-00281-3
[Abstract]From the 1930s to the 1970s a large number of experimental studies on mediated generalization were published, and this research tradition provided an important context for early research on stimulus equivalence. Mediated generalization and stimulus equivalence have several characteristics in common, notably that both traditions seek to experimentally investigate derived responding among arbitrarily related stimuli in human participants. Although studies of stimulus equivalence are currently being regularly published, few studies investigate mediated generalization in humans today, and the research tradition is mainly of historical interest. The current article will give an account of the origin, the development, and the demise of research on mediated generalization, including a presentation of publication trends, experimental methodology, and the conceptual context research on mediated generalization took place within. Finally, some thoughts on the demise of mediated generalization and its relevance for modern research on stimulus equivalence and other types of derived responding are presented, including reflections on the observability of explanatory variables and the use of inferential statistics.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Ellia, F., & Chis-Ciure, R. (2022). Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 100. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281
[Abstract]In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Evans, R. (2004). Book Review of Krakow, I (2002) Why the Mind-Body Cannot be Solved. Minds & Machines. 14(3), 403-407.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Fargas-Malet, M., & Dillenburger, K. (2016). Intergenerational transmission of conflict-related trauma in Northern Ireland: A behaviour analytic approach. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 25(4), 436-454. doi:10.1080/10926771.2015.1107172
[Abstract]Intergenerational transmission of trauma describes the impact that traumatic events experienced by one generation have for the subsequent generation. In Northern Ireland, violent conflict raged between 1969 and 1998, when a peace process begun. This study explored to what extent (if any) parents’ experiences of the conflict influenced how children perceived life in this society. Parents completed a questionnaire, and their children drew 2 pictures, depicting Northern Ireland now and before they were born. Children’s behaviors and awareness of the conflict were influenced by their parents’ experiences and narratives, their age, gender, and school. Parental narrative about the violence was influenced by individual learning history, the child’s age and gender, and present circumstances. A behavior analytic approach is offered.
[Citing Place (1988b) in context]  

Farrell, B. A. (1965). Review of the book The Behavioral Basis of Perception by J. G. Taylor. Mind, 74, 259-280
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Fisher, A. R. J. (2022). The two Davids and Australian Materialism. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitschell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 29-51). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.003.0004
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Ford, S. (2010). What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Queensland. philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=FORWFP
[Abstract]This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.
Note:
CHAPTER 8 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - OUTLINE 131 CHAPTER 9 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - DISCUSSION 137 9.1 Truthmakers for Dispositional Properties 137 9.2 The Causal Role of the Microstructure 140 9.3 Summary and Conclusions 141
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996e)]  [Citing Place (1996f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Foxall, G. R. (1999). The contextual stance. Philosophical Psychology, 12(1), 25-46. doi:10.1080/095150899105918
[Abstract]The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett’ s intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett’ s interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  

Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11-12), 11-39. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020011/art00002
[Abstract]This article presents the case for an approach to consciousness that I call illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them (or, on some versions, their objects) as having phenomenal properties. Thus, the task for a theory of consciousness is to explain our illusory representations of phenomenality, not phenomenality itself, and the hard problem is replaced by the illusion problem. Although it has had powerful defenders, illusionism remains a minority position, and it is often dismissed as failing to take consciousness seriously. This article seeks to rebut this accusation. It defines the illusionist programme, outlines its attractions, and defends it against some common objections. It concludes that illusionism is a coherent and attractive approach, which deserves serious consideration.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Fried, M. (2020). Kuhn's challenge: conceptual continuity and natural kinds [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Birkbeck, University of London. eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40475
[Abstract]Thomas Kuhn poses a fundamental worry about explaining scientific progress, which I call Kuhn's Challenge. The Challenge consists of two related questions: (A) If the meanings of key terms change between theories on either side of a paradigm shift, how can we still say that these theories are about the same thing? (B) Even if we assume that two theories address the same subject matter, how can we determine which one is better? A popular reply to Kuhn is to adopt a semantics for natural kind terms influenced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and Putnam in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", according to which such terms rigidly refer - independently of theory changes - to the same kinds across possible worlds and through time. I argue that this approach can explain extra-theoretical conceptual continuity only if we assume that all natural kinds have the same essence type. Though Kripke and Putnam take for granted that this essence type is microstructural, I argue that in practice, many sciences postulate natural kinds with other essence types, such as historical or functional essences; and that when new discoveries are made, prompting paradigm shifts, the relevant essence type may change. Moreover, which type is relevant to which science is as much a matter of decision as of discovery. Such a claim may seem to threaten realism about natural kinds. I argue, however, that we can be both pluralists and realists, if we recognise that conceptual continuity is secured ex post. Contrary to those who have argued for similar positions, I claim that we need not give up the rigidity of natural kind terms or the global ambitions of realism. In the end I show how the framework I have developed illuminates the debate over Kripke's argument against Physicalism in the philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Friend, T. (2021). Megarian Variable Actualism. Synthese, 199, 10521–10541. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03257-7
[Abstract]Megarian Actualism is the denial of unmanifesting powers. Aristotle called such a view ‘buffoonery’ and dispositionalists have provided compelling reasons for the contrary platitude that powers need not manifest. Even so, drawing on extant treatments of quantitative powers I’ll suggest that many of the powers which feature in quantitative lawlike equations are plausibly interpreted as Megarian. This is because the powers described by such equations are best understood as being directed towards all the values of exhaustive manifestation variables. I’ll discuss the prospects for generalising these Megarian characteristics to powers not typically represented in strict quantitative terms. The result will be a strong basis for a scientifically informed and plausible dispositionalist account: Megarian Variable Actualism.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Gascoigne, N. (2023). Philosophy of mind: Mind-body identity and eliminative materialism. In M. Müller (Eds.), Handbuch Richard Rorty. Springer VS. doi.:10.1007/978-3-658-16253-5_36
[Abstract]A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Giorgi, R., & Lavazza, A. (2018). Mental causation. APhEx, 17.
[Abstract]This article aims to provide a brief overview of the mental causation problem and its proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out to be one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first two sections, we offer an outline of the problem and the philosophical debate about it, and show that the mental causation problem is pivotal within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the third section, we focus on the most popular models of mental causation, namely Kim's and Davidson's accounts, also discussing the objections raised against them. In the final section, we take into consideration some recent proposals poised to solve the mental causation problem, including powerism. Given the logical and metaphysical plausibility of almost all these different options, our conclusion is that mental causation is still an open problem and it is far from being resolved.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Goldstick, D. (2021). In Defence of David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Perception. Dialogue, 1-16. doi:10.1017/S0012217320000438
[Abstract]There are no qualia. The phenomenological difference between seeing and visualizing something is that the propositions which the experient begins to believe in the first case are only entertained in the second. We can know what it's like to be a bat by knowing that their echolocation informs them non-inferentially of the shapes, sizes, and directional distances away of nearby surfaces. The terms for secondary qualities like colours, though, are names of the type-properties they designate, tracing back causally to a verbal 'baptism,' and so experients don't know the character of colour experiences until they study brain physiology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Goodwyn, E. (2021). Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables. Synthese, 199, 8831–8855. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03184-7
[Abstract]In this paper the explanatory gap of the philosophy of mind is explored, and found to have a similar structure even in different framings of the mind–body problem (MBP). This leads to the consideration that the MBP may be a special case of the more general whole-part problem: how do properties of wholes arise from the particular assembly of isolated parts? The conclusion is argued that only an approach of mereological holism offers (some) solace from the explanatory gap problem, exchanging it for a reverse explanatory gap problem that has more promising prospects for future solution, possibly in the form of integrated information theory. These considerations, along with the problem of explaining qualia lead to a proposed solution to the MBP in holistic cosmopsychism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gouveia, S.S. (2022). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Methodological Analysis. Springer Nature. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95369-0
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Gozzano, S., & Hill, S. C. (2012). Introduction. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill, New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 1-15).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Graham, G, (2019). Behaviorism. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/behaviorism/
[Abstract]It has sometimes been said that “behave is what organisms do.” Behaviorism is built on this assumption, and its goal is to promote the scientific study of behavior. The behavior, in particular, of individual organisms. Not of social groups. Not of cultures. But of persons and animals. In this entry I consider different types of behaviorism. I outline reasons for and against being a behaviorist. I consider contributions of behaviorism to the study of behavior. Special attention is given to the so-called “radical behaviorism” of B. F. Skinner (1904–90). Skinner is given special (not exclusive) attention because he is the behaviorist who has received the most attention from philosophers, fellow scientists and the public at large. General lessons can also be learned from Skinner about the conduct of behavioral science in general. The entry describes those lessons.
[Citing Place (2000b) in context]  

Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182. doi:10.1023/A:1010032528485
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1992d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Graham, G. (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In J. Radden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion (pp. 89-105). Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Graham, G. (2013). The disordered mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness (Second Edition). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  

Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.34.08gra
[Abstract]This chapter celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's "Is consciousness a brain process" appeared in the The British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and brain processes" appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review. These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness) and what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the consciousness mind is and where it can, and can't, rely on cognitive science. The grain project is the scientific program in cognitive science that involves investigating the causal roles associated with phenomenal consciousness at several levels of detail or resolution. We argue that even if the causal grain of phenomenal consciousness were to become fully understood within cognitive science, various theoretical options concerning qualia that are presently live theoretical options in philosophical discussion would all still remain live theoretical options.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Greenberg, G. (1983). Psychology Without the Brain. Psychological Record, 33, 49–58. doi:10.1007/BF03394821
[Abstract]This paper presents a critique of the currently dominant neurological reductionism that pervades contemporary psychology. The argument is made that while the brain is certainly involved in behavior it is not the source of it. Rather, a more parsimonious approach to understanding the behavior of organisms can be found in an epigenetic orientation. It is suggested that the concept of evolution holds much promise for theoretical advance within psychology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gudmundsson, K. (2018). The Skinner-Chomsky debate: The centrality of the dilemma argument. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 1-24.
[Abstract]The Skinner-Chomsky debate has been with us for a long time but has never been fully resolved. Outside behaviorism, Chomsky’s review is generally highly praised. Behaviorists have, however, countered by demonstrating many inaccuracies, misquotes, and basic errors couched in Chomsky’s emotional language. The purpose of this paper is to show that both parties are right. Although much of Chomsky’s criticisms miss the mark, one very basic point that Chomsky himself endlessly repeats is yet unresolved. This part of Chomsky’s is called the dilemma argument and is shown to be a valid constructive critique that behaviorists would do well to address. Therefore, it is necessary to go in some detail into this criticism. It is about time to flesh out its basic structure in order to add clarity to its examination. It is however, not the purpose of this paper to answer this criticism but only to highlight it. This will be a determined attempt at clarity, never giving up even when wading through Chomsky’s general emotional attitude – to say the least.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Gunner, D. L. (1967). Professor Smart's "Sensations and brain processes". In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 1-20). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gusman, S. (2016). The Phenomenological Fallacy and the Illusion of Immanence: Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology Against Mental Reification. Diametros, (48), 18-37.
[Abstract]Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions. On a final note, I compare the criticism to the views of Metzinger, a contemporary analytic philosopher who uses the phenomenological fallacy to accuse his adversaries.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  

Hall, G. A. (1998). Promoting synthesis in the analysis of verbal relations. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15, 113-116.
[Abstract]This paper argues that an important direction for the analysis of verbal relations is a synthesis of different specialty areas that study the same behavioral events. It appears that certain benefits may accrue from translating among conceptual frameworks and integrating research findings (where applicable) from the different specialty areas. Such interdependence may yield a more comprehensive view of the overall subject matter and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort by workers in different areas.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  

Hamlyn, D. W. (1964). Causality and human behaviour. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 38, 125-142. www.jstor.org/stable/4106605
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hannegan, W. (2018). Dispositional essentialism, directedness, and inclination to an end. Journal of Philosophical Research, 43, 191-204. doi:10.5840/jpr2018828132
[Abstract]Dispositional essentialists U. T. Place, George Molnar, and C. B. Martin hold that dispositions are intrinsically directed to their manifestations. Thomists have noted that this directedness is similar to Thomistic directedness to an end. I argue that Place, Molnar, and Martin would benefit from conceiving of dispositional directedness as the sort of directedness associated with Thomistic inclinations. Such Thomistic directedness can help them to account for the production of manifestations; to justify their reliance on dispositional directedness; to show the causal relevance of dispositions; and to motivate their view that dispositions are not reducible to categorical bases. I argue, moreover, that Thomistic inclination to an end does not succumb to the most common objections to finality: it is not mentalistic or vitalistic, and it does not involve backwards causation. Place, Molnar, and Martin, therefore, can embrace the directedness associated with Thomistic inclination—and reap its benefits—without incurring any high metaphysical cost.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Heidelberger, M. (2003). The mind-body problem in the origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychophysical parallelism. In P. Parrini, W. C. Salmon, & M. H. Salmon (Eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 233-262). University of Pittsburgh Press.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1990a) in context]  

Heil, J. (1970). Sensations, experiences and brain processes. Philosophy, 45(173), 221-226. www.jstor.org/stable/3749624
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Heil, J. (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Heil, J. (2022). Armstrong's revenge. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Heil, J. (2022). The incremental chain of being. In S. Wuppuluri, & I. Stewart (Eds), From Electrons to Elephants and Elections. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_2
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hinton, J. M. (1967). Illusions and identity. Analysis, 27, 65-76. doi:10.2307/3326799
Note:
A revised version from February 1969 is reprinted in C. V. Borst (Ed.) (1970), The mind-brain identity theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Hocutt, M. (1967). In defence of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 27(3), 366-385. doi:10.2307/2106063 www.jstor.org/stable/2106063
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hocutt, M. (2009). Private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 105-117.
[Abstract]What are “private events” and what is their significance? The term is B. F. Skinner‟s, but the idea is much older. Before J. B. Watson challenged their methods and their metaphysics, virtually all psychologists assumed that the only way to discover a person‟s supposedly private states of mind was to ask her about them. Not a believer in minds, Skinner nevertheless agreed that sensations, feelings, and certain unspecified forms of “covert behavior” cannot be observed by others, because they take place inside the body underneath the skin. Then he added that these inner events are of interest only to the physiologist; the concern of the behavior analyst is how intact organisms interact with their environment, not how their inward parts interact with each other. That compromise enabled Skinner to pursue behavior analysis in disregard of neurophysiology, which there was at the time no good way to study anyhow. But Skinner‟s talk of ineluctably private events was ill considered and ill conceived. There is no well understood sense in which people observe their own sensations, feelings, and “covert behavior,” but if these take place inside the body, as it is reasonable to believe, the physiologist can observe them given the sophisticated new machines now available. And since these events inside the body vary with circumstances and influence behavior, the psychologist cannot afford to ignore what the physiologist has to say about them. Black box psychology is out of date. Though it is opaque, the skin is not an epistemological barrier.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hoffman, D. D. (2008). Conscious realism and the mind-body problem. Mind and Matter, 6(1), 87–121 cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
[Abstract]Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. This is troubling, since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity, and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world. To this end, I develop two theses. The multimodal user interface theory of perception states that perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world. Conscious realism states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences; these can be mathematically modeled and empirically explored in the normal scientific manner.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Holman, E. L. (2023). Panpsychism and the mind-body problem in contemporary analytic philosophy, Intellectual History Review. doi:10.1080/17496977.2023.2283925
[Abstract]Not so long ago, the idea that analytic philosophers would be taking panpsychism seriously would have been hard to believe. That is because in its early, logical positivist, stage, the analytic movement earned the reputation of being militantly anti-metaphysical. But analytic philosophy has come a long way since the heyday of logical positivism; and, in fact, the dialectic of recent debates on the mind–body problem among analytic philosophers has pushed many of them in the direction of panpsychism. In this paper, I want to explain how this has come about and take a look at some of the versions of panpsychism that have emerged. This will involve running through a quick history of debates on the mind–body problem since about 1960, focusing on how panpsychism has been proposed as a promising, though not unproblematic, way of breaking an apparent impasse that has emerged between more standard physicalist and dualist theories of mind. Along the way, I will also have occasion to comment on the prospects of panpsychism as a respectable scientific theory and how a number of scientists stand on this.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759428
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf

