Referencing publications of Place: 1954, 1954 1999, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1966, 1967, 1969a, 1969b, 1969c, 1971a, 1971b, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1977b, 1978a, 1978b, 1981a,1981b, 1982, 1983b, 1983d, 1985a, 1985c, 1985d, 1985e, 1986a, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1988a, 1988c, 1988e, 1988f, 1989a, 1989c, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991f, 1991h, 1991k, 1992a, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e, 1992f, 1992j, 1993c, 1993d, 1993i, 1994a, 1994c, 1994d, 1995a, 1995b, 1995d, 1995/6, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1996g, 1996h, 1996i, 1996j, 1996k, 1996l, 1996m, 1996n, 1996o, 1997a, 1997b, 1997d, 1997e, 1997f, 1997g, 1997h, 1997m, 1998b, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1999a, 1999b, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f, 1999g, 1999h, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f, 2000g, 2002, 2004, Place & Smart (1955), Place & Sofroniou (1987), Place & Taylor (1995), Place & Wheeler Vega (1999), Amsterdam 1-26, 28

Publications referenced by U. T. Place.
764 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 5 .

Miller, G.A. (1951). Language and communication McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, J. (1998, July 20). Acquiring spontaneous spoken language: the role of simple syntax and ready-made phrases [Conference presentation at the 6th International Pragmatics Conference, Reims].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, J. (1998). Acquiring spoken language and learning written language [Conference presentation abstract]. In 6th International Pragmatic Conference, 19-24 July 1998, Reims, France: Abstracts. International Pragmatic Association (IPrA).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, N. E. (1948). Studies in fear as an acquirable drive: I. Fear as motivation and fear reduction as reinforcement in the learning of new responses. J. Exp. Psychol., 38, 89-101.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, S., & Konorski, J. (1928). Sur une forme particulière des réflexes conditionelles. Comptes Rendus des Séances de la Société de Biologie et de ses Filiales, 99, 1155-1157. [For a more detailed description of these experiments in English see Konorski (1948), pp. 211-235.]
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Moerk, E. L. (1983). The Mother of Eve: As a first language teacher. Ablex.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Molière (1673). Le Malade Imaginaire.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Monk, R. (1990). Ludwig Wittgenstein: The duty of genius. Jonathan Cape.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Montague, P. R., Gally, J. A., & Edelman, G. M. (1991). Spatial signalling in the development and function of neural connections. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 199-220.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Moore, G. E. (1936). Is existence a predicate? Proceedings of the Aristotalian Society, Supp. Vol. 15, 175-188. Reprinted in A. G. N. Flew (1953), Logic and Language, Series II. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Moore, G. E. (1953). Some main problems of philosophy Allen and Unwin
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Morford, J. P. (1996). Insights into language from the study of gesture: a review of research on the gestural communication of non-signing deaf people. Language & Communication, 16, 165-178.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Morford, J. P., Singleton, J. L., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1993). The role of iconicity in manual communication. In K. Beals, G. Cooke, D. Kathman, S. Kita, K.-E. McCullough, & D. Testen (Eds.) Papers from the Chicago Linguistic Society, 29, Volume 2: The Parasession (pp. 243-253).
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Morgan, C. Lloyd (1894). Introduction to Comparative Psychology Scott.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient Society Holt.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 2 (pp. 78-137). University of Chicago Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Morris, C. W. (1946). Signs, banguage and behavior Prentice-Hall.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. W. (1949). Brain stem reticular formation and activation of the EEG. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology. 1, 455-473.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mourik-van den Bergh, E. van, & T. W. Place (1972). Wat is dromen Psychologisch Laboratorium, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mowrer, O. H. (1950). Learning theory and personality dynamics Ronald.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Murray, D. K. C. (1986). Silent speach acts and their cognitive effects. In M. B. Papi & J. Verscheuren (Eds.), The pragmatic perspective: Selected papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference . Benjamins
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Myers, C. S. (1923). The evolution of feelings. Australian Journal of Psychology & Philosophy, 1(1), 3-11. wellcomecollection.org/works/ejurcrhs
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Nidditch, P. H. (1960). Elementary Logic of Science and Mathematics. University Tutorial Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Noble, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). Human evolution, language and mind: A psychological and archaeological inquiry Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Olds, J. & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and other regions of the rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47, 419-427.

