Philosophy, psychology and philosophical psychology
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Psychology emerged as an independent scientific discipline one hundred years ago with the foundation by Wilhelm Wundt of the first laboratory of Experimental Psychology at the University of Leipzig in 1879. Wundt, a physiologist by training held the post of Professor of Philosophy at Leipzig and Experimental Psychology as he conceived it was a matter of applying the experimental methods of sensory physiology to the investigation of the traditional philosophical problems about the way in which the human mind acquires knowledge from sense experience or sensation.

Although this conception of psychology as providing an experimental scientific underpinning for epistemology did not survive beyond the first generation of psychologist trained by Wundt himself, psychology has never succeeded entirely in establishing its right to complete independence from its parent discipline. Despite the fact that philosophers have long since abandoned their claim to pass judgement on matters of psychological fact on the basis of "armchair" introspection and despite the redefinition of the subject matter of psychology by the American Behaviorist Movement led by J. B. Watson from the study of the private experience and mental processes of human beings to the study of objectively observable behaviour of organisms in general, philosophers still consider that they have a right to question, legislate and pass judgement on the conceptual and theoretical behaviour of the psychologist to an extent and in a way in which they would never presume to question, legislate or pass judgement upon the conceptual and theoretical behaviour of the physicist, the chemist, the biologist, the economist or the historian. Only the sociologist suffers from a similar indignity at the hands of the philosopher. But concern for the conceptual indiscretions of the psychologist is far more widespread among philosophers than is the corresponding concern for the often far more blatant and deep-rooted conceptual ineptitudes of the sociologist.

Part of the reason for this situation is that like the sociologist, but unlike the physicist, the chemist, the biologist, the economist or the historian, the psychologist has not yet succeeded in evolving a generally agreed conceptual and theoretical framework or "paradigm", as T. S. Kuhn (1962) calls such things, within which to conduct his research and frame his more specific hypotheses and explanations. Although the rival Schools of Psychology which flourished in the period between the first and second World Wars have largely disappeared as coherent affiliations within Psychology, they have been succeeded, not by a single coherent theoretical programme, but on the one hand by a multiplicity of shortlived fads and fashions each claiming for the duration of its brief moment to have the philosopher's stone which will finally unlock the mysteries of the human and/or animal soul, and on the other hand by a bland eclecticism which tries vainly to cover up the yawning claims that separate the different, theoretical positions with a blanket of conceptual confusion.

So long as this confused situation persists, psychologists can never hope to achieve the enviable position enjoyed by the physicists and other natural scientists of providing a model or recipe for scientific success which can be distilled from their scientific practice by philosophers of science and passed on to other discipline, if such there be, in a yet more primitive stage of scientific evolution. As psychologists well know, from the fate of the crucial experiments which were expected to decide the issues between S-R and S-S learning theorists in the 1940s, conceptual and theoretical differences of this kind cannot be settled on the basis of the empirical evidence alone, since each party to any such quarrel can always accommodate any empirical findings which appear to support the conclusions of his opponents by reinterpreting them in terms of his own conceptual framework. Consequently the only weapon the protagonists of any two such conflicting theoretical positions have left to them in order to support the claims of the one against the other is the weapon of philosophical argument and

debate. And so long as <u>that</u> is their only weapon and they cannot forbear to use it, they place themselves in a position in which they cannot reasonably refuse to defer to the opinion of the professional philosopher who is the expert in its use.

This, however, is only part of the story. What it explains is why psychologists so often find themselves in the position of having to defer to the superior wisdom of the philosopher in the matter of their own internal controversies. What it does not explain why the philosophers should concern themselves with such internal controversies within psychology far more readily and far more often than they concern themselves with similar controversies within sociology whose case in this respect is certainly not better and if anything a great deal worse than that of psychology. To understand the special concern of the philosopher with matter psychological we need to know something more about the nature and history of philosophy considered both as an academic discipline and as a form of intellectual activity.

