Publications citing U. T. Place.
398 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 3 .

Manzotti, R. (2021) The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofica e Psicologia, 12(3), 225-241. doi:10.4453/rifp.2021.0022
[Abstract]In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2010). Is neuroscience adequate as the forhtcoming “mindscience”? Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 1-29.
[Abstract]The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming "mindscience". Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative "mindscience". The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework — an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marek, J. C. (1994). On the relation of the mental and the physical In R. Casati, B. Smith, & G. White (Eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 15-22 August 1993 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria) (pp. 139-145). Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature. I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2022). What’s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, A. Roselli (Eds): Powers, Time and Free Will (Chapter 1). Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_1
[Abstract]Modern science cannot do without Aristotelian powers – thus have argued Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) among many others. Aristotelian powers are essentially dynamic entities, which account for causal phenomena, and thus explain how change comes about in the world. In this chapter I argue that explaining causation in terms of interacting causal powers places causation … beyond the reach of our understanding(!) – because causal interaction shows us what powers do, and not what powers are. Metaphysicians by and large agree that the intrinsic nature of powers is to be dynamic entities. I contend here that their dynamism is irreducible, and crucially, unknowable, rendering what powers are ‘black boxes’ to us, despite multiple attempts of defining them in the literature. The sciences discover only how powers behave, and classify them teleologically to tell us what they do. Powers, however, are mysterious and unexplorable black boxes to us, even though they are indispensable in our scientific explanations of change in the world.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
[Abstract]Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies (which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  

Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
[Abstract]The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]  

Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2,) 127-145. doi:10.1080/00048406812341111
[Abstract]My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements
[Citing Place (1956)]  

McKitrick, J. A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174. doi:10.1080/713659629
[Abstract]Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press.
[Abstract]This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Michel, M. (2019). The mismeasure of consciousness: A Problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1239–1249. doi:10.1086/705509
[Abstract]As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Miller, S. M. (2001). Binocular rivalry and the cerebral hemispheres with a note on the correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. Brain and Mind, 2(1), 119-149.
[Abstract]In addressing the scientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, “It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them?” (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bihemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness.
[Citing Place (1990a) in context]  

Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(3), 159-176. doi:10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x
[Abstract]Objective: In the past decade, much has been written about the hard problem of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.
Methods: Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.
Results: The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the NCC acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to the hard problem, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.
Conclusion: In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.

[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  

Mills, J. (2022). A Critique of Materialism. In J. Mills (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem (Chapter 1). Routledge
[Abstract]In the boon of medical, scientific, and technological progress, materialism has gained increasing explanatory power in deciphering the enigma of mind. But with the proliferation and acceptance of cognitive science, psychic reality has been largely reduced to a physical ontology. In this chapter, the author explores the ground, scope, and limits to the materialist framework and shows that while bio-neurochemical-physiology is a necessary condition for mental functioning, it is far from being a sufficient condition for adequately explaining the human being. This becomes especially significant when examining the question of selfhood, freedom, personal autonomy, and the phenomenal quality of the lived experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (2000). A proposal for the development of a mental vocabulary, with special reference to pretence and false belief. In P. Mitchell, & K. Riggs (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 51-80). Psychology Press.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Moore, J. (1995). Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction. The Behavior Analyst, 18, 33–49. doi:10.1007/BF03392690
[Abstract]The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Moore, J. (2001). On Distinguishing Methodological from Radical Behaviorism, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(2), 221-244, doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434196
[Abstract]Methodological behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range of intellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and inside psychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical behaviorism and analytic philosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Four principal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontological and methodological assumptions. Skinner?s radical behaviorism may be distinguished from methodological behaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, rather than logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character, rather than mental.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  

Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf

Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Sloan.
[Abstract]Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  [Citing Place (1999a) in context]  

Moore, J. (2011). A review of Baum’s review of Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 95(1), 127–140.
[Abstract]Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum’s position needs to be resolved.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  

