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Pivčević has published numerous articles and book reviews in a variety of international journals, as well as a volume of autobiography.

Elizabeth McCardell

PLACE, Ullin Thomas (1924–2000)

U.T. Place was born in Northallerton, Yorkshire on 24 October 1924 and died in Thirsk on 2 January 2000. He was educated at Rugby School, spending a term at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, before registering as a conscientious objector in 1943 and working with a Quaker ambulance unit until the end of the war. He returned to Oxford in 1946 and took a degree in philosophy and psychology, studying under H.P. GRICE and B.A. FARRELL. He graduated in 1949, and obtained a Diploma in Anthropology in 1950. In 1951 he was appointed lecturer in psychology in the Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide. He returned to England in 1954, where he went to work at the Institute of Experimental Psychology, Oxford. He worked as a clinical psychologist from 1960 to 1966, and then lectured in psychology and clinical psychology until 1970, before becoming lecturer in philosophy, as well as associated lecturer in psychology, at the University of Leeds from 1970 until his retirement in 1982. After retirement, he did work in experimental psychology at the University of Wales, Bangor, where he was honorary lecturer, and began publishing more extensively in philosophy. Ullin Place, the pioneer of the mind/brain identity theory, left his brain to the University of Adelaide where it has been preserved.

U.T. Place will always be remembered as one of the three philosophers who developed the identity theory of mind in the late 1950s. The advent of the identity theory, and more generally of physicalism, was the most significant event in twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind, for it literally transformed the subject: from that point onwards, physicalism was in the foreground or at least background of almost all theorizing about the nature of mind. Place was the first to make it into print, with his succinct (seven pages) 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' appearing in *The British Journal of Psychology* in 1956 (received by the journal in 1954). Two years later American philosopher Herbert Feigl published his considerably longer (128 pages) article 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"' in 1958, and a year after that J.J.C. SMART made what was to become the definitive statement of the new theory with his 'Sensations and Brain Processes' published in the 1959 *Philosophical Review*.

Though his 1956 paper is well known, the extent of Place's personal responsibility for the identity theory is not, and so is in danger of being seriously underestimated. The fact that Place's paper appeared in a psychology journal led to it being overlooked by philosophers: it only started to be reprinted and widely read later on as a result of interest in Smart's paper. Yet it was Place who converted Smart to the identity theory. J.J.C. Smart took the Chair of Philosophy in Adelaide University in 1950, and appointed both U.T. Place and C.B. Martin. Place developed the identity theory at Adelaide

in discussions with Smart, Martin and D.A.T. GASKING, all of whom firmly resisted his ideas. Nevertheless, by 1954 Place was convinced enough of his new theory to end 'The Concept of Heed', a partial critique of Rylean behaviourism, with the sentence, 'It is my belief ... that the logical objections to the statement "consciousness is a process in the brain" are no greater than the logical objections which might be raised to the statement "lightning is a motion of electrical charges"' (p. 255). At this time, Smart remained unconvinced and continued to defend a Rylean view; it was not until long after Place had left Australia (and after Smart had read Feigl), that Smart came around to Place's position.

Place himself traced the origins of the identity theory to E.G. Boring's 1933 *The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness*, a work to which he was introduced at Oxford by B.A. Farrell. In his highly influential paper 'Experience', Farrell had discussed and ultimately rejected Boring's view that 'Neural process and sensation are identical' ('Experience', pp. 174–5), the very view Place was later to defend. Now Place may have discovered the view in Boring and other psychologists of the early twentieth century, but it certainly did not originate there: the general idea that the mind is physical and in some sense the same thing as the brain has a very long history, as documented in Lange's *History of Materialism*. But though the idea has been around throughout the ages, it was always something of a curiosity. It was Place's great achievement to make physicalism/materialism about the mind a mainstream view, a position from which it rapidly became the orthodoxy it is today.