<u>The nature and origins of philosophy</u>

As far the European cultural tradition is concerned philosophy, as its name implies (from the Greek φιλειν = to love and σοφια = wisdom), is an invention of the Ancient Greek Civilization and was the exclusive and even distinctive preoccupation of that culture and civilisation for the best part of a millennium from the 5th century B.C. down to the 5th century A.D. The importance attached to philosophy in Greek culture was recognised at the very beginning of the Christian era by St. Paul, who after his experience of preaching in Athens, wrote in his first letter to the Corinthians "For the Jews require a sign and <u>the Greek seek after wisdom</u>, but we preach Christ crucified unto the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greek foolishness" (1 Corinthians 1:22-23).

This Greek tradition of philosophical thinking originated, significantly enough, in the Ionian cities along the Western fringe of the mainland of Asia Minor and was perpetuated by the Athenians who controlled these cities along with intervening islands of the Agean as parts of Athenian empire during the principal point of culture contact between Greek civilisation and the ancient civilisations of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley, then dominated by the Persian Empire which extended, as the later Greek Empire of Alexander was to do, as far as the fringes of the Indian sub-continent with its ancient civilisation based on the Valley of the Indus.

The individuality of a particular human culture or civilisation may be said to consist in (a) a common and distinctive language, (b) a common and distinctive set of ethical and aesthetic values and (c) a common and distinctive set of magico-religious beliefs and practices. A group of people untied in these three respects may be said to share a common culture despite differences in political, economic or technological organisation. Where differences in these areas exist, there is a difference of culture which may exist and persist despite political, economic and technological uniformity. These cultural differences between groups create an unavoidable barrier to communication and cooperation between groups of people who differ in these ways and the problem this creates must have troubled mankind ever since such differences first began to develop. The problem presented by the differences in language is relatively easily overcome provided that some members of one group are prepared to learn the language of the other and become bilingual. Aesthetic values are usually quite readily taken over by one group from the other or mingled together to form a distinctive syncretistic style at the point of culture contact. Much more intractable are the differences in ethical values in terms of which the personal relationships are regulated within the group which shares them and the differences in magico-religious belief with their associated rites and customs. Differences of this kind between communities living in close contact with one and another has been, and it still is, a potent source of conflict and dissention.

Many different solutions to this problem have been tried in the history of mankind. One solution, often tried, but seldom, if ever, successful, is for the politically dominant group to impose its ethical values and religious beliefs on the subjected people. Another solution available to a politically dominant group is that which is illustrated by the so-called <u>interpretatio Romana</u> whereby the beliefs and practices of the subjected people are reinterpreted in so far as this proves possible and politically

acceptable, in terms of beliefs and practices of the dominant group, based often on the slenderest of isomorphisms between the two. Then there is the Hindu solution in which groups with different cultural traditions and beliefs maintain their separate identities while being integrated into a wider society by means of a hierarchically ordered and exclusive caste system. In practice, however, this system is combined with a considerable degree of assimilation of the ethical principles and religious beliefs of the different groups to those of the dominant Brahmin caste along the lines of the interpretatio Romana.

A more radical solution is the adoption by groups with different cultural traditions of a set religious beliefs and moral principles which is not identical with those of any one of the groups concerned, as in the case of a wholesale conversion to one of the great universal religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. However the history of these great religious movements suggests that a necessary precondition for the adoption of this solution is the widespread acceptance of the basic principle of what we may call the philosophical solution to this problem, the recognition of the possibility that none of the existing cultural traditions has a monopoly of wisdom in these matters and that the right answer may be something different form all of them that is yet to be found.

On this interpretation philosophy, in the broader sense which includes much of what we now think of as belonging to the natural and social sciences, is the attempt to resolve the problem of divergent ethical principles and systems of magico-religious belief, partly by speculation, that is to say, by inventing and exploring new ways of thinking about the issues on which different views are held in different cultural traditions, but more particularly by trying to decide between the different cultural traditions and the alternatives to them generated by speculative thinking through a process of rational argument and debate.

Philosophy as speculative metaphysics and the Scientific Revolution

The characteristic problems of philosophy in this broader sense are such issues as the origin and nature of the universe, the origin and nature of life in general and human life in particular, the nature and manner of operation of unseen forces that control human destiny in all its aspects, the fertility of herds and crops, the success or failure of a business venture, victory or defeat in battle, the health or sickness of body and mind, what lies beyond the grave and, in the light of the answers given to these questions, the idea of the correct recipe for happiness, right conduct and the proper ordering of the body politic.