Moore, J. (2013). Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It — Part 2. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 34(3), 205-232. doi:10.2307/43854394
[Abstract]Part 1 of this review suggested that mentalism consists in explanations of behavior in terms of causal mental states and processes. These causal mental states and processes are inferred to reside in an unobservable dimension beyond that in which behavior occurs, and to function differently from environmental events, variables, and relations. One of those functions is inferred to be mediation, in which environmental events trigger a mediating state or process, which in turn triggers a response. For mentalism, an explanation should properly focus on specifying the causal role of the mediator, rather than talking about observable relations. Part 1 further suggested that mentalism is actually as integral to mediational neobehaviorism as it is to cognitive psychology, even though each claims to differ from the other. Part 2 continues the review of mentalism by addressing the relations among mentalism, operationism, and the meaning of scientific verbal behavior, especially when the verbal behavior involves private behavioral events. The review then considers some sources of mentalism, along with examples of how mentalism is supported in philosophy. Finally, the review summarizes the radical behaviorist opposition to mentalism. Overall, the review concludes that radical behaviorism differs from both cognitive psychology and mediational neobehaviorism, which radical behaviorism regards as comparably mentalistic.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Morris, E. K. (1997). Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis. The Psychological Record, 47, 529-542. doi:10.1007/BF03395245
[Abstract]Recent conceptual work in behavior analysis has argued that the discipline is not mechanistic, but contextualistic, in world view. This argument has been contested, however, and a mechanism-contextualism debate has ensued. In taking the side of contextualism, I offer four reflections on the controversy. These concern (a) confusions concerning Pepper’s purpose in writing his book and its place in the debate, (b) misunderstandings about the meanings of context and contextualism, (c) the pragmatic implications of theories of truth in world views other than contextualism, and (d) the evolution of ontology from mechanism to contextualism. In the end, behavior analysis may benefit from this debate by evolving as a world view unto its own for its science of behavior. The two-the world view and the science-are inexorably interrelated.
[Citing Place (1994c)]  [Citing Place (1996q)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Mørch, H. H. (2023). Non-Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009317344
[Abstract]Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. The main non-physicalist theories of consciousness are introduced and the most important arguments for them, are explained and considered how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mørch, H.H. (2020). Does dispositionalism entail panpsychism? Topoi, 39, 1073–1088. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
[Abstract]According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mumford, S. (1995). Dispositions, bases, overdetermination and identities. Ratio, 8, 42-62.
[Abstract]In this paper I aim to make sense of our pre-theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are outlined.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
Files added, see Download
1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf  Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mun, C. (2021). We are living in a material world. In C. Mun, Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion (Chapter 5). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71194-8_5
[Abstract]In this chapter, I begin by providing a brief history of the mind-body problem, and I argue that the philosophical commitment to dualism stands as a barrier to a thoroughly unified interdisciplinary approach to research and theorizing in the science of emotion. I then explain the significance of David J. Chalmers’ (The Conscious Mind: In Search of A Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) hard problem of consciousness and meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61,, 2018; Journal of Consciousness Studies 27: 201–226, 2020) for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion. Finally, I present and argue in favor of a materialistic solution to Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, which will also include a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness, over eliminative materialism, eliminativism, and interactionist dualism. In doing so, I provide an additional foundation—semantic dualism—for my proposed framework for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion (meta-semantic pluralism about emotion), as well as the first foundation for my theory of emotion as a sui generis kind of embodied cognition, which I refer to as semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualisme).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Muñoz-Suárez, C. (2015). Introduction: Bringing Together Mind, Behavior, and Evolution. In C. Muñoz-Suárez, & F. De Brigard (Eds), Content and Consciousness Revisited (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_1
[Abstract]In Sect. 1.1 I discuss the main concepts and hypotheses introduced in Content and Consciousness . In Sect. 1.2 I sketch the context of interdisciplinary research surrounding Content and Consciousness’s birth. Finally, in Sect. 1.3, I introduce the chapters of this volume.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Myin E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2044. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044
[Abstract]The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of consciousness studies, 23(5-6), 80-104. penultimate draft
[Abstract]In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Myin, E., & Loughlin, V. (2018). Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness. In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness (pp. 202-215). Routledge.
[Abstract]According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally  extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Nagel, T. (1965). Physicalism. The Philosophical Review, 74(3), 339–356. doi:10.2307/2183358
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29).
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nannini, S. (2023) The mind-body problem in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 14(1-2), 118-134. doi:10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
[Abstract]Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998a) in context]  

Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185.
[Abstract]U. T. Place is rightly called the forerunners of Physicalism or Identity Theory of Mind. But he also claims himself to be a behaviourist. Like the behaviourist he believed that mental events can be elucidated purely in terms of hypothetical propositions about behaviour. These can also be elucidated by the reports of the first person’s experiences. He has many arguments in favour of behaviourism for which he is called a behaviourist. In this article I shall give a glimpse of behaviourism, particularly of logical behaviourism and then explain the circumstances under which Place is called a behaviourist.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
[Abstract]The identity theory of mind came into existence as a reaction to the theory of Behaviourism. This theory is advocated and developed by different  philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. According to this theory, certain physical states of brain are identical to mental states. In others words, this theory holds that the so-called mental phenomena like thoughts, feelings, wishes and the rest are identical with the bodily states and processes. Thus to have some specific kind of thought is to have some kind of specific states and processes of bodily cells, typically brain cells. When we say that someone is in a certain mental state, it implies that in the cerebral cortex of the brain of that person, certain physical event is going on. The person concerned may not be aware of the happenings of the brain but these two states are not merely correlated with each other rather these two are one and the same event in the literal sense. Thus this theory asserts that everything mental is physical. But though it speaks of mental states it does not assert that these are not physical. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. These problems are the problem of identity, the problem of co-existence and the problem of consciousness. But in this paper I will discuss the problem of identity and the problem of co-existence and subsequently efforts will be made to solve these problems from materialist point of view.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
[Abstract]In the history of philosophy different philosophers have extended their efforts to give a solution of mind body problem. In modern period Rene Descartes explained the mind –body problem from the dualistic point of view. Behaviourism, on the other hand, does not believe [in] the existence of [the] mind. This theory emphasises only on behaviour. But none could give a satisfactory solution of the problem. Identity theory of mind also attempted to give a solution from the materialistic point of view. This theory is developed by U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart,H. Feigl and some other thinkers. This theory came into existence as a reaction to the behaviourism. The main thesis of the theory is - the mental states and processes and the brain states and processes are  identical. Before the establishment of his own theory Smart tries to answer some of the possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory. But this does not mean that Smart accepts Place‟s theory to the full extent. Rather he claims that his arguments for identity theory is very much different from that of Place and this he very sharply stated in his article “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959). In this paper I shall try to explore some possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory as well as answers given by Smart and subsequently tries to show the issues on which Smart agrees with Place. Finally, efforts will be made to highlight Smart‟s difference from that of Place and his own view on the Identity Theory.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  [Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
[Abstract]Identity theory of mind occupies an important place in the history of philosophy of mind. According to his theory mental events are nothing but physical events in the brain. This theory came into existence as a reaction of behaviourism and developed by U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, H. Feigl and others. But there is a debate among the profounder of the theory and this is- whether it is said about concrete particulars, (e.g., individual instances of occurring in particular subject at particular times), or about a kind to which such concrete particulars belong. With this question two answers are found and they are called Type identity and Token identity. According to token identity theory, every concrete particular that falls under a mental kind can be identified with some physical happenings. Type identity theory, on the other hand, holds that mental kinds themselves are physical kinds. Thus in this article I shall try to delineate the different arguments given by the profounder of this theory in favour of both the theories and finally show that which one is stronger than the others.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
[Abstract]This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1967). What are perceptual reports about? Psychological bulletin, 67(4), 249–272. doi:10.1037/h0024320
[Abstract]This article presents a discussion of some methodological and substantive issues associated with the use of reports in perceptual experiments. The distinction between "report" and "response" is first clarified and a definition of report behavior is proposed. The relation of reference (aboutness) is next considered in the context of phenomenal vs. cognitive reports. At a less level, two pairs of contrasting proposals on the referents of perceptual reports are used to bring earlier questions to focus. One pair stems from philosophical approaches to the question of this article. The other arises in a current controversy concerning what psychophysical scales measure. A brief discussion of the role of e's own perceptual experience is followed by a review of methods for establishing report validity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 435-67. doi:10.2307/1422567
[Abstract]Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas, T. (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism, 5(1), 75–97.
[Citing Place (1972a)]  

Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Nichols, C. (1983) Neurobiology and Social Theory: Some Common and Persistent Problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13(2), 207-234. doi:10.1177/004839318301300207
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Owen, J. L. (2002). A retrospective on behavioral approaches to human language: And some promising new developments. American Communication Journal, 5(3).
[Abstract]Early schools of behaviorism, namely, "classical" and "methodological," hold only limited implications for studies in human language behavior. In contrast, contemporary radical behaviorism is not only relevant, but it is dramatically more so due to its recent breakthroughs in the area of relational frame theory. Unfortunately, the few articles on behaviorism found in communication journals deal primarily with classical and methodological behaviorisms. References to radical behaviorism are rare, superficial, and out of touch with recent developments. A major purpose of this article is to draw some sharp distinctions among the three major behaviorisms: "classical," "methodological," and "radical"; and, to capture each of their unique perspectives on human language behavior. A second purpose is to show how radical behaviorism-especially in light of its recent progress in relational frame theory-provides the basis for a comprehensive behavioral theory of complex human language behavior. In doing so, it also provides a viable alternative to the cognitive theories that continue to dominate the field of communication studies.
[Citing Place (1997a) in context]  

Palmer, D. C. (1999). A Call for Tutorials on Alternative Approaches to the Study of Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 16, 49-55.
[Citing Place (1992a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Chomsky's Nativism Reconsidered The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17, 51-56
[Citing Place (1992a)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Dedication Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 5.
[Abstract][This dedication is followed by The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994]
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  [Citing Place (1992c)]  
Download: Palmer (2000) Dedication Ullin Place 1924-2000.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky's Appraisal of Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Half Century of Misunderstanding. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 253-67. doi:10.1007/BF03392134
[Abstract]The history of the writing of Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Chomsky’s review (1959), and MacCorquodale’s rebuttal (1970) are briefly summarized. Chomsky’s recent reflections on his review are analyzed: Chomsky’s refusal to acknowledge the review’s errors or its aggressive tone is consistent with his polemical style but comes at a minor cost in consistency and plausibility. However, his remarks about the place of Skinner’s work in science reveal misunderstandings so great that they undercut the credibility of the review substantially. The gradual growth in the influence of Skinner’s book suggests that its legacy will endure.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2007). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/15021149.2007.11434280
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account?  There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated.  Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2008). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8, 161-175.
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account? There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated. Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
[Abstract]Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Papineau, D. (2020). The problem of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. Towards the end I shall also say some things about the Where? question. As for the What? question, a few brief introductory remarks will have to suffice.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Pappas, G. S. (1977). Armstrong’s Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(3)- 569-592. doi:10.1080/00455091.1977.10717033
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  

Passmore, J. A. (1966). A hundred years of philosophy (second edition). Duckworth.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Pelczar, M. (2021). Modal arguments against materialism. Noûs, 55(2), 426-444. doi:10.1111/nous.12320
[Abstract]We review existing strategies for bringing modal intuitions to bear against materialist theories of consciousness, and then propose a new strategy. Unlike existing strategies, which assume that imagination (suitably constrained) is a good guide to modal truth, the strategy proposed here makes no assumptions about the probative value of imagination. However, unlike traditional modal arguments, the argument developed here delivers only the conclusion that we should not believe that materialism is true, not that we should believe that it is false.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pelczar, M. (2022). The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment. Synthese, 200(4), 1-22. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03775-y
[Abstract]According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are, at bottom, nothing but experiential phenomena. One argument for this view proceeds from an alleged need for physical phenomena to have features beyond what physics attributes to them; another starts by arguing that consciousness is ubiquitous, and proposes an identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation of this alleged fact. The first argument assumes that physical phenomena have categorical natures, and the second that the world’s experience-causing powers or potentials underdetermine its physical features. I argue that panpsychists are not entitled to these assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pelczar, M. (2023). Phenomenalism: A metaphysics of chance and experience. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Pereboom, D. (2011). Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features. The seriousness of this open possibility is enhanced by an analogy with our perceptual representations of secondary qualities. Our vision represents colors as having certain qualitative natures, and it is an open possibility, widely regarded as actual, that colors actually lack them. If it’s possible that representing phenomenal properties introspectively attributes to them qualitative natures that they actually lack, then the force of the anti-physicalism arguments might well be blunted. The second response exploits the possibility that our ignorance of things in themselves consists in part in our lack of knowledge of the fundamental intrinsic properties of things. This idea has been developed by Bertrand Russell and more recently by David Chalmers into a framework for a unified account of the mental and the physical. Currently unknown or incompletely understood fundamental intrinsic properties provide the categorical bases for the known physical dispositional properties, and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book’s third theme is a defense of a nonreductive account of physicalism. The version of the nonreductive view endorsed departs from others in that it rejects the token identity of psychological and microphysical entities of any sort. The deepest relation between the psychological and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pernu T. K. (2017). The five marks of the mental. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
[Abstract]The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Pessoa Jr., O. (2021). The colored-brain thesis. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 84-93. doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10
[Abstract]The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality ω associated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain Σ, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Σω)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Σω)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (2000f) in context]  

