Myin, E., & Loughlin, V. (2018). Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness. In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness (pp. 202-215). Routledge.
[Abstract]According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally  extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Nagel, T. (1965). Physicalism. The Philosophical Review, 74(3), 339–356. doi:10.2307/2183358
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29). www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.029
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
[Abstract]This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1967). What are perceptual reports about? Psychological bulletin, 67(4), 249–272. doi:10.1037/h0024320
[Abstract]This article presents a discussion of some methodological and substantive issues associated with the use of reports in perceptual experiments. The distinction between "report" and "response" is first clarified and a definition of report behavior is proposed. The relation of reference (aboutness) is next considered in the context of phenomenal vs. cognitive reports. At a less level, two pairs of contrasting proposals on the referents of perceptual reports are used to bring earlier questions to focus. One pair stems from philosophical approaches to the question of this article. The other arises in a current controversy concerning what psychophysical scales measure. A brief discussion of the role of e's own perceptual experience is followed by a review of methods for establishing report validity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 435-67. doi:10.2307/1422567
[Abstract]Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas, T. (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism, 5(1), 75–97. www.jstor.org/stable/27758886
[Citing Place (1972a)]  

Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Nichols, C. (1983) Neurobiology and Social Theory: Some Common and Persistent Problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13(2), 207-234. doi:10.1177/004839318301300207
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia. philarchive.org/archive/OPIC
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Owen, J. L. (2002). A retrospective on behavioral approaches to human language: And some promising new developments. American Communication Journal, 5(3).
[Abstract]Early schools of behaviorism, namely, "classical" and "methodological," hold only limited implications for studies in human language behavior. In contrast, contemporary radical behaviorism is not only relevant, but it is dramatically more so due to its recent breakthroughs in the area of relational frame theory. Unfortunately, the few articles on behaviorism found in communication journals deal primarily with classical and methodological behaviorisms. References to radical behaviorism are rare, superficial, and out of touch with recent developments. A major purpose of this article is to draw some sharp distinctions among the three major behaviorisms: "classical," "methodological," and "radical"; and, to capture each of their unique perspectives on human language behavior. A second purpose is to show how radical behaviorism-especially in light of its recent progress in relational frame theory-provides the basis for a comprehensive behavioral theory of complex human language behavior. In doing so, it also provides a viable alternative to the cognitive theories that continue to dominate the field of communication studies.
[Citing Place (1997a) in context]  

Palmer, D. C. (1999). A Call for Tutorials on Alternative Approaches to the Study of Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 16, 49-55.
[Citing Place (1992a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Chomsky's Nativism Reconsidered The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17, 51-56
[Citing Place (1992a)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky's Appraisal of Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Half Century of Misunderstanding. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 253-67. doi:10.1007/BF03392134
[Abstract]The history of the writing of Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Chomsky’s review (1959), and MacCorquodale’s rebuttal (1970) are briefly summarized. Chomsky’s recent reflections on his review are analyzed: Chomsky’s refusal to acknowledge the review’s errors or its aggressive tone is consistent with his polemical style but comes at a minor cost in consistency and plausibility. However, his remarks about the place of Skinner’s work in science reveal misunderstandings so great that they undercut the credibility of the review substantially. The gradual growth in the influence of Skinner’s book suggests that its legacy will endure.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2007). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/15021149.2007.11434280
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account?  There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated.  Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2008). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8, 161-175.