The first thing to note about the issues I have hinted is that since the onset of the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century many of these issues ceased to be matters of philosophical speculation and debate and have become matters of scientific knowledge dealt with by specialists in the natural, biological and social sciences rather than by philosophers. Thus the origin and nature of the Universe is dealt with by physics and astronomy, the origin and nature of life and the causes of the fertility in corps and herds by biology, the causes of health and sickness by scientific medicine, and business success and failure by economics. The philosophers are left to debate life, if such there be, beyond the grave, and the recipes for happiness, right conduct and the proper organisation of society, primarily because no scientific decision procedure for settling issues of these kinds has yet been devised.

These considerations gives us a clue to one of the reasons why the philosopher tends to perceive the psychologists as intruding or liable to intrude on his (the philosopher's) private preserves. For if ethics and the problem of life after death are all that remain to the philosopher of his original empire after the depredations of the scientific revolution, a would-be science which purports to study (a) that hypothetical part of the human person which must be postulated, if there is to be any kind of continued existence of the person after the dissolution of his body and (b) the causes of the behaviour and conduct of human beings for which ethics seeks to prescribe cannot fail to raise and, in so far as it succeeds, seriously constrain the possible answers that can be given to such questions, even if it does not settle them beyond all possibility of further philosophical debate.

This view of the relationship between philosophy and psychology is based upon what we may call the positivist view of the relationship between sciences and philosophy which holds that philosophical speculation, argument and debate survives only in those areas where the method of

deductive reasoning as in mathematics and formal logic and the methods of systematic observation and experimental test, as in the natural, biological and social sciences, have not yet succeeded in settling the issues decisively one way or the other. On this view all that is needed to bring these otherwise indeterminable philosophical debates to an end is a more rigorous and effective application of the traditional methods of empirical sciences in those areas such as psychology and sociology where all the major unresolved substantive problems of philosophy, the mind-body problem, the problem of the freedom of the will and the problem of ethics and political philosophy, are to be found.

<u>Philosophy as Methodology</u>

It may well happen in the not too distant future that these remaining substantive problems of philosophy will become technical problems in empirical psychology and sociology. The mind-body problem could soon become a technical issue in neurophysiology and physiological psychology; the problem of the freedom of the will may likewise become a technical problem in the social psychology of moral judgements and their effect on social behaviour; that of providing a recipe for personal happiness may become, as it already partly is, a technical issue in the field of psychopathology and psychotherapy; while the problem of providing a recipe for moral conduct and the proper ordering of society may ultimately be given a technical rationale within sociology. But it would be a mistake to suppose that, were this to happen, philosophy as a distinct branch of human enquiry would be finally liquidated.

   The reason why we can be quite confident that this final liquidation of philosophy envisaged by the positivists will not happen is that in the course of its development philosophy has acquired another set of problems of a logical and methodological kind and a set of techniques for handling those problems which in the nature of things cannot be taken over by any existing science or any science that might conceivably be developed in the future.

   The interest of philosophers in these fundamental conceptual, methodological and logical problems seems to have originated in what was initially little more than a piece of "gamesmanship", a sophistical devise for scoring points off one's opponent in an argument of debate where the proof or evidence required to settle the issue decisively one way or the other is not available to either party. In a debate of this kind one can readily stop an opponent who is unprepared for such a move by raising questions, not so much about the substantive issue under discussion, as about the meaning of the words used in framing the question and the answer that is being given to it, about the grounds or evidence for the different assertions being made and about the validity of the arguments whereby the grounds or evidence purporting to justify a given thesis or assertion are linked to that thesis or assertion.

   Not only have philosophers developed special conceptual and logical skills for handling particular questions of this kind as they arise in the course of a particular discussion or debate, they have also taken the practice of raising such questions to its most general and logical conclusions by exploring such issues as the way in which words, expressions and sentences come to have whatever meaning they do have, how we can justify any claim that a given assertion or proposition is true and known to be true, and precisely what it is about any argument which determines whether or not it is valid or fallacious. Since it involves raising what Kant calls "transcendental" questions, concerning the justification of any claim that a given proposition or judgement is true and known to be true, the discussion of such issues is logically prior to any decision that is taken as to the truth or falsity of any particular judgment or proposition. Any scientist, before he can proceed to raise the appropriate questions within his field of competence or attempt to answer those questions in accordance with the traditional canons of scientific method, must assume certain standard conventions for the use of the words he employs in asking his initial questions and in defining whatever technical terms he may adopt for the purpose of answering those questions. He must assume without argument or demonstration that the methods he uses to reach his conclusions are valid and are capable under the appropriate conditions of yielding conclusions which are not only true, but known to be true. He must make these assumptions and take them for granted, because if, like the philosopher, he refused to set