Pika, S., Nicoladis, E., & Marentette, P. (2009). How to order a beer: Cultural differences in the use of conventional gestures for numbers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(1), 70-80. doi:10.1177/0022022108326197
[Abstract]It is said that conventional gestures for numbers differ by culture. Conventional gestures are thought to imply consistency of form both across and within individuals. The present study tests the consistency of finger gestures of 60 participants of three different cultures and in three different mother tongues in nine different hypothetical scenarios. The first subject of analysis is whether participants differentiate between counting and signaling. The second subject is the consistency of gestures within and between groups. The third is how participants depict the number 1. Result show that most people use the same gestures for counting and signaling. In addition, Germans and English Canadians show relatively low degrees of individual differences whereas French Canadians show relatively high degrees of individual variability. Furthermore, only the Germans use the thumb to indicate the number 1, whereas the two North American cultures use the index finger. The present data suggest that finger gestures of some cultures clearly qualify as conventional gestures whereas others do not. It is suggested that the development of conventional gestures is influenced by cultural exposure, which can even result into the loosening of conventions.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64.
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Pockett , S. (2022). Midwifing a science of consciousness: the role of Kuhnian paradigms. Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 1(1). doi:10.5281/zenodo.6637736
[Abstract]It is argued that in terms of Thomas Kuhn's analysis of how different fields of science develop and progress, consciousness research is still in the pre-paradigm or pre-science phase that precedes the advent of any universally accepted paradigm.  A means by which this long-standing situation may be escaped is here suggested. This is to treat each of the three distinct theoretical positions that presently drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness as mini-paradigms and then apply the same logic that Kuhn sees as underpinning paradigm shifts in mature sciences to decide which of these three mini-paradigms becomes the first universally accepted paradigm of a mature science of consciousness. At present, the three mini-paradigms that drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness are: (1) the cognitive-science process theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is a process, not a thing"), (2) the neurophysiologists' preferred psychoneural identity theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is brain activity") and (3) the EMF field theory mini-paradigm  ("consciousness is a 4-D electromagnetic pattern generated by brain activity"). In established science, paradigms shift when enough 'anomalies' – falsified predictions or largely unrecognised but once-recognised-unacceptable consequences – build up to make the existing paradigm uncomfortable for those who operate within it.  At this point, a sudden paradigm shift occurs, ushering in another long period of 'normal science' during which the new paradigm drives experimentation. With regard to the three existing mini-paradigms on the nature of consciousness, it is argued that (1) recognition that processes are abstract entities –and that this renders the "consciousness is a process, not a thing" mini-paradigm dualist – makes this mini-paradigm unacceptable to practitioners who regard dualism as unscientific and who prefer to see themselves as staunchly scientific, and therefore as monists. (By definition, monists equate consciousness with physical entities, while dualists equate it with abstract entities). (2) The strong prediction of the "consciousness is brain activity" mini-paradigm – that conscious experiences should invariably correlate with the firing of either particular single neurons or groups of single neurons in the brain – has now been falsified often enough to make this mini-paradigm unacceptable to its practitioners. And this leaves intact only the "consciousness is a 3-D electromagnetic field" mini-paradigm – the idea that conscious experiences are particular 3-dimensional (or, given that they change in time, strictly speaking 4-dimensional) patterns in the electromagnetic field generated by brain activity. And as a result, it is suggested that this third mini-paradigm might usefully become the first universally accepted full paradigm, which would finally allow announcement of the birth of a Kuhnian science of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pockett , S. (2023). What are Conscious Sensations? Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 2(1), 56-75. doi:10.5281/zenodo.7740150
[Abstract]Existing theories about the nature of conscious sensations are discussed.  The oldest classification system contrasts dualist theories (which say consciousness is an abstract entity) with monist theories (which say consciousness is a concrete entity).  A more recent system contrasts process theories ("consciousness is a process, not a thing") with vehicle theories (consciousness is a property of one or more of the things associated with brain processes). The present paper first points out that processes are abstracta, which makes process theories dualist. It then argues that (a) dualist theories are untestable and therefore unscientific and (b) process theories which invoke information are at odds with the normal definition of information.  Then two separate kinds of vehicle theory are discussed: first the neural identity theory and then a theory that pulls together the enormous volume of data generated by Crick's suggestion to forget about theories and simply measure the neural correlates of consciousness into a proposal equating sensory consciousness with certain patterns in the electromagnetic fields generated by brain function.  The paper concludes with an injunction to stop researching this topic altogether, on the grounds that the results are likely to be used in unacceptably dystopian developments.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polák, M. (2022). Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18(2), A1-31. doi:10.31820/ejap.18.2.1
[Abstract]Even after many years of empirical and conceptual research there are underlying controversies which lead scholars to dispute identity theory. One of the most influential examples is Kripke’s modal argument leading to the rejection of the claim that pain and C-fibres firing are identical. The aim of the first part of the paper is to expose that Kripke does not rigorously distinguish the meaning of individual relata entering the identity relation, and therefore his claim about the faultiness of the analogy between propositions “heat is molecular motion”, and “pain is C-fibres firing”, is mistaken. Moreover, whilst much emphasis within metaphysics of mind-brain relations has been placed upon conscious phenomenal states, it might be worthwhile to also consider cases of unconscious phenomenal states. If one admits the unconscious phenomenal states, such as unconscious pain, then, Kripke’s claim is further discredited by the fact that even pain can be individuated through its contingent property. Identity statements about pain could therefore be analogous to any other identity statements. The second part of the paper focuses on the relevance of the modal argument in confrontation with empirical evidence. It argues against the assumption embedded in the modal argument that an identical neurobiological pattern occurs regardless of whether conscious pain is present or completely absent.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018) Neural Correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1269. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269
[Abstract]One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  

