Patmore, C. K. D. (1877). The Unknown Eros and Other Odes. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Patmore, C. K. D. (1895). The Rod, the Root and the Flower. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (English translation by G. V. Anrep). Oxford University Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]
Pavlov, I. P. (1938). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals (6th Edition). State Biological and Medical Publishing House.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Peano, G. (1894). Notations de Logique Mathématique. Bocca.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pearce, J.M. (1988). Stimulus generalization and the acquisition of categories by pigeons. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.) Thought without Language (pp. 132-155). Clarendon Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Pearce, J.M. (1989). The acquisition of an artificial category by pigeons. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41B, 381-406.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Pellionisz, A., & Llinás, R. (1979). Brain modeling by tensor network theory and computer simulation. The cerebellum: distributed processor for predictive coordination. Neuroscience, 4, 323-348.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)] [2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. University of California Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1987). Interspecies communication: A tool for assessing conceptual abilities in the African Grey parrot. In G. Greenberg, & E. Tobach (Eds.), Cognition, language and consciousness: Interactive levels. Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1990). Referential mapping: A technique for attaching functional significance to the innovative utterances of an African Grey parrot (Psittachus erithacus).
Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, 23-44.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1992). A search for equivalence classes in an African Grey Parrot: Equivalence involving objects and auditory and visual labels (Unpublished paper presented to the 15th Symposium on Quantitative Analyses of Behavior (Stimulus Relations), June 14th 1992). Harvard University.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Perin, C. T. (1943). A quantitative investigation of the delay-of-reinforcement gradient. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 37-51.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Perky. C. W. (1910). An Experimental study of imagination. American Journal of Psychology, 21, 422-452.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Phelips, V. (Philip Vivian) (1906/1934) . The Churches and Modern Thought: An Inquiry into the Grounds of Unbelief and an Appeal for Candour (Second Edition in the Thinker's Library). Watts.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1923). Le langage et la pensée chez l'enfant (Many editions. Translated as The Language and Thought of the Child. Routledge & Kegan Paul.). Delachaux et Niestlé.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child (Translated from the French by M.Gabain). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1972). Piaget's Theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology (3rd Ed., Vol. I). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and cognition. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1988). On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References] [21 citing publications] [29 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf 1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g).
Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References] [264 citing publications] [57 referring publications by Place] [15 reprinting collections]
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf 1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1956a). Emotion concepts and learning theory [Unpublished paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Manchester, 1956].
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1959). The ‘phenomenological fallacy' - a reply to J. R.Smythies. British Journal of Psychology, 50,72-73. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1959.tb00684.x
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1959 The Phenomenological Fallacy - A Reply to J.R. Smythies.pdf
Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References] [Is reply to] [17 citing publications] [8 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [9 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf 1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [6 citing publications] [7 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf
Place, U. T. (1969a). Burt on brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 285-292.
Keywords: consciousness, introspection
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [6 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1969a Burt on Brain and Consciousness.pdf
Place, U. T. (1969b). Collected papers on brain, mind and consciousness [Doctoral thesis submitted 1969 for the degree of D.Litt, degree awarded in 1972]. University of Adelaide.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1969b Brain, Mind and Consciousness - Introduction DLitt Thesis.pdf [includes editorial changes by UTP]
Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References] [7 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971b). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 158-166
[References] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1971b Understanding the Language of Sensations.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971c). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis [Unpublished paper with an author's note added in 1999].
[Abstract]Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for
the negative reinforcement condition. In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112. www.jstor.org/stable/2252189
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [9 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf
Place, U. T. (1972b). Inner life [Conference presentation]. Northern Universities Philosophy Conference, Nottingham, April 11th-14th, 1972.