about dealing with the substantive issues until he was quite clear about the meanings of his basic undefined concepts and the logical justification for his methodology he would never get started on his real business of dealing with the substantive issues themselves. What he cannot do is to deny the philosopher's right to raise these questions about his (the scientist's) concepts and methodology. Nor without engaging in serious philosophical discussion himself can he hope to substantiate the claim that his own methodological procedures are appropriate to answering these second order questions about the justification of those procedures themselves.

Here then we have a series of questions, conceptual questions about the meaning of the basic undefined terms which any language which is to be a medium of interpersonal communication must possess, epistemological questions about the justification of the whole process whereby we ask questions, give answers and judge some of those answers to be true and others false, and logical questions about validity of arguments and the implications or entailments of certain judgments or assertions, which the philosopher can claim as distinctively philosophical without there being any danger that some upstart science such as philosophy can take them from him, and where the philosopher's special expertise in handling such questions cannot be disputed without ipso facto playing the philosopher's game, and playing it better than he does himself.

The Philosophy of Psychology

Philosophers have been debating these conceptual, epistemological and logical issues since the time of Socrates who, to judge from Plato's Socratic dialogues, seems to have been the first philosopher to make systematic use of the practice of raising these second order questions in the context of a philosophical discussion. But the displacement of the older conception of philosophy as speculative metaphysics by the conception of philosophy as primarily, if not exclusively concerned with these second order methodological issues is a relatively recent development due partly to the success of the continuously expanding Scientific Revolution that has been with us since the time of Galileo in removing most of the traditional substantive issues of philosophy from the area of speculation and debate, and partly to the revolution in the science of Logic which began when Gottlob Frege of the University of Jena published his Begriffschrift in 1879, the same year that Wundt established the first Psychological Laboratory in the neighbouring University of Leipzig.

From this conception of philosophy as the discipline primarily concerned with the fundamental conceptual, epistemological, methodological and logical issues that arise in connection with any form of intellectual enquiry whatsoever derives the modern conception of the relation between philosophy and other academic disciplines which is expressed in the emergence of a whole range of new branches of philosophical enquiry concerned with the conceptual, epistemological, methodological and logical issues concerning the fundamental concepts, theories and research methods which are peculiar to and distinctive of a particular academic discipline. Thus we have the Philosophy of Science with its subdivisions, the Philosophy of Mathematics, the Philosophy of Physics, the Philosophy of Biology, the Philosophy of Psychology and the Philosophy of Social Science, the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Law or Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Religion conceived as the Philosophy of Theology and Religious Studies. Here we see Philosophy no longer competing with other disciplines in the attempt to settle substantive issues, but concerned instead with examining second order questions about the concepts and methodology employed by specialists in these other fields, which the specialist himself cannot afford to do, because to do so would interfere with the effective and productive use of those concepts and the application of that methodology, to the substantive issues which concern him.

Conceived in this way as a branch of the philosophy of science concerned with the fundamental concepts, theories and methodology of Psychology, the Philosophy of Psychology has, on the face of it, an important, but nevertheless ancillary role to play in relation to the science of psychology itself. This conception of the relationship between the two disciplines does not justify any claim on the part of the philosopher to pass judgment on matters which are of professional concern to the psychologist, any more than a philosopher of physics would be justified in passing judgment on

issues within the professional competence of the physicist, except in so far as the greater prestige and obvious success of the physical sciences make it less likely that the philosopher will presume to pass judgment on the logical propriety of the physicist's concepts, theories and arguments.

Philosophy and Psychology of the Higher Mental Processes

There are however at least three sets of considerations which suggest that the Philosophy of Psychology is a special case in this respect, and that the professional psychologist cannot avoid taking philosophical considerations of the conceptual, epistemological and logical kind into account in his activity as a scientist in the way that a physicist or a historian can usually avoid such issues with respect to his own discipline.