Olton, D. S., & Schlosberg, P. (1978). Food-searching strategies in young
rats: Win-shift predominates over win-stay. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology
, 92, 609-618.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Oppenheim, P. & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (II, pp. 3-36). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Osgood, C. E. (1953). Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The Measurement of Meaning. University of Illinois Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Oswald, I. (1966). Sleep. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Owen, J. L. (Ed.). (1997). Context and communication behavior. Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Page, W. (1912). The Victoria History of the County of York (Vol. II). Constable.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Palmer, D. C., & Donahoe, J. W. (1992). Essentialism and selectionism in cognitive science and behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1344-1358.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Parsons, T. (1951). Illness and the role of the physician: A sociological perspective. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 21, 452-460. Reprinted in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (Eds.) (1953), Personality in Nature, Society and Culture (Second Edition, pp. 609-617). Knopf.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pashler, H. (1991). Shifting visual attention and selecting motor responses: distinct attentional mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 1023-1040.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Pashler, H. E. (1997). The Psychology of Attention. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Patmore, C. K. D. (1877). The Unknown Eros and Other Odes. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Patmore, C. K. D. (1895). The Rod, the Root and the Flower. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (English translation by G. V. Anrep). Oxford University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Pavlov, I.P. (1938). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals (6th Edition). State Biological and Medical Publishing House.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Peano, G. (1894). Notations de Logique Mathématique. Bocca.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pearce, J.M. (1988). Stimulus generalization and the acquisition of categories by pigeons. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.) Thought without Language (pp. 132-155). Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pearce, J.M. (1989). The acquisition of an artificial category by pigeons. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41B, 381-406.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pellionisz, A., & Llinás, R. (1979). Brain modeling by tensor network theory and computer simulation. The cerebellum: distributed processor for predictive coordination. Neuroscience, 4, 323-348.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. University of California Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1987). Interspecies communication: A tool for assessing conceptual abilities in the African Grey parrot. In G. Greenberg, & E. Tobach (Eds.), Cognition, language and consciousness: Interactive levels. Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1990). Referential mapping: A technique for attaching functional significance to the innovative utterances of an African Grey parrot (Psittachus erithacus). Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, 23-44.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1992). A search for equivalence classes in an African Grey Parrot: Equivalence involving objects and auditory and visual labels (Unpublished paper presented to the 15th Symposium on Quantitative Analyses of Behavior (Stimulus Relations), June 14th 1992). Harvard University.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Perin, C. T. (1943). A quantitative investigation of the delay-of-reinforcement gradient. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 37-51.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Perky. C. W. (1910). An Experimental study of imagination. American Journal of Psychology, 21, 422-452.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Phelips, V. (Philip Vivian) (1906/1934) . The Churches and Modern Thought: An Inquiry into the Grounds of Unbelief and an Appeal for Candour (Second Edition in the Thinker's Library). Watts.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1926/1932). The Language and Thought of the Child (2nd Ed.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child (Translated from the French by M.Gabain). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1972). Piaget's Theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology (3rd Ed., Vol. I). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and cognition. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1988). On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [9 citing publications]  [26 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [141 citing publications]  [45 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1956a). Emotion concepts and learning theory [Unpublished paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Manchester, 1956].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1959). The ‘phenomenological fallacy' - a reply to J. R.Smythies. British Journal of Psychology, 50,72-73. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1959.tb00684.x
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[References]  [Is reply to]  [1 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1959 The Phenomenological Fallacy - A Reply to J.R. Smythies.pdf

Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [10 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf  1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [2 citing publications]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf

Place, U. T. (1969a). Burt on brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 285-292.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1969a Burt on Brain and Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1969b). Collected papers on brain, mind and consciousness [Doctoral thesis submitted 1969 for the degree of D.Litt, degree awarded in 1972]. University of Adelaide.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1969b Brain, Mind and Consciousness - Introduction DLitt Thesis.pdf [includes editorial changes by UTP]

Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971b). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 158-166
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1971b Understanding the Language of Sensations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971c). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis [Unpublished paper with an author's note added in 1999].
[Abstract]Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for the negative reinforcement condition. In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112. www.jstor.org/stable/2252189
[References]  [Is reply to]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf

Place, U. T. (1972b). Inner life [Conference presentation]. Northern Universities Philosophy Conference, Nottingham, April 11th-14th, 1972.
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972b Inner Life.pdf

Place, U. T. (1973). The mental and the physical - a reply to Dr. Meynell. The Heythrop Journal, XIV(4), 417-424. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00758.x
[References]  [Is reply to]  [8 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1973 The Mental and the Physical - A Reply to Dr Meynell.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-15). Lecture 25: Theories of emotion and the nature of emotional reactions (15/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Emotion as experience. Physiological theories of emotion, The vocabulary of feeling and emotion. Enjoying. Wanting. Dimensions of emotion. Measuring emotions
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 25.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-22). Lecture 26: The elicitation of emotional reactions and their biological functions (22/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Biological emergencies: opportunities and threats. Errors in the elicitation of emotions. Emotion and motivation. Emotional conditioning. Conditioning versus innate releases in the elicitation of emotion.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 26 - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1978a). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. De Psycholoog, 13, 611-621.
[Abstract]The application of Kuhn's concept of "incommensurable paradigms" to the science of psychology is discussed. Two such paradigms, the behaviorist or behavior analytic paradigm and the cognitive/mentalist paradigm, are distinguished. It is suggested that the choice of paradigm will depend on the method of behavior modification to be employed. If behavior is to be modified by stimulus control and contingency management, a version of the behaviorist paradigm will be selected. If behavior is to be modified by changing the individual's self-directed verbal behavior, the mentalist/cognitive paradigm is to be preferred.
Note:
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy at the Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport in July 1974 and was in 1978 published in De Psycholoog, in English The Psychologist, a journal of the Dutch Society of Psychology. The present revision is from 1986.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1978a 1986 Psychological Paradigms and Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - why we need it. Behaviorism, 9, 1-24. www.jstor.org/stable/27758970
[Abstract]To explain behaviour in terms of intension­al or mentalistic concepts is to explain the behaviour in question on the assump­tion of a consistent and rational connection between what the agent does and what he says or what is said to him and that therefore any general account of verbal or linguistic behaviour which employs such concepts is necessarily circular, since it explains the acquisition of linguistic skills on the assumption that the speaker already possesses such skills. It follows that this circularity can only be avoided by developing a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which is stated entirely in a nonintensional or extensional language. At the present time, the most developed conceptual system for description and explanation of the behav­iour of organisms at the molar level in purely extensional terms is that provided by the so-called ‘Radical Behaviorism’ of B. F. Skinner and his followers. Fur­thermore, in his book Verbal Behavior Skinner (1957) has used this conceptual framework to develop a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which repre­sents the most ambitious attempt made so far to formulate a theory of linguistic behaviour in nonintensional or extensional terms.
Note:
Revised version is from 1999.
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1981a 1999 Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - Why We Need It - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1981b). Skinner's Verbal Behavior II - what is wrong with it. Behaviorism, 9, 131-152. www.jstor.org/stable/27758982
[Abstract]Skinner's Verbal Behavior as it stands suffers from four major defects. (1) Skinner fails to do justice to the distinction between words which are the repeated and repeatable units of verbal behaviour, but which have a function only in so far as they contribute to the function of the sentences in which they occur, and the sentences themselves which are the functional units of verbal behaviour, but which are seldom repeated word for word either in the mouth of the speaker or in the hearing of the listener. (2) The account given by Skinner of the listener's response to the verbal operant and of the concept of "the discriminative stimulus" which he deploys in this connection is seriously inadequate. (3) Skinner's concept of "the tact" involves a confusion between tacts as words and tacts as sentences. Tacts as words, i.e. names and general terms, designate recurrent features of the common stimulus environment of speaker and listener, both general and particular and contrast with autoclitic words whose function is purely intra-sentential. Tacts as sentences on the other hand are functionally complete verbal operants corresponding to the grammatical concept of an assertion, which act for the benefit of the listener and contrast with mands, sentence utterances corresponding to the imperatives and interrogatives of grammar and logic, which typically act for the benefit of the speaker. (4) Skinner's account fails to do justice to the all-important logical distinction between those tact sentence utterances or assertions which are true and on which the listener can consequently rely and those which are false and therefore unreliable as a source of information from the standpoint of the listener.
[References]  [7 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1981b Skinner’s Verbal Behavior II – what is wrong with it.pdf