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account? There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated. Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
[Abstract]Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Papineau, D. (2020). The problem of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. Towards the end I shall also say some things about the Where? question. As for the What? question, a few brief introductory remarks will have to suffice.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Passmore, J. A. (1966). A hundred years of philosophy (second edition). Duckworth.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Pelczar, M. (2021). Modal arguments against materialism. Noûs, 55(2), 426-444. doi:10.1111/nous.12320
[Abstract]We review existing strategies for bringing modal intuitions to bear against materialist theories of consciousness, and then propose a new strategy. Unlike existing strategies, which assume that imagination (suitably constrained) is a good guide to modal truth, the strategy proposed here makes no assumptions about the probative value of imagination. However, unlike traditional modal arguments, the argument developed here delivers only the conclusion that we should not believe that materialism is true, not that we should believe that it is false.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pelczar, M. (2022). The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment. Synthese, 200(4), 1-22. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03775-y
[Abstract]According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are, at bottom, nothing but experiential phenomena. One argument for this view proceeds from an alleged need for physical phenomena to have features beyond what physics attributes to them; another starts by arguing that consciousness is ubiquitous, and proposes an identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation of this alleged fact. The first argument assumes that physical phenomena have categorical natures, and the second that the world’s experience-causing powers or potentials underdetermine its physical features. I argue that panpsychists are not entitled to these assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pelczar, M. (2023). Phenomenalism: A metaphysics of chance and experience. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Pereboom, D. (2011). Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features. The seriousness of this open possibility is enhanced by an analogy with our perceptual representations of secondary qualities. Our vision represents colors as having certain qualitative natures, and it is an open possibility, widely regarded as actual, that colors actually lack them. If it’s possible that representing phenomenal properties introspectively attributes to them qualitative natures that they actually lack, then the force of the anti-physicalism arguments might well be blunted. The second response exploits the possibility that our ignorance of things in themselves consists in part in our lack of knowledge of the fundamental intrinsic properties of things. This idea has been developed by Bertrand Russell and more recently by David Chalmers into a framework for a unified account of the mental and the physical. Currently unknown or incompletely understood fundamental intrinsic properties provide the categorical bases for the known physical dispositional properties, and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book’s third theme is a defense of a nonreductive account of physicalism. The version of the nonreductive view endorsed departs from others in that it rejects the token identity of psychological and microphysical entities of any sort. The deepest relation between the psychological and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pernu T. K. (2017). The five marks of the mental. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
[Abstract]The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Pessoa Jr., O. (2021). The colored-brain thesis. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 84-93. doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10
[Abstract]The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality ω associated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain Σ, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Σω)_q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Σω)_q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (2000f) in context]  

Pika, S., Nicoladis, E., & Marentette, P. (2009). How to order a beer: Cultural differences in the use of conventional gestures for numbers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(1), 70-80. doi:10.1177/0022022108326197
[Abstract]It is said that conventional gestures for numbers differ by culture. Conventional gestures are thought to imply consistency of form both across and within individuals. The present study tests the consistency of finger gestures of 60 participants of three different cultures and in three different mother tongues in nine different hypothetical scenarios. The first subject of analysis is whether participants differentiate between counting and signaling. The second subject is the consistency of gestures within and between groups. The third is how participants depict the number 1. Result show that most people use the same gestures for counting and signaling. In addition, Germans and English Canadians show relatively low degrees of individual differences whereas French Canadians show relatively high degrees of individual variability. Furthermore, only the Germans use the thumb to indicate the number 1, whereas the two North American cultures use the index finger. The present data suggest that finger gestures of some cultures clearly qualify as conventional gestures whereas others do not. It is suggested that the development of conventional gestures is influenced by cultural exposure, which can even result into the loosening of conventions.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Pockett , S. (2022). Midwifing a science of consciousness: the role of Kuhnian paradigms. Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 1(1). doi:10.5281/zenodo.6637736