Polger, T W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016). The Multiple Realization Book. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polger, T. W. (2011). Are sensations still brain processes? Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1–21.
[Abstract]Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, ‘‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’’ It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s (1959) text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Smart discussed as well as some that he did not anticipate. Finally, I offer a brief manifesto for the identity theory, providing a small list of the claims that I believe the contemporary identity theorist should accept. As it turns out, these are more or less the ones that Smart defended fifty years ago.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Polten, E. P. (1973). Critique of the psycho-physical identity theory: A refutation of scientific materialism and an establishment of mind-matter dualism by means of philosophy and scientific method. Mouton.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviews]  

Potrč, M. (1995). U. T. Place. The British founder of physicalism: from behaviorism to connectionism. In Jaakko Hintikka & Klaus Puhl (Eds.), The British tradition in 20th century philosophy. Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 14th to 21th August 1994, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellscha
[Abstract]Dualism recognized the existence of inner mental processes and states, but without any material or physical foundation. Behaviourism, on the contrary, even if it did not deny their existence, refused to attribute any explanatory role to inner states and processes. In the British Journal of Psychology, in 1956, Place published a paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, There, he advocated a form of physicalism which steers a middle course between dualism and behaviourism. Mental processes were considered to be literally inside the body and identical with material/physical processes in the brain. It is well known that dualism was seriously undermined by this theory. But it is less well known that Place held his theory to be compatible with behaviourism. He draws a distinction between mental processes which he thinks are processes in the brain and mental states which he thinks, following Ryle (1949), are dispositions to talk and behave in a variety of broadly specifiable ways. The identity theory as applied to mental processes is seen as complementing rather than replacing Ryle's behaviourism. The exclusion of mental states allows Place to avoid the difficulties which confront the attempt to extend type identity theory to cover propositional attitudes, and which have led many to adopt the token identity version. Unlike token identity physicalism which regards any attempt to establish psycho-physical correlations as futile, Place's version of type identity theory predicts such correlations across individuals in the case of mental processes and within individuals in the case of mental states. This, combined with an emphasis which comes from his background in behaviourist psychology on learning as the primary source of mental/behavioural dispositions, makes it easy for Place (1991) to embrace connectionism which he regards as entirely compatible with behaviourism. He does not emphasize the compatibility between type identity theory and connectionism, probably because this point is obvious to him. There is no analogous way of establishing links with brain science in the case of token identity theory.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1989d)]  [Citing Place (1994a)]  
Download: Potrc (1995) U T Place - The British Founder of Physicalism - from Behaviorism to Connectionism.pdf