Place, U. T. (1982). Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - how to improve Parts I and II. Behaviorism, 10, 117-136. www.jstor.org/stable/27759002
[References]  [2 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1982 Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - How to Improve Parts I and II

Place, U. T. (1983a). Comments on Mark Burton's theses. Behaviour Analysis, 4(1), 22-31.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1983d). Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - how to improve Part IV, Skinner's account of syntax. Behaviorism, 11, 163-186. www.jstor.org/stable/27759026
Keywords: behavioral contingency semantics, Skinner, verbal behavior
[References]  [2 citing publications]  [14 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1983d Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - How to Improve Part IV - Skinner's Account of Syntax.pdf

Place, U. T. (1984a). Logic, reference and mentalism: a comment on B.F.Skinner, 'The operational analysis of psychological terms'. In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.), Canonical papers of B.F.Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 565-566. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Place, U. T. (1985a). A response to Sundberg and Michael. VB News, 3, 38-45. [Reprinted in The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 3, 41-47]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [1 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1985a A Response to Sundberg and Michael.pdf

Place, U. T. (1985c). Semicovert behavior and the concept of pain: a comment on H. Rachlin 'Pain and behavior'. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 70-71. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00019695
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1985c Semicover Behavior and the Concept of Pain.pdf

Place, U. T. (1985d). Three senses of the word "tact". Behaviorism, 13, 63-74. www.jstor.org/stable/27759058
[References]  [2 citing publications]  [12 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1985d Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf  1985d Supplement to Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf complete table with all occurrences of the word 'tact' in Skinner's Verbal Behavior

Place, U. T. (1986c). The invisibility of extra-episodic reinforcement as a problem in presenting behavior analysis to conversation analysts [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, St. Andrew's, Scotland, April 1986].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1987a). Skinner re-skinned. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 235-243). Falmer Press.
[Abstract]In 'Skinner Skinned' Dennett (1978, chapter 4) discusses two arguments, the virtus dormitiva and intentionality arguments, which he sees as the only solid ground underlying the various arguments which Skinner gives for repudiating the use of mentalistic explanations in a scientific psychology; and of these he endorses only the intentionality argument. I argue (a) that what Skinner finds objectionable in mentalistic idioms is their dispositional character, (b) that both the virtus dormitiva and intentionality argument are arguments against the use of dispositional property ascriptions in scientific explanation, and (c) that, since dispositional property ascriptions are essential to any causal explanation, Dennett has failed to provide any good reason for endorsing Skinner's repudiation of mentalism. It is suggested that mentalism is objectionable only insofar it involves the use of idioms which presuppose what Skinner (1969) calls 'rule-governed' behaviour to explain behaviour that is 'contingency-shaped'.
[References]  [2 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1987a Skinner Re-skinned.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [7 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Place, U. T. (1988a). Thirty years on - is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 208-219.
[References]  [4 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1988a Thirty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
[Abstract]The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behavior (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
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Place, U. T. (1988f). Consciousness as an information processing system. [Paper presented to the Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Leeds, April 1988].
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1988f Consciousness as an Information Processing System.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and meality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References]  [1 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
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Place, U. T. (1990a). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 11, 20-31.
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Download: 1990a E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf added to the end of the document are excerpts from Boring, 1933

Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine (1) the reference of singular terms, (2) the extension of general terms, (3) the truth of propositions, (4) the validity of arguments, (5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf