Lecture 1: Philosophy, philosophical psychology and its relevance for empirical psychology (26/9/1973). Section 1
Abstract:
The nature of philosophy and psychology. The distinction between the philosophy of psychology and philosophical psychology. The relevance of philosophical psychology for empirical psychology.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 01.pdf

Lecture 6.2: Introduction to the conceptual analysis of ordinary language (7/11/1973). Section 2
Abstract:
Conceptual analysis as a technique for revealing ontological commitment and explanatory function. Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of usage
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 06.2 - revised version.pdf

Lecture 3: Ontology (17/10/1973). Section 1
Abstract:
The nature of existence. Universalia in rebus and Aristotle's doctrine of substance. Metaphysical materialism and spatio-temporal extension. Ontological categories
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 03.pdf

Lecture 4: Cosmology 1. Reductionism (24/10/1973) Section 1
Abstract:
The nature of explanation. Reduction - conceptual, material, substantial and theoretical
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 04 - revised version.pdf

Lecture 5: Cosmology 2. Causation (31/10/1973) Section 1
Abstract:
Causal Explanation. Hume's account of the causal relation: what is valid, what is obscure, what is mistaken. 24 causal principles that replace Hume's account
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 05 - revised version.pdf

Lecture 14: Varieties of explanation in psychology. (6/2/1974). Section 4
Abstract:
The schools of psychology. Feigl's three languages of psychology. Incommensurability in the explanation of behaviour. The evidential basis of mentalist language. The explanation of facts and the explanation of phenomena. Molecular languages in the explanation of behavioral phenomena: cybernetics and neurophysiology. The identity of factual reference.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 14

Lecture 16: The Mind as a substance (20/2/1974). Section 5
Abstract:
Mental substance. The substantive 'mind' in ordinary language idiom. The reference of the first person pronoun - the Kantian argument. Aristotle's doctrine of substance and the Cartesian argument. Personal identity - the Lockean argument.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 16

Lecture 8: Sentence frame analysis (21/11/1973). Section 2
Abstract:
The study of sentence frames. Psychological concepts as personal predicates. The tense structure of psychological verbs and the ontological categories. The objects of psychological verbs and the problem of intentionality
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 08 - revised version.pdf

Lecture 9: Definition in use and verification analysis (28/11/1973) Section 2
Abstract:
Entailment and the entailment test. The definition in use and its limitations. Some examples. The verification test and the verification principle.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 09 - revised version.pdf

Lecture 12: Mentalist explanations - Believing and wanting (23/1/1974). Section 3
Abstract:
The dispositional character and the intentionality of mentalist explanations. Mentalism as a scientific theory. The logical structure of mentalist explanations
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 12.pdf

Lecture 13: Mentalist explanations - epistemology and ontology (30/1/1974). Section 3
Abstract:
The nature of the evidence for mentalist explanations. The ontological commitments of mentalist explanations
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 13.pdf

Lecture 2: Metaphysics & Epistemology (3/10/1973). Section 1
Abstract:
Metaphysics as meta-science. The three divisions of metaphysics: Metaphysical Epistemology, Ontology and Cosmology.
Knowledge and belief as propositional attitudes. Sentences and propositions; words and concepts. Necessary and contingent truth. The correspondence and coherence theories of truth
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 02.pdf

Lecture 28: The logical and functional aspects of language with special reference to moral discourse (12/6/1974). Section 8
Abstract:
The pragmatic or functional aspect of language. Skinner on language behaviour. Ethical utterances. Blaming as an aggressive act and an aversive event. The acceptance and avoidance of blame. Domestic and political quarrels.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 28.pdf

Lecture 27: The experimental study of emotion (29/5/1974). Section 7
Abstract:
Place, U.T. (1971). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis. [Unpublished paper]<br>Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for<br> the negative reinforcement condition.","In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf

Beckermann, A. (2012). Aufsätze. Bd. 1: Philosophie des Geistes. Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld. pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2508111
[Reprints in this collection]  

Aaron, P. G., & Joshi, R. M. (2006). Written Language Is as Natural as Spoken language: A Biolinguistic Perspective. Reading Psychology, 27(4), 263-311. doi:10.1080/02702710600846803
Abstract:
A commonly held belief is that language is an aspect of the biological system since the capacity to acquire language is innate and evolved along Darwinian lines. Written language, on the other hand, is thought to be an artifact and a surrogate of speech; it is, therefore, neither natural nor biological. This disparaging view of written language, even though propounded by some renowned linguists and biologists, has not gained universal acceptance. Dissenters such as linguists from the Prague circle who claim that written language is an independent system that deserves a status equivalent to that of spoken language have developed their argument along linguistic parameters. The present article also endeavors to show that written language is as natural as spoken language but does so from a biolinguistic perspective. Biolinguistics defines language as a product of biological adaptation in the Darwinian sense (Givon, 2002) and considers language to be innate and species specific (Jenkins, 2000). The present article presents evidence to show that, similar to spoken language, written language has adaptive value, evolved over time, and is relatively independent of spoken language. The Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, which has a history of about 4,000 years, is used for examining the proposition that written language evolved along Darwinian lines as much as spoken language did. It is concluded that written language is yet another manifestation of the natural endowment of the human mind and may not be treated as a proxy for speech. The educational implication is that, in literacy instruction, written language should be given as much importance in today's schools as elements of spoken language, such as phoneme awareness and phonological awareness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Adams, C. D., & Dickinson, A. (1981). Instrumental responding following reinforcer devaluation. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 33 B, 109-112.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Aitchison, J. (1989). The articulate mammal: An introduction to psycholinguistics. Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature. In R. J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 158-180). Blackwell.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Apter, M. J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The theory of psychological reversals. Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Apter, M. J. (1989). Reversal theory: Motivation, emotion, and personality. Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Aranyosi, I (2011). A new argument for mind-brain identity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 489-517, doi:10.1093/bjps/axr001
Abstract:
In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a ‘nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Aristotle (1901). Posterior analytics. B.H. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Aristotle (1925). Metaphysics (translated by W.D. Ross).
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Aristotle (1936). Physics (Translated by H. G. Apostle). Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Aristotle (1941). De Anima. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle. Random House.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Aristotle (1963) Categories (translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill) Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1962). Bodily sensations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [16 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism (two volumes). Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals: An opinionated introduction. Westview Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004(12). ndpr.nd.edu/news/identifying-the-mind-selected-papers-of-u-t-place/
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Armstrong (2004) Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind - Selected Papers of U.T. Place.pdf

Armstrong, D. M., & Place, U. T. (1991). A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: the Armstrong-Place debate. Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 25(66), 3-44.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B., Place, U. T., & Crane, T. (Ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A debate. Routledge.
[8 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Armstrong, D. M., Place, U. T., & Martin, C. B. (1992). A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation: Part II The Martin-Armstrong-Place debate. Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 26(68-69), 3-58.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P. (1662) La logique, ou l'art de penser.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Aserinsky, E., & Kleitman, N. (1955) Two types of ocular motility occurring in sleep. Journal appl. Physiology. 8, 1-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Augustine of Hippo De Quantitate Animae.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1956). Ifs and cans. Proceedings of the British Academy. Reprinted in J. L. Austin (1961), Philosophical Papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson, & G. J. Warnock, pp. 205-232). Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1961). Philosophical papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1962a). Sense and sensibilia (Reconstructed by G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1962b). How to do Things with Words (Edited by J. O. Urmson). Oxford University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Ayer, A. J. (1936/1946). Language, Truth and Logic (2nd Edition). Gollancz.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ayer, A. J. (1940). Foundations of empirical knowledge. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ayer, A. J. (1947). Thinking and Meaning: Inaugural Lecture. H. K. Lewis.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ayer, A. J. (1959). Privacy. British Academy Lecture.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ayer, A. J. (1960). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Journal of Philosophy, 57, 517-535.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2018). The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Appraisal [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Trento.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (pp. 73-108). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_4
Abstract:
In this chapter, the author compares the neo-mechanistic theory with one of its major contemporary competitors, the Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition (MCTHC). The aim of the author in this chapter is to evaluate to what extent the main arguments presented by the proponents of MCTHC against the neo-mechanistic theory, directed to particular aspects of it, represent great threats to the aspirations of the neo-mechanists. MCTHC supports a 'ruthless (strong) neuro-cognitive reductionism', as a form of scientific integration for cognitive and neural science, based on current neuroscientific work present in the field of molecular and cellular neuroscience. This theory presents a clear challenge to the neo-mechanistic theory, which is committed to causal and explanatory pluralism and a weak autonomy of higher-level sciences. After characterizing the neuroscientific reductionist position more precisely, the author discusses the neo-mechanists' answer to the challenge and their attempt to stand with pluralism, instead of reduction. A meticulous analysis of their replies shows, however, that the challenge of explanatory reduction cannot be overcome with the arguments the neo-mechanists provide, and their theory, therefore, needs to be understood ultimately as reductionist.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). The Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (Chapter 3, 39-70). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_3
Abstract:
In the third chapter, the author provides a systematical and analytical exposition of the most central theoretical aspects of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC). He shows that the theory is clearly committed to a form of physicalism, on the one hand, but it rejects certain kinds of traditional epistemological reductionist approaches, on the other hand. The framework attempts to offer a pluralist and integrative mechanistic view concerning the relationship between human brain and cognition; a view that is applied to phenomena and to theories overall in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. This general pluralist integrative neuro-cognitive relation is the most important pillar grounding the theory's application to human cognition. Besides this, the author also investigates how the framework is applied in concrete to two paradigmatic cases of human cognitive phenomena: the first case is related to the perceptual system; and the second case, to the memory system. In this way, it is possible to evaluate the application of the theory to particular psychological phenomena.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Azrin, H. H., Hutchinson, R. R., & Sallery R. D. (1964). Pain-aggression toward inanimate objects. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 7, 223-228.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Azrin, N. H., Holz, W., Ulrich, R. & Goldiamond, I. (1961). The control of the content of conversation through reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 4, 25-30.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Azrin, N. H., Hutchinson, R. R., & Hake, D. F. (1966). Extinction-induced aggression. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 9, 191-204.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Baker, L. R. (1997). Why constitution is not identity. Journal of Philosophy, XCIV, 599-621.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Baker, M. C. (1992). Thematic conditions on syntactic structures: Evidence from locative applicatives. In I. M. Roca (Ed.), Thematic structure and its role in grammar (pp. 23-46). Foris Publications.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Baldwin, J. M. (1902). Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol.II. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bannister, D. (1968). The myth of physiological psychology. Bulletin of the British Psychology Society, 21, 229-31.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bard, P. (1942). Neural mechanisms in emotional and sexual behaviour. Psychosom. Med., 4, 171-2.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
Abstract:
In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967)]  
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf

Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. MIT Press.
[16 referring publications by Place]  

Beakley, B., & Ludlow, P. (Eds.) (1992). The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues. MIT Press.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Beasty, A. (1987). The role of language in the emergence of equivalence relations: A developmental study [Unpublished Ph.D. thesis]. University of Wales, Bangor, U.K.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Beckermann, A. (2007). Neue Überlegungen zum Eigenschaftsphysikalismus. In M. Pauen , M. Schütte , & A. Staudacher (Eds), Begriff, Erklärung, Bewusstsein. Neue Beiträge zum Qualia-Problem (pp. 143-170). Mentis. pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2555625
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Beckermann, A. (2012). Property Identity and Reductive Explanation. In S. Gozzano & C. Hill (Eds.), New Perspectives on Type-Identity (pp. 66-87). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511687068.004
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Bedford, E. (1956-1957). Emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVII, 281-304.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Beloff, J. (1995). The Searle fallacy and what we can learn from it. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 20, 19-26.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Beloff, J. (1996). Searle's fallacy versus Place's nonsense: John Beloff replies to his critics The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section Newsletter, 22, 14-16.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Bennett, J. (1976). Linguistic Behaviour. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bentall, R. P., Lowe, C. F. and Beasty, A. (1985). The role of verbal behavior in human learning II: The development of fixed-interval responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 43, 165-181.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Berkeley, G. (1710) The principles of human knowledge.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Bickerton, D. (1990). Language and Species. University of Chicago Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Bickle, J. (2000). Editor's note. Brain and Mind, 1, 25. doi:10.1023/A:1010015620339
Download: Bickle (2000) Editor's Note.pdf

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1999). Critical notice of Tim Crane, ed. Dispositions: A debate by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place. doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10715993
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Bigelow & Pargetter (1999) Critical Notice of Dispostions - A Debate.pdf

Binswanger, L. (1947). Ausgewälhte Vorträge und Aufsätze. Francke.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Bird, A. (2001). Review of DAVID ARMSTRONG, CHARLIE MARTIN, and ULLIN PLACE, edited by TIM CRANE Dispositions: A Debate and STEPHEN MUMFORD Dispositions. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.137
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Bird (2001) Review of Armstrong et al Dispositions.pdf

Blackburn, I., Bishop, S., & Glen, A. J. (1981). The efficacy of cognitive therapy in depression: A treatment trial using cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy - each alone and in combination. British Journal of Psychiatry ,139, 181-9.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Blackburn, S. (1996). The fertile comma [Review of the book 'Dispositions: A Debate' by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place].
[Reviewed publication(s)]  

Bloomfield, L. (1933). Language. Holt.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Bobbs-Merrill (1969). Phil.163. Bobbs-Merrill reprint series in Philosophy.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Boring, E. G. (1933). The Physical Dimension of Consciousness. Century.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Boring, E. G. (1940). Was this analysis a success? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 35, 4-10. [Reprinted in S. Rachman (ed.) Critical Essays in Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Pergamon, 16-22.]
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd edition; first edition: 1929). Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Borst, C.V. (Ed.). (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15364-0_2
[Reprints in this collection]  

Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, <>em>XLI, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Bradley, M. C. (1964). Critical Notice of Smart's Philosophy and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLII, 262-83.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brain, Lord (1965) Some Aspects of the Mind-Brain Relationship In J. R. Smythies (Ed.)., Brain and Mind (pp. 63-79). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Braithwaite, R. B. (1932). The nature of believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129-146.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
[14 referring publications by Place]  

Brentano, F. C. (1911/1973). Appendix to the classification of mental phenomena. In O.Kraus (Ed.), Psychology from an empirical standpoint (English translation L. L. McAlister (Ed.)). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (1895). Studien über Hysteria.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brewer, W. F. (1974). There is no convincing evidence for operant or classical conditioning in adult humans. In W. B. Weimer & D. J. Palermo (Eds.), Cognition and the Symbolic Processes (pp. 1-34). Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Bridgman, G. (1928). The logic of modern physics. Macmillan.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Broad, C. D. (1925). Mind and its place in nature. Routledge.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and Communication. Pergamon.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Broadbent, D. E. (1961). Behaviour. Eyre and Spottiswoode.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and Stress. Academic Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Broadbent, D. E. (1973). In Defence of Empirical Psychology. Methuen.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Brogden, W. J. (1939). Sensory preconditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25, 323-332
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brogden, W. J., Lipman, E. A., & Culler, E. (1938). The role of incentive in conditioning and extinction. The American Journal of Psychology, 51, 109–117. doi:10.2307/1416419
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Bromberger, S. (1965). An approach to explanation. In R.J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series (pp. 72-105). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, P. L., & Jenkins, H. M. (1968). Auto-shaping of the pigeon's key-peck. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 11, 1-8.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language use: politeness phenomena. In E. N. Goody (Ed.), Questions and politeness: Strategies in social interaction. Cambridge University Press. Reissued with corrections, new introduction and new bibliography as Politeness: Some Universals of Language Usage. Cambridge: C
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, R. (1973). A First Language: The Early Stages. Harvard University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, R. (2012). The brain and its states. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, & N. Zach (Eds.), Being in time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Bühler, K. (1907). Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgange I. Über Gedanken. Arch. Ges. Psychol., 9, 297-365.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Burgess, A. (1972). A Clockwork Orange. Lorrimer.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Burgess, P. W. & Shallice, T. (1996). Confabulation and the control of recollection. Memory, 4, 359-411.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Burt, C. (1968). Brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 55-69.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Burt, C. (1969). Brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 29-36.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Byrne, D. (2016) Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent? Philosophical Psychology,29(5), 669-678, doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1108398

Cabanis, P. J. G. (1802). Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Canfield, T. H. (1941). Sex determination of day-old chicks, II. Type variations. Poultry Science, 20, 327-328.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Cannon, W. B. (1929). Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage. Appleton-Century.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Carnap R. (1942). Introduction to Semantics. Harvard University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Carnap, R. (1938). The Unity of Science. Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Catania, A. C., & Harnad, S. (Eds.) (1988). The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. Cambridge University Press.
[Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Catania, A. C., Shimoff, E., & Matthews, B. A. (1989). An experimental analysis of rule-governed behavior. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control, pp. 119-150. Plenum Press, .
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Catania, A.C. (2002). The verbal behavior of Ullin T. Place. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 3(1), 1-5. doi:10.1080/15021149.2002.11434199
Abstract:
Ullin Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the perseverance and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2002) The Verbal Behavior of Ullin T. Place.pdf

Catania, A.C. (2003). Ullin T. Place: A life in verbal behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 173-180. behavior.org/resources/130.pdf
Abstract:
Ullin T. Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the dignity, perseverance, and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2003) Ullin T. Place - A Life in Verbal Behavior.pdf

Chalmers, D. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9-10), 6-61.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Chalmers, D. J. (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). (1962). The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Chase, S. (1968). Selectivity in multidimensional stimulus control. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 66, 787-792.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chater, N. (1989). Learning to respond to structure in time. R.S.R.E. Malvern Technical Report, September 1989.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Chisholm, R. (1967). Intentionality. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58.
[19 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1967). The General Properties of Language. In F. L. Darley (Ed.), Brain Mechanisms Underlying Speech and Language. Grune and Stratton.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and Mind. Harcourt, Brace and World.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1-15.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1987). On the nature, use and acquisition of language. In N. Chomsky, Generative Grammar: Its Basis, Development and Prospects. Kyoto University of Foreign Studies.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N., Place, U. T., & Schoneberger, T. (Ed.) (2000). The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994 The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 7-38. doi:10.1007/BF03392953
Abstract:
Edited correspondence between Ullin T Place and Noam Chomsky, which occurred in 1993-1994, is presented. The principal topics are (a) deep versus surface structure; (b) computer modeling of the brain; (c) the evolutionary origins of language; (d) behaviorism; and (e) a dispositional account of language. This correspondence includes Chomsky's denial that he ever characterized deep structure as innate; Chomsky's critique of computer modeling (both traditional and connectionist) of the brain; Place's critique of Chomsky's alleged failure to provide an adequate account of the evolutionary origins of language, and Chomsky's response that such accounts are “pop-Darwinian fairy tales”; and Place's arguments for, and Chomsky's against, the relevance of behaviorism to linguistic theory, especially the relevance of a behavioral approach to language that is buttressed by a dispositional account of sentence construction.
[Is cited by]  
Download: Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) The Chomsky-Place Correspondence.pdf

Churchland P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain MIT Press
[3 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78,67-90.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness (Revised Edition). MIT Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Clark S. (1717) A Collection of Papers, which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibniz, and Dr. Clarke, In the Years 1715 and 1716. James Knapton
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7-19. [doi:org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7) era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/1312/TheExtendedMind.pdf

Cobb, M. (2020). The idea of the brain. A history. Profile Books.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Cohen, L. J. (1968). Criteria of Intensionality II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, XLII, 123-142.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Comte, A. (1830-1842). Cours de Philosophie Positive (6 Volumes).
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Condillac, E. B. de (1746/1947). Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines. Ouvrage où l'on réduit á un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain. In: Oeuvres Philosophiques de Condillac. Georges LeRoy.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Cornman, J. W. (1962). The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy, LIX, 486-492.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Cowey, A. (1974). Atrophy of retinal ganglion cells after removal of striate cortex in a rhesus monkey. Perception, 3, 257-260.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1995). Blindsight in monkeys. Nature, 373(6511), 247-249.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1997). Visual detection in monkeys with blindsight. Neuropsychologia, 35, 929-939.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Crystal, D. (1985). A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Curry, D. S. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850-877. doi:10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
Abstract:
Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
[Citing Place (1996c) in context]  

Curry, D.S. (2021). How beliefs are like colors. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03144-1
Abstract:
Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Danckert, J., & Rossetti, Y. (2005). Blindsight in action: what can the different sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(7), 1035–1046 doi:10.1016/J.NEUBIOREV.2005.02.001 www.academia.edu/19599266/Blindsight_in_action_what_can_the_different_sub_types_of_blindsight_tell_us_about_the_control_of_visually_guided_actions
Abstract:
Blindsight broadly refers to the paradoxical neurological condition where patients with a visual field defect due to a cortical lesion nevertheless demonstrate implicit residual visual sensitivity within their field cut. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, through a selective review of the blindsight literature we propose a new taxonomy for the subtypes of residual abilities described in blindsight. Those patients able to accurately act upon blind field stimuli (e.g. by pointing or saccading towards them) are classified as having ‘action-blindsight’, those whose residual functions can be said to rely to some extent upon attentive processing of blind field stimuli are classified as demonstrating ‘attention-blindsight’, while finally, patients who have somewhat accurate perceptual judgements for blind field stimuli despite a complete lack of any conscious percept, are classified as having ‘agnosopsia’ — literally meaning ‘not knowing what one sees’. We also address the possible neurological substrates of these residual sensory processes. Our second aim was to investigate the most striking subtype of blindsight, action-blindsight. We review the data relevant to this subtype and the hypotheses proposed to account for it, before speculating on how action-blindsight may inform our normal models of visuomotor control.
[Citing Place (2000a)]  

Danto, A.C. (1965). Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1, 141-148.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Murray
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Darwin, C. (1872). Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals Murray.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. Journal of Philosophy, LX, pp. 685-700. Reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 3-19). Clarendon Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1967a). Truth and meaning. Synthese, 17, 304-323.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1967b). Causal relations. Journal of Philosophy, LXIV, 691-703. Reprinted in D. Davidson (1980), Essays on Actions and Events (pp.149-162). Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1969). The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel pp. 216-234). Reidel. Reprinted in D. Davidson (1980), Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 163-180). Clarendon Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth. Reprinted in D. Davidson (1980), Essays on actions and events (pp. 207-227). Clarendon Press.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1976). Hempel on explaining action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239-253.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. Dialectica, 36, 317-327.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

DeHaene, S. (2020). How we learn. Why brains learn better than any machine ... for now.. Viking.

Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Is reply to]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf

Dennett, D. C. (2016). Illusionism as the obvious default theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 65-72.
Abstract:
Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counter-intuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Dennett, D.C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on the mind and psychology Bradford.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Descartes, R. (1637). Discours de la Méthode.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Descartes, R. (1641/1954). Meditations on First Philosophy, 2nd Edition. In G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Trs. & Eds.), Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Nelson.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Descartes, R. (1649). Les passions de l'âme.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Devany, J. M., Hayes, S. C., & Nelson, R. O. (1986). Equivalence class formation in language-able and language-disabled children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 46; 243-257.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Dickins D. W. (2005). On aims and methods in the neuroimaging of derived relations. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior84(3), 453–483. doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.92-04
Abstract:
Ingenious and seemingly powerful technologies have been developed recently that enable the visualization in some detail of events in the brain concomitant upon the ongoing behavioral performance of a human participant. Measurement of such brain events offers at the very least a new set of dependent variables in relation to which the independent variables familiarly manipulated in the operant laboratory may be explored. Two related paradigms in which a start has been made in such research concern the derivation of novel or emergent relations from a baseline set of trained relations, and include the phenomenon of transitive inference (TI), observed in studies of stimulus equivalence (SE) and serial learning (SL) or seriation. This paper reviews some published and forthcoming neuroimaging studies of these and related phenomena, and considers how this line of research both demands and represents a welcome synthesis between types of question and levels of explanation in behavioral science that often have been seen as antithetical.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, D., Singh, K., Roberts, N., Burns, P., Downes, J., Jimmieson, P., & Bentall, R. (2001). An fMRI study of stimulus equivalence. Neuroreport, 12(2), 405-411. www.academia.edu/download/43697924/An_fMRI_study_of_stimulus_equivalence20160313-1683-54en2k.pdf
Abstract:
In order to study brain activation during the formation of equivalence relations, 12 subjects (mean age 27.6 yrs) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) during matching-to-sample (MTS) tests of (1) previously trained arbitrary relationships between iconic stimuli and the untrained, emergent relations of (2) symmetry, (3) transitivity, and (4) symmetry with transitivity, plus a test of verbal fluency (VF). Brain activation was similar in all MTS tasks and in the VF task. In particular, both types of task activated dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex bilaterally. However VF, but not the MTS tasks, activated Broca's area. In three of the four MTS tasks, behavioural accuracy was significantly correlated with left lateralisation of DLPFC activity. Brain activation patterns during equivalence thus resembled those involved in semantic processing underlying language, without involving regions concerned with the simple sub-vocal articulation of stimulus names.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, T. (2002). A behaviourist's perspective on the origins of language. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 4(1), 31-42.
Abstract:
The article discusses behaviorist's perspective on the origins of language. The Massive Modularity Hypothesis has been a feature of recent approaches within Evolutionary Psychology (EP). EP sees its task as that of explaining the proximate psychological mechanisms that have been selected to resolve ultimate adaptive problems during the ancestry of species. The discrete nature of adaptive problems affords a discretely organized cognition. Sidman Stimulus Equivalence (SSE) is a kind of stimulus equivalence. SSE is defined as the formation of equivalence classes with reference to the formal properties of a mathematical equivalence set which are reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. These properties are best explained with reference to the laboratory procedures used to induce them.

Dickins, T. (2021). Tom Dickins about Ullin Place on Twitter.
Abstract:
I attended various talks by Ullin Place. He used to sit and read from an MS and occasionally pause for long periods of time and then write fairly copious notes in the margins correcting himself. Once done the talk would continue taking a different line than previously suggested.
— Behavioural Science Lab Middlesex (@BSL_MDX) January 15, 2021

Dickins, T., & Dickins, D. (2001). Symbols, stimulus equivalence and the origins of language. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 221-244. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759429
Abstract:
Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account of language acquisition has led to a modular and distinctly nativist psychology of language (cf. Pinker, 1994, 1997; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Little has been said about the role or nature of learning mechanisms in the evolution of language. Although Place does not provide any defense of a behaviorist linguistic ontogeny, this is no reason to rule out his phylogenetic speculations. We aim to outline Place's evolutionarily parsimonious view of symbol origins and their relation to stimulus equivalence. We applaud Ullin Place for bringing symbols into focus within the broader discipline of language origins and suggest that he has raised an interesting set of questions to be discussed in future work.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g)]  
Download: Dickins (2001) Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.pdf

Dickinson, A. (1988). Intentionality in animal conditioning. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.), Thought without Language. Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Dickinson, A., & Balleine, B. (1993). Actions and responses: The dual psychology of behaviour. In N. Eilan, R. A. McCarthy, & B. Brewer (Eds.), Spatial representation: Problems in philosophy and psychology (pp. 277–293). Blackwell Publishing.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Dilworth, J. (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40.
Abstract:
The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. By using U. T. Place's intentional analysis of dispositions a dispositional analysis of perceptual representation is developed.
Download: Dilworth (2005) The Reflexive Theory of Perception.pdf

Dollard, J. J., & Miller, N. E. (1950). Personality and Psychotherapy McGraw & Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Donahoe, J. W. (1991). The selectionist approach to verbal behavior: potential contributions of neuropsychology and connectionism. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on Verbal Behavior: Proceedings of the First International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 6, pp. 119-145). Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Donahoe, J. W., Burgos, J. E., & Palmer, D. C. (1993). A selectionist approach to reinforcement. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 60(1), 17–40. doi:10.1901/jeab.1993.60-17
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Donahoe, J. W., Palmer, D. C., & Burgos, J. E. (1997). The S-R issue: clarification of its status in Donahoe and Palmer's Learning and Complex Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 67, 193-212.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67(3), 547-619.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Dugdale, N. (1987). A search for symmetry in the conditional discriminations of language-trained chimpanzees (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Manchester, April 1987).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Dugdale, N., & Lowe, C.F. (1990). Naming and stimulus equivalence. In D. E. Blackman, & H. Lejeune (Eds.), Behaviour analysis in theory and practice: Contributions and controversies (pp. 115-138). Erlbaum.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Duhem, P. (1914). La théorie physique: son objet et sa structure. (English translation as The aim and structure of physical theory (1954)). Chevalier et Rivière.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Eccles, J. C. (1953). The Neurophysiological basis of mind. Clarendon.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Edelman, G. M. (1987). Neural darwinism: The theory of neuronal group selection Basic Books.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Edwards, W. (1954). The theory of decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 380-417.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ekwall, E. (1959). Etymological notes on English place-names. Lunds Universitets Årsskrift, N.F. Avd. 1 Bd. 53 Nr 5. (Lund Studies in English. XXVII.)
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Estes, W. K., & Skinner, B. F. (1941). Some quantitative properties of anxiety. J. Exp. Psychol., 29, 390-400.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Eysenck, H. J. (1953). Uses and Abuses of Psychology. Penguin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Eysenck, H. J. (Ed.) (1960). Behaviour Therapy and the Neuroses Pergamon.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fantl, J. (1997). Review of D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place, 'Dispositions: A Debate'.
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Fantl (1997) Review of Disposition - A Debate.pdf

Farah, M. J. (1990). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and what they tell us about Normal Vision.. M.I.T. Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Farrell, B. A. (1950). Experience. Mind, LIX, 170-198
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Farrer, W. (1915). Early Yorkshire Charters (Vol. II). Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fechner, G. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik (Two Volumes. English translation of Volume I as Elements of Psychophysics. H. E. Adler (trans.), D. H. Howes and E. G. Boring (eds.) (1966). Holt, Rinehart and Winston). Breitkopf and Hartel,
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Feigl, H. (1950). The mind-mody problem in the development of logical empiricism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4. Reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Broadbeck (Eds.) (1953), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 612-626). Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Feigl, H. (1967). The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript. University of Minnesota Press.
[Reprints in this collection]  [3 referring publications by Place]  

Ferster, C. B. (1958). Control of behavior in chimpanzees and pigeons by time out from positive reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 72, Whole No. 461.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ferster, C. B., & Skinner, B. F. (1957). Schedules of reinforcement Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Festinger, L. (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance Stanford University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Feyerabend, P. (1962). Explanation, reduction and empiricism. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol.III, pp. 28-97). University of Minnesota Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Feyerabend, P. K. (1957-1958). An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVIII, 143-170.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Feyerabend, P. K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. The Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 49-66.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Feyerabend, P. K. (1975). Against method. New Left Books
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Flew, A. G. N. (Ed.). (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. The Macmillan Company.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
[13 referring publications by Place]  

Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fodor, J.A. (1980). Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive Psychology. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 63-73.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fodor, J.A. (1987). Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Fordyce, W. E. (1978). Learning processes in pain. In R. A. Sternbach (Ed.), The psychology of pain. Raven Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11-12), 11-39. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020011/art00002
Abstract:
This article presents the case for an approach to consciousness that I call illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them (or, on some versions, their objects) as having phenomenal properties. Thus, the task for a theory of consciousness is to explain our illusory representations of phenomenality, not phenomenality itself, and the hard problem is replaced by the illusion problem. Although it has had powerful defenders, illusionism remains a minority position, and it is often dismissed as failing to take consciousness seriously. This article seeks to rebut this accusation. It defines the illusionist programme, outlines its attractions, and defends it against some common objections. It concludes that illusionism is a coherent and attractive approach, which deserves serious consideration.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Frede, M. & Patzig, G. (1988). Aristoteles "Metaphysik Z": Text, Überzetzung und Kommentar (2 Vols.). Beck.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Freeman, F., & Thomas, D. R. (1967). Attention vs. cue utilization in generalization testing. [Paper presented at Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago.]
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1879). Begriffschrift (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2nd. Ed. Blackwell).
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logische-mathematische Untersuchung ueber den Begriff der Zahl (English translation as The foundations of arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number by J. L. Austin, 1950. Philosophical Library).
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1891). Function and concept. Jenaischer Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (2nd. Ed.). Blackwell.)
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1918). Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, I, 58-77. English translation as 'The thought. A logical enquiry' by A. and M. Quinton (1956). In Mind LXV: 289-311.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1952). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Eds. P. T. Geach & M. Black; 1952 first edition, 1960 second edition, ). Blackwell.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

French, J. D. (1960). The reticular formation. In J. Field et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Physiology, Sect. 1, Vol. 2. American Physiological Society.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S (1923). Das Ich und das Es (English translation as The Ego and the Id).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S. (1900). Die Traumdeutung Franz Deuticke.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S. (1904). Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (English translation as The Psychopathology of Everyday Life).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S. (1916-1917). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (English translation as Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis),
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S. (1920). Jenseits des Lustprinzips Internationaler Psycho-analytischer Verlag.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fried, M. (2020). Kuhn's challenge: conceptual continuity and natural kinds [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Birkbeck, University of London. eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40475
Abstract:
Thomas Kuhn poses a fundamental worry about explaining scientific progress, which I call Kuhn's Challenge. The Challenge consists of two related questions: (A) If the meanings of key terms change between theories on either side of a paradigm shift, how can we still say that these theories are about the same thing? (B) Even if we assume that two theories address the same subject matter, how can we determine which one is better? A popular reply to Kuhn is to adopt a semantics for natural kind terms influenced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and Putnam in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", according to which such terms rigidly refer - independently of theory changes - to the same kinds across possible worlds and through time. I argue that this approach can explain extra-theoretical conceptual continuity only if we assume that all natural kinds have the same essence type. Though Kripke and Putnam take for granted that this essence type is microstructural, I argue that in practice, many sciences postulate natural kinds with other essence types, such as historical or functional essences; and that when new discoveries are made, prompting paradigm shifts, the relevant essence type may change. Moreover, which type is relevant to which science is as much a matter of decision as of discovery. Such a claim may seem to threaten realism about natural kinds. I argue, however, that we can be both pluralists and realists, if we recognise that conceptual continuity is secured ex post. Contrary to those who have argued for similar positions, I claim that we need not give up the rigidity of natural kind terms or the global ambitions of realism. In the end I show how the framework I have developed illuminates the debate over Kripke's argument against Physicalism in the philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Frischberg, N. (1979). Historical change: from iconic to arbitrary. In E. Klima, U. Bellugi (Eds.), The signs of language. Harvard University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Frishberg, N. (1975). Arbitrariness and iconicity: Historical change in American Sign Language. Language, 51, 696-719.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Gaeta, R. (no date). Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Gallese, V. (1998). From neurons to meaning: Mirror neurons and social understanding [Paper presented to the Second Annual Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, June 21st 1998].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Galton, A. (1984). The logic of aspect Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Garfinkel, H (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Garfinkel, H. (1964). Studies in the routine grounds of everyday activities. Social Problems, 11, 225-250. Reprinted with revisions in H. Garfinkel (1967), Studies in Ethnomethodology (pp. 35-75). Prentice-Hall.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Garrett, R. (1985). Elbow room in a functional analysis: Freedom and dignity regained. Behaviorism, 13, 21-36
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1949-50). Russell's theory of description. Analysis, 10, 84-92.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1950). Subject and predicate. Mind, 59, 461-482.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[21 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1962). Reference and Generality Cornell University Press.
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Geach, P. T. (1972). Logic Matters Blackwell
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Gehrz, R. D., Black, D. C., and Solomon, P. M. (1984). The formation of stellar systems from interstellar molecular clouds. Science, 292, 327-338.
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George, F. H. (1962). Cognition Methuen & Co.
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Gibson, J. J. (1959). Perception as a function of stimulation. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: Study of a science (Vol. 1). McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Gibson, J. J. (1974). Overt and covert attention [Unpublished "Purple Peril"]. commons.trincoll.edu/purpleperils/1972-1979/overt-and-covert-attention/

Gibson, J. R., & Maunsell, H. R. (1997). Sensory modality specificity of neural activity related to memory in visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 78(3), 1263-1275.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Goldberg, A. E. (1995) Constructions: A construction approach to argument structure. The University of Chicago Press
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Goldiamond, I. (1966). Perception, language and conceptualization rules. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Problem solving: Research, method and theory (pp. 183-224). New York: Wiley.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Goldin-Meadow, S., & Mylander, C. (1984). Gestural communication in deaf children: The effects and non-effects of parental input on early language development. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 49, 1-121.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Goldin-Meadow, S., & Mylander, C. (1990). Beyond the input given: The child's role in the acquisition of language. Journal of Child Language, 17, 527-563.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Goldstick, D. (2021). In Defence of David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Perception. Dialogue, 1-16. doi:10.1017/S0012217320000438
Abstract:
There are no qualia. The phenomenological difference between seeing and visualizing something is that the propositions which the experient begins to believe in the first case are only entertained in the second. We can know what it's like to be a bat by knowing that their echolocation informs them non-inferentially of the shapes, sizes, and directional distances away of nearby surfaces. The terms for secondary qualities like colours, though, are names of the type-properties they designate, tracing back causally to a verbal 'baptism,' and so experients don't know the character of colour experiences until they study brain physiology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gollub, L. (1977). Conditioned reinforcement: Schedule effects. In W. K. Honig, & J. E. R. Staddon (Eds.), Handbook of operant behavior. Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, fiction and forecast (2nd Edition, first edition 1955). Bobbs-Merrill.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182.

Graham, G. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place, 1924 - 2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74-77, Memorial Minutes (pp. 116-117). American Philosophical Association.

Graham, G. (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In J. Radden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion (pp. 89-105). Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Graham, G., & Valentine, E. R. (Eds.). (2004). Identifying the mind: Selected papers of U. T. Place Oxford University Press.
[Reprints in this collection]  [Reviews]  

Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.34.08gra
Abstract:
This chapter celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's "Is consciousness a brain process" appeared in the The British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and brain processes" appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review. These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind.
This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness) and what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the consciousness mind is and where it can, and can't, rely on cognitive science.
The grain project is the scientific program in cognitive science that involves investigating the causal roles associated with phenomenal consciousness at several levels of detail or resolution.
We argue that even if the causal grain of phenomenal consciousness were to become fully understood within cognitive science, various theoretical options concerning qualia that are presently live theoretical options in philosophical discussion would all still remain live theoretical options.
[Is replied by]  

Greenfield, P. M., & Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1990). Grammatical combinations in pan paniscus: Processes of learning and invention in the evolution and development of language. In S. T. Parker, & K. R. Gibson (Eds.), Language and intelligence in monkeys and apes: Comparative developmental perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Greenspoon, J. (1954). The effect of two non-verbal stimuli on the frequency of two verbal response classes (). American Psychologist, 9, 384.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Greenspoon, J. (1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of two responses. American Journal of Psychology, 68, 409-416.
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Grice, G. R. (1948). The relation of secondary reinforcement to delayed reward in visual discrimination learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 1-16.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review, 66, 377-388.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Grice, H. P. (1958). Utterer's meaning, a Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning. Foundations of Language, 4, 225-242.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Grice, H. P. (1975/1989). Logic and conversation (The 1967 William James Lectures, Harvard University). In P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts, Academic Press, 1975. In H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Part 1). Harvard University Press, 1989.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Grice, H. P. (1978). Further notes on logic and conversation. In P. Cole (Ed.), Syntax and semantics 9: Pragmatics. Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Griffiths, A. P. (1962-3). On belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63, 167-186. Reprinted in Griffiths, A. P. (Ed.) (1967). Knowledge and Belief (pp. 127-143). Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Grimshaw, J. (1990). Argument structure. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Gross, R. D. (1987). Psychology: The science of mind and behaviour. Hodder and Stoughton.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Guidi, G. (1908) Recherches expérimentales sur la suggestibilité. Archives de Psychologie, 8, 49-54.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Gustafson, D. F. (Ed.) (1964). Essays in Philosophical Psychology.
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Guthrie, E. R. (1935). The Psychology of Learning Harper.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Hamilton, W. (1860-1861). Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (2nd Ed., H.L.Mansel and J.Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood.
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Hamilton, W. (1860). Lectures on Logic (H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Hammerton, M. (1962). An investigation into the optimal gain from a velocity control system. Ergonomics, 5, 539-543.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hare, R. M. (1962). The Language of Morals Oxford University Press.
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Harris, Z. (1951) Structural Linguistics. University of Chicago Press.
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Hartley, D. (1749) Observations on Man 1749.
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Harvey, W. (1628). Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus. Frankfurt
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Harzem, P. & Miles, T. R. (1978). Conceptual issues in operant psychology Wiley.
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Hayes, S. C. (1991). A relational control theory of stimulus equivalence. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on Verbal Behavior: Proceedings of the First International Institute on Verbal Relations.. Context.
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Hayes, S. C. (Ed.) (1989). Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control Plenum.
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Hebb, D. O. (1946). Emotion in man and animal: an analysis of the intuitive process of recognition. Psychol.Rev., 53, 88-106
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Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior Wiley.
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Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/1931). Phänomenologie des Geistes (English translation as The Phenomenology of Mind by J. B. Baillie. Macmillan).
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Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Wiley.
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Herman, L. M. (1987). Receptive competencies of language-trained animals In J. S. Rosenblatt, C. Beer, M.C. Busnel, & P. J. B. Slater (Eds.), Advances in the Study of Behaviour. Academic Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Herman, L. M., Kuczaj, S. A., & Holder, M. D. (1993). Responses to anomalous gestural sequences by a language-trained dolphin: Evidence for processing of semantic relations and syntactic information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122(2), 184-194.
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Herman, L. M., Pack A. A., & Morrel-Samuels, P. (1993). Representational and conceptual skills of dolphins. In H. R. Roitblat, L. M. Herman & P. Nachtigall (Eds.), Language and communication: Comparative perspectives. Erlbaum.
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Herman, L. M., Richards, D. G., & Wolz, J. P. (1984). Comprehension of sentences by bottlenosed dolphins. Cognition, 16, 129-219.
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Herman, L.M., & Uyeyama, R.K. (1999). The dolphin's grammatical competency: Comments on Kako (1999). Animal Learning & Behavior, 27, 18-23. doi:10.3758/BF03199426
[Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Herrnstein, R. J., Loveland, D. H. & Cable, C. (1976). Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 2, 285-302.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hewes, G. W. (1973a). An explicit formulation of the relationship between tool-using, tool-making and the emergence of language. Visible Language, 7, 101-127.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hewes, G. W. (1973b). Primate communication and the gestural origin of language. Current Anthropology, 14, 5-24.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hewes, G. W. (1976). The current status of the gestural theory of language origins. In S. R. Harnad, H. D. Steklis, & J. Lancaster (Eds.), Origins and evolution of language and speech. New York Academy of Science.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Heyes, C., & Dickinson, A. (1990). The intentionalty of animal action. Mind and Language, 5, 87-104.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hilgard, E. R., & Marquis, D.G. (1940), Conditioning and Learning. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief Cornell University Press
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759428
Abstract:
Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf

Hook, S. (Ed.) (1960). Dimensions of mind Collier Books.
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Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (1996). Connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. MIT Press.
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Horne, P. J., & Lowe, C. F. (1996). On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 65, 185-241. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1350072/pdf/jeabehav00215-0185.pdf
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Hout, A. van (1998). Event semantics of verb frame alternations: A case study of Dutch and its acquisition Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Hull, C. L. (1933) Hypnosis and Suggestibility. Appleton-Century.
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Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of Behavior. Appleton Century.
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Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise on Human Nature (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed., 2nd Edition, P.H. Nidditch, Ed. - 1978. Clarendon Press).
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Hume, D. (1777). Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed. (1902), 2nd Edition. Clarendon Press).
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Humphrey, G. E. (1951). Thinking, an introduction to its experimental psychology Methuen.
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Humphrey, N. K. (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study. Perception, 3, 241-255.
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Husserl, E. G. (1900). Logische Untersuchungen.
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Huxley, A. (1932). Brave New World Chatto and Windus.
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Huxley, T. H. (1893). Collected Essays (Vol.I). Macmillan.
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Huxley, T. H. (1899). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. In: Method and results: Essays (pp. 199-250). D. Appleton & Co. (Paper dated 1874)
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Jackendorff, R. (1987). The status of thematic relations in linguistic theory. Linguistic Inquiry, 18(3), 369-411.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

James, W. (1884). What is emotion. Mind, 9, 188-205.
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James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology (2 Volumes). Holt.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Jastrow, J. (1900). Fact and Fable in Psychology Houghton-Mifflin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Jefferson, G. (1980). Final Report to the Social Science Research Council on the Analysis of Conversations in which "Troubles" and "Anxieties" are Expressed.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Jefferson, G. (1980). On "trouble-premonitory" response to inquiry. Sociological Inquiry, 50, 153-185.
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Jefferson, G. (1981). The abominable "Ne?": A working paper exploring the phenomenon of post-response pursuit of response. University of Manchester, Department of Sociology Occasional Paper no. 6.
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Jefferson, G. (1988). On the sequential organization of troubles-talk in ordinary conversation. Social Problems, 35, 418-441.
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Jhannesson, A. (1949). Origins of Language: Four Essays. Leiftur.
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Jhannesson, A. (1950). The gestural origins of language. Nature, 166, 60-61.
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Johnson, W. E. (1921). Logic. Cambridge University Press.
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Jordan, M. I. (1986). Attractor dynamics and parallelism in a connectionist sequential machine. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum.
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Joyce, J. A. A. (1926). Ulysses. Shakespeare
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Kako, E. (1999). Elements of syntax in the systems of three language-trained animals. Animal learning & behavior, 27, 1-14.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y philpapers.org/archive/KAMTIO-4.pdf
Abstract:
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kant, I. (1781/1787). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (First edition 1781, second edition 1787, English translation as The critique of pure reason). Hartknoch
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Kant, I. (1785/1948). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (English translation as The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, by H.J.Paton. Hutchinson).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Katz, J. J., & Fodor, J. A. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39, 170-210.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs Norton.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Kim, J. (1971). Materialism and the criteria of the mental. Synthese22, 323–345 doi:10.1007/BF00413431 http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43820/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413431.pdf
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kim, J. (1973). Causes and counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 570-572.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Kimble, G.A., & Garmezy, N. (1963). Principles of general psychology Ronald.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Kneale, W. (1968). Intentionality and intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42, 73-90.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic Clarendon Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Koffka, K. (1921) Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung (English translation as The Growth of the Mind, 1924).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Köhler, W. (1921). Intelligenzprüfungen auf Menschenaffen. (English translation by E. Winter as The Mentality of Apes, 1927, 2nd ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul). Springer.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Köhler, W. (1925). The Mentality of Apes. Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Koksvic, O. (2010). Metaphysics of consciousness. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (Eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash ePress.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Konorski, J. (1948). Conditioned Reflexes and Neuron Organization (English translation by S. Garry. Cambridge University Press).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Kim, I. J. & Alpert, N. M. (1995). Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cortex. Nature, 378, 496-498.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Krasner, L. (1958). Studies of the conditioning of verbal behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 55, 148-170.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity Blackwell.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd Edition, enlarged). University of Chicago Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Kuschel, R. (1973). The silent inventor: The creation of a sign language by the only deaf-mute on a Polynesian island. Sign Language Studies, 3, 1-27
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. I. Lakatos, & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things. Chicago University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

LaRock, E. (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. Behavior and philosophy, 34, 39-58.
Abstract:
A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

LaRock, E. (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 201-229. doi:10.5840/ipq20084827
Abstract:
I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lashley, K. S. (1929). Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. University of Chicago Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lashley, K. S. (1930). Basic neural mechanisms in behavior. Psychological Review, 37, 1-24.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lashley, K. S. (1938). The mechanism of vision. XV. Preliminary studies of the rat's capacity for detail vision. Journal of General Psychology, 18, 123-193.
Note:

[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior: The Hixon Symposium. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Leeper, R. W. (1948). A motivational theory of emotion to replace "emotion as disorganised response", Psychol. Rev., 55, 5-21.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lehman, H. C. (1935). The creative years in science and literature. Science Monthly, 43, 151-162.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Leibniz, G. W. F. von (1964). Selections. In A. G. N. Flew (Ed.), Body, Mind and Death (pp. 149-153). Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Leibniz, G. W. von (1951). Selections (Edited by P .P. Wiener). Scribner.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Leigland, S. (2000). Remembering Ullin Place. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 99-100. doi:10.1007/BF03392003

Lenin, V. I. (1908) Materialism and empirio-criticism.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
Abstract:
Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Levin, B. (1993). English verb classes and alternations: A preliminary investigation. The University of Chicago Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewin, K. (1935). A Dynamic Theory of Personality McGraw Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of Topological Psychology McGraw Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewin, K. (1946). Behavior and development as a function of the total situation. In L.Carmichael, (Ed.), Manual of Child Psychology (pp. 791-844). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewis, D. K. (1975). Languages and Language. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII, 3-25. University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 556-567.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Lewis, H. (2001). Ullin Place and Mind-Brain Identity. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 32-38.
Abstract:
The article presents an account of philosopher Ullin Place's contribution to the philosophy of mind. Ullin's project to demonstrate the reality and adaptive utility of the personality-transformation induced by mystical experience was thus the motor of his choice of undergraduate and postgraduate subjects of study. According to him the phenomenon of conscious experience which appears in the self-reports of human subjects and for whose existence those reports are the objective evidence is an integral and vital part of the causal mechanism in the brain which transforms input into output, stimulus into response, thereby controlling the interaction between the organism and its environment.

Liberman, A. M. (1993). Some Assumptions about Speech and How They Changed Haskins Laboratories status report on speech research, 113, 1-32.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Linden, E. (1975). Apes, men and language Dutton.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lindsley, D. B. (1960). Attention, consciousness, sleep and wakefulness. In J. Field et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Physiology, Sect. 1, Vol. 3, American Physiological Society.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Lindsley, O.R. (1964). Direct measurement and the problems of retarded behaviour. Journal of Education, 47, 62-81.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Linschoten, J. (1964). Idolen van de psycholoog. Bijleveld.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lippman, G., & Meyer, M. E. (1967). Fixed interval performance as related to instructions and to subject's verbalisations of the reinforcement contingency. Psychonomic Science, 8, 135-36.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Llinás, R. R., & Grace, A.A. (1989). Intrinsic 40 Hz oscillatory properties of layer IV neurons in guinea pig cerebral cortex in vitro. Society of Neuroscience Abstracts, 15, 660.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lloyd, A. C. (1981). Form and Universal in Aristotle Cairns.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Locke, J. (1706). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Bassett. J. W. Yolton (Ed.), Two volumes - 1961. Everyman).
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Lorenz, K. (1935). Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels; die Artgenoße als auslösendes Moment sozialer Verhaltungsweisen. Journal of Ornithology, 83, 137-213 & 289-413. [English translation as Companionship in bird life: fellow members of the species as releasers of social behavior in C. H. Schiller (Ed.) (1957), Instinctive Behavior. Internati
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F. (1979). Determinants of human operant behaviour. In M. D. Zeiler, & P. Harzem, P. (Eds.), Advances in the analysis of behaviour. Vol. 1 Reinforcement and the organisation of behaviour (pp. 159-192). Wiley.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F. (1983). Radical behaviourism and human psychology. In G. C. L. Davey (Ed.), Animal models and human behaviour (pp. 71-93). Wiley.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F. (1992). From conditioning to consciousness: The cultural origins of mind [Inaugural lecture by C. Fergus Lowe, Psychology, 29th November, 1989]. Coleg Prifysgol Gogledd Cymru/University College of North Wales.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F. & Beasty, A. (1987). Language and the emergence of equivalence relations: a developmental study. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 40: A49.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F. and Higson, P. J. (1983). Is all behaviour modification 'cognitive'? In E. Karas (Ed.), Current Issues in Clinical Psychology (Vol.1, pp. 207-227). Plenum.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Lowe, C. F., Beasty, A., & Bentall, R. P. (1983). The role of verbal behavior in human learning: Infant performance on fixed-interval schedules. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 39, 157-164.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Luck, S. J., & Beach, N. J. (1996). Visual attention and the binding problem: a neurophysiological perspective. In R. Wright (ed.), Visual Attention. Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Lucretius De Rerum Naturae
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Luria, A. R. (1961). The Role of Speech in the Regulation of Normal and Abnormal Behavior Liveright.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Luria, A.R. (1932). The Nature of Human Conflicts Liveright.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lycan, W. G. (1969). On "Intentionality" and the Psychological. American Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 305-311.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Lycan, W. G. (Ed.) (1999). Mind and Cognition (2nd Edition). Basil Blackwell.
Abstract:
In the Acknowledgements it is stated that the reprint of Place (1956) 'Is consciousness a brain proces' incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g) 'We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do.' Paper presented at a Conference on 'Forty Years of Australian Materialism', University of Leeds, June 1997; however, the revisions are lacking in this reprint, but see the downloads of Place (1956).
[Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Lycan, W. G. (Ed.). (1990). Mind and Cognition. Basil Blackwell.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Lyons, W. (Ed.). (1995). Modern Philosophy of Mind. Everyman.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Maccorquodale, K. (1969). B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A retrospective appreciation. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12, 831-841.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mach, E. (1885). Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations. English translation C. M. Williams. Open Court, 1897.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1962). Counterfactuals and Causal Laws. In R. J. Buttler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 66-80), Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe Oxford University Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

MacPhail, E. M., & Reilly, S. (1989). Rapid acquisition of a novelty versus familiarity concept by pigeons (Columba livia). Journal of Experimental Psychology (Animal Behaviour Processes), 15, 242-252.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Malcolm, N. (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue, III, 115-125
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Reprinting collections]  

Malebranch, N. (1674). La Recherche de la Verité.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Marcel, A. J. (1983a). Conscious and unconscious perception: experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 197-237.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Marcel, A. J. (1983b). Conscious and unconscious perception: an approach to the relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 238-300.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Marcel, A. J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In A. J. Marcel, & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science. Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Marr, M. J. (2003). The what, the how, and the why: The explanation of Ernst Mach. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 181-192. www.jstor.org/stable/27759457
Download: Marr (2003) The What, the How, and the Why - The Explanation of Ernst Mach.pdf

Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly, 44 , 1-8.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (1954). Low Claim Assertions [Unpublished M.S. copy].
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (1984). Anti-realism and the world's undoing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 3-20.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (1996). Final replies to Place and Armstrong. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place, T. Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate (pp. 178-9). Routledge
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (2000). A remembrance of an event - Foreword to "The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation" by Ullin T. Place. Brain and Mind, 1, 27. doi:10.1023/A:1010091822636
Download: Martin (2000) A Remembrance of an Event.pdf

Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
Abstract:
Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies (which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  

Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
Abstract:
The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]  

Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1988). Explorations in parallel distributed processing: A handbook of models, programs, and exercises MIT Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

McDougall, W. (1923). Outline of psychology Scribner.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

McGinn, C., & Hopkins, J. (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 52, 195-236.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

McLaughlin, B. P. (1994). Epiphenomenalism. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of mind (pp. 277-88). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.

Medlin, B. (1967). Ryle and the mechanical hypothesis. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 94-150). University of Queensland Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Melden, A. I. ( 1961). Free Action Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mellor, H. ( 1991). In defence of dispositions. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Messerschmidt, R. O. (1927). A suggestibility scale [Unpublished thesis presented for the degree of M.A.] Ohio State University.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mettrie, J. O. de la (1748). L'homme machine.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Meynell, H. (1973). The mental and the physical. The Heythrop Journal, 14(1), 35-46. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00695.x
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Michael, J. (1982). Distinguishing between discriminative and motivational functions of stimuli. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 37(1), 149-155.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation Routledge.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Millenson, J.R. (1967). Principles of behavioral analysis Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, G.A. (1951). Language and communication McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, J. (1998, July 20). Acquiring spontaneous spoken language: the role of simple syntax and ready-made phrases [Conference presentation]. 6th International Pragmatics Conference, Reims.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, J. (1998). Acquiring spoken language and learning written language [Conference presentation abstract]. In 6th International Pragmatic Conference, 19-24 July 1998, Reims, France: Abstracts. International Pragmatic Association (IPrA).
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, N. E. (1948). Studies in fear as an acquirable drive: I. Fear as motivation and fear reduction as reinforcement in the learning of new responses. J. Exp. Psychol., 38, 89-101.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Miller, S., & Konorski, J. (1928). Sur une forme particulière des réflexes conditionelles. Comptes Rendus des Séances de la Société de Biologie et de ses Filiales, 99, 1155-1157. [For a more detailed description of these experiments in English see Konorski (1948), pp. 211-235.]
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mitchell, N. (Host). (2006, September 23). The mind-body problem Down Under [Audio podcast episode]. In All in the mind. ABC Radio National. https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/allinthemind/the-mind-body-problem-down-under/3347916 Last retrieved November 18, 2020
Abstract:
Mind. Brain. Are they the same thing, or is the mind something special? The conundrum has perplexed us for centuries. Descartes' split the two - into a spiritual, soul-like mind and fleshly, material brain. But in 1956 a group of 'renegade' Oxford graduates Down Under, now international stars in philosophy, launched a challenge. Consciousness and the brain were united, and any talk of mental spooks and ghosts in the machine was out...almost. Now in their 80s, David Armstrong and Jack Smart join Natasha Mitchell and others to reminisce on taking Descartes to task.
Download: Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.mp3 Audio file  Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.pdf Transcript

Moerk, E. L. (1983). The Mother of Eve: As a first language teacher. Ablex.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Molière (1673). Le Malade Imaginaire.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Monk, R. (1990). Ludwig Wittgenstein: The duty of genius. Jonathan Cape.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Montague, P. R., Gally, J. A., & Edelman, G. M. (1991). Spatial signalling in the development and function of neural connections. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 199-220.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Moore, G. E. (1936). Is existence a predicate? Proceedings of the Aristotalian Society, Supp. Vol. 15, 175-188. Reprinted in A. G. N. Flew (1953), Logic and Language, Series II. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Moore, G. E. (1953). Some main problems of philosophy Allen and Unwin
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Moore, J. (1995). Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction. The Behavior Analyst, 18, 33–49. doi:10.1007/BF03392690
Abstract:
The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
Abstract:
On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
Abstract:
A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf

Morford, J. P. (1996). Insights into language from the study of gesture: a review of research on the gestural communication of non-signing deaf people. Language & Communication, 16, 165-178.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Morford, J. P., Singleton, J. L., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1993). The role of iconicity in manual communication. In K. Beals, G. Cooke, D. Kathman, S. Kita, K.-E. McCullough, & D. Testen (Eds.) Papers from the Chicago Linguistic Society, 29, Volume 2: The Parasession (pp. 243-253).
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Morgan, C. Lloyd (1894). Introduction to Comparative Psychology Scott.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient Society Holt.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Morick, H. (Ed.). (1970). Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Scott-Foresman.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 2 (pp. 78-137). University of Chicago Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Morris, C. W. (1946). Signs, banguage and behavior Prentice-Hall.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Morris, E. K. (1997). Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis. The Psychological Record, 47, 529-542. doi:10.1007/BF03395245 core.ac.uk/download/pdf/60541821.pdf
Abstract:
Recent conceptual work in behavior analysis has argued that the discipline is not mechanistic, but contextualistic, in world view. This argument has been contested, however, and a mechanism-contextualism debate has ensued. In taking the side of contextualism, I offer four reflections on the controversy. These concern (a) confusions concerning Pepper’s purpose in writing his book and its place in the debate, (b) misunderstandings about the meanings of context and contextualism, (c) the pragmatic implications of theories of truth in world views other than contextualism, and (d) the evolution of ontology from mechanism to contextualism. In the end, behavior analysis may benefit from this debate by evolving as a world view unto its own for its science of behavior. The two-the world view and the science-are inexorably interrelated.
[Citing Place (1994c)]  [Citing Place (1996b)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Reviews]  

Mortensen, C. (2015). The Brain of Ullin T. Place [Brochure for the display of Place's brain in the Abbie Museum of Anatomy, University of Adelaide]. www.adelaide.edu.au/uni-collections/collections/UC_Brain_of_UT_Place_Brochure_PRINT_2018.pdf
Download: Mortensen (2015) The Brain of Ullin T Place.pdf

Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. W. (1949). Brain stem reticular formation and activation of the EEG. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology. 1, 455-473.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mourik-van den Bergh, E. van, & T. W. Place (1972). Wat is dromen Psychologisch Laboratorium, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mowrer, O. H. (1950). Learning theory and personality dynamics Ronald.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Mumford, S. (1998). Book review of Dispositions: a Debate by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place and edited with introduction by Tim Crane. Philosophical Quarterly, 48(193), 548-550. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00123
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Book Review of Dispositions - a Debate.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
Abstract:
This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mumford, S. D. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A new theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Murray, D. K. C. (1986). Silent speach acts and their cognitive effects. In M. B. Papi & J. Verscheuren (Eds.), The pragmatic perspective: Selected papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference . Benjamins
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Myers, C. S. (1923). The evolution of feelings. Australian Journal of Psychology & Philosophy, 1(1), 3-11.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Myin E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2044. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044
Abstract:
The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of consciousness studies, 23(5-6), 80-104. https://www.academia.edu/download/43094596/PASWD_JCS_resubmission_clean.pdf penultimate draft
Abstract:
In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29). www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.029
Abstract:
This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185. www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0913/ijsrp-p2125.pdf
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014a). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014b). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
Abstract:
This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
Abstract:
An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Noble, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). Human evolution, language and mind: A psychological and archaeological inquiry Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

O'Connor, J. (Ed.). (1969). Modern Materialism. Harcourt, Brace and World.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Olds, J. & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and other regions of the rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47, 419-427.