Horst, S. (2009). Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass, 4(1), 219-254.
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a ‘naturalistic’ theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a ‘naturalization’ of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Section 1 introduces a distinction between two types of project that have been styled ‘naturalistic’, which I call philosophical naturalism and empirical naturalism. Sections 2 to 6 canvass different strands of philosophical naturalism concerning the mind, followed by a much briefer discussion of attempts to provide empirical naturalizations of the mind in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the essay with a consideration of the relations between philosophical and empirical naturalism in philosophy of mind, arguing that at least some types of philosophical naturalism are incompatible with empirical naturalism.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Ingthorsson, R. D. (2015). The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(3), 529–41. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00548.x
[Abstract]The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird’s and George Molnar’s attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It is true that dispositional monism is popularly assumed to characterise powers as dependent entities, but this is not what the arguments aim to prove. They merely aim to demonstrate that it would be absurd to assume that all properties are dependent in this way. Finally, it is argued that there is an unresolved tension in Bird’s and Molnar’s account of powers. They characterise them as being for their nature dependent on the manifestations that they are for, and yet ontologically independent of those same manifestations. Until that tension is resolved, their accounts are not equipped to remove the threat of vicious regress.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

James, E., Keppler, J., L Robertshaw, T., & Sessa, B. (2022). N,N-dimethyltryptamine and Amazonian ayahuasca plant medicine. Human psychopharmacology,, e2835 . doi:10.1002/hup.2835
[Abstract]Objective: Reports have indicated possible uses of ayahuasca for the treatment of conditions including depression, addictions, post‐traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and specific psychoneuroendocrine immune system pathologies. The article assesses potential ayahuasca and N,N‐dimethyltryptamine (DMT) integration with contemporary healthcare. The review also seeks to provide a summary of selected literature regarding the mechanisms of action of DMT and ayahuasca; and assess to what extent the state of research can explain reports of unusual phenomenology.
Design: A narrative review.
Results: Compounds in ayahuasca have been found to bind to serotonergic receptors, glutaminergic receptors, sigma‐1 receptors, trace amine‐associated receptors, and modulate BDNF expression and the dopaminergic system. Subjective effects are associated with increased delta and theta oscillations in amygdala and hippocampal regions, decreased alpha wave activity in the default mode network, and stimulations of vision‐related brain regions particularly in the visual association cortex. Both biological processes and field of consciousness models have been proposed to explain subjective effects of DMT and ayahuasca, however, the evidence supporting the proposed models is not sufficient to make confident conclusions. Ayahuasca plant medicine and DMT represent potentially novel treatment modalities.
Conclusions: Further research is required to clarify the mechanisms of action and develop treatments which can be made available to the general public. Integration between healthcare research institutions and reputable practitioners in the Amazon is recommended.