The first of these three sets of considerations is the consideration that all phenomena, if we may so describe them, about which the philosopher raises his second order conceptual and methodological issues, namely concepts, the meaning of words, propositions and arguments or inferences are phenomena which on any interpretation of the subject matter of psychology must constitute an important part of that subject matter. Concept formation, language learning, the formation and retention of propositional attitudes (knowledge and beliefs) and thinking or reasoning form, as they have always done, an essential and central part of the psychology of the so-called "higher mental processes", and it is evident that no psychological investigation in this area can proceed very far without some considerations of what philosophers have to say on such matters. It is true that the psychologist's concern in this field is different from the philosopher's. In dealing with concepts and the theory of meaning, the philosopher seeks to tease out and characterise the meanings of particular words and expressions and to draw such distinctions as are required in order to give a coherent account of what it means to say of someone that he understands what is said to him. He is not directly concerned with the specifically psychological problem about how human beings acquire the concepts and learn the meanings of those words which they acquire and learn or about the brain mechanisms that need to be postulated in order to account for their ability to do so. Similarly in the case of propositions, and arguments, what interests the philosopher is the problem of the truth or falsity of the propositions, the validity or otherwise of the inferences and, how far this can be conclusively determined and guaranteed. The psychologist, on the other hand, takes the truth or falsity of the propositions which his subjects come to believe and the validity or otherwise of the inferences they draw very much for granted. What interests him are such questions as why people tend to believe p when the available evidence for q is as good, if not better than, for p, why people find it easier to acquire, retain or retrieve the knowledge that p than to acquire, retain, or retrieve the knowledge that q, why they find it easier to draw some inferences rather than others and what sort of mechanism in the brain has to be postulated in order to account for human abilities and disabilities in these respects.

But although the problems confronting the philosopher and the psychologist are different, they are problems concerning the same features of the universe and no general account of concepts, meaning, propositions, propositional attitudes and inferences, can be ultimately acceptable, which does not take into account both of the distinctions and other considerations which are of importance to functions performed in practice by human subjects and other forms of living organism. It should be noted, however, that this argument leads as strongly to the conclusion that philosophers need to study the empirical evidence supplied by psychologist as to how human beings acquire concepts, learn language, acquire, retain and retrieve information and misinformation and draw inferences and conclusions from that information, as it does to the conclusion that psychologists need to study what the philosophers have to say about the analysis of concepts, the theory of meaning, epistemology and logic.

The reflexive nature of psychological research

The second consideration which suggests that philosophical considerations impinge on the practice of psychology in a way that they do not impinge on the work of other specialists is the one to which Linschoten draws attention in his book <u>Idolen van de psycholoog</u>, namely that psychology is in what

from a methodological point of view is a unique situation in that psychology considered as a variety of intellectual activity forms part of the subject matter of the science itself. This problem of the partly reflexive character of psychology does not present as many difficulties today as it did in Wundt's time when it was thought that only a trained psychologist was capable of correctly observing psychological phenomena. Thanks to Watson and the behaviourists it is now accepted that the basic empirical data of psychology consist in objective observations of performance and behaviour rather than in the data of introspective observation. Consequently the problem of the reflexive nature of psychological research no longer arises at the level of observation. Where it does still arise is at the theoretical level where any general theory of human intellectual activity and competence which does not account for the intellectual activity involved in the construction of such a theory is necessarily self-falsifying. While the problems which this situation presents are no doubt of a kind to which the conceptual and logical skills of the philosopher are well adapted, I am not convinced that there are any problems here which cannot be handled equally well by a reasonably clear headed psychologist.

Nevertheless it is perhaps worth pointing out in this connection that although few psychologists today make much use of introspective data in the classical Wundtian sense, and many would reject such evidence outright as scientifically unacceptable, the phenomenon whereby human beings appear to have the ability to observe and report on occurrences within the system controlling their behaviour (query their brains) whose occurrence cannot at present be detected and identified as such in any other way by an independent observer, is a psychological phenomenon in its own right which psychologists have a clear duty to investigate and explain. That they have so far significantly failed even to address themselves to the task is due partly to the fear of trespassing on what has been traditionally regarded as the preserve of the philosopher, but partly no doubt to the genuinely very difficult conceptual and logical problems confronting any one venturing into this area. Here, at least, is one psychological problem which is unlikely to be solved without close collaboration between psychologists and philosophers.