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1972b Inner Life.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-10-24). Lecture 4: Cosmology 1. Reductionism (24/10/1973) Section 1
[Abstract]The nature of explanation. Reduction and analysis - conceptual, material, substantial and theoretical. The Reductionist Myth.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 04 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973). The mental and the physical - a reply to Dr. Meynell. The Heythrop Journal, XIV(4), 417-424. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00758.x
[References] [Is reply to] [8 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1973 The Mental and the Physical - A Reply to Dr Meynell.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-15). Lecture 25: Theories of emotion and the nature of emotional reactions (15/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Emotion as experience. Physiological theories of emotion, The vocabulary of feeling and emotion. Enjoying. Wanting. Dimensions of emotion. Measuring emotions
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 25.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-22). Lecture 26: The elicitation of emotional reactions and their biological functions (22/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Biological emergencies: opportunities and threats. Errors in the elicitation of emotions. Emotion and motivation. Emotional conditioning. Conditioning versus innate releases in the elicitation of emotion.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 26 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[References] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Place, U. T. (1978a). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. De Psycholoog, 13, 611-621.
[Abstract]The application of Kuhn's concept of "incommensurable paradigms" to the science of psychology is discussed. Two such paradigms, the behaviorist or behavior analytic paradigm and the cognitive/mentalist paradigm, are distinguished. It is suggested that the choice of paradigm will depend on the method of behavior modification to be employed. If behavior is to be modified by stimulus control and contingency management, a version of the behaviorist paradigm will be selected. If behavior is to be modified by changing the individual's self-directed verbal behavior, the mentalist/cognitive paradigm is to be preferred.
Note:
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy at the Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport in July 1974 and was in 1978 published in De Psycholoog, in English The Psychologist, a journal of the Dutch Society of Psychology. The present revision is from 1986.
[References] [Talks] [2 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1978a 1986 Psychological Paradigms and Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - why we need it. Behaviorism, 9, 1-24. www.jstor.org/stable/27758970
[Abstract]To explain behaviour in terms of intensional or mentalistic concepts is to explain the behaviour in question on the assumption of a consistent and rational connection between what the agent does and what he says or what is said to him and that therefore any general account of verbal or linguistic behaviour which employs such concepts is necessarily circular, since it explains the acquisition of linguistic skills on the assumption that the speaker already possesses such skills. It follows that this circularity can only be avoided by developing a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which is stated entirely in a nonintensional or extensional language. At the present time, the most developed conceptual system for description and explanation of the behaviour of organisms at the molar level in purely extensional terms is that provided by the so-called ‘Radical Behaviorism’ of B. F. Skinner and his followers. Furthermore, in his book Verbal Behavior Skinner (1957) has used this conceptual framework to develop a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which represents the most ambitious attempt made so far to formulate a theory of linguistic behaviour in nonintensional or extensional terms.
Note:
Revised version is from 1999.
[References] [7 citing publications] [11 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1981a 1999 Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - Why We Need It - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1981b). Skinner's Verbal Behavior II - what is wrong with it. Behaviorism, 9, 131-152. www.jstor.org/stable/27758982
[Abstract]Skinner's Verbal Behavior as it stands suffers from four major defects. (1) Skinner fails to do justice to the distinction between words which are the repeated and repeatable units of verbal behaviour, but which have a function only in so far as they contribute to the function of the sentences in which they occur, and the sentences themselves which are the functional units of verbal behaviour, but which are seldom repeated word for word either in the mouth of the speaker or in the hearing of the listener. (2) The account given by Skinner of the listener's response to the verbal operant and of the concept of "the discriminative stimulus" which he deploys in this connection is seriously inadequate. (3) Skinner's concept of "the tact" involves a confusion between tacts as words and tacts as sentences. Tacts as words, i.e. names and general terms, designate recurrent features of the common stimulus environment of speaker and listener, both general and particular and contrast with autoclitic words whose function is purely intra-sentential. Tacts as sentences on the other hand are functionally complete verbal operants corresponding to the grammatical concept of an assertion, which act for the benefit of the listener and contrast with mands, sentence utterances corresponding to the imperatives and interrogatives of grammar and logic, which typically act for the benefit of the speaker. (4) Skinner's account fails to do justice to the all-important logical distinction between those tact sentence utterances or assertions which are true and on which the listener can consequently rely and those which are false and therefore unreliable as a source of information from the standpoint of the listener.
[References] [9 citing publications] [10 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1981b Skinner’s Verbal Behavior II – what is wrong with it.pdf
Place, U. T. (1982). Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - how to improve Parts I and II. Behaviorism, 10, 117-136. www.jstor.org/stable/27759002
[References] [2 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1982 Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - How to Improve Parts I and II
Place, U. T. (1983a). Comments on Mark Burton's theses. Behaviour Analysis, 4(1), 22-31.