[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Janković, I. (2022). The language of physicalism: A conceptual review of physicalist ontology. Synesis: Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(3), 7-21. doi:10.7251/SIN2203001J
[Abstract]In this paper, the author explores the development and influence of the language of physicalism on the understanding of the mind and body problem. Firstly, we will address the early development and, later, the transformation of physicalism from a language methodology to a metaphysical theory, which will receive its final form in the philosophy of mind. The chapter will be concluded with a short review of the identity theory, and consequently, the question about the legitimacy of the identification of philosophical and scientific concepts will arise. Afterwards, in the second chapter, the author will use the so-called problem picture in order to provide a conceptual analysis of the language of physicalism. That way, we will demonstrate how the transformation of crucial philosophical notions emerges from a wider linguistic and contextual background. In this case, philosophical concepts, or language, are influenced by the metaphysics of scientism. Finally, instead of a summary, the last chapter will provide a short sketch of the ontogrammatical method, whose task is to shed light upon ontological transformations via conceptual and linguistic analysis
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Jaworski, W. (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica, 91(2), 179-201.
[Abstract]Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Jaworski, W. (2017) Psychology without a mental-physical dichotomy. In W. M.R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & N, J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Chapter 11, pp. 261-291). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315211626-14
[Abstract]Is there a mental-physical dichotomy? Philosophers, scientists, and many ordinary folk seem to think so. We often speak of the difference between mental health and physical health, or between the mental aspects of athletic performance and the physical ones. In addition, standard definitions of psychology typically imply that it is the science of mental phenomena, and that the latter comprise a subject matter that distinguishes the methods of psychology from those of biology, chemistry, or physics. But the mental-physical dichotomy generates mind-body problems: persistent philosophical problems understanding how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. These problems suggest that there is a conceptual instability at the very foundations of psychological science. A hylomorphic metaphysic provides an alternative. It implies that there is nothing canonical about the mental-physical dichotomy; any distinctions we draw between mental and nonmental subject-matters or physical and nonphysical ones are mere artifacts of our descriptive and explanatory interests. This suggests an understanding of psychological science that is not based on a mental-physical dichotomy.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Jungbauer, T. J. (2024). A Madhyamaka critique of Jaegwon Kims supervenience argument. Comparative Philosophy, 15(1), 67-96. doi:10.31979/2151-6014(2024).150108
[Abstract]Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately exist between, or among, emergent phenomena and basal phenomena because they doubt that anything ultimately exists. As such, the Madhyamaka critique of causality may provide a skeptical response to Kim because Kim assumes that both emergent and basal phenomena are primarily existent. Altogether, I argue that if we draw upon and accept the Madhyamaka critique of causality, then we may resolve Kim’s problem of epiphenomenalism by reconceptualizing causality as a relation obtaining conventionally between phenomena, while remaining silent on the status of causation at the ultimate level of truth. By arguing this point, I do not mean to suggest that the Madhyamaka critique of causality, while plausible, is in fact correct. Rather, I intend only to show that plausible responses to Kim’s argument may be found by considering less commonly taught philosophical traditions in relation to Kim’s metaphysical assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y philpapers.org/archive/KAMTIO-4.pdf
[Abstract]Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Key, B., Zalucki, O.H., & Brown, D.J. (2022). A first principles approach to subjective experience. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224
[Abstract]Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kievit, R. A. (2014). Turtles all the way down? Psychometric approaches to the reduction problem [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Univerity of Amsterdam hdl.handle.net/11245/1.417009
[Abstract]The question of how different explanatory levels in scientific inquiry are related to each other is known as the reduction problem. This thesis focuses on a specific domain of this question, namely how we should relate brains to (psychological) behaviour. The central position of this thesis is that this question is ultimately a measurement problem. That is, in order to understand the relationship between brains and minds, we need to formulate measurement models that can relate observable variables (e.g. response times, brain activity, brain structure) to the underlying constructs we are interested in (e.g. memory capacity, intelligence or personality differences). Moreover, in the case of relating brains to behaviour, theories from philosophy of mind can be translated into such measurement models, thereby guiding empirical inquiry and simultaneously providing an empirical test of philosophical theories. Further extensions of these ideas focus on the application of representational geometry, whereby the structure of neural and behavioural patterns are used to relate brain and behaviour, and the examination of cases where inferences across explanatory levels goes awry (known as Simpson’s Paradox). Based on empirical applications in several domains it is concluded that supervenience theory, which suggests a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship between brain and mind, is most in line both with theoretical considerations and empirical data.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  

