Publications citing U. T. Place.
260 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 3 .

Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
[Abstract]Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a )]  

Shaw, J. (2021). Feyerabend Never Was an Eliminative Materialist: Feyerabend’s Meta-Philosophy and the Mind–Body Problem. In K. Bschir & J. Shaw (Eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays (pp. 114-131). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108575102.007
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind cite Feyerabend as an early proponent of eliminative materialism, or the thesis that there are no mental processes. This attribution, I argue, is incorrect. Rather, Feyerabend only showed that common objections against materialism presuppose problematic meta-philosophical commitments. In this paper, I show how Feyerabend’s meta-philosophy leads him to the conclusion that the mind-body problem admits of many different solutions which are to be sorted out as science progresses. Moreover, I show how Feyerabend’s view evolves from a methodological to an ethical view on what a proper solution to the mind-body problem would entail.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation: Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming. Psychological Review, 91(4), 417–447. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.91.4.417
[Abstract]Attempts a rapprochement between J. J. Gibson's (1961) ecological optics and a conviction that perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming are similarly guided by internalizations of long-enduring constraints in the external world. Phenomena of apparent motion illustrate how alternating presentations of 2 views of an object in 3-dimensional space induce the experience of the simplest rigid twisting motion prescribed by kinematic geometry—provided that times and distances fall within certain lawfully related limits on perceptual integration. Resonance is advanced as a metaphor for not only how internalized constraints such as those of kinematic geometry operate in perception, imagery, apparent motion, dreaming, hallucination, and creative thinking, but also how such constraints can continue to operate despite structural damage to the brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Siewert, C. (2016), Consciousness and Intentionality, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2016 (first version Fall 2002).
[Abstract]To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, for example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes seen as equivalent to, what is called “mental representation”. Consciousness and intentionality can seem to pervade much or all of mental life—perhaps they somehow account for what it is to have a mind; at any rate they seem to be important, broad aspects of it. But achieving a general understanding of either is an enormous challenge. Part of this lies in figuring out how they are related. Are they independent? Is one (or each) to be understood in terms of the other? How we address the issues to which these questions give rise can have major implications for our views about mind, knowledge, and value.
The first time Place (1956) is cited is in the Fall 2016 version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Sklar, L. (1967). Types of inter-iheoretic reduction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18(2), 109–124.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skokowski, P. (2022). Sensing Qualia. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405
[Abstract]Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind — Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory — will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24).,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
[Abstract]The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Slezak P. P. (2002) Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech. [Comments to Carruthers: The Cognitive Functions of Language.] Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 699-700 doi:10.1017/S0140525X02490127 Link Text
[Abstract]The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak P. P. (2002). The tripartite model of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 239 - 270. doi:10.1080/0951508021000006085 Link Text
[Abstract]Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak P. P. (2008). The 'Hard' Problem and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 30, 525 Link Text
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-vu all over again. [Commentary to Pylyshyn’s article: Mental Imagery]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 209–210.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). Thinking about thinking: language, thought and introspection. Language & Communication, 22, 353–373. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00012-5 Link Text
[Abstract]I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think ‘in’ language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor’s ‘language of thought’. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the ‘imagery debate’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2018). Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously. Philosophy93(4), 529-555. doi:10.1017/S0031819118000232 Link Text
[Abstract]In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1957) Plausible reasoning in philosophy. Mind, 66(261), 75-78.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 252-254.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [23 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963), Philosophy and scientific realism. Routledge and Kegan Paul
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1966). Philosophy and scientific plausibility. In P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Mind, matter and method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl (pp. 377-390). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1959)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [6 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1989). C. B. Martin: A biographical sketch. In J. Heil (Ed. ), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 1-3). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007).
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Smart (2007) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Snowdon, P. F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 137-158). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202.
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149.