<u>Philosophical Psychology and its relevanc for empirical psychology</u>

Thirdly and finally there are the considerations which suggest that what is variously referred to as "philosophical psychology" or the "philosophy of mind" has practical implications for the empirical science of psychology.

Philosophical psychology may be described as the philosophical rump of the older mental philosophy after it had given birth to the science of psychology in the course of the last century. In other words philosophical psychology is concerned with those residual philosophical problems concerning the mind and its workings which were not incorporated in the new science of empirical psychology at its foundation in the late 19th century and more especially since the behaviourist revolution in psychology of the 1920's which separated out the empirical and philosophical issues within psychology rather more sharply than they had been separated in earlier introspective phase of psychology's history. During the course of the 1930's and 1940's philosophical psychology began to emerge as a branch of philosophical inquiry, wholly divorced from empirical psychology, in so far as the philosopher had now ceased to claim any special knowledge and expertise concerning matters of empirical psychological fact. The starting point of this development were the lectures largely devoted to this topic, given by Wittgenstein at Cambridge in the course of the 1930's and 1940's, which provided the basis of his <u>Philosophical Investigations</u> published posthumously in 1953 and indirectly for Ryle's book <u>The Concept of Mind</u> published four years earlier in 1949.

Although there is a substantial area of overlap and agreement between the tradition in philosophical psychology which stems from the work of Wittgenstein himself and that which springs from Ryle and <u>The Concept of Mind</u> there is also an important difference between these two traditions in that whereas Wittgenstein's interests in the field of philosophical psychology derive from an underlying preoccupation with fundamental problems in the philosophy of language and communication, which led him in particular into a consideration of the logical problems involved in the communication of private experience, Ryle, although he uses the material as means of demolishing

certain traditional philosophical and psychological theories about the mind, sets out quite specifically with the object of examining what he calls "the logical geography of the psychological or mental concepts of ordinary language". One of the consequences of this difference of emphasis is that the distinction between what I have called the philosophy of psychology, concerned with the concepts, methods and forms of explanation appropriate to the science of psychology, and philosophical psychology, concerned with the psychological concepts and forms of explanation used by ordinary people in ordinary non-technical contexts, is not as clear in the Wittgensteinian tradition, as it is that which stems from Ryle. And it is with philosophical psychology in the Rylean rather than the Wittgensteinian sense that we are here concerned.

Given this Rylean definition of philosophical psychology as the study of the psychological concepts of ordinary non-technical discourse, we need to know whether this form of enquiry has any relevance for the technical purposes of an empirical and experimental science of psychology. Why, we may well ask, should the psychologist pay any attention to the ordinary pre-scientific discourse within his area of competence, when other scientists see no reason to examine the ordinary pre-scientific concepts in their fields except as an historical curiosity? It certainly cannot be plausibly argued in the light of the experience of other more developed sciences that the psychologist is guilty of some fundamental logical or philosophical mistake, if for his own technical purposes he employs derived from the psychological language of ordinary discourse in a new way which contravenes the norms and conventions governing the use of those terms as they occur in the context of ordinary language.

Ever since Galileo broke away from the conceptual conservatism of the Aristotelian tradition, the freedom of scientists to develop new concepts and theories for their own technical purposes untrammelled by the traditional conventions and misconceptions embodied in ordinary language and common sense, has been one of the most important factors in making possible the remarkable achievements of the natural sciences since that time. There is no reason to suppose that this freedom for conceptual innovation will not prove to be just as important for the development of psychology as it has been in the case of other empirical sciences.

Nevertheless there are four sets of considerations which apply in the case of psychology in a way in which they do not apply in the case of other natural and biological sciences, which suggest that the psychologist cannot afford to neglect the study of the ordinary common sense concepts within his field of competence in the way that scientists in the other fields are able to do.