Kievit, R. A., Romeijn, J. W., Waldorp, L. J., Wicherts, J. M., Scholte, H. S., & Borsboom, D. (2011). Mind the Gap: A psychometric approach to the reduction problem. Psychological Inquiry, 22(2), 67-87. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2011.550181
[Abstract]Cognitive neuroscience involves the simultaneous analysis of behavioral and neurological data. Common practice in cognitive neuroscience, however, is to limit analyses to the inspection of descriptive measures of association (e.g., correlation coefficients). This practice, often combined with little more than an implicit theoretical stance, fails to address the relationship between neurological and behavioral measures explicitly. This article argues that the reduction problem, in essence, is a measurement problem. As such, it should be solved by using psychometric techniques and models. We show that two influential philosophical theories on this relationship, identity theory and supervenience theory, can be easily translated into psychometric models. Upon such translation, they make explicit hypotheses based on sound theoretical and statistical foundations, which renders them empirically testable. We examine these models, show how they can elucidate our conceptual framework, and examine how they may be used to study foundational questions in cognitive neuroscience. We illustrate these principles by applying them to the relation between personality test scores, intelligence tests, and neurological measures.
Note:
A reply to the comments of this target article by the same authors is Modeling Mind and Matter.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kievit, R. A., Romeijn, J. W., Waldorp, L. J., Wicherts, J. M., Scholte, H. S., & Borsboom, D. (2011). Modeling mind and matter: Reductionism and psychological measurement in cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Inquiry, 22(2), 139-157. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2011.567962
[Abstract]According to Karlin (1983), “the purpose of models is not to fit the data but to sharpen the questions” (Krukow, Nielsen, & Sassone, 2008, p. 3782). Given the rich and insightful commentaries we received, our approach to the reduction problem can be considered a success in this respect. The commenters have taken our ideas and expanded them both in breadth and depth. They have also critically examined the assumptions of our approach. In general, the commentaries suggest that the implementation of conceptually guided psychometric models is viable, is empirically tractable, and can be improved and revised on the basis of empirical and conceptual advances. Most important, they show that psychometric models yield increased depth and precision in dialogues concerning the foundational questions of cognitive neuroscience. In this rejoinder, we address the core points of criticism and present an expansion of the ideas we formulate in the Kievit et al. (this issue) target article, based on the ideas and suggestions offered by the commenters. Our focus is on the following set of themes that figured centrally in the comments: (a) What is the role of mechanisms with respect to our approach, (b) what explanatory levels should we study; (c) why should we engage in reductive science in the first place, (d) how can psychometric models be extended, (e) what interpretations of causality and realism are relevant for psychometric models, and (f) what philosophical positions can be translated into measurement models.
Note:
This article is a reply to the comments of the target article by the same authors: Mind the Gap.
[Citing Place (1999e)]  

Killeen, P. R., & Jacobs, K. W. (2017) Coal Is Not Black, Snow Is Not White, Food Is Not a Reinforcer: The Roles of Affordances and Dispositions in the Analysis of Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 40(1), 17-38. doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0080-7
[Abstract]Reinforcers comprise sequences of actions in context. Just as the white of snow and black of coal depend on the interaction of an organism’s visual system and the reflectances in its surrounds, reinforcers depend on an organism’s motivational state and the affordances — possibilities for perception and action — in its surrounds. Reinforcers are not intrinsic to things but are a relation between what the thing affords, its context, the organism, and his or her history as capitulated in their current state. Reinforcers and other affordances are potentialities rather than intrinsic features. Realizing those potentialities requires motivational operations and stimulus contexts that change the state of the organism — they change its disposition to make the desired response. An expansion of the three-term contingency is suggested in order to help keep us mindful of the importance of behavioral systems, states, emotions, and dispositions in our research programs.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  

Kim, J. (1971). Materialism and the criteria of the mental. Synthese22, 323–345 doi:10.1007/BF00413431 http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43820/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413431.pdf
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kim, J. (1998). The mind–body problem after fifty years. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 43, 3-21.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Kneale, W. (1969). [Review of A Materialist Theory of Mind by D. M. Armstrong.] Mind, 78(310), 292-301. www.jstor.org/stable/2252380
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Koksvik, O. (2010). Metaphysics of consciousness. In G. Oppy, & N. Trakakis (Eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Koslicki, K., & Massin, O. (2023). A plea for descriptive social ontology. Synthese, 202(60). doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04263-7
[Abstract]Social phenomena—quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind—are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naïve approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle’s emphasis on “saving the appearances”, Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine’s contrast between naïve and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

LaRock, E. (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. Behavior and philosophy, 34, 39-58.
[Abstract]A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

LaRock, E. (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 201-229. doi:10.5840/ipq20084827
[Abstract]I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lau, H. (2022). In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856771.001.0001
[Abstract]This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This is discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lazzeri, F., & Zilio, D. (2023) Commitments with reductive and emergent relations in behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 102-124
[Abstract]The philosophical debate on reduction and emergence commonly springs from the division of domains (and subdomains) correlated with the sciences, such as biological domains (e.g., genetics and physiology) and psychological domains (e.g., learning, perception, emotions). These domains are interconnected, with some depending on or composed of elements from others. The debate revolves around whether certain domains are reducible or irreducible to those on which they depend or are composed. In this work, following an examination of common interpretations of the notions of reduction and emergence, we aim to identify and compare radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism as regards the reducibility or irreducibility between the following pairs of domains: (i) behavioral – physiological; (ii) psychological – behavioral; (iii) teleological – contingencies of natural or operant selection; and (iv) cultural – behavioral. This article contributes, among other things, to explaining several core similarities and differences between radical behaviorism (as worked out by B. F. Skinner) and molar behaviorism (as worked out by W. M. Baum and H. Rachlin); as well as some conceptual aspects pertaining to the identity of behavior analysis and its interfaces with related research areas both in natural and social sciences.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lea, S. E., Wills, A. J., Leaver, L. A., Ryan, C. M., Bryant, C. M., & Millar, L. (2009). A comparative analysis of the categorization of multidimensional stimuli: II. Strategic information search in humans (Homo sapiens) but not in pigeons (Columba livia). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 123(4), 406. doi:10.1037/a0016851
[Abstract]Pigeons and undergraduates learned conditional discriminations involving multiple spatially separated stimulus dimensions. Under some conditions, the dimensions were made available sequentially. In 3 experiments, the dimensions were all perfectly valid predictors of the response that would be reinforced and mutually redundant; in 2 others, they varied in validity. In tests with stimuli in which 1 of the 3 dimensions took an anomalous value, most but not all individuals of both species categorized them in terms of single dimensions. When information was delivered as a function of the passage of time, some students, but no pigeons, waited for the most useful information, especially when the cues differed in objective validity. When the subjects could control information delivery, both species obtained information selectively. When cue validities varied, almost all students tended to choose the most valid cues, and when all cues were valid, some chose the cues by which they classified test stimuli. Only a few pigeons chose the most useful information in either situation. Despite their tendency to unidimensional categorization, the pigeons showed no evidence of rule-governed behavior, but students followed a simple “take-the-best” rule.
[Citing Place (1988b) in context]  