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2002)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review, 76, 201-213.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Taylor, C. (1969). Two issues about materialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 19(74), 73–79. doi:10.2307/2218192
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  

te Vrugt, M., Needham, P., & Schmitz, G. J. (2022) Is thermodynamics fundamental? arXiv:2204.04352v1 [physics.hist-ph] 9 Apr 2022 doi:10.48550/arXiv.2204.04352
[Abstract]It is a common view in philosophy of physics that thermodynamics is a non-fundamental theory. This is motivated in particular by the fact that thermodynamics is considered to be a paradigmatic example for a theory that can be reduced to another one, namely statistical mechanics. For instance, the statement "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy" has become a textbook example for a successful reduction, despite the fact that this statement is not correct for a large variety of systems. In this article, we defend the view that thermodynamics is a fundamental theory, a position that we justify based on four case studies from recent physical research. We explain how entropic gravity (1) and black hole thermodynamics (2) can serve as case studies for the multiple realizability problem which blocks the reduction of thermodynamics. Moreover, we discuss the problem of the reducibility of phase transitions and argue that bifurcation theory (3) allows the modelling of "phase transitions" on a thermodynamic level even in finite systems. It is also shown that the derivation of irreversible transport equations in the Mori-Zwanzig formalism (4) does not, despite recent claims to the contrary, constitute a reduction of thermodynamics to quantum mechanics. Finally, we briefly discuss some arguments against the fundamentality of thermodynamics that are not based on reduction.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Thagard, P. (2022). Energy requirements undermine substrate independence and mind-body functionalism. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 70-88. doi:10.1017/psa.2021.15
[Abstract]Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be living in a computer simulation, the plausibility of transferring minds into computers, and the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Thalberg, I. (1983). Immateriality. Mind, 92(365), 105–113. doi:10.1093/mind/XCII.365.105
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Thompson, T. (2017). Fort Skinner in the Desert: The Emergence and Dissolution of Arizona State University’s Behavior Analysis Program 1955–1970. Behavior and Social Issues, 26, 27–50. doi:10.5210/bsi.v26i0.7107
[Abstract]An innovative behavior analysis program was created, developed and matured, then unexpectedly imploded at Arizona State University between 1955 and 1970. The program included many who later became leaders in behavior analysis, and trained distinguished doctoral students. The conditions giving rise to the program in the first instance, and what caused the abrupt dissolution of the program in 1970 is the subject of this historical investigation. Consideration is given to more general implications of this series of events with possible lessons learned.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Tiehen, J. (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96 3), 501-522. doi:10.1111/papq.12126
[Abstract]What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every introductory class in the philosophy of mind, that dualism has a special problem accounting for mental causation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tomberlin, J. E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 43(3), 295-299. doi:10.1080/00048406512341251
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tonneau, F (2001). Equivalence Relations: A Reply. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 99-128. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434185
[Abstract]Some commentaries on Equivalence relations: A critical analysis (this issue) have questioned the consistency and generality of a correlation-based alternative to equivalence-class research, whereas others defend the use of matching-equivalence concepts in behavior theory. In this reply I reiterate the most important points of the target article, provide further clarifications, and discuss various misunderstandings. In contrast to equivalence class notions, the concept of function transfer is clear, simple, and coherent; and it necessarily plays a crucial role in the behavioral analysis of complex psychological functioning. A molar view based on environmental networks is well qualified to explain function transfer and thus provide insights into a variety of complex behavioral phenomena.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Tonneau, F (2004). Consciousness outside the head. Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 97-123
[Abstract]Brain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, others call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived or not; nonveridical perceptions of the environment over an arbitrarily short period of time are supposed to be objective constituents of the environment over a more extended time scale. I argue here that neorealism fares at least as well as brain-centered theories of consciousness on a number of fundamental issues. On one fundamental issue—the nature of the relation between veridical and nonveridical perceptions—neorealism outperforms its competitors.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Towl B. N. (2012). Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology, 25(2), 187–202.