The first set of considerations relate to the use of the psychological language of common sense and ordinary discourse in predicting and explaining the behaviour of other people. As George Kelly has pointed out in his book The Psychology of Personal Constructs, the most important ability which a human being requires in order to adapt effectively to his environment is the ability to predict within limits how his environment is likely to change from moment to moment and for most human beings the most important aspect of that environment whose prospective changes need to be predicted is the behaviour of other human beings. It is therefore not at all surprising to find that, embedded in psychological language of common sense, there is a highly sophisticated and on the whole very efficient conceptual system whose primary function is to make it possible to predict the behaviour of other human beings. I refer here to the system whereby the actions of an individual are explained and predicted from a set assumptions about the various inferences which he is likely to draw from those propositions and about his purposes, motives and intentions with respect to the state of affairs to which those propositions refer. The distinctive feature of this system of behavioural explanation is that it provides us with a way of predicting what a man will do on the assumption that there is a consistent and "rational" relationship between what he says and what he does. While it is true that this consistent and rational relationship does not always hold, the very fact that we are able to rely on it so extensively in everyday life and become so uneasy when, as in the case of insanity, it ceases to hold, shows that it is a form of explanation, with which a scientific psychology can ill afford to dispense when dealing with those aspects of human behaviour over which the relationship holds. We may be able to refine this system of explanation for scientific purposes, particularly by introducing techniques for quantifying and measuring the strength of motives and the confidence with which beliefs are held,

as is done in statistical decision theory. But it seems unlikely that we shall ever be able to replace it altogether. And until we do, it remains a naturally occurring theoretical system whose logical working we shall do well to understand.

Secondly, in addition to this basic theoretical framework for explaining human behaviour by relating what a man says to what he does, the long history of man's attempt to understand and predict the behaviour of himself and his fellows has left its mark on the psychological language of common sense in many other ways, so that a study of this system of concepts is still capable of bringing to light many subtle features of behaviour not only of humans, but in some cases of animals also, which the psychologist with his relatively blunt conceptual tools has not yet fully incorporated into the scientific account of the behaviour of organisms which he is trying to develop. A particularly rich harvest in this respect, so it seems to me, awaits the psychologist who is prepared to employ the techniques of conceptual analysis developed by philosophers in order to study the complex language of feeling and emotion which forms an integral part of the psychology of common sense.

My third set of considerations arise out of the observation that an important part of the empirical data of which the psychologist must take account in studying human behaviour, particularly in the fields of clinical and social psychology, consists in statements made by the individual subject or patient about his reasons for acting as he does, his beliefs, attitudes, purposes and intentions, as well as his private thoughts, experiences and feelings. In order to avoid the charge of contaminating his data by training his subjects to use his own theoretical concepts, the psychologist can only validly make use of statements of this kind made by subjects and patients who are psychological naïve; and the account which the naïve subject gives of the reasons for his own behaviour are necessarily formulated in terms of the psychological concepts of ordinary language rather than in terms or the technical concepts of psychological theory. This means that unless the psychologist is content to conceptualise the behaviour he is studying in terms of the same set of concepts as those employed by his subjects, he is faced with a serious problem of translating what the subject or patient is saying into his own technical language. It is for this reason, I suggest, that social psychologists and psychotherapists, who are concerned with the problem of influencing the behaviour of the individual through the medium of verbal communication, are understandably reluctant to abandon theoretical formulation of the so-called "cognitive" and "dynamic" type which preserve the basic logical structure of the psychological language of ordinary discourse. For to use a theoretical language which preserves this logical structure simplifies very considerably the problems of translating from the ordinary language statements made and understood by the subject or patients into the theoretical language of the psychologist and vice versa.

In recent years, however, it has become apparent, particularly in the field of clinical psychology, that there are considerable advantages to be gained from analysing and describing certain aspects of this behaviour in terms of theoretical languages such as stimulus-response behaviourism, information theory and neuro-physiology which have very different logical structures from that of common sense psychology. When such theoretical formulations are used, the problem of incorporating information derived from the patient's own self-report into the account given by the psychologist becomes extremely difficult and cannot in my view be satisfactorily handled without a clear understanding both of the logical structure of the psychological language of common sense in which the patient's statements are framed and of the logical structure of the technical language in terms of which the psychologists frame his theoretical explanation. The interpretation of the logical structure of the technical language of psychology is the job of the philosophy of psychology; the interpretation of the language of common sense psychology is the function of philosophical psychology.