Potrč, M. (2000). In memoriam - Ullin Thomas Place. Acta Analytica, 15(25), 7-18.
[Abstract]Ullin Thomas Place is known as the Australian materialist who introduced the thesis of type identity. But his work is of [a] much larger spectrum, involving behaviorism, connectionism, dispositions, natural laws, picture theory of meaning and consciousness. Place's relationship with Slovenia is reviewed, beginning with some personal memories.
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1977a)]  

Potrč, M. (2020). Zero point content Synthesis Philosophica, 69(1), 113–133.
[Abstract]The strategy is to first present the usual content atomistic fullness approaches, in their occurrent and dispositional guises. Then, the focal point semantic treatments are summarized. This difference may be explained through workings of chromatic illumination from the local external information inviting incline surrounding at the background cognitive landscape, in two directions. First, the external information is appreciated, and thus becomes a total cognitive state non-dimensional point at the middle level of the cognitive system’s description. At the upper level of description, total cognitive state content obtains its experiential richness from the multiple characteristics present in the mentioned local environment, and appreciated in it, without which they would be explicitly represented in epistemic agent’s consciousness. Failure of this second step leads to the requirement of content’s explicit representation. In comparison, the failure to apply chromatic illumination to the external information leads to the externalist focal point semantic strategies.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Powell, J. P. (1969). The brain and consciousness: a reply to Professor Burt. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 27-28.
[Abstract]This article presents a criticism of C. Burt's article. Essentially, Burt's "mental field" theory is questioned in terms of its plausibility and scientific status. It is argued that the "astonishing complexity of the brain may well baffle us, but our lack of understanding can scarcely be ameliorated by mystery-mongering.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Puccetti, R. (1964). Science, analysis, and the problem of mind. Philosophy, 39(149), 249-259. doi:10.1017/S0031819100055625
[Citing Place (1960)]  

Raimondi, A. (2021). Crane and the mark of the mental. Analysis, 81(4), 683–693. doi.:10.1093/analys/anab035
[Abstract]Brentano’s (1874) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998], 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes’s challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane’s representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Rainey, S. (2023). Clinical Implications. In S. Rainey, Philosophical Perspectives on Brain Data (Chapter 3, pp. 65-91). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27170-0_3
[Abstract]Scientific realism is the philosophical conviction that the posits of science—quarks, electrons, forces—are real, not just ways of accounting for the world. If true, we might take from this the view that a full story of the world and everything in it is most possible through the pursuit of scientific experimentation and observation. The truths of science, on this view, are the truths of nature. Scientific truths are true despite what anyone may actually think of them. This poses a problem for one of the more salient objects in our world—human beings. From the perspective of each of us, what’s most notable about the world is that it’s a place that we are in at a time. We can’t help but experience the world in terms of our subjectivity, in other words. Even the simplest cases of perspectival relativism attest to that. From a person’s point of view, a full story of the world given in objective terms will describe all but one fact; the fact of that point of view itself (or the ‘I’ that describes).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ray, J. (1972). Do mental mvents mxist? Physiological adumbrations. British Journal of Psychiatry, >120(555), 129-132. doi:10.1192/bjp.120.555.129
[Abstract]In this paper, elaboration of a Realist answer to some of the classical questions of psychology and epistemology will be sought, starting from a knowledge of Soviet and Western findings in psychophysiology (particularly the work of Pavlov, 1932, and Hebb, 1949; see also the summary by Burt, 1968). The point of departure taken in the philosophical literature is the paper by Place (1969). This paper will adopt a reflexological model of brain function—with its implied view that memory is synaptically encoded. While this model has largely fallen into disfavour it is used here paradigmatically—to show that well-developed physiological models in general can provide a satisfactory account of ‘mental’ phenomena.
[Citing Place (1969a)]  