Olton, D. S., & Schlosberg, P. (1978). Food-searching strategies in young
rats: Win-shift predominates over win-stay. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology
, 92, 609-618.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia. philarchive.org/archive/OPIC
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Oppenheim, P. & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (II, pp. 3-36). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The Measurement of Meaning. University of Illinois Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Oswald, I. (1966). Sleep. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Page, W. (1912). The Victoria History of the County of York (Vol. II). Constable.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pallier, C. (2013. Age effects in language acquisition and attrition. In J. J. Bolhuis, & M. Evereart, M. (Eds), Birdsong, Speech, and language exploring the evolution of mind and brain. MIT. www.pallier.org/papers/Pallier.chapterBolhuis.2013.pdf

Pallier, C., Dehaene, S., Poline, J-B., LeBihan, D., Argenti, A-M., Dupoux, E. and Mehler, J. (2003). Brain imaging of language plasticity in adopted adults: can a second language replace the first?. Cerebral Cortex, 13(2), 155--161. www.pallier.org/papers/Pallier_cerebralcortex2003.pdf
Abstract:
Do the neural circuits that subserve language acquisition lose plasticity as they become tuned to the maternal language? We tested adult subjects born in Korea and adopted by French families in childhood; they have become fluent in their second language and report no conscious recollection of their native language. In behavioral tests assessing their memory for Korean, we found that they do not perform better than a control group of native French subjects who have never been exposed to Korean. We also used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor cortical activations while the Korean adoptees and native French listened to sentences spoken in Korean, French and other, unknown, foreign languages. The adopted subjects did not show any specific activations to Korean stimuli relative to unknown languages. The areas activated more by French stimuli than by foreign stimuli were similar in the Korean adoptees and in the French native subjects, but with relatively larger extents of activation in the latter group. We discuss these data in light of the critical period hypothesis for language acquisition.

Palmer, D. C. (1999). A Call for Tutorials on Alternative Approaches to the Study of Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 16, 49-55.
[Citing Place (1992a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000). Chomsky's Nativism Reconsidered The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17, 51-56
[Citing Place (1992a)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2000a). Dedication Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 5.
Abstract:
[This dedication is followed by The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994]
Download: Palmer (2000) Dedication Ullin Place 1924-2000.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2000b). In memoriam Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 95-98. doi:10.1007/BF03392002
Download: Palmer (2000) In Memoriam Ullin Place.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2001). Behavioural interpretations of cognition. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 39-45.
Download: Palmer (2001) Behavioural Interpretation of Cognition.pdf

Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky's Appraisal of Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Half Century of Misunderstanding. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 253-67. doi:10.1007/BF03392134
Abstract:
The history of the writing of Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Chomsky’s review (1959), and MacCorquodale’s rebuttal (1970) are briefly summarized. Chomsky’s recent reflections on his review are analyzed: Chomsky’s refusal to acknowledge the review’s errors or its aggressive tone is consistent with his polemical style but comes at a minor cost in consistency and plausibility. However, his remarks about the place of Skinner’s work in science reveal misunderstandings so great that they undercut the credibility of the review substantially. The gradual growth in the influence of Skinner’s book suggests that its legacy will endure.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2007). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/15021149.2007.11434280
Abstract:
How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account?  There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated.  Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C. (2008). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8, 161-175.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Palmer, D. C., & Donahoe, J. W. (1992). Essentialism and selectionism in cognitive science and behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1344-1358.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
Abstract:
Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Papineau, D. (2020). The problem of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Abstract:
Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. Towards the end I shall also say some things about the Where? question. As for the What? question, a few brief introductory remarks will have to suffice.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Parsons, T. (1951). Illness and the role of the physician: A sociological perspective. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 21, 452-460. Reprinted in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (Eds.) (1953), Personality in Nature, Society and Culture (Second Edition, pp. 609-617). Knopf.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pashler, H. (1991). Shifting visual attention and selecting motor responses: distinct attentional mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 1023-1040.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Pashler, H. E. (1997). The Psychology of Attention. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (English translation by G. V. Anrep). Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Pavlov, I.P. (1938). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals (6th Edition). State Biological and Medical Publishing House.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pearce, J.M. (1988). Stimulus generalization and the acquisition of categories by pigeons. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.) Thought without Language (pp. 132-155). Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pearce, J.M. (1989). The acquisition of an artificial category by pigeons. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41B, 381-406.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pellionisz, A., & Llinás, R. (1979). Brain modeling by tensor network theory and computer simulation. The cerebellum: distributed processor for predictive coordination. Neuroscience, 4, 323-348.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. University of California Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1987). Interspecies communication: A tool for assessing conceptual abilities in the African Grey parrot. In G. Greenberg, & E. Tobach (Eds.), Cognition, language and consciousness: Interactive levels. Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1990). Referential mapping: A technique for attaching functional significance to the innovative utterances of an African Grey parrot (Psittachus erithacus). Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, 23-44.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pepperberg, I. M. (1992). A search for equivalence classes in an African Grey Parrot: Equivalence involving objects and auditory and visual labels (Unpublished paper presented to the 15th Symposium on Quantitative Analyses of Behavior (Stimulus Relations), June 14th 1992). Harvard University.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Perin, C. T. (1943). A quantitative investigation of the delay-of-reinforcement gradient. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 37-51.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Perky. C. W. (1910). An Experimental study of imagination. American Journal of Psychology, 21, 422-452.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pessoa Jr., O. (2021). The colored-brain thesis. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 84-93. doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  

Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1926/1932). The Language and Thought of the Child (2nd Ed.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child (Translated from the French by M.Gabain). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Piaget, J. (1972). Piaget's Theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology (3rd Ed., Vol. I). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and cognition. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1988). On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [Is cited by]  [22 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1954a). Conditioning and the treatment of enuresis: A theoretical discussion. Read to the South Australian Group, May 1954, British Psychological Society.

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Abstract:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [Is cited by]  [38 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1956a). Emotion concepts and learning theory [Unpublished paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Manchester, 1956].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1959). The ‘phenomenological fallacy' - a reply to J. R.Smythies. British Journal of Psychology, 50,72-73. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1959.tb00684.x
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1959 The Phenomenological Fallacy - A Reply to J.R. Smythies.pdf

Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is cited by]  [6 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [11 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf  1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is cited by]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf

Place, U. T. (1969a). Burt on brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 285-292.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1969a Burt on Brain and Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1969b). Collected papers on brain, mind and consciousness [Doctoral thesis submitted 1969 for the degree of D.Litt, degree awarded in 1972]. University of Adelaide.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1969b Brain, Mind and Consciousness - Introduction DLitt Thesis.pdf [includes editorial changes by UTP]

Place, U. T. (1969c). The outline of a neurophysiological theory designed to account for the mental phenomena as described in ordinary language in which is as far as possible consistent with current physiological and psychological evidence [Unpublished paper, 3/11/69].
[References]  
Download: 1969c The Outline of a Neurophysiological Theory Designed to Account for Mental Phenomena as Described in Ordinary Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971b). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 158-166
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1971b Understanding the Language of Sensations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971c). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis [Unpublished paper with an author's note added in 1999].
Abstract:
Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for the negative reinforcement condition. In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112. www.jstor.org/stable/2252189
[References]  [Is reply to]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf

Place, U. T. (1972b). Inner life [Conference presentation]. Northern Universities Philosophy Conference, Nottingham, April 11th-14th, 1972.
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972b Inner Life.pdf

Place, U. T. (1973-11-07). Lecture 6.1: Cosmology 3. Dispositions (7/11/1973) Section 1
Abstract:
Dispositional concepts and their explanatory functions
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 06.1 - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1973-11-14). Lecture 7: Linguistic Rules and their classification (14/11/1973). Section 2
Abstract:
The concept of a linguistic rule and the traditional classification into pragmatic, semantic and syntactic rules.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 07 - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1973-12-12). Lecture 10: Action & movement. (12/12/1973). Section 3
Abstract:
Common sense psychology and the explanation of behaviour. The concept of action
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 10.pdf

Place, U. T. (1973-1974). The metaphysical foundations of empirical psychology [A series of twenty eight lectures presented to the Vakgroep Methodenleer, Sub-Fakulteit Psychologie, University of Amsterdam between September 1973 and May 1974]. See Amsterdam Lectures

Place, U. T. (1973). The mental and the physical - a reply to Dr. Meynell. The Heythrop Journal, XIV(4), 417-424. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00758.x
[References]  [Is reply to]  [8 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1973 The Mental and the Physical - A Reply to Dr Meynell.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-01-16). Lecture 11: Purposive behaviour in animals and men - Intending, deciding & trying (16/1/1974). Section 3
Abstract:
The thesis that human actions are defined in terms of their intentions. Teleology. Intending. Involuntary and unconscious purposive behaviour. Voluntary action controlled by consciousness and attention
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 11.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-02-13). Lecture 15: Mentalism and S-R behaviourism (13/2/1974). Section 4
Abstract:
The relationship between languages at the molar level: the mentalist language of ordinary discourse and the language of stimulus-response behaviourism.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 15

Place, U. T. (1974-02-27). Lecture 17: The categories of mental life - mental states (27/2/1974) Section 5
Abstract:
Two arguments for the thesis that a person or human organism is a spatio-temporally extended and located substance which has both mental and non-mental, physical properties (continuation of lecture 16). Ontological taxonomy of mental predicates. Mental processes, mental events and mental states. Logical behaviourism. Knowledge of our own mental states. Mental dispositions and continuous mental states
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 17

Place, U. T. (1974-03-06). Lecture 18: Mental processes, experience and introspection (6/3/1974). Section 5
Abstract:
Mental activities and experiences. The privacy of mental processes. The control and interpretation of experience. Introspection
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 18

Place, U. T. (1974-03-13). Lecture 19: Perception, topic neutrality and the properties of experience (13/3/1974). Section 5
Abstract:
Phenomenalism. Topic neutrality of phenomenal descriptions. Introspective reports. The expression of pain. Dream reports. Thesis: the language we use to describe our private experiences and sensations is a metaphorical extension of a language whose basic function is to describe material objects and their properties as they exist and occur in a three dimensionally extended spatial world
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 19

Place, U. T. (1974-03-20). Lecture 20: Mental events, mental acts and imageless thoughts.(20/3/1974). Section 5
Abstract:
Mental events as the interface between a process and a state. Imageless thoughts. Our knowledge of our own mental events. The symbolic nature of thought
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 20

Place, U. T. (1974-03-27). Lecture 21: The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (27/3/1974). Section 6
Abstract:
The mind-body problem and its history. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 21.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-04-24) Lecture 22: The materialist hypothesis and Leibniz's Law (24/4/1974). Section 6
Abstract:
Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Logical crtieria for identy and Leibniz's Principle or Law. Experiences
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 22.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-01). Lecture 23: Presumptive criteria of identity and Central State Materialism (1/5/1974). Section 6
Abstract:
Presumptive criteria of identity: spatio-temporal location, micro reductive explanation and the explanation of common observations. Central State Materialism
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 23.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-08). Lecture 24: Towards a neurophysiological theory of conscious experience (8/5/1974). Section 6
Abstract:
The role and function of private experiences. The causes and effects of conscious experiences. Broadbent's Information Flow diagram. Mapping mental life into the brain
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 24.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-15). Lecture 25: Theories of emotion and the nature of emotional reactions (15/5/1974). Section 7
Abstract:
Emotion as experience. Physiological theories of emotion, The vocabulary of feeling and emotion. Enjoying. Wanting. Dimensions of emotion. Measuring emotions
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 25.pdf

Place, U. T. (1974-05-22). Lecture 26: The elicitation of emotional reactions and their biological functions (22/5/1974). Section 7
Abstract:
Biological emergencies: opportunities and threats. Errors in the elicitation of emotions. Emotion and motivation. Emotional conditioning
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 26 - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1977b). Filosofie, psychologie en filosofische psychologie. In K. Soudijn, & H. Bergman (Eds.), Ontwikkelingen in de psychologie (pp. 23-38). Boom/Intermediair.
Note:
Translated in Dutch and edited by Karel Soudijn.
[References]  
Download: 1977b Philosophy, Psychology and Philosophical Psychology.pdf

Place, U. T. (1978a). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. De Psycholoog, 13, 611-621.
Abstract:
The application of Kuhn's concept of "incommensurable paradigms" to the science of psychology is discussed. Two such paradigms, the behaviorist or behavior analytic paradigm and the cognitive/mentalist paradigm, are distinguished. It is suggested that the choice of paradigm will depend on the method of behavior modification to be employed. If behavior is to be modified by stimulus control and contingency management, a version of the behaviorist paradigm will be selected. If behavior is to be modified by changing the individual's self-directed verbal behavior, the mentalist/cognitive paradigm is to be preferred.
Note:
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy at the Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport in July 1974 and was in 1978 published in De Psycholoog, in English The Psychologist, a journal of the Dutch Society of Psychology. The present revision is from 1986.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1978a 1986 Psychological Paradigms and Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1978b). Natural kinds and psychophysical laws: Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins symposium (PAS 1978) [Unpublished paper].
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1978b Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws - Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins Symposium.pdf

Place, U. T. (1979a). Review of K. V. Wilkes, Physicalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Philosophy, 54(209), 423-425. doi:10.1017/s0031819100048877
[References]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1979a Review of K V Wilkes Physicalism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1979b). Essay Review of Karl R. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and its Brain: An argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1977. Annals of Science, 36, 403-408.
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1979b Essay Review of Karl R. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and its Brain.pdf

Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - why we need it. Behaviorism, 9, 1-24. www.jstor.org/stable/27758970
Abstract:
To explain behaviour in terms of intension­al or mentalistic concepts is to explain the behaviour in question on the assump­tion of a consistent and rational connection between what the agent does and what he says or what is said to him and that therefore any general account of verbal or linguistic behaviour which employs such concepts is necessarily circular, since it explains the acquisition of linguistic skills on the assumption that the speaker already possesses such skills. It follows that this circularity can only be avoided by developing a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which is stated entirely in a nonintensional or extensional language. At the present time, the most developed conceptual system for description and explanation of the behav­iour of organisms at the molar level in purely extensional terms is that provided by the so-called ‘Radical Behaviorism’ of B. F. Skinner and his followers. Fur­thermore, in his book Verbal Behavior Skinner (1957) has used this conceptual framework to develop a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which repre­sents the most ambitious attempt made so far to formulate a theory of linguistic behaviour in nonintensional or extensional terms.
Note:
Revised version is from 1999.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [7 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1981a 1999 Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - Why We Need It - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1981b). Skinner's Verbal Behavior II - what is wrong with it. Behaviorism, 9, 131-152. www.jstor.org/stable/27758982
Abstract:
Skinner's Verbal Behavior as it stands suffers from four major defects. (1) Skinner fails to do justice to the distinction between words which are the repeated and repeatable units of verbal behaviour, but which have a function only in so far as they contribute to the function of the sentences in which they occur, and the sentences themselves which are the functional units of verbal behaviour, but which are seldom repeated word for word either in the mouth of the speaker or in the hearing of the listener. (2) The account given by Skinner of the listener's response to the verbal operant and of the concept of "the discriminative stimulus" which he deploys in this connection is seriously inadequate. (3) Skinner's concept of "the tact" involves a confusion between tacts as words and tacts as sentences. Tacts as words, i.e. names and general terms, designate recurrent features of the common stimulus environment of speaker and listener, both general and particular and contrast with autoclitic words whose function is purely intra-sentential. Tacts as sentences on the other hand are functionally complete verbal operants corresponding to the grammatical concept of an assertion, which act for the benefit of the listener and contrast with mands, sentence utterances corresponding to the imperatives and interrogatives of grammar and logic, which typically act for the benefit of the speaker. (4) Skinner's account fails to do justice to the all-important logical distinction between those tact sentence utterances or assertions which are true and on which the listener can consequently rely and those which are false and therefore unreliable as a source of information from the standpoint of the listener.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [7 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1981b Skinner’s Verbal Behavior II – what is wrong with it.pdf

Place, U. T. (1982). Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - how to improve Parts I and II. Behaviorism, 10, 117-136. www.jstor.org/stable/27759002
[References]  [Is cited by]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1982 Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - How to Improve Parts I and II

Place, U. T. (1983a). Comments on Mark Burton's theses. Behaviour Analysis, 4(1), 22-31.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1983b). Behavioural contingency semantics [Conference presentation abstract]. In P. Simons (Ed.), Abstracts of the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, Sections 5 and 12 (pp. 342-345). J. Huttegger OHG.
Note:
Presentation given at the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science held in Salzburg, July 11th-16th 1983. In the downloads two documents are made available. One is an extended abstract, in actual fact a 4 pages summary as published in the proceedings of the conference and second is the text of the presentation. In the abstract Place tried to show how a later strand in Skinner's thinking represented by his 1969 book Contingencies Reinforcement, particularly the operant analysis of problem solving can be developed in such a way as to make good all the important deficiencies in the account given by Skinner in Verbal Behavior and what are mercilessly exposed by Chomsky in his 1959 Review. In the presentation Place discusses the reasons why a behavioural account of language acquisition and language use is to be preferred to the alternative theories belonging to the tradition that stems from Chomsky.
[References]  
Download: 1983b Behavioural Contingency Semantics. The Abstract.pdf  1983b Behavioural Contingency Semantics. The Presentation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1983c). Behavioural contingency semantics and the analysis of behaviour. [Conference presentation abstract, delivered at the Christmas Meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, January 1983]. Behaviour Analysis Letters, 3, 128-129.
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics, verbal behaviour, behaviour analysis, discriminative stimulus, significant stimulus event, disinforcement
[References]  
Download: 1983c Behavioural Contingency Semantics and the Analysis of Behaviour - The Abstract.pdf  1983c Behavioural Contingency Semantics and the Analysis of Behaviour - The Presentation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1983d). Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - how to improve Part IV, Skinner's account of syntax. Behaviorism, 11, 163-186. www.jstor.org/stable/27759026
Keywords: behavioral contingency semantics, Skinner, verbal behavior
[References]  [Is cited by]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1983d Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - How to Improve Part IV - Skinner's Account of Syntax.pdf

Place, U. T. (1983e). Disposicijska svojstva i argument virtus dormitiva (Dispositional properties and the virtus dormitiva argument). Filozofska Istrazivanja, 3(7), 77-84.