[Abstract]It is argued that in terms of Thomas Kuhn's analysis of how different fields of science develop and progress, consciousness research is still in the pre-paradigm or pre-science phase that precedes the advent of any universally accepted paradigm.  A means by which this long-standing situation may be escaped is here suggested. This is to treat each of the three distinct theoretical positions that presently drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness as mini-paradigms and then apply the same logic that Kuhn sees as underpinning paradigm shifts in mature sciences to decide which of these three mini-paradigms becomes the first universally accepted paradigm of a mature science of consciousness. At present, the three mini-paradigms that drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness are: (1) the cognitive-science process theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is a process, not a thing"), (2) the neurophysiologists' preferred psychoneural identity theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is brain activity") and (3) the EMF field theory mini-paradigm  ("consciousness is a 4-D electromagnetic pattern generated by brain activity"). In established science, paradigms shift when enough 'anomalies' – falsified predictions or largely unrecognised but once-recognised-unacceptable consequences – build up to make the existing paradigm uncomfortable for those who operate within it.  At this point, a sudden paradigm shift occurs, ushering in another long period of 'normal science' during which the new paradigm drives experimentation. With regard to the three existing mini-paradigms on the nature of consciousness, it is argued that (1) recognition that processes are abstract entities –and that this renders the "consciousness is a process, not a thing" mini-paradigm dualist – makes this mini-paradigm unacceptable to practitioners who regard dualism as unscientific and who prefer to see themselves as staunchly scientific, and therefore as monists. (By definition, monists equate consciousness with physical entities, while dualists equate it with abstract entities). (2) The strong prediction of the "consciousness is brain activity" mini-paradigm – that conscious experiences should invariably correlate with the firing of either particular single neurons or groups of single neurons in the brain – has now been falsified often enough to make this mini-paradigm unacceptable to its practitioners. And this leaves intact only the "consciousness is a 3-D electromagnetic field" mini-paradigm – the idea that conscious experiences are particular 3-dimensional (or, given that they change in time, strictly speaking 4-dimensional) patterns in the electromagnetic field generated by brain activity. And as a result, it is suggested that this third mini-paradigm might usefully become the first universally accepted full paradigm, which would finally allow announcement of the birth of a Kuhnian science of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polák, M. (2022). Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18(2), A1-31. doi:10.31820/ejap.18.2.1
[Abstract]Even after many years of empirical and conceptual research there are underlying controversies which lead scholars to dispute identity theory. One of the most influential examples is Kripke’s modal argument leading to the rejection of the claim that pain and C-fibres firing are identical. The aim of the first part of the paper is to expose that Kripke does not rigorously distinguish the meaning of individual relata entering the identity relation, and therefore his claim about the faultiness of the analogy between propositions “heat is molecular motion”, and “pain is C-fibres firing”, is mistaken. Moreover, whilst much emphasis within metaphysics of mind-brain relations has been placed upon conscious phenomenal states, it might be worthwhile to also consider cases of unconscious phenomenal states. If one admits the unconscious phenomenal states, such as unconscious pain, then, Kripke’s claim is further discredited by the fact that even pain can be individuated through its contingent property. Identity statements about pain could therefore be analogous to any other identity statements. The second part of the paper focuses on the relevance of the modal argument in confrontation with empirical evidence. It argues against the assumption embedded in the modal argument that an identical neurobiological pattern occurs regardless of whether conscious pain is present or completely absent.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018) Neural Correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1269. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269
[Abstract]One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  

Polger, T W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016). The Multiple Realization Book. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polger, T. W. (2011). Are sensations still brain processes? Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1–21.
[Abstract]Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, ‘‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’’ It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s (1959) text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Smart discussed as well as some that he did not anticipate. Finally, I offer a brief manifesto for the identity theory, providing a small list of the claims that I believe the contemporary identity theorist should accept. As it turns out, these are more or less the ones that Smart defended fifty years ago.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Powell, J. P. (1969). The brain and consciousness: a reply to Professor Burt. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 27-28.
[Abstract]This article presents a criticism of C. Burt's article. Essentially, Burt's "mental field" theory is questioned in terms of its plausibility and scientific status. It is argued that the "astonishing complexity of the brain may well baffle us, but our lack of understanding can scarcely be ameliorated by mystery-mongering.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Puccetti, R. (1964). Science, analysis, and the problem of mind. Philosophy, 39(149), 249-259. doi:10.1017/S0031819100055625
[Citing Place (1960)]  

Raimondi, A. (2021). Crane and the mark of the mental. Analysis, 81(4), 683–693. doi.:10.1093/analys/anab035
[Abstract]Brentano’s (1874) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998], 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes’s challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane’s representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Ray, J. (1972). Do mental mvents mxist? Physiological adumbrations. British Journal of Psychiatry, >120(555), 129-132. doi:10.1192/bjp.120.555.129
[Abstract]In this paper, elaboration of a Realist answer to some of the classical questions of psychology and epistemology will be sought, starting from a knowledge of Soviet and Western findings in psychophysiology (particularly the work of Pavlov, 1932, and Hebb, 1949; see also the summary by Burt, 1968). The point of departure taken in the philosophical literature is the paper by Place (1969). This paper will adopt a reflexological model of brain function—with its implied view that memory is synaptically encoded. While this model has largely fallen into disfavour it is used here paradigmatically—to show that well-developed physiological models in general can provide a satisfactory account of ‘mental’ phenomena.