Leach, S. (2019). U. T. Place and the mystical origin of modern physicalism. Think, 18(53), 75-78. doi:10.1017/S1477175619000228
[Abstract]An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  

Leigland, S. (1996). An experimental analysis of ongoing verbal behavior: Reinforcement, verbal operants, and superstitious behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 79-104. doi:10.1007/BF03392908
[Abstract]Four adult humans were asked to asked to "find" and talk about a particular topic to a person in an adjoining room, and were instructed that they would hear a short beep (the only form of reply from the other person) when they were talking about the topic, or were "close" to the topic. In Session 1, the experimenter in the adjoining room presented the beeps in the manner of shaping, or the differential reinforcement of successive approximations, "toward" the designated topic. In Session 2, the same conditions were in effect but the experimenter was unable to hear the subject and the beeps were presented noncontingently in a way that roughly matched the frequency and distribution of presentations in Session 1. In Session 3, shaping conditions were again in effect but with a different topic than that designated for Session 1. Audio recordings were transcribed in a way that was designed to show the progress of shaping over time. These and additional forms of supporting data and accompanying rationale are presented and discussed in detail. Issues raised by the methodology and results of the experiment include the nature of the verbal operant, superstitious verbal behavior, and a variety of methodological issues relevant to the experimental analysis of ongoing or continuous verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1996). The functional analysis of psychological terms: In defense of a research program. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 105-122. doi:10.1007/BF03392909
[Abstract]In 1945, B. F. Skinner outlined a proposal that psychological or mentalistic terms found in natural language might be analyzed empirically in terms of the variables, conditions, and contingencies of which they may be observed to be a function. Such an analysis would enable discriminations to be made between different classes of variables that enter into the control of the term. In this way, the analysis would clarify what is traditionally called the "meanings" of such terms as they occur as properties of verbal behavior. Despite his expressed confidence in the success of such a program, Skinner largely abandoned the functional analysis of psychological terms in favor of the development of a promising new field; the experimental analysis of behavior. The present paper argues that the original program is of great importance as well, and for the following reasons: (a) to make full, immediate, and (most importantly) effective contact with the range of issues and terms of central importance to the traditionally and culturally important concepts of "mind" and "mental life" (and thereby demonstrating the relevance of radical behaviorism to the full range of human and verbal behavior); and (b) to extend the methodology of the functional analysis of verbal behavior more generally. Such a research program would demonstrate, through an empirically-based scientific analysis, that the philosophical problems concerning "mental life" may be productively analyzed as problems of verbal behavior. Issues of methodology are discussed, and possible methodological strategies are proposed regarding the confirmation of behavior analytic interpretations of mentalistic terms.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1998). Current Status and Future Directions of the Analysis of Verbal Behavior - The Methodological Challenge of the Functional Analysis of Verbal Behavior The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15(1),125-127. doi:10.1007/BF03392933
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  [Citing Place (1997d) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2000). A contingency interpretation of Place’s contingency anomaly in ordinary conversation. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 161-165. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2755454/pdf/anverbbehav00028-0161.pdf doi:10.1007/BF03392962
[Abstract]A verbal phenomenon often reported in the research literature of conversation analysis is reviewed. The phenomenon involves the observation that spoken sentences often receive consequences from listeners, and that the effect of these consequences appears to be variability in sentence emission, whereas the absence of such consequences appears to produce response persistence. If the speaker's sentences function as units of  verbal behavior and the listener's responses function as reinforcers, the effect seems to run  contrary to reinforcement contingency effects observed in the laboratory, where reinforcement produces response differentiation and extinction produces an increase in response variability and a decrease in the response class previously selected by reinforcement. An interpretation of the conversation phenomenon is presented, employing standard reinforcement contingencies for which the behavioral dynamics involved may be seen when speaker's sequence of sentences is construed as a behavior chain.
[Citing Place (1991a)]  [Citing Place (1997a)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  
Download: Leigland (2000a) A Contingency Interpretation of Place's Contingency Anomaly in Ordinary Conversation.pdf