Keywords: consciousness
[References] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1983a Comments on Mark Burton's Theses.pdf
Place, U. T. (1983d). Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - how to improve Part IV, Skinner's account of syntax. Behaviorism, 11, 163-186. www.jstor.org/stable/27759026
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics, Skinner, verbal behavior
[References] [3 citing publications] [15 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1983d Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - How to Improve Part IV - Skinner's Account of Syntax.pdf
Place, U. T. (1984a). Logic, reference and mentalism: a comment on B.F.Skinner, 'The operational analysis of psychological terms'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7(4), 565-566. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321
Note:
The download also includes the response of Skinner.
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1984a Logic, Reference, and Mentalism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985a). A response to Sundberg and Michael. VB News, 3, 38-45. [Reprinted in The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 3, 41-47]
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1985a A Response to Sundberg and Michael.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985c). Semicovert behavior and the concept of pain: a comment on H. Rachlin 'Pain and behavior'. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 70-71. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00019695
[References] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1985c Semicovert Behavior and the Concept of Pain.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985d). Three senses of the word "tact". Behaviorism, 13, 63-74. www.jstor.org/stable/27759058
[References] [2 citing publications] [14 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1985d Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf 1985d Supplement to Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf complete table with all occurrences of the word 'tact' in Skinner's Verbal Behavior
Place, U. T. (1986c). The invisibility of extra-episodic reinforcement as a problem in presenting behavior analysis to conversation analysts [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, St. Andrew's, Scotland, April 1986].
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1987a). Skinner re-skinned. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 235-243). Falmer Press.
[Abstract]In 'Skinner Skinned' Dennett (1978, chapter 4) discusses two arguments, the virtus dormitiva and intentionality arguments, which he sees as the only solid ground underlying the various arguments which Skinner gives for repudiating the use of mentalistic explanations in a scientific psychology; and of these he endorses only the intentionality argument. I argue (a) that what Skinner finds objectionable in mentalistic idioms is their dispositional character, (b) that both the virtus dormitiva and intentionality argument are arguments against the use of dispositional property ascriptions in scientific explanation, and (c) that, since dispositional property ascriptions are essential to any causal explanation, Dennett has failed to provide any good reason for endorsing Skinner's repudiation of mentalism. It is suggested that mentalism is objectionable only insofar it involves the use of idioms which presuppose what Skinner (1969) calls 'rule-governed' behaviour to explain behaviour that is 'contingency-shaped'.
[References] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1987a Skinner Re-skinned.pdf
Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References] [11 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication
Place, U. T. (1988a). Thirty years on - is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 208-219.
[References] [14 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1988a Thirty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
[Abstract]The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behavior (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
[References] [Talks] [5 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1988b Skinner's Distinction Between Rule Governed and Contingency Shaped Behaviour.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988f). Consciousness as an information processing system. [Paper presented to the Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Leeds, April 1988].
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1988f Consciousness as an Information Processing System.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References] [4 citing publications] [4 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked to provide a version of the the causal theory of the reference of natural kind terms and proper names which rejects Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation and retains the Port Royal-Hamilton thesis that the extension of a general term is determined by its comprehension or intension, together with Frege's thesis that the reference (Bedeutung) of a singular term is determined by its sense (Sinn).
[References] [Talks] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf
Place, U. T. (1990a). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 11, 20-31.
[References] [Talks] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1990a E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf added to the end of the document are excerpts from Boring, 1933
Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine
(1) the reference of singular terms,
(2) the extension of general terms,
(3) the truth of propositions,
(4) the validity of arguments,
(5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References] [Talks] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf
Place, U. T. (1991a). Conversation analysis and the analysis of verbal behavior. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal behavior: The First International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 5, pp. 85-109). Context Press.
[References] [4 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1991a Conversation Analysis and Analysis of Verbal Behavior.pdf
Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References] [3 citing publications] [14 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf
Place, U. T. (1991k). From syntax to reality: the picture theory of meaning [Discussion paper presented to a small conference on 'Footprints of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language' at the Neurosciences Institute, New York, February 1991].