[Abstract]One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus and its correlation with sensations of thirst. Given that there are relations besides identity that can explain such correlations, the type-identity theorist is left with a dilemma: either the correlations we consider are weak, in which case we do not have an IBE to an identity claim, or else the correlations we look at are maximally strong, in which case there are too few cases for the inductive part of the strategy to work.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  

Treffner, P. & Peter, M. (2002). Intentional and attentional dynamics of speech–hand coordination. Human Movement Science, 21(5–6), 641-697. doi:10.1016/S0167-9457(02)00178-1
[Abstract]Interest is rapidly growing in the hypothesis that natural language emerged from a more primitive set of linguistic acts based primarily on manual activity and hand gestures. Increasingly, researchers are investigating how hemispheric asymmetries are related to attentional and manual asymmetries (i.e., handedness). Both speech perception and production have origins in the dynamical generative movements of the vocal tract known as articulatory gestures. Thus, the notion of a “gesture” can be extended to both hand movements and speech articulation. The generative actions of the hands and vocal tract can therefore provide a basis for the (direct) perception of linguistic acts. Such gestures are best described using the methods of dynamical systems analysis since both perception and production can be described using the same commensurate language. Experiments were conducted using a phase transition paradigm to examine the coordination of speech–hand gestures in both left- and right-handed individuals. Results address coordination (in-phase vs. anti-phase), hand (left vs. right), lateralization (left vs. right hemisphere), focus of attention (speech vs. tapping), and how dynamical constraints provide a foundation for human communicative acts. Predictions from the asymmetric HKB equation confirm the attentional basis of functional asymmetry. Of significance is a new understanding of the role of perceived synchrony (p-centres) during intentional cases of gestural coordination.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Tsou, J.Y. (2022). Philosophical naturalism and empirical approaches to philosophy. In M. Rossberg (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.
In contemporary analytic philosophy, ‘naturalism’ is an ambiguous and equivocal term (Papineau, 2020) that can be distinguished into weaker and stronger methodological commitments:
N1. Philosophy should be constrained by scientific results. Philosophical theories should not be inconsistent with the findings of empirical science (e.g., the positing of supernatural entities).
N2. Philosophy is continuous with science. Philosophical standards (e.g., the assumption that knowledge is fallible) and methods (e.g., empirical and experimental methods) should not be different in kind from those adopted in the natural sciences. Moreover, genuine philosophical problems should be tractable with naturalistic empirical methods.
N3. Philosophy should be empirically driven. Philosophical theorizing should be guided by the results of science and empirical science provides the most promising route to formulating sound philosophical theories.
N1 implies that philosophical theories should be consistent with scientific theories. N2 implies that philosophical standards and methods should be continuous with those adopted in science. N3 implies that the empirical scientific findings should be utilized to direct philosophical inquiry. Whereas N1 is a platitude among many contemporary analytic philosophers, fewer are committed to N2 or N3. This chapter examines philosophical theories (e.g., theories of mind and ethics) that are committed to N2 and N3, with particular emphasis on N3.

[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Van Rysewyk, S (2013, April 30). Philip Ball on neuroaesthetics. Simon van Rysewyk.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vauclair, J. (2004). Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language. Interaction Studies, 5(3), 363-384.
[Abstract]This article argues for the gestural origins of speech and language based on the available evidence gathered in humans and nonhuman primates and especially from ape studies. The strong link between motor functions (hand use and manual gestures) and speech in humans is reviewed. The presence of asymmetrical cerebral organization in nonhuman primates along with functional asymmetries in the perception and production of vocalizations and in intentional referential gestural communication is then emphasized. The nature of primate communicatory systems is presented, and the similarities and differences between these systems and human speech are discussed. It is argued that recent findings concerning neuroanatomical asymmetries in the chimpanzee brain and the existence of both mirror neurons and lateralized use of hands and vocalizations in communication necessitate a reconsideration of the phylogenic emergence of the cerebral and behavioral prerequisites for human speech.
Keywords: evolution, communication, primates, gesture, language, vocalization, mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2002). How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(11), 2002, pp.3-29.