Fourthly and finally there is the related problem which has already been briefly mentioned of studying and explaining the phenomenon whereby human subjects have the ability to make these self-reports and in so doing to report the occurrence of private thoughts and experiences whose occurrence cannot at present be detected in any other way. The problem is that there is no independent check on the accuracy of these reports. Furthermore, as was demonstrated in the famous controversy over Imageless Thoughts or Bewusstseinslagen between Külpe and his associates at Würzburg and

Titchener at Cornell in the first decade of this century, you cannot appeal to the observations of so-called trained introspective observers in such matters without encountering the objection that the observations of any such trained observer are necessarily contaminated by the psychological theories implicit in that training. Consequently the only empirical data we can legitimately use in studying this remarkable human capacity are again the self-reports of naïve human subjects, couched as they necessarily are in terms of the psychological concepts of common sense and ordinary discourse. Here again, any conclusions that the psychologist may wish to draw on the basis of these self-reports, either about the way in which they are produced or about the nature of the occurrences they report, must take into account the kind of information which the philosophical psychologist can provide about language and concepts in terms of which the self-reports of the naïve subject are framed.

Research at the interface between philosophy and psychology

While it is not difficult to envisage a programme of collaborative research between philosophers and psychologists along the lines indicated here, it is much more difficult to point to any actual body of work that has been or is being pursued in these directions. Such work as has been done in recent years has been concentrated almost exclusively in the area of concept formation and language acquisition. Most of this work has been done by psychologists with a philosophical background like Jean Piaget, George Kelly or the linguist Noam Chomsky's two psychologist lieutenants Jerrold Katz and J. A. Fodor. Unfortunately Piaget's work suffers in the eyes of philosophers from being stated in terms of a philosophically outdated conceptual framework which is difficult to reconcile with modern logic and conceptual analysis. George Kelly's theory of what he calls constructs, though separated from it by the adoption of an alien terminology, is much closer to the spirit of conceptual analysis as understood by the philosopher, than is the not dissimilar work of Osgood which preserves the traditional language of concepts. The work of Katz and Fodor is more in touch with contemporary work in logic and philosophy but suffers from an overzealous commitment to the controversial doctrines of Chomsky's transformational grammar, which, although it has philosophical implications, is primarily a theory of grammatical syntax.

On the philosophical side the only philosophers of any significance and reputation who have made any appreciable use of contemporary psychology in their theories of language acquisition and use are Charles Morris who developed a theory of what he calls "Sign-Behavior" in the 1940's, based on Hull's S-R learning theory, and W. van O. Quine who has more recently made use of some parts of Skinner's theory to account for certain features of language acquisition. One can only wish that Skinner had made similar use of Quine's logical expertise before he wrote Verbal Behavior. Had he done so he might have avoided laying himself open to some of the more devastating criticisms in Chomsky's famous review of that book.

As far as the study of the psychological concepts of ordinary language is concerned, there is little evidence that psychologists have yet begun to see this as a problem for them. Where they have done, as in the case of Fritz Heider's studies of what he calls the naïve psychology, there is no apparent appreciation of the value and importance of the contribution to this area of study made by philosophers like Wittgenstein and Ryle. Nor have the philosophers themselves appreciated the nature and value of their potential contribution in this respect for the work of the psychologist.

The main reason for this situation, I suggest, is that the legitimacy of using the psychological concepts of ordinary language and their derivatives within what purports to be a scientific psychology is still a deeply divisive issue within psychology, a controversy in which the advocates of a cognitive and/or dynamic psychology invoke the assistance of the philosopher in their campaign against the two demons of behaviourism and physiological reductionism, a role in which the philosopher is often all too ready to be cast. As I see the matter, we shall only get progress in this area when it is recognised that the psychological concepts of ordinary language have a role to play within a scientific psychology, but that that role is a restricted one and does not in any way exclude or need to compete with other conceptual systems derived from physiology, information theory or the objective analysis of the stimulus-response relationship. Once that is recognised the philosophical psychologist will be

free to apply his understanding of the logical structure of common sense psychology to the exploration of its relationship to these other conceptual schemes within a scientific psychology that embraces them all.

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