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1991k From Syntax to Reality - the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf revised version from 1999
Place, U. T. (1992a). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. In S. C. Hayes,& L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations: The Second and Third International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 9, pp. 135-151). Context Press.
Keywords: behaviour analysis, behavioural contingency semantics, correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning, situation, three-term contingency
[References] [Talks] [2 citing publications] [15 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1992a Behavioral Contingency Semantics and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf
Place, U. T. (1992c). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 21-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759268
[Abstract]For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the differences between the two models suggests that that the effect of such a development would be to steer linguistic theory towards a return to the empiricism and behaviorism which prevailed before it was driven by Chomsky towards nativism and mentalism. Linguists, however, will not be persuaded to return to such a theory unless and until it can deal with the phenomenon of novel sentence construction as effectively as its nativist/mentalist rival.
[References] [Talks] [1 citing publications] [8 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1992c Eliminative Connectionsm -Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist-Behaviorist Linguistics.pdf
Place, U. T. (1992d). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 22, 461-474. doi:10.1177/004839319202200403
[Abstract]It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is assumed to operate. Examples are given of the use of ethnomethodological experiments, both in vivo and as a thought experiment, in order to demonstrate the existence of otherwise invisible conventions governing human social behavior. Comparable examples are cited from the writings of ordinary language philosophers of ethnomethodological thought experiments designed to demonstrate the existence of linguistic conventions.
[References] [Talks] [1 citing publications] [12 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1992d The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms, and its Application to Conceptual Analysis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1992k). Selectionism, connectionism and the re-socialization of linguistics. [Unpublished paper. Presented in absentia under the title 'Selectionism and connectionism: Their implications for a return to an empirical/behavioristic linguistics' at the 1992 Conference of the Research Committee for Sociolinguistics of the International Sociological Association on 'The interface between Sociology and Linguistics', Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 9th-11th June 1992].
Note:
Last change to the text of the presentation made by UTP is from 1999.
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1993c). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 25-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759281
[Abstract]Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two or more observers which those observers confirm as a correct description provide a far more objective and secure foundation for empirical knowledge than statements describing private events in the experience of a single individual. In the course of this argument, I also invoke Wittgenstein's (1953) demonstration — his 'private language argument' — of the incoherence of traditional subjective empiricism. Regarding the second deficiency, I argue that observation statements describing private events can serve as data for an objective study, provided that (a) the verbal behavior in which they consist and its context are objectively observed and recorded, and (b) an explanation is given of how this verbal behavior is generated by the events it reports.
Keywords: methodological behaviorism, objectivity principle, private events, private language argument, radical behaviorism
[References] [Talks] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1993c A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events.pdf
Place, U. T. (1993d). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. Acta Analytica, 8(10), 143-155.
[Abstract]A synthetic proposition is true, if there exists a situation corresponding to that which the proposition depicts. Assurance that such correspondence obtains depends on the coherence of a body of pragmatically tested beliefs, anchored to reality by objective observation statements endorsed as correct by the relevant linguistic community. Hull's "primitive suggestibility" and Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" are invoked to explain how failures of correspondence are detected.
Keywords: conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, holism, picture theory of meaning
Note:
Added to the full text: unpublished rephrasing of some of the central points of this article by the author.
[References] [Talks] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1993d Holism and Cognitive Dissonance in the Discrimination of Correspondence between Sentences and Situations.pdf
Place, U. T. (1995/6). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Behavior and Philosophy, 23/24, 13-30. www.jstor.org/stable/27759337
[Abstract]A symbol is defined as a species of sign. The concept of a sign coincides with Skinner's (1938) concept of a discriminative stimulus. Symbols differ from other signs in five respects: (1) They are stimuli which the organism can both respond to and produce, either as a self-directed stimulus (as in thinking) or as a stimulus for another individual with a predictably similar response from the recipient in each case. (2) they act as discriminative stimuli for the same kind of object for all members of the verbal community within which they function as symbols; (3) they acquire their properties by virtue of arbitrary social convention rather than any natural and intrinsic connection between the sign and what it is a sign of; (4) competent members of the verbal community can both produce the appropriate symbol in response to a naturally occurring sign of the presence of the object or a sample of the kind of object which the symbol stands for and select the appropriate object when presented with the symbol; (5) they form stimulus equivalence classes of the kind demonstrated in the matching-to-sample task (Sidman, 1971; Sidman and Tailby, 1982) both with other symbols having the same meaning and, more important, with the naturally-occurring non-symbolic signs of the presence of the object or kind of object which the symbol stands for.