[Citing Place (1969a)]  

Raz, A., & Donchin, O. (2003). A zetetic’s perspective on gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 237-238.
[Abstract]Charmed by Corballis’s presentation, we challenge the use of mirror neurons as a supporting platform for the gestural theory of language, the link between vocalization and cerebral specialization, and the relationship between gesture and language as two separate albeit coupled systems of communication. We revive an alternative explanation of lateralization of language and handedness.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BPv50-Reed.pdf
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Note:
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Rego, F. (2021). Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? In P. Á. Gargiulo, & H. L. Mesones Arroyo (Eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry (Vol. IV, 73-88). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_8
[Abstract]In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Renz, G. (2021). What is God’s Power?. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(3). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3295
[Abstract]Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Reynhout, G., & Carter, M. (2011). Social Stories™: a possible theoretical rationale, European Journal of Special Needs Education, 26(3), 367-378. doi:10.1080/08856257.2011.595172
[Abstract]Social Stories™ are an intervention widely used with individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). This paper discusses a possible theoretical rationale that might account for the purported efficacy of Social Stories™. Attributes of individuals with ASD in relation to Social Story intervention including difficulties with theory of mind (involving perspective taking and emotion perception), weak central coherence, visual learning style, intellectual ability and comprehension, and stimulus overselectivity are considered. In addition, behavioural explanations are explored. Probably the most parsimonious explanation is that Social Stories may be viewed as loose contingency contracts, which highlight natural reinforcers. It is noted however, that the possible underlying mechanisms remain speculative and that there may be many factors involved.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Roberts, H. (1967). The Construction of Consciousness. Psychological Reports, 20(1), 99–102. doi:10.2466/pr0.1967.20.1.99
[Abstract]Consciousness is analyzed after a brief review of some aspects of the present stage of understanding of consciousness. Discerned as its elements are brain configurations, in principle as described by Wolfgang Koehler or D. O. Hebb, and which are functionally termed “schemata.” Basic schemata represent, that is, are activated by and associated with, environmental, somatic, and psychic conditions. Self, being, and relation schemata are defined. Primal and self consciousness (collectively basic consciousness), relational consciousness, and metaconciousness (conciousness of consciousness) are formulated as organizations of schemata.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and sense: A critique of contemporary materialism. Cambridge University Press
[Abstract]Published in 1982 by CUP  it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, Z., Maley, C., & Piccinini, G (2015). Is Consciousness a spandrel? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365-383. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.10
[Abstract]Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Rodríguez, S.S. (2022). The ontology of perceptual experience. Rowman & Littlefield.
[Abstract]Contemporary philosophy of perception typically focuses on discussions concerning the content and the phenomenology of perceptual experience. In a significant departure from this tradition, The Ontology of Perceptual Experience explores the very conscious phenomena to which intentional or phenomenal features are thus ascribed. Drawing on a new wave of research— including the work of maverick philosophers like Helen Steward, Brian O’Shaughnessy, and Matthew Soteriou—this book examines two ways of categorizing perceptual experiences in accordance to their dynamic structure: on the one hand, Experiential Heracliteanism, an approach striving to describe perceptual experiences in terms of irreducibly dynamic components; and, on the other, Experiential Non-Heracliteanism, which conceives perceptual experiences as dynamic phenomena that may nevertheless be described in terms of non-dynamic elements. Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez describes both proposals and makes a modest case on behalf of the Non-Heraclitean approach against its increasingly popular Heraclitean counterpart. This case crucially turns on the fact that the Heracliteanist engages in a controversial and perhaps unnecessary commitment to irreducibly dynamic processes. The ontological framework this book unpacks offers a platform from which traditional issues in the philosophies of mind and perception may be revisited in refreshing and potentially fruitful ways.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rollins, C. D. (1967). Are mental events actual physical? In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 21-37). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ros, A. (1997). Reduktion, Identität und Abstraktion. Philosophie der Psychologie Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um die These von der Identität physischer und psychischer Phänomene. In M. Astroh, D. Gerhardus & G. Heinzmann (Eds.), Dialogisches Handeln. Eine Festschrift für Kuno Lorenz (pp. 403-425). Spektrum Verlag. Republished in: e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie, 2007, 7. www.jp.philo.at/texte/RosA1.pdf
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Roselli, A., & Austin, C. (2021). The dynamical essence of powers. Synthese, 199, 14951–14973. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03450-8
[Abstract]Powers are properties defined by what they do. The focus of the large majority of the powers literature has been mainly put on explicating the (multifaceted) results of the production of a power in certain (multifaceted) initial conditions: but all this causal complexity is bound to be—and, in fact, it has proved to be—quite difficult to handle. In this paper we take a different approach by focusing on the very activity of producing those multifaceted manifestations themselves. In this paper, we propose an original account of what the essence of a power consists in which stems from a radical reconceptualisation of power-causation according to which counterfactuals are to be explained away by powers, and not vice-versa. We call this approach the dynamical operator account of powers. According to this account, the causal role of powers consists in their ensuring that the ontological transition from a stimulus S to a manifestation M happens. Powers thus have a dynamical essence which consists in the fundamental activity of generating the counterfactuals typically associated with them. We show that if one conceptualises this functional activity as the metaphysical fulcrum around which counterfactual-based causation revolves, one is granted not only an improved methodology to individuate powers but also a better understanding of their knowability, modality and directedness.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Schlicht, T. (2022}. Minds, Brains, and Deep Learning: The development of Cognitive Science through the lens of Kant’s approach to cognition. In H. Kim, & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence (Chapter 1, pp. 3-38). De Gruyter.
[Abstract]This paper reviews several ways in which Kant’s approach to cognition has been influential and relevant for the development of various paradigms in cognitive science, such as functionalism, enactivism, and the predictive processing model of the mind. In the second part, it discusses philosophical issues arising from recent developments in artificial intelligence in relation to Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding. More precisely, it investigates questions about perception, cognition, learning, understanding, and about the age-old debate between empiricists and rationalists in the context of so-called deep neural network architectures as well as the relevance of Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding for these issues.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]  

Schoneberger, T. (1991). Verbal understanding: Integrating the conceptual analyses of Skinner, Ryle, and Wittgenstein. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 9, 145-151
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's (1949) and Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953; 1958; 1974/78) conceptual analyses of verbal understanding are presented. For Ryle, the term understanding signifies simultaneously an acquired disposition and a behavioral episode. For Wittgenstein, it signifies simultaneously a skill and a criterial behavior. Both argued that episodes of understanding comprise heterogenious classes of behaviors, and that each member of such a class is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of understanding. Next, an approach integrating the analyses of Ryle and Wittgenstein with that of Skinner is presented. Lastly, it is argued that this integrated analysis adequately counters Parrott's (1984) argument that understanding, for Skinner, is potential behavior and not an event.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  

Schouten, M., & Looren de Jong, H. (2007). Mind matters; The roots of reductionism In M. Schouten, & H. Looren de Jong (Eds.), The matter of the mind: Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Blackwell Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Shaffer, J. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy, 58, 813-822.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
[Abstract]Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a )]  

Shaw, J. (2021). Feyerabend Never Was an Eliminative Materialist: Feyerabend’s Meta-Philosophy and the Mind–Body Problem. In K. Bschir & J. Shaw (Eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays (pp. 114-131). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108575102.007 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340065806_Feyerabend_Never_was_an_Eliminative_Materialist
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind cite Feyerabend as an early proponent of eliminative materialism, or the thesis that there are no mental processes. This attribution, I argue, is incorrect. Rather, Feyerabend only showed that common objections against materialism presuppose problematic meta-philosophical commitments. In this paper, I show how Feyerabend’s meta-philosophy leads him to the conclusion that the mind-body problem admits of many different solutions which are to be sorted out as science progresses. Moreover, I show how Feyerabend’s view evolves from a methodological to an ethical view on what a proper solution to the mind-body problem would entail.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation: Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming. Psychological Review, 91(4), 417–447. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.91.4.417
[Abstract]Attempts a rapprochement between J. J. Gibson's (1961) ecological optics and a conviction that perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming are similarly guided by internalizations of long-enduring constraints in the external world. Phenomena of apparent motion illustrate how alternating presentations of 2 views of an object in 3-dimensional space induce the experience of the simplest rigid twisting motion prescribed by kinematic geometry—provided that times and distances fall within certain lawfully related limits on perceptual integration. Resonance is advanced as a metaphor for not only how internalized constraints such as those of kinematic geometry operate in perception, imagery, apparent motion, dreaming, hallucination, and creative thinking, but also how such constraints can continue to operate despite structural damage to the brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Siewert, C. (2016), Consciousness and Intentionality, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2016 (first version Fall 2002). plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/consciousness-intentionality/
[Abstract]To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, for example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes seen as equivalent to, what is called “mental representation”. Consciousness and intentionality can seem to pervade much or all of mental life—perhaps they somehow account for what it is to have a mind; at any rate they seem to be important, broad aspects of it. But achieving a general understanding of either is an enormous challenge. Part of this lies in figuring out how they are related. Are they independent? Is one (or each) to be understood in terms of the other? How we address the issues to which these questions give rise can have major implications for our views about mind, knowledge, and value.
Note:
The first time Place (1956) is cited is in the Fall 2016 version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Simpson, A. (2022). The museums and collections of higher education. Taylor & Francis.
[Abstract]The Museums and Collections of Higher Education provides an analysis of the historic connections between materiality and higher education, developed through diverse examples of global practice. Outlining the different value propositions that museums and collections bring to higher education, the historic link between objects, evidence and academic knowledge is examined with reference to the origin point of both types of organisation. Museums and collections bring institutional reflection, cross-disciplinary bridges, digital extension options and participatory potential. Given the two primary sources of text and object, a singular source type predisposes a knowledge system to epistemic stasis, whereas mixed sources develop the potential for epistemic disruption and possible change. Museums and collections, therefore, are essential in the academies of higher learning. With the many challenges confronting humanity, it is argued that connecting intellect with social action for societal change through university museums should be a contemporary manifestation of the social contract of universities.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Sklar, L. (1967). Types of inter-iheoretic reduction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18(2), 109–124. www.jstor.org/stable/686579
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skokowski, P. (2022). Sensing Qualia. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405
[Abstract]Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind — Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory — will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24). http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.024 http://courses.washington.edu/lingclas/200/Lectures/Biol/Psycoloquy_2000_Gesture,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
[Abstract]The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Slezak P. P. (2002) Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech. [Comments to Carruthers: The Cognitive Functions of Language.] Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 699-700 doi:10.1017/S0140525X02490127 Link Text
[Abstract]The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak P. P. (2002). The tripartite model of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 239 - 270. doi:10.1080/0951508021000006085 Link Text
[Abstract]Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak P. P. (2008). The 'Hard' Problem and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 30, 525 Link Text
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-vu all over again. [Commentary to Pylyshyn’s article: Mental Imagery]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 209–210.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). Thinking about thinking: language, thought and introspection. Language & Communication, 22, 353–373. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00012-5 Link Text
[Abstract]I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think ‘in’ language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor’s ‘language of thought’. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the ‘imagery debate’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2018). Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously. Philosophy, 93(4), 529-555. doi:10.1017/S0031819118000232 Link Text
[Abstract]In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1957) Plausible reasoning in philosophy. Mind, 66(261), 75-78.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 252-254.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963), Philosophy and scientific realism. Routledge and Kegan Paul
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1966). Philosophy and scientific plausibility. In P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Mind, matter and method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl (pp. 377-390). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1959)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [6 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese, 22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1989). C. B. Martin: A biographical sketch. In J. Heil (Ed. ), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 1-3). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Smart (2007) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Snowdon, P. F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 137-158). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf

Sorem, E. (2010). Searle, materialism, and the mind-body problem. Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy, 3, 30-54. www.ucd.ie/philosophy/perspectives/resources/issue3/Perspectives_volumeIII_SearleMaterialismMindBody.pdf
[Abstract]In The Rediscovery of Mind, Searle gives a spirited attempt to offer a “simple solution” to the mind-body problem in his “biological naturalism.” It is the purpose of this paper, however, to show that the solution he offers is not simple and is arguably incoherent as it currently stands. I focus on Searle’s claim that the key to solving the mind-body problem is to first reject the system of conceptual categories that underlies materialism and then adopt his biological naturalism. I argue that the positions articulated in this theory, however, appear to generate serious inconsistencies that make his proposal look either incoherent or suggestive of the sort of property dualism he wants to reject. Because Searle lacks a sufficient metaphysical scheme to produce compelling arguments against these particular accusations and because it is not clear that biological naturalism is the obvious or common-sense position he says it is, I conclude that his proposal cannot be a “simple solution.”