Place enacted this transformation in the fortunes of physicalism by arguing that the identity of sensations with brain processes was to be construed as a scientific hypothesis, akin to the reduction of lightning to a motion of electric charges, or of water to H_2O. This move not only tapped into the general scientific optimism of the time, it also overcame what was considered the overwhelming 'logical' objection to physicalism. The objection was essentially that 'sensation' and 'brain process' do not mean the same, and so in talking about sensations we cannot be talking about brain processes. This objection was forcefully put by C.D. BROAD in his 1925 *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (pp. 612–24), who on that basis dismissed 'Reductive Materialism' as 'preposterously silly'. In 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' Place short-circuits this objection at the outset by agreeing that 'To say that statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes is manifestly false' (p. 45), but points out that this leaves it open that what we happen to refer to might nevertheless be brain processes. Here we see the crucial application of Frege's distinction between sense and reference allowing for two expressions with different meanings to share a reference. The difference of meaning prevents conceptual derivation of the identity a priori, since the two expressions are logically independent of each other, but it leaves open the possibility that they might be empirically discovered to be determining the same referent in different ways.

Interestingly, Place does not explicitly make the connection to Frege, as Feigl and Smart were to, but instead draws on his background in ordinary language philosophy to provide a diagnosis of the apparent force of the logical objection, which he puts down to 'a failure to distinguish between what we may call the "is" of definition and the "is" of composition' ('Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', p. 45). True statements involving the 'is' of definition, such as 'a square is an equilateral rectangle', are necessary and analytic, but true statements involving the 'is' of composition, such as 'his table is an old packing case', are contingent and empirical. Only when the 'is' of definition is involved is it a legitimate objection to simply point out that the two terms (e.g., 'square' and 'equilateral rectangle') are disconnected in meaning. But Place's identity theory employs the 'is' of composition, and so the objection is illegitimate. It is no objection to claiming 'his table is

an old packing case' that 'his table' and 'old packing case' might not have picked out the same thing (as they would not have if he had bought a manufactured table, for instance), and it is no objection to the identity theory that 'consciousness' and 'brain process' might not have picked out the same thing. All that is being claimed is that they actually do pick out the same thing.

Place notes that 'his table is an old packing case' states a token identity, but 'consciousness is a brain process' makes a general claim about all states of consciousness. This renders the logical independence of 'consciousness' and 'brain process' more problematic, since Place doubts that if all tables were packing cases the terms would have retained their independence. Place later argued, in his 1967 'Comments' (footnote pp. 66–7), that if physicalism became an established fact, physical and mental terms would likely lose their logically independent status, in which case mind-brain identity statements would become analytic truths (see also *Dispositions: A Debate*, p. 59). The reason for the logical independence of expressions within a statement of reduction is that observations grounding application of each of the expressions 'can seldom if ever be performed simultaneously' ('Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', p. 46). Thus the logical criteria for confirming 'a cloud is a mass of tiny particles' require different observations from different perspectives. The mind-brain case cannot be quite like this, however, because 'A closer introspective scrutiny will never reveal the passage of nerve impulses over a thousand synapses in the way that a closer scrutiny of a cloud will reveal a mass of tiny particles in suspension' (ibid., p. 47). What the identity theory requires instead is that 'scientific observations ... provide an immediate explanation of the observations made by the man in the street' (ibid., p. 48). This is how 'lightning is a motion of electric charges' is confirmed, since the charges explain the sort of visual stimulation that lead to reports of lightning. The problem is that this seems to be just what cannot be done in the case of consciousness, for it is hard to see how investigations into neural activity could explain consciousness.

It is striking how Place's emphasis on the explanatory demands of physicalism, which combines with his conception of neural activity *composing* consciousness (an idea passed over by later identity theorists), parallels contemporary discussions of consciousness. In 1983 Joseph Levine coined the term 'explanatory gap' to describe our inability to explain conscious properties as macro-properties of neural micro-properties. This conception of consciousness as dependent upon and needing to be explained by lower-level neural properties is exactly Place's, since composition is an asymmetrical relation (consciousness is composed of neural activity and not vice versa), and Place thinks his hypothesis is to be justified on explanatory grounds. However, Place would regard the 'explanatory gap' as an illusion stemming from what he called 'the phenomenological fallacy'. This fallacy is basically indirect realism, i.e. thinking that phenomenal properties are directly observable in introspection and provide indirect access to properties in the world. Place thinks on the contrary that we only observe external properties, phenomenal properties being 'mythological', and that 'when we describe the after-image as green, we are not saying that there is something, the after-image, which is green, we are saying that we are having the sort of experience which we normally have when ... looking at a green patch of light' (ibid., p. 49). This idea that experiences are described in terms of the publicly observable and not anything intrinsic to the experience was called 'topic-neutrality' by Smart, and originates in B.A. Farrell's 'Experience'. Once this fallacy is overcome, concludes Place, there is no obstacle to the physiological explanation of consciousness through the correlation of neural activity with environmental conditions, which is all that is required to confirm the mind-brain identity hypothesis.