[References] [Talks] [13 citing publications] [4 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1995-6 Symbolic Processes and Stimulus Equivalence.pdf
Place, U. T. (1995a). The Searle fallacy: a reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle). The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 21, 5-18.
[References] [Is reply to] [Is replied by]
Download: 1995a The Searle Fallacy a Reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle).pdf
Place, U. T. (1995b). 'Is consciousness a brain process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner, & J. Shawe-Taylor (Eds.), Consciousness at the crossroads of cognitive science and philosophy: Selected proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project 'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Maribor, Slovenia, 23-7 August, 1994 (pp. 9-15). Imprint Academic.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1995b 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process' Some Misconceptions about the Article.pdf
Place, U. T. (1995e). Conceptual analysis and the concept of reinforcement in classical/respondent conditioning and instrumental/operant learning [Presentation given at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 11th April 1995].
[Abstract]Conceptual analysis is the empirical investigation of the social conventions which govern the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language. Although it has application to other aspects of language, the focus is on features that are universal across languages and on ordinary rather than technical language. In relation to the scientific study of the behaviour of living organisms, it gives us insight both into the respects in which common sense psychology serves functions which have no place in the scientific enterprise and into the way behaviour is in fact regulated, based on thousands of years of experience of how it looks from without as well from within.
The way in which the distinction between classical/respondent conditioning and instrumental/operant learning is marked in the sentences of common sense psychology is discussed as a means of reconciling the different technical languages of behaviour analysis and associative learning theory.
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1995e Conceptual Analysis and the Concept of Reinforcement.pdf
Place, U. T. (1996g). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Dialectica, 50, 91-120. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality . . . all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states." The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's (1983) directedness and Anscombe's (1965) indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states. The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892) indirect reference/Quine's (1953) referential opacity, evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [39 citing publications] [10 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1996g Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.pdf
Place, U. T. (1996j). Linguistic behaviorism as a philosophy of empirical science. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology ( Chapter 9, pp. 126-140). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n9
[Abstract]Linguistic behaviorism is a philosophy of science with application to every empirical science from physics to sociology. It holds that
• philosophy, including the philosophy of science, uses conceptual analysis to study the interface between language and the 'reality' it depicts,
• conceptual analysis is an empirical investigation of the conventions governing the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language and its technical derivatives,
• conformity to linguistic convention is maintained by selective social reinforcement.
It endorses the analytic/synthetic distinction, a picture theory of the meaning of sentences, a correspondence theory of synthetic truth and a counterfactual theory of causal necessity.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[References] [Talks] [3 citing publications] [10 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1996j Linguistic Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Empirical Science.pdf
Place, U. T. (1996l). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 264-270). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
[Abstract]Before deciding what status should be given to folk psychology within scientific psychology, we must understand its linguistic peculiarities. To do that, we need to attend to research on the topic within the philosophical tradition known as "conceptual analysis." This research enables us to identify six respects in which folk psychological language can lead us astray, when used in a scientific context:
(1) the creation of bogus abstract entities by the process of "nominalizing" predicates and other non-substantival parts of speech,
(2) the persistent use of adjectives with evaluative (good/bad) connotations,
(3) the systematic evaluation of the content of other people's cognitive attitudes and judgments from the standpoint of the speaker,
(4) the distortion of causal accounts of human action by the demand for a single scapegoat on whom to pin the blame when things go wrong,
(5) the use of the metaphor of linguistic control when explaining behavior that is not subject to that type of control,
(6) the unavoidable use of simile when describing private experience.
[References] [Talks] [2 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1996l Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual Analysis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1996m). Metaphysics as the empirical investigation of the interface between language and reality. Acta Analytica,11(15), 97-118.
[Abstract]The rules of syntax and semantics on conformity to which linguistic communication depends are construed as social conventions instilled and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. That conception argues for the revival of conceptual analysis construed as the empirical investigation of such conventions using the ethnomethodological thought experiment as its primary research tool, and for a view of metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between utterances and the reality they depict.