Place, U. T. (1984a). Logic, reference and mentalism: a comment on B.F.Skinner, 'The operational analysis of psychological terms'. In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.), Canonical papers of B.F.Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 565-566. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Place, U. T. (1984b). Some comments on Professor Searle's Reith lectures. [Publication source unknown]
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1984b Some Comments on Professor Searle's Reith Lectures.pdf

Place, U. T. (1985a). A response to Sundberg and Michael. VB News, 3, 38-45. [Reprinted in The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 3, 41-47]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is cited by]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1985a A Response to Sundberg and Michael.pdf

Place, U. T. (1985b). Conversation analysis and the empirical study of verbal behaviour. [Conference presentation abstract, delivered at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Sussex, April 1984]. Behavioural Processes, 10, 196-197
Download: 1985b Conversational Analysis and the Empirical Study of Verbal Behaviour (abstract).pdf

Place, U. T. (1985c). Semicovert behavior and the concept of pain: a comment on H. Rachlin 'Pain and behavior'. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 70-71. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00019695
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1985c Semicover Behavior and the Concept of Pain.pdf

Place, U. T. (1985d). Three senses of the word "tact". Behaviorism, 13, 63-74. www.jstor.org/stable/27759058
[References]  [Is cited by]  [8 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1985d Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf  1985d Supplement to Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf complete table with all occurrences of the word 'tact' in Skinner's Verbal Behavior

Place, U. T. (1985e). Three senses of the word "tact" - a reply to Professor Skinner. Behaviorism, 13, 155-156.
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1985e Three Senses of the Word 'Tact' - A Reply to Professor Skinner.pdf

Place, U. T. (1986a). Ethics as a system of behavior modification. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Chapter 6, pp.157-178). Charles C. Thomas.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1986a Ethics as Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf revised and two footnotes added after publication of the book

Place, U. T. (1986b). Do we have intuitive knowledge of what is the case in all possible worlds [Presentation]. Department of Philosophy, University of York, 6th November 1986.
Download: 1986b Do We Have Intuitive Knowledge of What is the Case in All Possible Worlds.pdf at the end is included an appendix which explicates the structure of the main argument of the paper

Place, U. T. (1987a). Skinner re-skinned. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 235-243). Falmer Press.
Abstract:
In 'Skinner Skinned' Dennett (1978, chapter 4) discusses two arguments, the virtus dormitiva and intentionality arguments, which he sees as the only solid ground underlying the various arguments which Skinner gives for repudiating the use of mentalistic explanations in a scientific psychology; and of these he endorses only the intentionality argument. I argue (a) that what Skinner finds objectionable in mentalistic idioms is their dispositional character, (b) that both the virtus dormitiva and intentionality argument are arguments against the use of dispositional property ascriptions in scientific explanation, and (c) that, since dispositional property ascriptions are essential to any causal explanation, Dennett has failed to provide any good reason for endorsing Skinner's repudiation of mentalism. It is suggested that mentalism is objectionable only insofar it involves the use of idioms which presuppose what Skinner (1969) calls 'rule-governed' behaviour to explain behaviour that is 'contingency-shaped'.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1987a Skinner Re-skinned.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987b). Skinner re-placed. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 249-251). Falmer Press.
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1987b Skinner Re-placed.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
Abstract:
The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Place, U. T. (1988a). Thirty years on - is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 208-219.
[Is cited by]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1988a Thirty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
Abstract:
The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behaviour (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1988c). What went wrong? - comments on B.F.Skinner's 'Whatever happened to psychology as the science of behavior?' Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 1, 307-309. doi:10.1080/09515078808254214
[References]  
Download: 1988c What Went Wrong.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988d). Consciousness as an information processing system. The British Psychological Society 1988 Abstracts, 58.

Place, U. T. (1988e). The problem of mental content from the standpoint of linguistic empiricism [Presentation prepared for the Course on Functionalism and Content, Inter-university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia (since 1991 Croatia), 7-15 September 1988] Inter-university Post-graduate Centre.
[References]  
Download: 1988e The Problem of Mental Content from the Standpoint of Linguistic Empiricism .pdf

Place, U. T. (1988f). Consciousness as an information processing system. [Paper presented to the Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Leeds, April 1988].
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1988f Consciousness as an Information Processing System.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988h). Pre-linguistic and post-linguistic concepts. [Presentation to the Generalisation Group, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor at 10 March 1988 and to the Department of Psychology, Trinity College, Dublin at 11 March
Download: revised in 1999

Place, U. T. (1988i). Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling [Unpublished].
Note:
It is unclear to which publication of Natsoulas Place is reacting in this unpublished comment. Natsoulas wrote several articles about Skinner’s views on consciousness with titles like Toward a model for consciousness in the light of B.F. Skinner’s contribution (1978), Perhaps the most difficult problem faced by behaviorism (1983), On the radical behaviorist conception of consciousness (1986), On the radical behaviorist conception of pain experience (1988). But no one is as explicit about feelings as suggested in this comment on Natsoulas. Perhaps Place is reacting to an unpublished paper of Natsoulas. The present comment is of interest because of the conceptual analysis of the verb to feel.
The date of this comment is unclear. I have chosen 1988, but this is more or less an educated guess.
Download: 1988i Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and meality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References]  [Is cited by]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1989c). Concept acquisition and ostensive learning: a response to Professor Stemmer. Behaviorism, 17, 141-145. www.jstor.org/stable/41236094
Abstract:
The alternative offered by Professor Stemmer to cognitivist theories of the process whereby general terms acquire their meaning is criticised in its turn on the grounds that it presents an oversimplified view of the complex processes involved in the acquisition of word meanings.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is cited by]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1989c Concept Acquisition and Ostensive Learning - A Response to Professor Stemmer.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989d). Thirty five years on - is consciousness still a brain process? In J. Brandl, & W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 36(1), 17-29.
Download: 1989d Thirty Five Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989e). Contingency analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions [Conference presentation abstract]. British Psychological Society 1989 Abstracts, 67.

Place, U. T. (1989f). Two concepts of consciousness: The biological/private and the linguistic/social. Revista mexicana de análisis de la conducta= Mexican journal of behavior analysis, (Extra 3), 69-88.
Note:
The publication date, 1989, can't be correct, but it is the date used by the journal.
[Related]  
Download: 1989f Two Concepts of Consciousness (Revista Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta).pdf

Place, U. T. (1989g). Some thought on the work of the Würzburg School and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10-16 October 1989 [Unpublished presentation at the Departmental Seminar, Departement of Psychology, University College of North Wa
Abstract:
The debate between the Würzburg School and E. B. Titchener which took place during the first decade of this century was not, as it is often portrayed, a debate about the existence or non-existence of imageless thought. It is better described as a conceptual and terminological issue about the nature of consciousness, the place of meaning in consciousness and the role of introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) in its empirical investigation.
Titchener's contention that in introspection the trained psychologist strips away meaning in order to provide a description of raw uninterpreted experience is shown to be the absurdity that it is by Wittgenstein's (1953) 'private language argument'. There is, nevertheless, a useful distinction to be drawn between two ways of acquiring mental self-knowledge:
(a) introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) which yields observational knowledge of the qualia of ongoing experience, and
(b) inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) which yields intuitive knowledge of the onset and content of dispositional mental states.
In terms of this distinction, the Würzburg protocols are based on an inner perception of the content of the reported thoughts rather than on introspective observation of the qualia of experience.
The paper concludes with an assessment of the significance of the Würzburg-Titchener controversy for the subsequent history of psychology and for contemporary issues in psychology and the philosophy of mind.

Place, U. T. (1990a). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 11, 20-31.
[References]  [Related]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990a E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf added to the end of the document are excerpts from Boring, 1933

Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
Abstract:
The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine (1) the reference of singular terms, (2) the extension of general terms, (3) the truth of propositions, (4) the validity of arguments, (5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990c). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events [Conference paper abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1990 Abstracts, 38.

Place, U. T. (1990d). Can social constructivism be reconciled with scientific realism [Presentation to the Course on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, April 11th 1990]. Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
Download: 1990d Can Social Constructivism Be Reconciled With Scientific Realism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990e). Critical Notice [Unpublished book review of Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland. MIT Press, l986].
Keywords: conceptual analysis, eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity theory, neurophilosophy
Note:
This critical notice was commissioned by the editor of the Quarterly Journal of Philosophy in 1986 when the book first appeared; but since it was not completed until four years later in 1990, it was never submitted. It was revised in 1999 in anticipation of a meeting with Pat Churchland in Siena, Italy, in October of that year - a meeting that because of the illness of Place never took place.
[References]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1990e Critical Notice.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991a). Conversation analysis and the analysis of verbal behavior. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal behavior: The First International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 5, pp. 85-109). Context Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1991b). Error-correction in connectionist networks: A new perspective on the law of effect [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1991 Abstracts, 67.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1991c). Konekcionizem in o_ivljenje behaviorizma (Slovenian translation of 'Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism'). Anthropos, 1(3), 327-335.

Place, U. T. (1991d). The problem of error-correction in connectionist networks: a new perspective on the law of effect [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 24-27 1991 - Atlanta, Georgia (p. 148). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.
Abstract:
The parallel distributed processor (PDP) derives its ability to learn complex and subtle pattern discriminations from changes that occur in the so-called 'weights' of the synaptic connections between the multiple interconnected nodes of which the device consists as a consequence of previous activation of those connections. In order for the device to have that property, the changes which occur in the synaptic weights must conform to what is known as 'a learning rule' or to a limited number of such rules depending on the circumstances. McClelland and Rumelhart (1988) propose two such rules: "the so-called Hebbian or correlational learning rule .... and the error-correcting or 'delta' learning rule." Attention is drawn to the analogy, if not coincidence, between these learning rules and such traditional learning principles as association by contiguity in the case of the Hebbian or correlational learning rule and the Law of Effect in the case of the error-correcting or 'delta' rule. It is suggested that both of these learning rules are needed, the correlational/contiguity rule to control input selection by the mechanism of selective attention and the 'delta' rule/Law of Effect to control output selection. It is argued that, in the case of living organisms, a second input selection principle is required in order to account for the preoccupation of attention with the motivationally significant at the expense of the motivationally insignificant. Identification of the error-correction rule with the Law of Effect draws attention (a) to the fact that in living organisms the error- and correct-messages are constituted by the immediate consequences of behavior, and that these are differentiated into error-messages (disinforcements) and correct-messages (reinforcements) by the motivational attitude of the organism to those consequences, (b) to the fact that, in contrast to the prejudices of learning theorists in the nineteen thirties who were inclined to deny the weakening effect of punishment on the strength of response tendencies, on the connectionist view it is error-correction (disinforcement) rather than confirmation (reinforcement) that does all the work. It is concluded that what we need is a symmetrical conception of the Law of Effect which allows both the strengthening of response tendencies by success and the weakening of response tendencies by failure.
[References]  [Related]  

Place, U. T. (1991e). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 24-27 1991 - Atlanta, Georgia (p. 357). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[7 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991g). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1991 Abstracts, 2.
Download: 1991g Abstract of E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991h). Error-correction in connectionist networks: A new perspective on the law of effect [Unpublished paper. Presented to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Bournemouth, 12th April 1991, Session on Behavioristic Perspectives on Cognitive Psychology and to the 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, May 26th 1991.] .
[References]  [Related]  
Download: 1991h Error Correction in Connectionist Networks - A New Perspective on the Law of Effect.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991i). Dispositions as intentional states. Conceptus, XXV(66), 7-16. With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin ‘A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: The Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 2'.

Place, U. T. (1991j). On confounding conceptualism with nominalism.' Conceptus, XXV(66), 30-44. With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin ‘A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: The Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 4'.

Place, U. T. (1991k). From syntax to reality: the picture theory of meaning [Discussion paper presented to a small conference on 'Footprints of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language' at the Neurosciences Institute, New York, February 1991].
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1991k From Syntax to Reality - the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf revised version from 1999

Place, U. T. (1991l). Serbo-Croat translation of 'Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference.' SOL.
Note:
Translation of Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.

Place, U. T. (1992a). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. In S. C. Hayes,& L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations: The Second and Third International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 9, pp. 135-151). Context Press.
Keywords: behavior analysis, behavioral contingency semantics, correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning. situation, three-term contingency
[References]  [Is cited by]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992a Behavioral Contingency Semantics and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992b). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving? [Conference presentation, presented at 18th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 25-28 1992 - San Francisco, California]. Association for Behavior Analysis. Abstract published in Proceedings of 18th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 25-28 1992 - San Francisco, California (p. 155). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.
Abstract:
In 'An operant analysis of problem-solving', Skinner (1966/1969/1988) develops an account of problem-solving based on the distinction between two different ways in which an organism can learn to adapt to environmental contingencies: (1) contingency-shaped behavior in which the behavior of an organism is progressively shaped by repeated exposure to the contingency itself, and (2) rule-governed behavior in which a verbally competent human being adapts to a contingency by constructing a verbal formula or rule which is said to "specify" the contingency in question. A rule may be constructed, as in the case of contingency-shaped behavior, in the light of repeated exposure to the contingency itself. It may equally well be based on information about the contingency supplied by another speaker, on information derived from a written text, or on an inference from other rules derived from any or all these sources. It is this case where the agent infers a new rule tailor-made for the problem with which he/she is confronted that Skinner has in mind in offering an analysis of problem-solving in these terms. There is a growing body of empirical evidence (Hayes 1989) which confirms the accuracy of Skinner's description of problem-solving as it occurs in the case of verbally competent human beings. But animals also solve problems; and so do pre-verbal human infants. This kind of problem-solving cannot simply be a matter of contingency-shaping, though previous contingency-shaped behavior is the only resource from which a pre-verbal organism can draw in selecting an appropriate problem-solving strategy. It requires some mechanism like that which Köhler (1925) refers to as "insight" whereby the stimulus class which currently controls a particular response class is somehow stretched so as to include the current stimulus situation. The case for postulating such a behavior mediating mechanism within the conceptual framework of radical behaviorism is argued by appealing (a) to the analogy between attending behavior and thinking by talking to oneself, and (b) to the process whose existence is implied by Skinner's (1938) account of "stimulus class" whereby an organism learns to break up its stimulus environment into stimulus classes "along the natural lines of fracture."
Keywords: the natural lines of fracture, stimulus class, rule-governed behaviour, problem-solving, Skinner
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992b Is There an Operant Analysis of Animal Problem-Solving.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992c). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 21-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759268
Abstract:
For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the differences between the two models suggests that that the effect of such a development would be to steer linguistic theory towards a return to the empiricism and behaviorism which prevailed before it was driven by Chomsky towards nativism and mentalism. Linguists, however, will not be persuaded to return to such a theory unless and until it can deal with the phenomenon of novel sentence construction as effectively as its nativist/mentalist rival.
[References]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992c Eliminative Connectionsm -Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist-Behaviorist Linguistics.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992d). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 22, 461-474. doi:10.1177/004839319202200403
Abstract:
It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is assumed to operate. Examples are given of the use of ethnomethodological experiments, both in vivo and as a thought experiment, in order to demonstrate the existence of otherwise invisible conventions governing human social behavior. Comparable examples are cited from the writings of ordinary language philosophers of ethnomethodological thought experiments designed to demonstrate the existence of linguistic conventions.
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1992d The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms, and its Application to Conceptual Analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992e). Behaviorism and behavior analysis in Britain - An historical overview. The ABA Newsletter, 15(4), 5-7.
[References]  
Download: 1992e Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis in Britain.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992f). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Acta Analytica, 7(8), 53-72.
Abstract:
How much of the mental life which we attribute to ourselves and our fellow human beings should we attribute to other creatures, particularly those mammals to which we are most closely related in evolutionary terms, given that such creatures do not communicate with one another by means of anything resembling human natural language?
The paper approaches this question historically by considering the positions taken by Aristotle, Descartes, the post-Darwinians such as Romanes, the behaviorists down to Skinner, and contemporary philosophers such as Davidson and Fodor. A distinction is drawn between two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private which I argue we should not hesitate to attribute to all warm-blooded vertebrates and the linguistic/social which is exclusively human.
The concept of consciousness as biological and private is the 'consciousness' of traditional introspective psychology and of 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956). It comprises the phenomena of selective attention, conceptualization, mental image formation, emotional reaction and motivation. The concept of consciousness as linguistic and social is the consciousness of Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Skinner and much contemporary philosophical psychology. It consists of an integrated system of propositional attitudes (beliefs) all of which are either formulated or susceptible to formulation as sentences in natural language (Skinner's "contingency-specifying stimuli" or "rules").
[References]  [Is cited by]  
Download: 1992f Two Concepts of Consciousness the Biological Private and the Linguistic Social.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992g). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1992 Abstracts, 67.