One well-known element to the new physicalism conspicuously absent from Place's paper is an appeal to Occam's razor. At the end of his

1959 paper Smart describes Place's view that the identity thesis is a scientific hypothesis as 'partly right and partly wrong' (p. 155). It is right in the sense that whether consciousness is identified with a brain process or some other physical process is an empirical matter, but wrong to imply that empirical evidence might decide between the identity theory and competing metaphysical positions such as dualism. For the latter task Smart thinks the identity theory must be defended a priori through an appeal to Occam's razor. Place defended his position in 'Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis', arguing that Smart had confused two issues. Firstly, logical criteria must be established to determine when two sets of observations are observations of the same event. Place's original paper was an attempt to establish criteria for the mind-brain case. Secondly, when the criteria are in place, it is an entirely empirical matter whether the theory is accepted. In the case of the identity theory, it depends on whether neural processes can be discovered which satisfy the logical criteria decided upon. If such processes are found, this counts in favour of the identity theory and against competing theories such as dualism. Occam's razor is not needed.

Place maintained a fundamental distinction between sensations and propositional attitudes. The identity theory was true only of sensations and conscious states of which we could sensibly ask 'what it is like' to be in that state ('The Concept of Heed', p. 252), and 'where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable' ('Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', p. 44). About propositional attitudes, on the other hand, Place remained loyal to Rylean dispositional analysis, and consequently disapproved when later physicalists such as Armstrong (*A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, 1968) extended the theory to identify propositional attitudes with brain states ('The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation', 2000). Place's commitment to analysing propositional attitudes in terms of hypotheticals about behaviour, and also his view that words have meaning only in relation to the publicly observable (an idea at work in his diagnosis of 'the phenomenological fallacy'), explains the fact that he always described himself as a behaviourist ('A Pilgrim's Progress?', p. 50). This behaviourist allegiance provided a crucial link to his work in psychology, paradigmatic of which is the series of four papers he wrote in the early 1980s ('Skinner's *Verbal Behaviour* I–IV') in an attempt to revive interest in the behavioural analysis of language through a constructive critique of Skinner.

In his late work, Place became increasingly concerned with the nature of dispositions. His 1996 'Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional' disputes Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental. The various features of intentionality supposed distinctive of mental phenomena are in fact features resulting from dispositionality. Since dispositions can be either physical or mental, intentionality can be as well. In *Dispositions: A Debate* Place combines his view of dispositions as intentional states 'directed' upon their possible manifestations, with a broadly Rylean conditional theory of dispositions, according to which dispositional properties are the causal upshot of the microstructure of an entity, analysed in terms of hypotheticals about 'what would happen or, in the counterfactual case, what would *have* happened, if certain conditions were to be or had been fulfilled' (p. 20).

U.T. Place had a decisive influence on the philosophy of mind, albeit through one short paper and the agency of J.J.C. Smart. Of course, it might be thought that Place's idea was the inevitable product of a time ripe for a scientifically respectable theory of consciousness, when phenomenalism was declining in status, physicalism was emerging in the work of Carnap, and the shortcomings of behaviourism were beginning to be felt. However, when we discover in Place's semi-autobiographical 'A Pilgrim's Progress?' a young Quaker motivated to investigate the nature of mind through his desire to vindicate the reality and life-changing potential of religious experience, and when we also recall Place's tenacity in defending a view

considered ludicrous at the time, then confidence in the inevitability of his innovation must surely be shaken.

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PLAMENATZ, John Petrov (1912–75)

John Petrov Plamenatz was born in Cetinje, the capital of Montenegro, on 16 May 1912 and died at his home near Banbury on 19 February 1975. His father Peter had been Foreign Minister for Montenegro, and his mother was of aristocratic background. Peter Plamenatz was forced to leave Montenegro in 1917, and John was sent to England and educated at Clayesmore School, and at Oriel College, Oxford. Plamenatz took the new school of PPE, but fell ill in 1933, and was awarded an aegrotat degree. He took the history school the next year and obtained a first. In 1936 Plamenatz won election to a