[References] [Talks] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1996m Metaphysics as the Empirical Study of the Interface between Language and Reality.pdf
Place, U. T. (1996q). The picture theory of meaning and its implication for the theory of truth and its discrimination. Communication and Cognition, 29, 5-14.
[Abstract]Linguistic behaviourism is an approach to linguistics, philosophy and the philosophy of science which combines Skinner's (1957) thesis that language is a form of learned social behaviour maintained by the reinforcement practices of a linguistic or, as he would say, "verbal" community with Chomsky's (1957, etc.) insistence that the functional unit of language is the sentence and that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are typically constructed anew on each occasion of utterance. The ability of the listener or reader to be directed by an imperative sentence to do something she has never done before or to be alerted by a declarative sentence to the existence of a situation the like of which she has never encountered and to which she would otherwise have no access is explained on a version of the picture theory of meaning in which the structure and content of the sentence maps onto the structure and content of the situation which is thereby depicted. Hand in hand with the picture theory of meaning goes a correspondence theory of what it means for a contingent proposition to be true. But in accounting for the way true contingent propositions are discriminated, both the coherence and the pragmatic principles are invoked.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[References] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1996q The Picture Theory of Meaning and its Implication for the Theory of Truth and its Discrimination.pdf
Place, U. T. (1997a). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. In J. L. Owen (Ed.), Context and communication behavior (Chapter 18, pp. 369-385). Context Press.
[Abstract]Contingency analysis is a technique for analyzing the relation between a living organism and its environment based on a generalized version of Skinner's (1969) concept of the "three-term contingency." It can be applied to the analysis of any sequence of events in which a single individual interacts with its environment or, as in the case of social behavior, in which two or more individuals interact with each other. It is particularly valuable when applied to the analysis of naturally-occurring verbal interactions, such as conversations and business transactions. It can be applied not only to the sequence of events whereby utterances follow one another as the interaction proceeds, their pragmatics, but also to the semantic content of the utterances, the sequence of events called for by what Skinner (1957) calls a "mand" or those recorded or predicted by the kind of declarative sentence he sometimes (Place 1985) calls a "tact".
[References] [Talks] [2 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1997a Contingency Analysis Applied to the Pragmatics and Semantics of Naturally Occurring Verbal Interactions.pdf
Place, U. T. (1997d). Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism. Psychological Record, 47, 649-659. doi:10.1007/BF03395251
[Abstract]The discredit into which the socialist ideal has fallen as a consequence of recent political events calls into question, not just the viability of a particular political and economic system but, the very idea that the social order can be improved by applying principles derived from the scientific study of human social behavior. Before the collapse of socialism, the idea of a science of human behavior, construed in biological terms as a branch of the science of the behavior of free-moving living organisms in general, had been undermined by Chomsky's (1959) repudiation of the behaviorist project to construct a science of language (verbal behavior) based on principles derived from the study of animal learning. I contend that only by reinstating the link between linguistics and the study of animal learning can confidence be restored in the possibility of a genuine science of human behavior with application to the problem of constructing a better social order.
[References] [Talks] [3 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1997d Rescuing the Science of Human Behavior from the Ashes of Socialism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1997e). On the nature of conditionals and their truthmakers. Acta Analytica, 12(18), 73-88.
[Abstract]Standard propositional and predicate logic fails both as a model for natural language and, since it cannot handle causation, as a language for science. The failure to handle causation stems from a misconstrual of the causal conditional as a relation between the truth of two propositions (If p, then q). What the causal conditional in fact specifies is a 'relation' between the possible existence or non-existence of two situations made true by the existence of the dispositional properties of the concrete particulars involved.
[References] [Talks] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1997e On the Nature of Conditionals and Their Truthmakers.pdf
Place, U. T. (1997f). De re modality without possible worlds. Acta Analytica, 12(19), 131-145.
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between de dicto modality which is a matter of which propositions can, cannot and must be true, given the laws of logic, and de re modality which is a matter of which situations (events or states of affairs) can, cannot and must exist, given the laws of nature. It is argued that Kripke's de re modality, defined in terms of what is true in some possible world, no possible world and all possible worlds, is an unsatisfactory amalgam of the two.