Place, U. T. (1992h). The Tower of Babel: some speculations on the role of technology, language and trade on the evolution of religion, philosophy and science [Conference presentation with additional notes, presented at the Centennial Conference of the Department of P Department of Philosophy, University Leeds.
Abstract:
The paper explores the relationship between three features which, it is often claimed, distinguish human beings from other species of living organism:
(1) the ability to colonize a new environment by developing an appropriate technology,
(2) the ability to communicate with one another by means of a learned language, and
(3) the propensity to develop a system of magico-religious beliefs and practices.
The Tower of Babel legend is seen as reflecting the way in which a new environment and the development of a new set of technologies designed to deal with that environment leads to changes in linguistic practice within the community involved. The dependence of human beings on the possession of integrated systems of causal theory and technological practice for their survival, is proposed as the motive for the creation of a system of magico-religious beliefs and practices in those areas of human life where understanding of the causal relations and consequent technological control is lacking. Because they are not constrained in the way that technological beliefs and practices are constrained, by the need for precise control over the technological process, magico-religious belief systems tend to proliferate in much the same way that languages proliferate as a consequence of the Tower of Babel phenomenon. The consequent multiplicity of magico-religious belief systems creates a barrier to trade and other forms of social co-operation between communities which differ in this respect which, to judge by the lengths to which human beings have gone to iron out such differences, is more serious than that presented by differences in language. The development of philosophy, the supra-national religions and science are interpreted as successive responses to this problem.
Download: 1992h The Tower of Babel.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992i). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the theory of universals. [Unpublished paper. Presented November 5th 1992, Department of Psychology, University of Wales, Bangor; November 26-28, 1992, Conference of the Linguistic Society of Belgi
Abstract:
Are universals (kinds) something over and above the things (their instances) of which they are kinds? Does the universe come already packaged into kinds of thing, or are the universals which the human and animal mind distinguishes simply the product of the mind's classificatory activity? Whether universals are mind-independent or mind-dependent, are the concepts human beings and other living organisms have of them innate or are they generated wholly or in part by some kind of learning process. In either case, what assurance do we have that our conceptual scheme does not seriously misrepresent the way things are, as Kant puts it, "in themselves."
While the tides of philosophical fashion have flowed backwards and forwards between the poles of this debate ever since the time of Plato and Aristotle, it is argued that there is now some reason to think that the current tide which appears to be moving away from platonism and nativism and back towards conceptualism and empiricism may be taking us towards a permanent scientifically-based resolution of the problem. This solution, if that is what it is, gives due weight to both innate factors and learning at the biological level and to social construction at the level of human linguistic communication. It sees Darwin's principle of variation and natural selection as operating as much in the ontogenetic development of our conceptual scheme as in its phylogeny, and as providing the assurance we need that, in B.F.Skinner's words, it takes "account of the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break." (Skinner 1938 p.33).
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
Download: 1992i Philosophical Fashion and Scientific Progress in the Theory of Universals.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992j). Towards a reconciliation between the associationist and radical behaviorist traditions in the experimental analysis of behavior. [Unpublished paper. Presented under the title 'The three term contingency as a link between the associationist and radical behaviorist traditions in the experimental analysis of behavior' as Invited Address to the First International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Guadalajara, Mexico, 6th October 1992].
Abstract:
It is an implication of the Law of Non-Contradiction that two incompatible descriptions of the same class of phenomena cannot both be true. This suggests that the future for radical behaviorism must lie in achieving a reconciliation with other disciplines and approaches studying the same or closely related phenomena. The approach known as "associative learning theory" shares a common data basis with radical behaviorism in the area of the experimental analysis of animal behavior. It is separated from radical behaviorism by a different view of the nature of what is learned. According to the radical behaviorist, under certain antecedent conditions (discriminative stimulus + establishing condition) an organism learns to emit a response. According to associative learning theory what is learned is an association between a pair of consecutive stimulus events. When presented with the first member of the pair, the organism learns to "predict" or "expect" the second member of the pair. Until recently, the principal application of this principle was Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) analysis of  Pavlovian (respondent) conditioning. More recently, Adams and Dickinson's (1981) reinforcer-devaluation experiment has led associationists to pay more attention to instrumental (operant) learning. It has also opened up an interesting divergence of views between Dickinson (1988; Heyes and Dickinson, 1991; Dickinson & Balleine, forthcoming) who takes it as evidence of a discontinuity between respondent conditioning, which he interprets in terms of the establishment of mechanical associations, and operant learning which he interprets in terms of the ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ of philosophical action theory, and Rescorla (1991) who uses it as evidence for an interpretation of operant learning based on the same principles of stimulus-stimulus association invoked by Rescorla and Wagner to account for respondent conditioning. Standing in the way of a reconciliation between radical behaviorism and associative learning theory are the misgivings of the former about the use made by the latter of ‘mentalistic’ concepts, such as ‘expect,’ ‘anticipate,’ and ‘predict.’ These misgivings may be allayed if attention is paid to the results of applying to such concepts the technique, known as ‘conceptual analysis,’ developed by Wittgenstein (1953; 1958) and the philosophers of the Oxford ‘ordinary language’ school. A recent application of this technique to the linguistic phenomenon known variously as ‘intentionality’ or ‘intensionality’ shows that it consists of two distinct varieties of ‘referential anomaly’ which ‘infect’ the grammatical objects of certain verbs. In one case, the grammatical object is used to indicate a range of possible events any one of which, if it were to occur, would constitute a manifestation or satisfaction of a disposition. In the other case, the grammatical object functions as a quotation of what the agent either has said or might be expected to say or have said. Referential anomaly of the dispositional kind is both unavoidable and benign, but the use of quotations to characterize behavioral dispositions is acceptable for scientific purposes only in those cases where the behavior in question is in fact subject to linguistic control. Since the grammatical object of the verbs ‘know,’ ‘believe’ and ‘think,’ as they occur in belief/desire explanations, takes the form of an embedded indicative sentence in oratio obliqua or indirect reported speech, Dickinson's explanation of instrumental/operant learning in animals involves the scientifically unacceptable metaphor of linguistic initiation and control. Rescorla's theory, on the other hand, requires nothing more than that the organism learn to ‘expect’ or ‘anticipate’ an event (the outcome), given the combination of an antecedent discriminative stimulus and the stimulus constituted by the incipient emission of the response which it evokes. In this case the anomaly of reference in the noun phrase which occurs as the grammatical object of the verb reflects its use as a device for indicating a range of possible outcomes any one of which, if it occurred, would fulfill and confirm the expectation which it specifies.
Note:
UTP made changes to the text of the presentation in 1995 and in 1999.
[References]  
Download: 1992j 1999 Towards a Reconciliation between the Ascociationist and Redical Behaviorist Traditions in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992k). Selectionism, connectionism and the re-socialization of linguistics. [Unpublished paper. Presented in absentia under the title 'Selectionism and connectionism: Their implications for a return to an empirical/behavioristic linguistics' at the 1992 Conference of the Research Committee for Sociolinguistics of the International Sociological Association on 'The interface between Sociology and Linguistics', Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 9th-11th June 1992].
Note:
Last change to the text of the presentation made by UTP is from 1999.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1993a). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social.(shortened version) The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 16, 11-23.

Place, U. T. (1993b). A behavioral view of language [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the 19th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis (p. 550). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.

Place, U. T. (1993c). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 25-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759281
Abstract:
Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two or more observers which those observers confirm as a correct description provide a far more objective and secure foundation for empirical knowledge than statements describing private events in the experience of a single individual. In the course of this argument, I also invoke Wittgenstein's (1953) demonstration — his 'private language argument' — of the incoherence of traditional subjective empiricism. Regarding the second deficiency, I argue that observation statements describing private events can serve as data for an objective study, provided that (a) the verbal behavior in which they consist and its context are objectively observed and recorded, and (b) an explanation is given of how this verbal behavior is generated by the events it reports.
Keywords: methodological behaviorism, objectivity principle, private events, private language argument, radical behaviorism
[References]  [Is cited by]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1993c A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993d). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. Acta Analytica, 8(10), 143-155.
Abstract:
A synthetic proposition is true, if there exists a situation corresponding to that which the proposition depicts. Assurance that such correspondence obtains depends on the coherence of a body of pragmatically tested beliefs, anchored to reality by objective observation statements endorsed as correct by the relevant linguistic community. Hull's "primitive suggestibility" and Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" are invoked to explain how failures of correspondence are detected.
Keywords: conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, holism, picture theory of meaning
Note:
Added to the full text: unpublished rephrasing of some of the central points of this article by the author.
[References]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1993d Holism and Cognitive Dissonance in the Discrimination of Correspondence between Sentences and Situations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993e). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving [Abstract]. Behavioral Development, 3(3), 5.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1993f). With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin 'A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part II: The Martin-Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 7. Microstructural properties: categorical or dispositional?. Conceptus, XXVI(68/69), 33-39.

Place, U. T. (1993g) Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis [Conference presentation]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1993, 30.

Place, U. T. (1993h). Psychologism and anti-psychologism: An historical overview [Conference presentation]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1993, 37.
Abstract:
Psychologism is the (mistaken) belief that logic is a descriptive science, that the laws of logic describe how people think in the way that the laws of motion describe how things move. Anti-psychologism repudiates psychologism, holding that logic is a normative or prescriptive science like ethics. Its laws tell us how people ought to think, not how they actually think in practice.
Psychologism has always had a strong following within psychology, even though the difficulty most human subjects encounter in making correct logical inferences is not easily reconciled with it. But in philosophy the influence of Frege (1894) on Russell and Wittgenstein on the one hand and Husserl on the other has ensured that anti-psychologism has been the dominant orthodoxy both in Austro-Anglo-Saxon Analytic Philosophy and in Continental (German-French) Phenomenology. More recently, Fodor (1975) has pointed out that the causal role played by formally stated logical rules in the basic software of the serial-digital computer shows
(a) that psychologism cannot be dismissed, as it has been in the past, on the grounds that logical principles are not the kind of thing that can enter into a causal relation, and
(b) that if, as Fodor himself thinks, the serial-digital computer is the right model for the functioning of the brain, psychologism must actually be true.
With the replacement of the serial-digital computer by the connectionist network as the preferred model for the way the brain functions, anti-psychologism looks set to become the dominant orthodoxy once again. But this time the case will be argued, not on a priori grounds, but on the the empirical evidence which renders psychologism a massively implausible account of how thought is actually generated.

Place, U. T. (1993i). Following 'the natural lines of fracture': Concept formation in neural networks [Conference presentation, presented at the Symposium on Associationism, Behaviour Analysis and Connectionism, held at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London 31st March 1993].
Abstract:
It is an implication of Darwin's theory of evolution by variation and natural selection that the survival and reproduction of complex free-moving living organisms, animals in other words, depends on their ability to change the spatial relations between themselves and other objects, including other organisms of the same and of different species, and so bring about the conditions necessary for that survival and reproduction. In order to do that the organism requires a system - its nervous system - whose function is to match the output to the current stimulus input on the one hand and the organism's current state of deprivation with respect to conditions required for its survival and successful reproduction on the other. Matching behaviour to the conditions required for survival and reproduction is the function of the motivational/emotional part of the system. Matching behaviour to current stimulus input is the function of the sensory/cognitive part of the system. The sensory/cognitive system cannot perform its function successfully without the ability to group inputs together in such a way that every actual and possible member of the class or category so formed is a reliable indicator of the presence of an environmental situation in which a particular behavioural strategy or set of such strategies is going to succeed. In other words the survival and reproduction of an organism of this kind depends crucially on its having a conceptual scheme, a conceptual scheme moreover, which reliably predicts the actual behaviour-consequence relations operating in the organism's environment. Although verbs such as ‘classifying’, ‘categorizing’ and ‘conceptualizing’ are not to be found in Skinner's writings, there is an important passage in The Behavior of Organisms (Skinner 1938) where he addresses the issue which others talk about when they use such terms. Thus in Chapter One, after outlining his "System of Behavior", he goes on to say The preceding system is based upon the assumption that both behavior and environment may be broken into parts which retain their identity throughout an experiment and undergo orderly changes. If this assumption were not in some sense justified, a science of behavior would be impossible. But the analysis of behavior is not an act of arbitrary sub-dividing.  We cannot define the concepts of stimulus and response quite as simply as ‘parts of behavior and environment’ without taking account of the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break. (Skinner 1938 p.33). What Skinner has primarily in mind in this passage is the way the scientist's concepts need to be shaped into conformity with what he calls "the natural lines of fracture." But on the Darwinian argument the same must be true of the stimulus classes within which any living organism's behaviour generalises and between which it discriminates. It is argued that studying the properties of artificially constructed neural networks helps us to understand how the brain develops patterns of generalisation and discrimination which do indeed "follow the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break." Attention is drawn to the role of the ‘hidden layer’ in responding to resemblances of pattern, to the role of re-entrant/recurrent and reverberatory circuits in establishing expectations on the basis of consecutive stimulus patterns, and to the role of error-correction in bringing stimulus classes into line with the contingencies experienced during learning.
[References]  
Download: 1993i Following 'The Natural Lines of Fracture' - Concept Formation in Neural Networks.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994a). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Acta Analytica, 9(12), 65-79.
Abstract:
The demise of behaviourism is traced to the advent of the serial-digital computer as a model for the functioning of the brain. With the advent of a new model in the shape of the parallel distributed processor (PDP) or connectionist network, the resurrection of behaviourism can be predicted. The relation between the two models is explained in terms of Skinner's (1966) distinction between "contingency-shaped" (modelled by the PDP) and "rule-governed" behaviour. Rule-governed behaviour in Skinner's sense is behaviour controlled by a verbal/symbolic "specification" of the relevant contingencies. The S-D computer is a device designed by a PDP (the human brain) to compensate for its own slowness and inefficiency in constructing and manipulating such symbolic specifications.
[References]  
Download: 1994a Connectionism and the Resurrection of Behaviorism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994b). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress [in the theory of universals]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1994, 87. [abstract; full text, see 1992i]

Place, U. T. (1994c). Contextualism, mechanism and the conceptual analysis of the causal relation [Conference presentation, presented at a symposium on "The Bogy of Mechanism": Alternative Philosophical Perspectives on the Contextualism/Mechanism Debate, conducted at the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, May 28th 1994]. Association for Behavior Analysis.
Abstract:
The notion that mechanism and contextualism are two alternative and conflicting ways of conducting the scientific enterprise rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of the causal relation. Every effect is the outcome of many causes. Where the effect is an event, there is always a single triggering event which combines with a set of standing conditions which are already in place to complete the set of causes which are jointly sufficient for the coming about of the effect. In a mechanism, one triggering event leads inevitably to another because any variation in the standing conditions has been eliminated by strict control of the context within which the causal process takes place. Most mechanisms are a product of human artifice. Some, such as the movements involved in animal locomotion, are the product of natural selection. Another example of mechanical causation in biology is the transmission of excitation across the synapse from the pre-synaptic to the post-synaptic neuron. However, research by connectionists on the properties of artificial neural networks shows that mechanical causation at the neuro-synaptic ('molecular') level yields multi-factorial contextual causation at the ('molar') level of the network as a whole.
[References]  [Is cited by]  
Download: 1994c Contextualism, Mechanism and the Conceptual Analysis of the Causal Relation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994d). Sharpness: an interesting exception to the rule that dispositional properties require explanation in terms of their owner's microstructure [Conference presentation, presented to the Twentieth Annual Conference on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 12th April 1994]. Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik.
Abstract:
The most common form of distinctively scientific causal explanation is an explanation of the dispositional properties shared by instances of a universal or kind. Such explanations typically invoke the structural properties of the property-bearer. In the majority of cases and in all cases where a specifically scientific explanation is required, what are invoked are features of the microstructure of the property-bearer which are not accessible to ordinary observation at the level of common sense. An interesting exception is the case of the sharpness of a knife or needle. Sharpness is a property and a concept with a number of unusual features. Most property-concepts are either purely dispositional, as in the case of such things as the brittleness of glass, the flexibility of rubber or the magnetic properties of an iron bar, or they are structural properties, such as the external shape and internal arrangement of an object. Sharpness, by contrast, is a property with two aspects, a purely dispositional aspect, the property-bearer's propensity to cut or pierce, and a structural aspect, the fineness and hardness of its edge or point. However, the relation between these two aspects is a causal relation between "distinct existences", not a relation of identity. The dispositional property, aptness to cut or pierce, depends on and is explained by the structural properties, the fineness and hardness of the edge or point. In this it differs from most other dispositional properties. For in this case, the structural properties on which the dispositional property depends are features of the macrostructure rather than the microstructure of the property-bearer. They are thus available to common observation by the man- or woman-in-the-street in a way that the microstructural properties on which most dispositional properties depend are not. Hence the absorption of both cause and its effect into a single common-sense concept. Causal relations and the causal explanations which invoke them have two components: (a) a categorical component, some kind of contact or proximity between the causal agent and the causal patient, and (b) a dispositional component which provides the "cement" which, in the explanation, takes the form of a 'covering law' and governs the interaction between the two. In this respect, the causal relation whereby aptness to cut or pierce is generated by the structural properties of fineness and hardness of edge or point is no exception. Of the two structural properties which stand as cause to the dispositional property as effect, one, the fineness of the edge or point, is categorical; the other, its hardness, is dispositional. From a philosophical standpoint the 'sharpness' example raises two interesting questions: (1) In what sense does the effect, the aptness to cut or pierce, constitute a "distinct existence" from its causes, the fineness and hardness of the edge or point, as Hume's principle requires? (2) What light, if any, is thrown by this example on the problem of the source of the dispositional properties of an elementary particle which has no microstructure (the 'charm' of the quark)?
[References]  
Download: 1994d Sharpness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994e). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic conventions: Some implications for behavior analysis [Conference presentation at the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, May 29th 1994].
Abstract:
In a recent paper (Place 1992), the writer has argued that conceptual analysis, as practised by the philosophers of the 'ordinary language' school, is an empirical study of the linguistic conventions to which a speaker must conform if what she says is to be understood by (i.e., is to effectively control the behavior of) any competent interpreter of the language, dialect or technical code she is using. Since conformity to social norms and conventions is maintained by the avoidance of the aversive consequences of failing to do so, the only way to demonstrate unambiguously the existence of such a norm or convention is to perform an ethnomethodological experiment (Garfinkel 1964) in which the putative norm or convention is deliberately flouted so that the actual social consequences of so doing can be observed.
Because of the social disruption and hostility towards the experimenter which such an experiment is liable to incur, in practice most such investigations take the form of a thought experiment in which the researcher invites the reader to imagine or recollect from her own past experience the consequences of flouting the convention in question. Though the consequences of flouting linguistic conventions are less serious, the reluctance of philosophers, in their professional capacity, to engage in any form of practical activity has ensured that the methodology of conceptual analysis is likewise that of the ethnomethodological thought experiment. In this case the existence of a linguistic convention is demonstrated by constructing a sentence which flouts the putative convention, and then asking the reader to consider how she would react, if confronted by such a sentence in the course of ordinary conversation.
Provided the linguistic conventions which are studied in this way are universal in the sense that some version of them is to be found in every natural language, conceptual analysis so conceived can provide valuable insights into
(a) the different ways in which language is used to control the behavior of the listener (pragmatics),
(b) the way in which sentences are used to depict or represent segments of environmental reality, possible future events and states of affairs as well as actual past and present ones, (semantics) and
(c) the nature of the reality thereby depicted (metaphysics).
In relation to behavior analysis, conceptual analysis has important implications for the study of verbal behavior, for an understanding of the relation between our ordinary psychological language ("folk psychology") and the language of behavior analysis on the one hand and the language of physiology on the other, and for an understanding of some of the concepts, such as the concepts of 'cause' and 'effect' which are fundamental to the enterprise of empirical science as a whole.

Place, U. T. (1995/6). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Behavior and Philosophy, 23/24, 13-30. www.jstor.org/stable/27759337
Abstract:
A symbol is defined as a species of sign. The concept of a sign coincides with Skinner's (1938) concept of a discriminative stimulus. Symbols differ from other signs in five respects: (1) They are stimuli which the organism can both respond to and produce, either as a self-directed stimulus (as in thinking) or as a stimulus for another individual with a predictably similar response from the recipient in each case. (2) they act as discriminative stimuli for the same kind of object for all members of the verbal community within which they function as symbols; (3) they acquire their properties by virtue of arbitrary social convention rather than any natural and intrinsic connection between the sign and what it is a sign of; (4) competent members of the verbal community can both produce the appropriate symbol in response to a naturally occurring sign of the presence of the object or a sample of the kind of object which the symbol stands for and select the appropriate object when presented with the symbol; (5) they form stimulus equivalence classes of the kind demonstrated in the matching-to-sample task (Sidman, 1971; Sidman and Tailby, 1982) both with other symbols having the same meaning and, more important, with the naturally-occurring non-symbolic signs of the presence of the object or kind of object which the symbol stands for.
[Is cited by]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995-6 Symbolic Processes and Stimulus Equivalence.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995a). The Searle fallacy: a reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle). The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 21, 5-18.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1995a The Searle Fallacy a Reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle).pdf

Place, U. T. (1995b). 'Is consciousness a brain process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner, & J. Shawe-Taylor (Eds.), Consciousness at the crossroads of cognitive science and philosophy: Selected proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project 'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Maribor, Slovenia, 23-7 August, 1994 (pp. 9-15). Imprint Academic.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995b 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process' Some Misconceptions about the Article.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995c). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic convention [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1995, 143.
Abstract:
Recent developments such as connectionism in the field of artificial intelligence and selectionism in the neurosciences point away from a conception of the rules of language as a set of formal principles genetically inscribed onto the brain's equivalent of a hard disk and towards the notion that they are social conventions acquired and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. These developments should lead to a revival, not only of an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics, but also of conceptual analysis conceived as the empirical investigation of linguistic convention, using as its research tool Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment in which the putative convention is deliberately flouted so that the social consequences of so doing can be observed or, in the case of a thought experiment, imagined. Some implications of such a revival for our conception of the role of the philosopher in relation to psychology are examined. It is suggested that in order to explain how a "grammatical investigation" (Wittgenstein 1953) can throw light on the structure of reality, we need to invoke a combination of Frege's (1891/1960) "function and argument" analysis of the sentence and Wittgenstein's (1921/1961) "picture theory" of its meaning. This theoretical underpinning shows us how conceptual analysis construed as an empirical investigation of linguistic conventions can yield (a) a conception of mental life as proceeding from mental activity/process through an instantaneous mental event to a mental disposition, and (b) an argument against the existence of abstract objects such as the mind and its faculties.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: fulltext of the presentation

Place, U. T. (1996a). Names as constituents of sentences: an omission. Commentary on P. Horne and C. F. Lowe, 'On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior'. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 65, 302-304. doi:10.1901/jeab.1996.65-302
Abstract:
After Skinner's (1957) insistence on separating the behavior of the speaker from that of the listener, Horne & Lowe (1996) have brought these two aspects of language back together by showing that in learning a name the child must not only learn, as speaker, to produce the name when presented with the object to which it applies, it must also learn, as listener, to select the object when presented with the name. What is missing from their account is the recognition that it is sentences, rather than names, that are the functional units of language, and that a primitive sentence requires a function or predicate in the form of an action-name in addition to one or more object-names. They are also chided for failing to distinguish the three senses of Skinner's term "tact" to which the writer drew attention in an earlier paper (Place 1985).

Place, U. T. (1996b). The picture theory of meaning and its implication for the theory of truth and its discrimination. Communication and Cognition, 29, 5-14.
Abstract:
Linguistic behaviourism is an approach to linguistics, philosophy and the philosophy of science which combines Skinner's (1957) thesis that language is a form of learned social behaviour maintained by the reinforcement practices of a linguistic or, as he would say, "verbal" community with Chomsky's (1957, etc.) insistence that the functional unit of language is the sentence and that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are typically constructed anew on each occasion of utterance. The ability of the listener or reader to be directed by an imperative sentence to do something she has never done before or to be alerted by a declarative sentence to the existence of a situation the like of which she has never encountered and to which she would otherwise have no access is explained on a version of the picture theory of meaning in which the structure and content of the sentence maps onto the structure and content of the situation which is thereby depicted. Hand in hand with the picture theory of meaning goes a correspondence theory of what it means for a contingent proposition to be true. But in accounting for the way true contingent propositions are discriminated, both the coherence and the pragmatic principles are invoked.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[Is cited by]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1996c). Dispositions as intentional states. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 2, pp. 19-32). Routledge.
Abstract:
All three authors agree that 'This glass is brittle' entails 'If it were suitably struck, it would break'. They also agree that such a statement, if true, requires a state of affairs whose existence makes it true (its truthmaker). They disagree as to its nature. For Place, it is an intentional state which "points towards" a possibly-never-to-exist future and a counterfactual past. In accordance with the conceptualist theory of universals and the picture theory of meaning which he outlines, such states are construed as properties of particulars. They provide Hume's "invisible glue" which sticks cause to effect.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Is cited by]  
Download: 1996c Chapter 2 Dispositions as Intentional States.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
Abstract:
Nominalised predicates, opaque contexts and monadic relational predicates are cases where surface structure conceals an underlying complexity. A conceptualist picture theory of meaning allows different ways of carving up reality into atomic situations. To say that a universal exists means either that it has at least one instance or that some creature has that concept. Structural factors combine to cause dispositions. Dispositions combine with the relevant conditions to cause their manifestations. Type-identities begin as contingent hypotheses and become necessary when used in classification. The existence of individual dispositional properties, not Laws of Nature, are the truthmakers for causal counterfactuals.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  
Download: 1996d Chapter 4 A Conceptualist Ontology.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996e). Structural properties: categorical, dispositional or both. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 7, pp. 105-125). Routledge.
Abstract:
Martin's "linguisticism" which converts existence into the truth of an existential statement is found in such doctrines as "To exist is to be the value of a variable", "Wanting is a propositional attitude", and "Causal conditionals are of the form 'If p, then q'". The (dispositional) properties of the whole are caused by, are often predictable from, but are not reducible to, the (categorical) arrangement of its parts and their dispositional properties. An unmanifested dispositional property is a law of the nature of the property-bearer which governs how it would behave, if its manifestation conditions were to be fulfilled.

Place, U. T. (1996f). Conceptualism and the ontological independence of cause and effect. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 10, pp. 153-162). London: Routledge.
Keywords: conceptualism
[References]  

Place, U. T. (1996g). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Dialectica, 50, 91-120. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x
Abstract:
Martin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality . . . all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states." The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's (1983) directedness and Anscombe's (1965) indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states. The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892) indirect reference/Quine's (1953) referential opacity, evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
[References]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996g Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996h). Mental causation is no different from any other kind. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 23, 15-20.
Abstract:
Mental causation, as the term is used here, is the relation between an individual's beliefs, desires and intentions on the one hand and the behaviour they motivate on the other. Until it was challenged by Donald Davidson (1963/1980), the accepted view amongst philosophers was that mental causation in this sense is not a causal relation ("reasons are not causes"). Now most subscribe to Davidson's view that it is a causal relation, but an anomalous one. I argue that it is a standard causal relationship which differs in no way from other non-mental cases of causation.
[References]  
Download: 1996h Mental Causation is No Different from Any Other Kind.pdf this is a shortened version of the unpublished:  1996h Full version of Mental Causation is No Different from Any Other Kind.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996i). The properties of conscious experiences: A second reply to John Beloff. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 23, 31-33. 1996i The Properties of Conscious Experiences A Second Reply to John Beloff.pdf
[References]  [Is reply to]  

Place, U. T. (1996j). Linguistic behaviorism as a philosophy of empirical science. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology ( Chapter 9, pp. 126-140). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n9
Abstract:
Linguistic behaviorism is a philosophy of science with application to every empirical science from physics to sociology. It holds that • philosophy, including the philosophy of science, uses conceptual analysis to study the interface between language and the 'reality' it depicts, • conceptual analysis is an empirical investigation of the conventions governing the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language and its technical derivatives, • conformity to linguistic convention is maintained by selective social reinforcement. It endorses the analytic/synthetic distinction, a picture theory of the meaning of sentences, a correspondence theory of synthetic truth and a counterfactual theory of causal necessity.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[Is cited by]  [5 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Place, U. T. (1996k). Introduction of 'Folk psychology and its implications for psychological science'. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 243-244). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
Download: 1996k Introduction of 'Folk psychology and its implications for psychological science'.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996l). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 264-270). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
Abstract:
Before deciding what status should be given to folk psychology within scientific psychology, we must understand its linguistic peculiarities. To do that, we need to attend to research on the topic within the philosophical tradition known as "conceptual analysis." This research enables us to identify six respects in which folk psychological language can lead us astray, when used in a scientific context: (1) the creation of bogus abstract entities by the process of "nominalizing" predicates and other non-substantival parts of speech, (2) the persistent use of adjectives with evaluative (good/bad) connotations, (3) the systematic evaluation of the content of other people's cognitive attitudes and judgments from the standpoint of the speaker, (4) the distortion of causal accounts of human action by the demand for a single scapegoat on whom to pin the blame when things go wrong, (5) the use of the metaphor of linguistic control when explaining behavior that is not subject to that type of control, (6) the unavoidable use of simile when describing private experience.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996l Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual Analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996m). Metaphysics as the empirical investigation of the interface between language and reality. Acta Analytica,11(15), 97-118.
Abstract:
The rules of syntax and semantics on conformity to which linguistic communication depends are construed as social conventions instilled and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. That conception argues for the revival of conceptual analysis construed as the empirical investigation of such conventions using the ethnomethodological thought experiment as its primary research tool, and for a view of metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between utterances and the reality they depict.
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996m Metaphysics as the Empirical Study of the Interface between Language and Reality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996n). A selectionist approach to the problem of universals [Conference presentation, presented at the 22nd Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, May 27th 1996]. Association for Behavior Analysis.
Abstract:
As it is discussed by philosophers, the problem of universals has two aspects: an ontological aspect and an epistemological aspect. Views on the ontological aspect divide between "realism" which holds that universals are abstract objects, distinct from their instances, with which the organism's concepts must line up if it is to survive and reproduce, and "constructivism" which holds that the organism's concepts are the only universals there are. Views on the epistemological issue divide between "nativism" which holds that concepts are innate, and "empiricism" which holds that they are learned. Most realists are nativists. Most constructivists are empiricists. Selectionist considerations suggest a middle position between these extremes:
(1) There are no universals in the absence of a classifying organism (constructivism).
(2) There is a significant innate contribution to the organism's system of concepts (nativism).
(3) The fine tuning which brings the organism's concepts into line with what Skinner (1938) calls "the natural lines of fracture along which environment and behavior actually break" is a matter of contingency-shaped discrimination learning (empiricism).
(4) There are objective constraints which ensure that the concepts so formed line up with "real" similarities and differences between objects, events and states of affairs in the organism's interactions with the environment (realism).
Keywords: universals
[References]  
Download: 1996n A Selectionist Approach to the Problem of Universals.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996o). On the anti-depressant effect of suppressing REM sleep [Conference presentation, presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Barcelona on the 18th of July 1996]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
Abstract:
In a paper presented to the 1995 Euro-SPP Meeting in Oxford Kathleen Taylor and I proposed the identification of conscious experience with the activity of what we call the "central input focuser (CIF)" which restructures the figure-ground relations within what Broadbent (1971) has called the "evidence" on which the categorization of problematic inputs is based. We further suggested that rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep is a condition in which the CIF is allowed to "freewheel" while decoupled from sensory input. As a result the vivid dream imagery which is characteristic of and peculiar to this phase of sleep recapitulates those associations formed during the preceding period of waking which have acquired motivational significance and hence an emotional charge by virtue of their resemblance to or associative links with emotionally charged events in the dreamer's past life. The effect of this is to ensure that the dreamer's attention is caught by inputs which have these emotionally charged associations during subsequent periods of waking consciousness. In this paper an explanation, based on this hypothesis, is offered of the well-known fact that anti-depressant drugs have the effect of suppressing REM sleep; though what the hypothesis in fact explains is why a drug that suppresses REM sleep should have an anti-depressant effect.
[References]  
Download: 1996o On the Anti-Depressant Effect of Suppressing REM Sleep.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996p). Review of Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis [Unpublished review of the manuscript submitted by Morris.]
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Review of Morris (1996), Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis.pdf Review by U.T. Place of the manuscript submitted by Morris.

Place, U. T. (1997a). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. In J. L. Owen (Ed.), Context and communication behavior (Chapter 18, pp. 369-385). Context Press.
Abstract:
Contingency analysis is a technique for analyzing the relation between a living organism and its environment based on a generalized version of Skinner's (1969) concept of the "three-term contingency." It can be applied to the analysis of any sequence of events in which a single individual interacts with its environment or, as in the case of social behavior, in which two or more individuals interact with each other. It is particularly valuable when applied to the analysis of naturally-occurring verbal interactions, such as conversations and business transactions. It can be applied not only to the sequence of events whereby utterances follow one another as the interaction proceeds, their pragmatics, but also to the semantic content of the utterances, the sequence of events called for by what Skinner (1957) calls a "mand" or those recorded or predicted by the kind of declarative sentence he sometimes (Place 1985) calls a "tact".
[References]  [3 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1997b). Linguistic behaviorism and the correspondence theory of truth. Behavior and Philosophy, 25, 83-94. www.jstor.org/stable/27759370
Abstract:
Linguistic Behaviorism (Place, 1996) is an attempt to reclaim for the behaviorist perspective two disciplines, linguistics and linguistic philosophy, most of whose practitioners have been persuaded by Chomsky's (1959) Review of B. F. Skinner's (1957) "Verbal Behavior" that behaviorism has nothing useful to contribute to the study of language. It takes as axiomatic (a) that the functional unit of language is the sentence, and (b) that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are constructed anew on each occasion of utterance out of units, words, phrases and turns of phrase, that are repeated. On this view, the problem of discriminating the true from the false arises from the use of novel declarative sentences (statements) to depict or, to use Skinner's term, "specify" contingencies the like of which the listener need never have encountered and to which he would otherwise have no access. In such cases the listener needs to distinguish among the sentences he receives from other speakers between those where the situation depicted/specified corresponds to that which actually exists at the time and place specified in the sentence and are, therefore, true, and those to which no actual situation corresponds and which are, therefore, false.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, linguistic behaviorism
Download: 1997b Linguistic Behaviourism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997c). From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society, 5, 117.

Place, U. T. (1997d). Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism. Psychological Record, 47, 649-659. doi:10.1007/BF03395251
Abstract:
The discredit into which the socialist ideal has fallen as a consequence of recent political events calls into question, not just the viability of a particular political and economic system but, the very idea that the social order can be improved by applying principles derived from the scientific study of human social behavior. Before the collapse of socialism, the idea of a science of human behavior, construed in biological terms as a branch of the science of the behavior of free-moving living organisms in general, had been undermined by Chomsky's (1959) repudiation of the behaviorist project to construct a science of language (verbal behavior) based on principles derived from the study of animal learning. I contend that only by reinstating the link between linguistics and the study of animal learning can confidence be restored in the possibility of a genuine science of human behavior with application to the problem of constructing a better social order.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997d Rescuing the Science of Human Behavior from the Ashes of Socialism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997e). On the nature of conditionals and their truthmakers. Acta Analytica, 12(18), 73-88.
Abstract:
Standard propositional and predicate logic fails both as a model for natural language and, since it cannot handle causation, as a language for science. The failure to handle causation stems from a misconstrual of the causal conditional as a relation between the truth of two propositions (If p, then q). What the causal conditional in fact specifies is a 'relation' between the possible existence or non-existence of two situations made true by the existence of the dispositional properties of the concrete particulars involved.
[References]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997e On the Nature of Conditionals and Their Truthmakers.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997f). De re modality without possible worlds. Acta Analytica, 12(19), 131-145.
Abstract:
A distinction is drawn between de dicto modality which is a matter of which propositions can, cannot and must be true, given the laws of logic, and de re modality which is a matter of which situations (events or states of affairs) can, cannot and must exist, given the laws of nature. It is argued that Kripke's de re modality, defined in terms of what is true in some possible world, no possible world and all possible worlds, is an unsatisfactory amalgam of the two.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997f De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997g). We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do [Conference presentation, presented at a Symposium on 'Forty years of Australian Materialism', June 21st 1997]. Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds.
Abstract:
Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic-synthetic distinction undermines three principles fundamental to the view expounded in ‘Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956): the idea that problems, such as that of the relation between mind and body, are partly conceptual confusions to be cleared away by philosophical analysis and partly genuine empirical questions to be investigated and answered decisively by the relevant empirical science, the distinction between the meaning of what the individual says when she describes her private experiences and the nature of the actual events she is describing as revealed by science, and the claim that, unless the connection is obscured by the different ways in which the two predicates come to be applied, co-extensive predicates become conceptually (intensionally) connected, and sentences asserting their identity become analytic. It is argued that, if the object is, as it should be, to assimilate this case to other cases of type-identity in science, rather than perpetuate the problem, these principles are still needed.
[References]  
Download: 1997g We Needed the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction to Formulate the Mind-Brain Identity Then We Still Do.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997h). Wundt's theory of imageless thought as a possible key to the role of slow-wave sleep in depressive ruminations [Conference presentation, presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP), Padova, 28th August 1997]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Download: 1997h Wundt's Theory of Imageless Thought as Possible Key to the Role of Slow-Wave Sleep in Depressive Ruminations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997i). Linguistic behaviourism and the correspondence theory of truth [Conference presentation abstract, presented at the Symposium on 'Finding the Truth in Behaviour Analysis']. In J.C. Leslie (Ed.) EMEAB III Proceedings of the Third European Meeting for the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, July 10-13 1997, Dublin, Ireland (p. 59). University of Ulster.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, linguistic behaviorism

Place, U. T. (1997j). Is consciousness a grain process? A response to Horgan & Graham [Unpublished response to a final draft (1997) of Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. [There is some overlap with Place (1999e).]
[Is reply to]  
Download: 1997j Is Consciousness a Grain Process - A Response to Horgan & Graham.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997k). Two theories of meaning: The two-factor dispositional/relational and the single factor relational [Presented at the Twenty Third Philosophy of Science Course, Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, 8th April 1997].
Abstract:
Theories of meaning are of two kinds, two-factor dispositional/relational theories and single factor relational theories. A two-factor dispositional/relational theory of meaning holds that the word 'meaning' has two senses: a primary and fundamental sense in which meaning is a disposition and a secondary and derivative sense in which meaning is a relation.
(a) In the primary or dispositional sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression, such as a phrase or sentence, is a disposition, shared by relevantly competent speakers and interpreters of a particular natural language or technical code, to apply certain criteria (which they need not be able to state) in deciding whether or not a particular they encounter is either an instance to which, in the case of a general term or universally quantified sentence, the expression applies or, in the case of a singular term or singularly quantified sentence, the individual to which it refers.
(b) In the secondary or relational sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression is the actual individuals assigned, by the application of those criteria, to the extension of a general term or universally quantified sentence or the actual individual referred to by a singular term or singularly quantified sentence when uttered on a particular occasion, as determined by the criteria.
Taking their cue from Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction, many philosophers have defended a purely relational/extensional theory of meaning in which dispositional notions such as 'intension', 'Sinn' ('sense'), 'analytic' and 'necessary' (defined in terms of what it is self-contradictory to deny) play no part. Motivation for the single-factor relational theory comes from logic. That for the two-factor dispositional relational theory defended here comes from psychology. The application of the two-factor theory to scientific principles such as 'Water is H2O' and Ohm's Law is described.

Place, U. T. (1997l). Consciousness and the Zombie-within. [Paper presented at the Inaugural Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Claremont, CA, June 15th 1997.]
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1998a). From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? In Man Cheung Chung (Ed.), Current Trends in History and Philosophy of Psychology, (Vol. 1, 1998, chapter 8, pp. 43-48). British Psychological Society.
Download: 1998a From Mystical Experience to Biological Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998b). Sentence and sentence structure in the analysis of verbal behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15, 131-133. doi:10.1007/BF03392935
[References]  [Is cited by]  
Download: 1998b Sentence and Sentence Structure in the Analysis of Verbal Behavior.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998c). Behaviourism and the evolution of language. In Man Cheung Chung (Ed.), Current Trends in History and Philosophy of Psychology Volume 2 (Chapter 9, pp. 55-61). British Psychological Society.

Place, U. T. (1998d). Behaviourism as a standpoint in linguistics. Connexions, (4), 26-30. www2.open.ac.uk/arts/journals/connexions/Connexions_4.pdf
[References]  
Download: 1998d Behaviourism as a Standpoint in the Science of Linguistics.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998e) Evidence for the role of operant reinforcement in the acquisition and maintenance of linguistic competence. Connexions, (4), 31-37. www2.open.ac.uk/arts/journals/connexions/Connexions_4.pdf
[References]  
Download: 1998e Evidence for the Role of Operant Reinforcement in the Acquisition and Maintenance of Linguistic Competence.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998f). Disposizione ('Dispositions' translated into Italian by Giacomo Gava). In G. Gava, Lessico Epistemologico (Epistemological Lexicon, 2nd edition, pp. 44-51). CLEUP (Cooperativa Libraria Editrice Università di Padova).
[References]  
Download: 1998f Dispositions.pdf the English original that is translated into Italian

Place, U. T. (1998g). In praise of the breadth of British Philosophers. Letter to the Editor in response to an article by Malcom Bradbury which appeared in the edition for 29/11/98, The Observer 6/12/98, p. 30.
Download: 1998g In Praise of the Breadth of British Philosophers.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998h). The neuroanatomy of consciousness and the zombie-within. [Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 20th June 1998].
Abstract:
In Chapter 3 of their book, Milner & Goodale (1995) concede that, since the ventral and dorsal streams as defined by Ungerleider & Mishkin (1982) bifurcate "downstream" of the striate cortex (V1), neither stream can account for the visual functions which survive lesions of V1 ("blindsight"). However, on their Figure 3.1 (p. 68) they show another pathway which I call the 'Sub-Cortical (S-C) to dorsal pathway' (SUPERIOR COLLICULUS, PULVINAR, POSTERIOR PARIETAL CORTEX) which bifurcates from the ventral pathway (LATERAL GENICULATE NUCLEUS, V1-V5, INFERO-TEMPORAL CORTEX) at the retina. Not only does the S-C to dorsal pathway explain blindsight. It also coincides exactly with Michael Posner's (Posner & Petersen 1990; Posner and Dehaene 1994) "posterior attention system". This allows us to identify the superior colliculus and pulvinar with that part of the "zombie-within" (Place 1997) which involuntarily attracts the focus of conscious attention to any input which it identifies as problematic and the posterior parietal cortex as the structure which, in addition to its role in the feedback control of voluntary movement, maintains voluntary control over the focus of conscious attention (in the ventral stream in the case of vision) until a satisfactory categorization of the input is achieved. This, when combined with the known functions of the ventral pathway, allows us, in the case of vision, to identify actual anatomically defined structures corresponding to most of the functionally defined modules envisaged in 'Consciousness and the zombie-within' (Place 1997) up to the point where conscious experience gives way to categorization.
[References]  
Download: 1998h The Neuroanatomy of Consciousness and the Zombie-within.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999a). Ryle's behaviorism. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of Behaviorism (Chapter 13, pp. 361-398). Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-012524190-8/50014-0
Abstract:
A distinction is drawn between the OR-behaviorism of the Americans which wants to make psychology more scientific and the OUR-behaviourism of Wittgenstein and Ryle which comes from the philosophy of language. Ryle's doctrines are classified into those that derive from Wittgenstein and those that are peculiar to Ryle. The latter are sub-classified into failures and successes. Criticisms of Ryle's position by Place, Geach, Medlin, Armstrong and Martin are examined and, where possible, rebutted. I conclude that, with some important exceptions, the dispositional analysis of mental concepts survives, as does, more controversially, the hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999a Ryle's Behaviorism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999b). Intentionality and the physical - a reply to Mumford. Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 225-231. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00139
Abstract:
Martin and Pfeifer (1986) claim "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality" proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they and Mumford do, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. To my contention that the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin's (1994) argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin's argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance are of the form 'If p then q'.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999b Intentionality and the Physical - A Reply to Mumford.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999c). Behaviourism and the evolution of language [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society, 7, 84.

