Publications citing U. T. Place.
223 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 3 .

Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review, 76, 201-213.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Taylor, C. (1969). Two issues about materialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 19(74), 73–79. doi:10.2307/2218192
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  

te Vrugt, M., Needham, P., & Schmitz, G. J. (2022) Is thermodynamics fundamental? arXiv:2204.04352v1 [physics.hist-ph] 9 Apr 2022 doi:10.48550/arXiv.2204.04352
[Abstract]It is a common view in philosophy of physics that thermodynamics is a non-fundamental theory. This is motivated in particular by the fact that thermodynamics is considered to be a paradigmatic example for a theory that can be reduced to another one, namely statistical mechanics. For instance, the statement "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy" has become a textbook example for a successful reduction, despite the fact that this statement is not correct for a large variety of systems. In this article, we defend the view that thermodynamics is a fundamental theory, a position that we justify based on four case studies from recent physical research. We explain how entropic gravity (1) and black hole thermodynamics (2) can serve as case studies for the multiple realizability problem which blocks the reduction of thermodynamics. Moreover, we discuss the problem of the reducibility of phase transitions and argue that bifurcation theory (3) allows the modelling of "phase transitions" on a thermodynamic level even in finite systems. It is also shown that the derivation of irreversible transport equations in the Mori-Zwanzig formalism (4) does not, despite recent claims to the contrary, constitute a reduction of thermodynamics to quantum mechanics. Finally, we briefly discuss some arguments against the fundamentality of thermodynamics that are not based on reduction.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Thagard, P. (2022). Energy requirements undermine substrate independence and mind-body functionalism. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 70-88. doi:10.1017/psa.2021.15
[Abstract]Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be living in a computer simulation, the plausibility of transferring minds into computers, and the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Thalberg, I. (1983). Immateriality. Mind, 92(365), 105–113. www.jstor.org/stable/2253934 doi:10.1093/mind/XCII.365.105
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tiehen, J. (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96 3), 501-522. doi:10.1111/papq.12126 philarchive.org/archive/TIEGCC
[Abstract]What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every introductory class in the philosophy of mind, that dualism has a special problem accounting for mental causation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tomberlin, J. E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 43(3), 295-299. doi:10.1080/00048406512341251
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tonneau, F (2001). Equivalence Relations: A Reply. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 99-128. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434185
[Abstract]Some commentaries on Equivalence relations: A critical analysis (this issue) have questioned the consistency and generality of a correlation-based alternative to equivalence-class research, whereas others defend the use of matching-equivalence concepts in behavior theory. In this reply I reiterate the most important points of the target article, provide further clarifications, and discuss various misunderstandings. In contrast to equivalence class notions, the concept of function transfer is clear, simple, and coherent; and it necessarily plays a crucial role in the behavioral analysis of complex psychological functioning. A molar view based on environmental networks is well qualified to explain function transfer and thus provide insights into a variety of complex behavioral phenomena.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Towl B. N. (2012). Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology, 25(2), 187–202.
[Abstract]One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus and its correlation with sensations of thirst. Given that there are relations besides identity that can explain such correlations, the type-identity theorist is left with a dilemma: either the correlations we consider are weak, in which case we do not have an IBE to an identity claim, or else the correlations we look at are maximally strong, in which case there are too few cases for the inductive part of the strategy to work.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  

Treffner, P. & Peter, M. (2002). Intentional and attentional dynamics of speech–hand coordination. Human Movement Science, 21(5–6), 641-697. doi:10.1016/S0167-9457(02)00178-1 http://metaffordance.com/papers/gestures-HMS-2002.pdf?origin%3Dpublication_detail
[Abstract]Interest is rapidly growing in the hypothesis that natural language emerged from a more primitive set of linguistic acts based primarily on manual activity and hand gestures. Increasingly, researchers are investigating how hemispheric asymmetries are related to attentional and manual asymmetries (i.e., handedness). Both speech perception and production have origins in the dynamical generative movements of the vocal tract known as articulatory gestures. Thus, the notion of a “gesture” can be extended to both hand movements and speech articulation. The generative actions of the hands and vocal tract can therefore provide a basis for the (direct) perception of linguistic acts. Such gestures are best described using the methods of dynamical systems analysis since both perception and production can be described using the same commensurate language. Experiments were conducted using a phase transition paradigm to examine the coordination of speech–hand gestures in both left- and right-handed individuals. Results address coordination (in-phase vs. anti-phase), hand (left vs. right), lateralization (left vs. right hemisphere), focus of attention (speech vs. tapping), and how dynamical constraints provide a foundation for human communicative acts. Predictions from the asymmetric HKB equation confirm the attentional basis of functional asymmetry. Of significance is a new understanding of the role of perceived synchrony (p-centres) during intentional cases of gestural coordination.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Tsou, J.Y. (2022). Philosophical naturalism and empirical approaches to philosophy. In M. Rossberg (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.
In contemporary analytic philosophy, ‘naturalism’ is an ambiguous and equivocal term (Papineau, 2020) that can be distinguished into weaker and stronger methodological commitments:
N1. Philosophy should be constrained by scientific results. Philosophical theories should not be inconsistent with the findings of empirical science (e.g., the positing of supernatural entities).
N2. Philosophy is continuous with science. Philosophical standards (e.g., the assumption that knowledge is fallible) and methods (e.g., empirical and experimental methods) should not be different in kind from those adopted in the natural sciences. Moreover, genuine philosophical problems should be tractable with naturalistic empirical methods.
N3. Philosophy should be empirically driven. Philosophical theorizing should be guided by the results of science and empirical science provides the most promising route to formulating sound philosophical theories.
N1 implies that philosophical theories should be consistent with scientific theories. N2 implies that philosophical standards and methods should be continuous with those adopted in science. N3 implies that the empirical scientific findings should be utilized to direct philosophical inquiry. Whereas N1 is a platitude among many contemporary analytic philosophers, fewer are committed to N2 or N3. This chapter examines philosophical theories (e.g., theories of mind and ethics) that are committed to N2 and N3, with particular emphasis on N3.