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1997f De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds.pdf
Place, U. T. (1997l). Consciousness and the Zombie-within. [Paper presented at the Inaugural Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Claremont, CA, June 15th 1997.]
[Talks] [3 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1999a). Ryle's behaviorism. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of Behaviorism (Chapter 13, pp. 361-398). Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-012524190-8/50014-0
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between the OR-behaviorism of the Americans which wants to make psychology more scientific and the OUR-behaviourism of Wittgenstein and Ryle which comes from the philosophy of language. Ryle's doctrines are classified into those that derive from Wittgenstein and those that are peculiar to Ryle. The latter are sub-classified into failures and successes. Criticisms of Ryle's position by Place, Geach, Medlin, Armstrong and Martin are examined and, where possible, rebutted. I conclude that, with some important exceptions, the dispositional analysis of mental concepts survives, as does, more controversially, the hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements.
Note:
'Brian Medlin challenges Ullin Place on the question of probity in Place's paper "Ryle's Behaviorism" and holds him accountable for defaming him. Medlin wants this rectified. In further correspondence Medlin wants the passage withdrawn from the paper. As the book had already been published, Ullin requested from the publisher that a corrigendum slip be printed and inserted into unsold copies of the book, and sewn in if any further copies of the book were printed.' Note on Box 1, Folder 025 (letters exchanged between Jack Smart, Ullin T. Place, Brian Medlin, Jim Franklin, David Armstrong) held in the Brian Medlin Collection at the Library of Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia.
[References] [11 citing publications] [4 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1999a Ryle's Behaviorism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1999b). Intentionality and the physical - a reply to Mumford. Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 225-231. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00139
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) claim "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality" proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they and Mumford do, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. To my contention that the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin's (1994) argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin's argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance are of the form 'If p then q'.
[References] [Is reply to] [10 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1999b Intentionality and the Physical - A Reply to Mumford.pdf
Place, U. T. (1999d). Connectionism and the problem of consciousness. Acta Analytica, 14(22), 197-226.
[Abstract]This paper falls into three parts. In Part 1 I give my reasons for rejecting two aspects of Horgan and Tienson's position as laid out in their book, the language of thought and belief-desire explanations of behaviour, while endorsing the connection they see between linguistic syntax and the syntax of a motor skill. In Part 2 I outline the theory that the brain consists of two input-output transformation systems consciousness whose function is (a) to categorise problematic inputs, (b) to select a response appropriate to such inputs once they have been categorised and (c) to initiate and monitor the execution of such response once selected, and the "zombie-within" whose function is (a) to identify and alert consciousness to any inputs that are problematic either because they are unexpected or because they are significant relative to the agent's current or perennial motivational concerns. In Part 3 I consider how far the properties of the two systems outlined in Part 2 can be understood in terms of the known properties of connectionist networks.
Keywords: connectionism, consciousness, problematic input, zombie-within
Note:
The download file contains some text added by the author after publication. Footnote 2 is added.
[References] [Related] [Talks] [3 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1999d Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness.pdf
Place, U. T. (1999f). Vagueness as a mark of dispositional intentionality. Acta Analytica, 14(23), 91-109.
[Abstract]Vagueness (within rather than at the boundaries of a concept) is one of the "three salient things about intention" listed by Elizabeth Anscombe (1965) in her paper ‘The intentionality of sensation’. In an unpublished paper John Burnheim has claimed that "physical causal dispositions" satisfy these "three marks of intentionality given by Anscombe." Subsequent discussion by C. B. Martin and K. Pfeifer (1986) and Place (1996) shows that if the various marks of intentionality proposed by Brentano, Chisholm, Anscombe, Lycan and Searle are sorted according to Kneale's (1968) distinction between intenTional states and intenSional locutions it turns out that all of the former (Anscombe's three marks plus Searle's/Brentano's directedness) are found in physical dispositions, while the latter (Chisholm's second and third marks) are marks of a quotation.
[References] [Talks] [4 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1999f Vagueness as a Mark of Dispositional Intentionality.pdf
Place, U. T. (1999j) Are qualia dispositional properties? [Paper presented at the Università di Siena and Terza Università di Roma conference on "Consciousness Naturalized", Certosa di Pontignano, Siena - published as Place, U. T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia its nature and its source. Brain and Mind, 1, 183-192].