Raz, A., & Donchin, O. (2003). A zetetic’s perspective on gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 237-238.
[Abstract]Charmed by Corballis’s presentation, we challenge the use of mirror neurons as a supporting platform for the gestural theory of language, the link between vocalization and cerebral specialization, and the relationship between gesture and language as two separate albeit coupled systems of communication. We revive an alternative explanation of lateralization of language and handedness.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38.
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Rego, F. (2021). Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? In P. Á. Gargiulo, & H. L. Mesones Arroyo (Eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry (Vol. IV, 73-88). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_8
[Abstract]In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Renz, G. (2021). What is God’s Power?. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(3). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3295
[Abstract]Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Reynhout, G., & Carter, M. (2011). Social Stories™: a possible theoretical rationale, European Journal of Special Needs Education, 26(3), 367-378. doi:10.1080/08856257.2011.595172
[Abstract]Social Stories™ are an intervention widely used with individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). This paper discusses a possible theoretical rationale that might account for the purported efficacy of Social Stories™. Attributes of individuals with ASD in relation to Social Story intervention including difficulties with theory of mind (involving perspective taking and emotion perception), weak central coherence, visual learning style, intellectual ability and comprehension, and stimulus overselectivity are considered. In addition, behavioural explanations are explored. Probably the most parsimonious explanation is that Social Stories may be viewed as loose contingency contracts, which highlight natural reinforcers. It is noted however, that the possible underlying mechanisms remain speculative and that there may be many factors involved.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Roberts, H. (1967). The Construction of Consciousness. Psychological Reports, 20(1), 99–102. doi:10.2466/pr0.1967.20.1.99
[Abstract]Consciousness is analyzed after a brief review of some aspects of the present stage of understanding of consciousness. Discerned as its elements are brain configurations, in principle as described by Wolfgang Koehler or D. O. Hebb, and which are functionally termed “schemata.” Basic schemata represent, that is, are activated by and associated with, environmental, somatic, and psychic conditions. Self, being, and relation schemata are defined. Primal and self consciousness (collectively basic consciousness), relational consciousness, and metaconciousness (conciousness of consciousness) are formulated as organizations of schemata.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and sense: A critique of contemporary materialism. Cambridge University Press
[Abstract]Published in 1982 by CUP  it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, Z., Maley, C., & Piccinini, G (2015). Is Consciousness a spandrel? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365-383. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.10
[Abstract]Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Rockwell, W. T. (1994). On what the mind is identical with. Philosophical Psychology, 7(3), 307–323. doi:10.1080/09515089408573126
[Abstract]The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind‐brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive activities are distributed throughout the human nervous system, which challenges the ‘scientific’ assumption (believed by Descartes, among others) that the brain is the seat of the soul, and the rest of the nerves are mere message cables to the brain. Dennett comes close to accepting this point when he criticizes ‘Cartesian materialism’, and yet he still claims that Vie head is headquarters’. Accepting that the mind is the entire nervous system solves some philosophical problems, for Dennett and others. There is also some evidence that indicates that some cognitive activities may be hormonal rather than neural, which raises some challenging problems for the once obvious distinction between causing a mental state and embodying that state.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rodríguez, S.S. (2022). The ontology of perceptual experience. Rowman & Littlefield.
[Abstract]Contemporary philosophy of perception typically focuses on discussions concerning the content and the phenomenology of perceptual experience. In a significant departure from this tradition, The Ontology of Perceptual Experience explores the very conscious phenomena to which intentional or phenomenal features are thus ascribed. Drawing on a new wave of research— including the work of maverick philosophers like Helen Steward, Brian O’Shaughnessy, and Matthew Soteriou—this book examines two ways of categorizing perceptual experiences in accordance to their dynamic structure: on the one hand, Experiential Heracliteanism, an approach striving to describe perceptual experiences in terms of irreducibly dynamic components; and, on the other, Experiential Non-Heracliteanism, which conceives perceptual experiences as dynamic phenomena that may nevertheless be described in terms of non-dynamic elements. Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez describes both proposals and makes a modest case on behalf of the Non-Heraclitean approach against its increasingly popular Heraclitean counterpart. This case crucially turns on the fact that the Heracliteanist engages in a controversial and perhaps unnecessary commitment to irreducibly dynamic processes. The ontological framework this book unpacks offers a platform from which traditional issues in the philosophies of mind and perception may be revisited in refreshing and potentially fruitful ways.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rollins, C. D. (1967). Are mental events actual physical? In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 21-37). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]