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149. www.jstor.org/stable/41236095
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989c)]  
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf

Stubenberg, L. (1997). Austria vs. Australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In K. Lehler, & J. C. Marek (Eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller (pp. 125-146). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Abstract]According to the received view the identity theory was developed in the decade stretching from the mid fifties to the mid sixties. At the time the identity theory seemed like an outrageous minority view. In the face of near universal opposition the early identity theorists developed a remarkable esprit de corps—they emphasized the similarities and de-emphasized the differences of their respective views. This sort of team spirit may have seemed essential to win a philosophical battle; but it also helped to obscure the crucial differences between the various theories that sailed under the flag of the identity theory. Today I want to invert the strategy of the early identity theorist—I want to emphasize the differences and de-emphasize the similarities between the early versions of the identity theory.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stubenberg, L. (1998). Consciousness and qualia. John Benjamins.
[Abstract]Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Sundberg, M. L (1991). 301 Research topics from Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 9(1), 81-96. doi:10.1007/BF03392862
[Abstract]Skinner’s (1957) analysis of verbal behavior addresses some of the most important issues in human behavior. However, relatively few of the analyses presented by Skinner in Verbal Behavior have been subjected to an experimental analysis. The current list of topics was assembled in an effort to stimulate empirical research on verbal behavior. The list contains thirty research areas with ten topics suggested for each area. A final topic, education, is presented as a challenge to behavior analysts.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Suojanen, M. (2019). Conscious experience and quantum consciousness theory: Theories, causation, and identity. E-LOGOS – Electronic Journal for Philosophy, 26(2), 14–34. doi:10.18267/j.e-logos.465
[Abstract]Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which mind and conscious experience are explained in terms of quantum theory. This article argues that experience is impossible to be both a physical and non-physical phenomenon. When discussing causality and identity as transcendental, quantum theory may imply the quantum physical nature of conscious experience, where a person associates causality to conscious experience, and, thus, the result is that the double-aspect theory and the mind/brain identity theory would be refuted.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2002a)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review, 76, 201-213.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Taylor, C. (1969). Two issues about materialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 19(74), 73–79. doi:10.2307/2218192
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  

te Vrugt, M., Needham, P., & Schmitz, G. J. (2022) Is thermodynamics fundamental? arXiv:2204.04352v1 [physics.hist-ph] 9 Apr 2022 doi:10.48550/arXiv.2204.04352
[Abstract]It is a common view in philosophy of physics that thermodynamics is a non-fundamental theory. This is motivated in particular by the fact that thermodynamics is considered to be a paradigmatic example for a theory that can be reduced to another one, namely statistical mechanics. For instance, the statement "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy" has become a textbook example for a successful reduction, despite the fact that this statement is not correct for a large variety of systems. In this article, we defend the view that thermodynamics is a fundamental theory, a position that we justify based on four case studies from recent physical research. We explain how entropic gravity (1) and black hole thermodynamics (2) can serve as case studies for the multiple realizability problem which blocks the reduction of thermodynamics. Moreover, we discuss the problem of the reducibility of phase transitions and argue that bifurcation theory (3) allows the modelling of "phase transitions" on a thermodynamic level even in finite systems. It is also shown that the derivation of irreversible transport equations in the Mori-Zwanzig formalism (4) does not, despite recent claims to the contrary, constitute a reduction of thermodynamics to quantum mechanics. Finally, we briefly discuss some arguments against the fundamentality of thermodynamics that are not based on reduction.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]