[Related] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (2000a). Consciousness and the zombie-within: a functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. In Y. Rossetti, & A. Revonsuo (Eds.), Beyond dissociations: Interaction between dissociated implicit and explicit processing (pp. 295-329). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.22.15pla
[Abstract]Cowey & Stoerig's (1995) demonstration that the phenomenon of blindsight applies to monkeys with striate cortical lesions in the same way as it does to humans with similar lesions makes it plausible to argue that the behaviour of mammals and probably that of other vertebrates is controlled by two distinct but closely interdependent and interacting systems in the brain which I shall refer to respectively as 'consciousness' and the 'sub-conscious automatic pilot or "zombie" within'.
On this hypothesis, consciousness has three functions, (a) that of categorizing any input that is problematic in that it is either unexpected or significant relative to the individual's current or perennial motivational concerns, (b) that of selecting a response appropriate both to the presence of a thing of that kind and to the individual's motivational concerns with respect to it, and (c) that of monitoring the execution of that response. Conscious/phenomenal experience, on this view, is the first stage in the process whereby problematic inputs are processed by consciousness. Its function is to modify the figure-ground relations within the central representation of a problematic input until an adequate categorization is selected.
The sub-conscious automatic pilot or “zombie-within” has two functions (a) that of continuously scanning the total current input and alerting consciousness to any input it identifies as problematic, (b) that of protecting consciousness from overload either by ignoring those non-problematic inputs which require no response or by responding appropriately but automatically to those for which there already exists a well practised skill or other “instinctive” response pattern.
Keywords: consciousness
[References] [Talks] [5 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 2000a Consciousness and the Zombie-within a Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence.pdf
Place, U. T. (2000c). The role of the hand in the evolution of language. Psycoloquy, 11(7), January 23. www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.007
[Abstract]This article has four sections. Section I sets out four principles which should guide any attempt to reconstruct the evolution of an existing biological characteristic. Section II sets out thirteen principles specific to a reconstruction of the evolution of language. Section III sets out eleven pieces of evidence for the view that vocal language must have been preceded by an earlier language of gesture. Based on those principles and evidence, Section IV sets out seven proposed stages in the process whereby language evolved: (1) the use of mimed movement to indicate an action to be performed, (2) the development of referential pointing which, when combined with mimed movement, leads to a language of gesture, (3) the development of vocalisation, initially as a way of imitating the calls of animals, (4) counting on the fingers leading into (5) the development of symbolic as distinct from iconic representation, (6) the introduction of the practice of question and answer, and (7) the emergence of syntax as a way of disambiguating utterances that can otherwise be disambiguated only by gesture.
[References] [Talks] [12 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 2000c The Role of the Hand in the Evolution of Language.pdf
Place, U. T. (2000d). The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind, 1, 29-43. doi:10.1023/A:1010087621727
[Abstract]The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental, and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as the brain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mental states depend causally on and are, thus, "distinct existences" from the states of the brain microstructure with which 'they' are correlated. It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity and its composition/underlying structure applies across the board. All stuffs and processes are the same thing as is described by a description of their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of a disposition extends beyond the "skin" of the dispositional property bearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure, usually the microstructure, of the bearer.
[References] [3 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 2000d The Two Factor-Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.pdf
Place, U. T., & Taylor, K. E. (1995). The functions of consciousness and its constituent parts [Conference presentation, presented to the Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, 31st August 1995]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
[References] [Talks] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: Place & Taylor (1995) The Functions of Consciousness and its Constituent Part.pdf
Plato (1953). Phaedo. In W.D. Woodhead (Tr. & Ed.) Plato: Socratic Dialogues. Nelson.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Plato (1961). Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophist, Statesman (English translation with introduction by John Warrington). Dent.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Popper, K. R. (1935). Logik der Forschung (English translation as The Logic of Scientific Discovery - 1959. Hutchinson).
[4 referring publications by Place]
Popper, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism Beacon.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Posner, M. I., & Dehaene, S. (1994). Attentional networks. Trends in Neuroscience, 17, 75-79.
[4 referring publications by Place]