[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Van Rysewyk, S (2013, April 30). Philip Ball on neuroaesthetics. Simon van Rysewyk. simonvanrysewyk.com/tag/philip-ball/
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vauclair, J. (2004). Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language. Interaction Studies, 5(3), 363-384. https://centrepsycle-amu.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Vauclair-Interaction-Studies-041.pdf https://www.academia.edu/12007254/Lateralization_of_communicative_signals_in_nonhuman_primates_and_the_hypothesis_of_the_gestural_origin_of_language
[Abstract]This article argues for the gestural origins of speech and language based on the available evidence gathered in humans and nonhuman primates and especially from ape studies. The strong link between motor functions (hand use and manual gestures) and speech in humans is reviewed. The presence of asymmetrical cerebral organization in nonhuman primates along with functional asymmetries in the perception and production of vocalizations and in intentional referential gestural communication is then emphasized. The nature of primate communicatory systems is presented, and the similarities and differences between these systems and human speech are discussed. It is argued that recent findings concerning neuroanatomical asymmetries in the chimpanzee brain and the existence of both mirror neurons and lateralized use of hands and vocalizations in communication necessitate a reconsideration of the phylogenic emergence of the cerebral and behavioral prerequisites for human speech.
Keywords: evolution, communication, primates, gesture, language, vocalization, mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2002). How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(11), 2002, pp.3-29.
[Abstract]In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other mental interventions can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that conscious mental control needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding consciousness (2nd Edition). Routledge. Understanding_Consciousness_(2nd_ed__Routledge__2009).pdf
[Abstract]Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years. The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers. Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2021). Is the universe conscious? Reflexive monism and the ground of being. In E. Kelly, & P. Marshall (Eds.), Consciousness Unbound (pp. 175-228). Rowman & Littlefield. Is-the-Universe-Conscious-Reflexive-Monism-and-the-Ground-of-Being.pdf
[Abstract]This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2005). How to Get Intentionality by Language. In G. Forrai, & G. Kampis (Eds), Intentionality. Past and Future (pp. 127-41). Rodopi, . HOW-TO-GET-INTENTIONALITY-BY-LANGUAGE.pdf
[Abstract]One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality — the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess — contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I will argue that this traditional conception is incorrect. First, the above characterizations do not provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts. Appearances notwithstanding, these characterizations are not the adequate linguistic counterparts of two elements folk-psychologically featuring intentionality, namely existence-independence and the possible apparent aspectual character of the intentional object, the target of a mental state endowed with intentionality. Indeed, they do not retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentional objects the above elements contain. I will replace failure of existential generalization and referential opacity with other linguistic factors, namely success of mere existentially unloaded particular quantification and pseudo-opacity. I will contend that they provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts, and claim that these factors are the adequate counterparts of the above folk-psychological elements, precisely because they retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentionalia those elements possess.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2020). Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts, 1(1), 19-32.
[Abstract]In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

White, A. R. (1960). Different Kinds of Heed Concepts. Analysis, 20(5), 112–116. doi:10.2307/3327080
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1963). Attending and noticing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII, 103-126.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1964). Attention. Blackwell
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Williams, N. E. (2019). The powers metaphysic. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as "powers", Neil E. Williams develops a metaphysic that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is advanced, one that understands this internal nature in terms of blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, Williams offers solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as is casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Zahnoun, F. (2018). Mind, mechanism and meaning: Reclaiming social normativity within cognitive science and philosophy of mind [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Antwerp. www.academia.edu/37116459/Mind_Mechanism_and_Meaning
[Abstract]The dissertation, titled Mind, Mechanism and Meaning, critically investigates two central assumptions of mainstream cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the commitment to the notion of internal representation on the one hand, and to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental on the other. With regard to the notion of internal representation, the dissertation argues that this notion is ultimately untenable in that, to the effect that internal representations are understood as content-carrying vehicles with causal explanatory power, the notion is grounded in a confusion between the descriptive and the prescriptive/normative. The thesis is defended that all content-carrying entities, including representations, are socio-normatively constituted and should therefore be excluded from non-normative causal explanations of cognition. The results of the research support a non-representational approach to mind and cognition, as exemplified in various forms of E-Cognition, particularly in radical enactive/embodied approaches. Understanding human cognition requires taking into account the whole subject, that is, the subject as ‘embrained', embodied, and embedded within an enacted normative intersubjective niche. With regard to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental, the dissertation argues that the idea can only be made intelligible against a particular metaphysical background, one that does not sit well with the intersubjective normative notions the idea of multiple realization conceptually relies on (types). Furthermore, it is argued that, even if we were to accept such a metaphysics, multiple realization is still not capable of providing the argument against identity theory which has come to be so widely accepted. The thesis is defended that there really is no strong argument against an identity theory, and that, in addition, assuming a strict identity between the mental and the physical is still a viable, perhaps even the only viable approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]