Leigland, S. (2003). Private Events and the Language of the Mental : Comments on Moore Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 159-164
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. The Behavior analyst, 37(1), 13-24 doi:10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5
[Abstract]Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Livanios, V. (2021). Manifestation and unrestricted dispositional monism. Acta Analytica. doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00476-y
[Abstract]Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Luce, D. R. (1966). Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophical Studies, 17(1), 1-7. doi:10.1007/BF00452165
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ludwig, K. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview. In S. P. Stich, & T. A. Warfield, (Eds.),The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 1). Wiley, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch1
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lumsden, D. & Ulatowski, J. (2023). Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action. Acta Analytica 23 October 2023. doi:10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w
[Abstract]Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal theory of action, a leading theory of action, which shows how reasons, understood as an appropriate pair of beliefs and desires, can be treated as causes of action. Davidson’s picture is based on cause as a relation between events, which can have both a description in scientific terms and in folk psychological terms. The character of both virtues and self-narratives is not that of events, even extended ones, so we need to refer to examples of scientific explanation that incorporate structural properties of objects. While we retain the spirit of the causal theory, we wish to guard against any unwarranted optimism that an explicitly scientific explanation for human action lies in our future, drawing on Chomsky’s view that a causal explanation of human actions is likely to remain beyond human science forming capacities. We take a mild-realist view of virtues and self-narratives, in the style of Dennett. We argue that, in spite of that limited form of realism, underlined by Chomsky’s mysterian position in this domain, we still need to frame our explanations of behaviour based on virtues and self-narratives in causal terms.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lycan, W. G. (1981). Form, function, and feel. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24-50.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lyons, W. (2001). Matters of mind. Routledge
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  

Macdonald, C. (1989). Mind-body identity theories. Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Malatesti, L. (2012). The knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malatesti, L. (2013). Zombies, the uniformity of nature, and contingent physicalism: A sympathetic response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena, 12(2), 245–259.
[Abstract]Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book Filozofija (2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malcolm, N. (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue, III, 115-125
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Manzotti, R. (2006). Consciousness and existence as a process. Mind and Matter, 4(1), 7-43.
[Abstract]The problem of consciousness is traditionally conceived as the impossible task of justifying the emergence of an inner world of experiences, qualia and/or mental representations out of a substratum of physical things conceived as autonomously existing. I argue that an alternative approach is possible but it requires a conceptual reconstruction of consciousness and existence, the two being different perspectives on the same underlying process. On this basis, I present a view of direct (conscious) perception that supposes that there is a unity between the activity in the brain and the events in the external world. The outlined process is here referred to as onphene. I will use the example of the rainbow as an intuition pump to introduce the new perspective. Eventually, the same approach is used to explain other kinds of consciousness: illusions, memory, dreams, and phosphenes. The view presented here shares some elements with neo realism and can be considered as a form of radical externalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Manzotti, R. (2006). An alternative view of conscious perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(6), 45-79.
[Abstract]I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insights into the problem of conscious representation in the brain and phenomenal consciousness. It is a form of anti-cranialism different from but related to other kinds of externalism.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Manzotti, R. (2016). Experiences are objects. Towards a mind-object identity theory. Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 7(1), 16-36. doi:10.4453/rifp.2016.0003
[Abstract]Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Manzotti, R. (2017). Consciousness and object: A mind-object identity physicalist theory. John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi:10.1075/aicr.95
[Abstract]What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Manzotti, R. (2021) The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofica e Psicologia, 12(3), 225-241. doi:10.4453/rifp.2021.0022
[Abstract]In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2010). Is neuroscience adequate as the forhtcoming “mindscience”? Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 1-29.
[Abstract]The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming "mindscience". Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative "mindscience". The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework — an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marek, J. C. (1994). On the relation of the mental and the physical In R. Casati, B. Smith, & G. White (Eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 15-22 August 1993 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria) (pp. 139-145). Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature. I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2022). What’s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, A. Roselli (Eds): Powers, Time and Free Will (Chapter 1). Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_1
[Abstract]Modern science cannot do without Aristotelian powers – thus have argued Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) among many others. Aristotelian powers are essentially dynamic entities, which account for causal phenomena, and thus explain how change comes about in the world. In this chapter I argue that explaining causation in terms of interacting causal powers places causation … beyond the reach of our understanding(!) – because causal interaction shows us what powers do, and not what powers are. Metaphysicians by and large agree that the intrinsic nature of powers is to be dynamic entities. I contend here that their dynamism is irreducible, and crucially, unknowable, rendering what powers are ‘black boxes’ to us, despite multiple attempts of defining them in the literature. The sciences discover only how powers behave, and classify them teleologically to tell us what they do. Powers, however, are mysterious and unexplorable black boxes to us, even though they are indispensable in our scientific explanations of change in the world.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
[Abstract]Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies (which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  

Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
[Abstract]The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]  

Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2,) 127-145. doi:10.1080/00048406812341111 philpapers.org/go.pl?id=MAXUS&aid=MAXUS.1
[Abstract]My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements
[Citing Place (1956)]  

McKitrick, J. A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174. doi:10.1080/713659629
[Abstract]Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press.
[Abstract]This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Michel, M. (2019). The mismeasure of consciousness: A Problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1239–1249. doi:10.1086/705509
[Abstract]As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]