[Abstract]In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other mental interventions can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that conscious mental control needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding consciousness (2nd Edition). Routledge. Understanding_Consciousness_(2nd_ed__Routledge__2009).pdf
[Abstract]Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years. The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers. Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2021). Is the universe conscious? Reflexive monism and the ground of being. In E. Kelly, & P. Marshall (Eds.), Consciousness Unbound (pp. 175-228). Rowman & Littlefield. Is-the-Universe-Conscious-Reflexive-Monism-and-the-Ground-of-Being.pdf
[Abstract]This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2005). How to Get Intentionality by Language. In G. Forrai, & G. Kampis (Eds), Intentionality. Past and Future (pp. 127-41). Rodopi, . HOW-TO-GET-INTENTIONALITY-BY-LANGUAGE.pdf
[Abstract]One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality — the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess — contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I will argue that this traditional conception is incorrect. First, the above characterizations do not provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts. Appearances notwithstanding, these characterizations are not the adequate linguistic counterparts of two elements folk-psychologically featuring intentionality, namely existence-independence and the possible apparent aspectual character of the intentional object, the target of a mental state endowed with intentionality. Indeed, they do not retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentional objects the above elements contain. I will replace failure of existential generalization and referential opacity with other linguistic factors, namely success of mere existentially unloaded particular quantification and pseudo-opacity. I will contend that they provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts, and claim that these factors are the adequate counterparts of the above folk-psychological elements, precisely because they retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentionalia those elements possess.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2020). Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts, 1(1), 19-32.
[Abstract]In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

White, A. R. (1960). Different Kinds of Heed Concepts. Analysis, 20(5), 112–116. doi:10.2307/3327080
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1963). Attending and noticing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII, 103-126.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1964). Attention. Blackwell
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Wiese, W. (2018). Toward a mature science of consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00693
[Abstract]In Being No One, Metzinger (2004[2003]) introduces an approach to the scientific study of consciousness that draws on theories and results from different disciplines, targeted at multiple levels of analysis. Descriptions and assumptions formulated at, for instance, the phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological levels of analysis provide different perspectives on the same phenomenon, which can ultimately yield necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of phenomenal representation. In this way, the “method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS)” (as it has been called by Weisberg, 2005) promotes our understanding of consciousness. However, even more than a decade after the first publication of Being No One, we still lack a mature science of consciousness. This paper makes the following meta-theoretical contribution: It analyzes the hurdles an approach such as MICS has yet to overcome and discusses to what extent existing approaches solve the problems left open by MICS. Furthermore, it argues that a unifying theory of different features of consciousness is required to reach a mature science of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Williams, N. E. (2019). The powers metaphysic. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as "powers", Neil E. Williams develops a metaphysic that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is advanced, one that understands this internal nature in terms of blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, Williams offers solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as is casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Wilson, J. M. (2014). No work of a theory of grounding. Inquiry, 57(5-6) ,535–579. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2014.907542
[Abstract]It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation —‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be (constitutively) ‘metaphysically dependent on’,or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence—for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on—which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Zahnoun, F. (2018). Mind, mechanism and meaning: Reclaiming social normativity within cognitive science and philosophy of mind [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Antwerp.
[Abstract]The dissertation, titled Mind, Mechanism and Meaning, critically investigates two central assumptions of mainstream cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the commitment to the notion of internal representation on the one hand, and to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental on the other. With regard to the notion of internal representation, the dissertation argues that this notion is ultimately untenable in that, to the effect that internal representations are understood as content-carrying vehicles with causal explanatory power, the notion is grounded in a confusion between the descriptive and the prescriptive/normative. The thesis is defended that all content-carrying entities, including representations, are socio-normatively constituted and should therefore be excluded from non-normative causal explanations of cognition. The results of the research support a non-representational approach to mind and cognition, as exemplified in various forms of E-Cognition, particularly in radical enactive/embodied approaches. Understanding human cognition requires taking into account the whole subject, that is, the subject as ‘embrained', embodied, and embedded within an enacted normative intersubjective niche. With regard to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental, the dissertation argues that the idea can only be made intelligible against a particular metaphysical background, one that does not sit well with the intersubjective normative notions the idea of multiple realization conceptually relies on (types). Furthermore, it is argued that, even if we were to accept such a metaphysics, multiple realization is still not capable of providing the argument against identity theory which has come to be so widely accepted. The thesis is defended that there really is no strong argument against an identity theory, and that, in addition, assuming a strict identity between the mental and the physical is still a viable, perhaps even the only viable approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]