Place, U. T. (1999d). Connectionism and the problem of consciousness. Acta Analytica, 14(22), 197-226.
Abstract:
This paper falls into three parts. In Part 1 I give my reasons for rejecting two aspects of Horgan and Tienson's position as laid out in their book, the language of thought and belief-desire explanations of behaviour, while endorsing the connection they see between linguistic syntax and the syntax of a motor skill. In Part 2 I outline the theory that the brain consists of two input-output transformation systems consciousness whose function is (a) to categorise problematic inputs, (b) to select a response appropriate to such inputs once they have been categorised and (c) to initiate and monitor the execution of such response once selected, and the "zombie-within" whose function is (a) to identify and alert consciousness to any inputs that are problematic either because they are unexpected or because they are significant relative to the agent's current or perennial motivational concerns. In Part 3 I consider how far the properties of the two systems outlined in Part 2 can be understood in terms of the known properties of connectionist networks.
Keywords: connectionism, consciousness, problematic input, zombie-within
Note:
The download file contains some text added by the author after publication. Footnote 2 is added.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999d Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999e). Token- versus type-identity physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy, 3(2), 21-31.
Abstract:
The observation that identity is a relation between two names or descriptions which refer to the same individual (token-identity) or the same kind or class of things (type-identity) suggests that, unless the descriptions in question are specified, physicalism, understood as the claim that every mentally specified state or process is identical with some physically specified state or process, is empty hand-waving. It can be argued on behalf of the type-identity physicalist that future psycho-physiological research will allow us to specify which types of mentally-specified states or processes are identical with which physically-specified states or processes. No such possibility can be envisaged if token-identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980) is true. Consequently, the case for token-identity physicalism must rest on an a priori argument. But the argument which Davidson offers is inconclusive. Token-identity physicalism is, therefore, in serious danger of being side-lined, should evidence supporting the stronger type-identity thesis be forthcoming.
[References]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1999e Token- versus Type-Identity Physicalism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999f). Vagueness as a mark of dispositional intentionality. Acta Analytica, 14(23), 91-109.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999f Vagueness as a Mark of Dispositional Intentionality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999g). Intentionality naturalized: dispositions and quotations [Unpublished paper].
[References]  
Download: 1999g Intentionality Naturalized - Dispositions and Quotations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999h). The picture theory of meaning: A rehabilation [Conference presentation; presented to the IUC Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, 31st May - June 5th 1999].
Abstract:
I argue the case for a rehabilitation of the "picture theory" of the meaning of sentences expounded by Wittgenstein (1921/1971) in the Tractatus, but abandoned by him in moving from his earlier to his later philosophy. This rehabilitation requires the replacement of 'facts' as the objects which sentences depict by 'situations' (Barwise and Perry 1983) and the recognition that the situation depicted by a sentence is an "intentional object" (Brentano 1871/1995). It also implies a different view of the way his sense (Sinn)/reference (Bedeutung) distinction should be applied to the meaning of sentences from that maintained by Frege (1892/1960) himself. Such a theory opens the door to a thorough-going empiricist theory of the acquisition of both concepts and sentence structure.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  
Download: 1999h The Picture Theory of Meaning - A Rehabilitation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999i). Comments on 'Causality, Senses and Reference' [Section from A defense of emergent downward causation by Teed Rockwell http://www.cognitivequestions.org/causeweb.html] www.cognitivequestions.org/utplacecaus.html
Download: 1999i Comments on Causality, Senses and Reference.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999j) Are qualia dispositional properties? [Paper presented at the Università di Siena and Terza Università di Roma conference on "Consciousness Naturalized", Certosa di Pontignano, Siena - published as Place, U. T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia its nature and its source. Brain and Mind, 1, 183-192].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (2000a). Consciousness and the zombie-within: a functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. In Y. Rossetti, & A. Revonsuo (Eds.), Beyond dissociations: Interaction between dissociated implicit and explicit processing (pp. 295-329). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.22.15pla
Abstract:
Cowey & Stoerig's (1995) demonstration that the phenomenon of blindsight applies to monkeys with striate cortical lesions in the same way as it does to humans with similar lesions makes it plausible to argue that the behaviour of mammals and probably that of other vertebrates is controlled by two distinct but closely interdependent and interacting systems in the brain which I shall refer to respectively as 'consciousness' and the 'sub-conscious automatic pilot or "zombie" within'. On this hypothesis, consciousness has three functions, (a) that of categorizing any input that is problematic in that it is either unexpected or significant relative to the individual's current or perennial motivational concerns, (b) that of selecting a response appropriate both to the presence of a thing of that kind and to the individual's motivational concerns with respect to it, and (c) that of monitoring the execution of that response. Conscious/phenomenal experience, on this view, is the first stage in the process whereby problematic inputs are processed by consciousness. Its function is to modify the figure-ground relations within the central representation of a problematic input until an adequate categorization is selected. The sub-conscious automatic pilot or “zombie-within” has two functions (a) that of continuously scanning the total current input and alerting consciousness to any input it identifies as problematic, (b) that of protecting consciousness from overload either by ignoring those non-problematic inputs which require no response or by responding appropriately but automatically to those for which there already exists a well practised skill or other “instinctive” response pattern.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [4 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000a Consciousness and the Zombie-within a Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000b). The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind, 1, 183-192. doi:10.1023/A:1010023129393
Abstract:
There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) which shows conclusively that if qualia are causally impotent we could have no possible grounds for believing that they exist. But if, as this argument shows, qualia are causally potent with respect to the descriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certain that they are causally potent in other more biologically significant respects. The empirical evidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of the striate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986; Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing in the absence of visual qualia is the ability to categorize sensory inputs in the visual modality. This would suggest that the function of private experience is to supply what Broadbent (1971) calls the “evidence” on which the categorization of problematic sensory inputs are based. At the same time analysis of the causal relation shows that what differentiates a causal relation from an accidental spatio-temporal conjunction is the existence of reciprocally related dispositional properties of the entities involved which combine to make it true that if one member of the conjunction, the cause, had not existed, the other, the effect, would not have existed. The possibility that qualia might be dispositional properties of experiences which, as it were, supply the invisible “glue” that sticks cause to effect in this case is examined, but finally rejected.
[References]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000b The Causal Potency of Qualia.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000c). The role of the hand in the evolution of language. Psycoloquy, 11(7), January 23. www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.007
Abstract:
This article has four sections. Section I sets out four principles which should guide any attempt to reconstruct the evolution of an existing biological characteristic. Section II sets out thirteen principles specific to a reconstruction of the evolution of language. Section III sets out eleven pieces of evidence for the view that vocal language must have been preceded by an earlier language of gesture. Based on those principles and evidence, Section IV sets out seven proposed stages in the process whereby language evolved: (1) the use of mimed movement to indicate an action to be performed, (2) the development of referential pointing which, when combined with mimed movement, leads to a language of gesture, (3) the development of vocalisation, initially as a way of imitating the calls of animals, (4) counting on the fingers leading into (5) the development of symbolic as distinct from iconic representation, (6) the introduction of the practice of question and answer, and (7) the emergence of syntax as a way of disambiguating utterances that can otherwise be disambiguated only by gesture.
[References]  [Is cited by]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 2000c The Role of the Hand in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000d). The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind, 1, 29-43. doi:10.1023/A:1010087621727
Abstract:
The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental, and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as the brain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mental states depend causally on and are, thus, "distinct existences" from the states of the brain microstructure with which 'they' are correlated. It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity and its composition/underlying structure applies across the board. All stuffs and processes are the same thing as is described by a description of their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of a disposition extends beyond the "skin" of the dispositional property bearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure, usually the microstructure, of the bearer.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000d The Two Factor-Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000e). Behaviorism as an ethnomethodological experiment: Flouting the convention of rational agency. Behavior & Philosophy, 28(1/2), 57. www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27759404.pdf
Abstract:
As interpreted here, Garfinkel's "ethnomethodological experiment" (1967) demonstrates the existence of a social convention by flouting it and observing the consternation and aversive consequences for the perpetrator which that provokes. I suggest that the hostility which behaviorism has provoked throughout its history is evidence that it flouts an important social convention, the convention that, whenever possible, human beings are treated as and must always give the appearance of being rational agents. For these purposes, a rational agent is someone whose behavior is controlled by a logically consistent body of means-end beliefs ("rules" in Skinner's terminology) and complementing desires which between them provide a basis for predicting how the individual will behave and for suggesting what arguments will persuade the agent to modify his or her beliefs and the behavior based upon them. The behaviorist flouts this convention by suggesting that its fictional character makes it unsuitable for the purposes of scientific explanation of behavior. The hostility that this suggestion provokes is evidence of the importance attached by the verbal community both to preserving a consistent and rational connection between what is said and what is done and presenting it as part of the natural order of things.
[References]  
Download: 2000e Behaviorism as an Ethnomethodological Experiment.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000f). Identity theories. In M. Nani, & M. Maraffa (Eds.), A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Roma Tre University. Retrieved Februari 9, 2019, from http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/mbit.htm
[Is cited by]  
Download: 2000f Theories of Mind.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000g). From icon to symbol: An important transition in the evolution of language [Abstract]. Proceedings of the 3rd International Evolution of Language Conference (pp. 183-184). École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications. www.infres.telecom-paristech.fr/confs/evolang/actes/_actes56.html
[References]  [Is cited by]  
Download: 2000g From Icon to Symbol - An Important Transition in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (2002). A pilgrim's progress? From mystical experience to biological consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(3), 34-52. www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000003/1261
Abstract:
Ullin Thomas Place died on 2nd January 2000 at the age of seventy-five. I had met him a little over three years earlier, in November 1996, during the annual 'Mind and Brain' symposium organized by Peter Fenwick and held at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. At that meeting Professor Place delivered a slightly shortened version of the paper reproduced here, in which he told his personal story — a pilgrim's progress? — recounting, as he put it, 'the history of a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled 'Is consciousness a brain process?' [Place, 1956] in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question'. [Abstract by Anthony Freedom]

Place, U. T. (2004). From mystical experience to biological consciousness. A pilgrim's progress? In G. Graham, & E.R. Valentine (Eds.), Identifying the mind: Selected papers of U. T. Place (pp. 14-29). Oxford University Press.
[Reprinting collections]  
Download: 2004 From Mystical Experiences to Biological Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T., & Smart, J. J. C. (1955). Contradictories and entailment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, 541-544. doi:10.2307/2103914
[References]  
Download: Place & Smart (1955) Contradictories and Entailment.pdf

Place, U. T., & Taylor, K. E. (1995). The functions of consciousness and its constituent parts [Conference presentation, presented to the Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, 31st August 1995]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Place & Taylor (1995) The Functions of Consciousness and its Constituent Part.pdf

Place, U. T., & Wheeler Vega, J. A. (1999). An anticipation of reversal theory within a conceptual-analytic and behaviorist perspective [Conference presentation, presented by the second author at the 9th International Conference on Reversal Theory, June 28 - July 2]. University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
Abstract:
Michael Apter denies that behaviorism can provide an adequate account of human action, referring to it in one place as "a kind of methodological vandalism" (Apter, 1989, p. 2). It is the purpose of this paper to show how the first author came, as a behaviorist and analytic philosopher, to a position that anticipates reversal theory to a surprising extent. The basis of this position is an analysis of polar statements concerning 'wanting': 'X wants O', and 'X does not want O'. These sentences imply a number of corollaries. For example, if 'X wants O', then: 'X will be pleased if O appears', 'X will be worried if it looks as if O will not appear', and 'X will be angry or miserable if O fails to appear'. Contrasting entailments follow ‘X does not want O'. These implications display the relationship between the motivational concepts of 'wanting' and 'not wanting', and emotion concepts such as being pleased, worried, angry, miserable, &c. This set of reciprocally related entailments provide, it will be argued, the conceptual foundation of reversal theory. This analysis led the first author to develop a behavioral theory of emotion, in which the various emotions can be located on two dimensions (after Myers, 1923): 'pleasant/unpleasant', and 'high-arousal/low-arousal'. Emotions are distinguished by reference to a third variable: a characteristic 'impulse' appropriate to the type of contingency in which the emotion in question is evoked. The notions of 'wanting' and 'not wanting' are defined, in the language of operant psychology, as differences in the reinforcing effect of actual and potential stimuli with respect to actual and potential operant responses by the organism. Some illustrative clinical and experimental applications of the theory by the first author, in the 1960's, are outlined.
[References]  
Download: Place & Wheeler Vega (1999) An Anticipation of Reversal Theory within a Conceptual Analytic and Behaviorist Perspective.pdf

Plato (1953). Phaedo. In W.D. Woodhead (Tr. & Ed.) Plato: Socratic Dialogues. Nelson.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Plato (1961). Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophist, Statesman (English translation with introduction by John Warrington). Dent.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018) Neural Correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1269. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269
Abstract:
One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Popper, K. R. (1935). Logik der Forschung (English translation as The Logic of Scientific Discovery - 1959. Hutchinson).
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism Beacon.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The Self and its Brain: An argument for Interactionism. Springer Verlag.
[Reviews]  

Posner, M. I., & Dehaene, S. (1994). Attentional networks. Trends in Neuroscience, 17, 75-79.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25-42.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Posner, M. I., & Warren, R. E. (1972). Traces, concepts and conscious construction. In A. W. Melton, & E. Martin (Eds.) Coding Processes in Human Memory. Winston.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Potrč, M. (1995). U. T. Place. The British founder of physicalism: from behaviorism to connectionism. In Jaakko Hintikka & Klaus Puhl (Eds.), The British tradition in 20th century philosophy. Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 14th to 21th August 1994, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellscha
Abstract:
Dualism recognized the existence of inner mental processes and states, but without any material or physical foundation. Behaviourism, on the contrary, even if it did not deny their existence, refused to attribute any explanatory role to inner states and processes. In the British Journal of Psychology, in 1956, Place published a paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, There, he advocated a form of physicalism which steers a middle course between dualism and behaviourism. Mental processes were considered to be literally inside the body and identical with material/physical processes in the brain. It is well known that dualism was seriously undermined by this theory. But it is less well known that Place held his theory to be compatible with behaviourism. He draws a distinction between mental processes which he thinks are processes in the brain and mental states which he thinks, following Ryle (1949), are dispositions to talk and behave in a variety of broadly specifiable ways. The identity theory as applied to mental processes is seen as complementing rather than replacing Ryle's behaviourism. The exclusion of mental states allows Place to avoid the difficulties which confront the attempt to extend type identity theory to cover propositional attitudes, and which have led many to adopt the token identity version. Unlike token identity physicalism which regards any attempt to establish psycho-physical correlations as futile, Place's version of type identity theory predicts such correlations across individuals in the case of mental processes and within individuals in the case of mental states. This, combined with an emphasis which comes from his background in behaviourist psychology on learning as the primary source of mental/behavioural dispositions, makes it easy for Place (1991) to embrace connectionism which he regards as entirely compatible with behaviourism. He does not emphasize the compatibility between type identity theory and connectionism, probably because this point is obvious to him. There is no analogous way of establishing links with brain science in the case of token identity theory.
Download: Potrc (1995) U T Place - The British Founder of Physicalism - from Behaviorism to Connectionism.pdf

Potrč, M. (2000). In memoriam - Ullin Thomas Place. Acta Analytica, 15(25), 7-18.

Povinelli, D. J., & Davis, D. R. (1994). Differences between chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and humans (Homo sapiens) in the resting state of the finger: implications for pointing. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 134-139
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Powell, J. P. (1969). The brain and consciousness: a reply to Professor Burt. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 27-28.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Price, H. H. (1932). Perception Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Price, H. H. (1953). Thinking and experience Hutchinson.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Pringle-Patterson, A. S. (Ed.) (1924). Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Prior, A. N. (1957). Time and modality Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Prior, A. N. (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, LXII, 91-106.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Proust M. (1923). À la recherche du temps perdu (8 volumes). Éditions de la nouvelle Revue Française
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pryor, K. (1984). Don't shoot the dog! Bantam Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind. Collier Books.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar.' In R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy (First Series, pp. 211-235), Blackwell.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological Predicates. In W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merill, (Eds), Art, Mind and Religion (pp. 37-48). University of Pittsburgh Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Putnam, H. (1975a). Mind, language and reality, Philosophical papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1975b). The meaning of 'meaning'. In K. Gunderson (Ed.) Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (VII). University of Minnesota Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and Object M.I.T. Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1951a). Mental entities. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, LXXX.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1951b). Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review, LX. Reprinted in W. v. O Quine (1953), From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953a). From a logical point of view Harvard University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953b). Reference and modality. In From a Logical Point of View (chapter VIII, pp. 139-159). Harvard University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1969). Epistemology naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. & Ullian, I. S. (1970). The Web of Belief Random House.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Quinton, A. (1973). The Nature of Things Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rachlin, H. (1985). Pain and behavior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 43-53.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rafal, R., & Robertson, L. (1995). The neurology of visual attention. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (Ch. 40, pp. 625-648). MIT Press, .
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Raichle, M. E., Fiez, J. A., Videen, T. O., MacLeod, A.-M. K., Pardo, J. V., Fox, P. T., & Petersen, S. E. (1994). Practice-related changes in human functional anatomy during non-motor learning. Cerebral Cortex, 4, 8-26.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Ravetz, J. R. (1971). Scientific knowledge and its social problems Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Raza, A., & Donchin, O. (2003). A zetetic’s perspective on gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 237-238.
Abstract:
Charmed by Corballis’s presentation, we challenge the use of mirror neurons as a supporting platform for the gestural theory of language, the link between vocalization and cerebral specialization, and the relationship between gesture and language as two separate albeit coupled systems of communication. We revive an alternative explanation of lateralization of language and handedness.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Reed, P. (2001). Editorial: Ullin Place, 1924-2000. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 155-157. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759424
Download: Reed (2001) Editorial - Ullin Place, 1924-2000.pdf

Rees, W. L. (1976). Stress, Distress and Disease. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 128()1, 3-18.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rees, W. R. (1957-8). Continuous States. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 58, 223-244
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Reese, H. W. (1992). Problem solving by algorithms and heuristics. In S. C. Hayes, & L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding Verbal Relations (Chapter 10, pp. 153-179). Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rego, F. (2021). Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? In P. Á. Gargiulo, & H. L. Mesones Arroyo (Eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry (Vol. IV, 73-88). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_8
Abstract:
In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rescorla, R. A. (1991). Associative relations in instrumental learning: The eighteenth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43B, 1-23.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement and non-reinforcement. In A. H. Black, & W. F. Prokasy (Eds.), Classical Conditioning, Vol. 2: Current Research and Theory. Prentice-Hall.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. A. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in Neuroscience, 21, 188-194.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Robinson, G. M. (1977). Procedures for the acquisition of syntax. In W. K. Honig, & J. E. R. Staddon (Eds.), Handbook of Operant Behavior. Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Romanes, G. J. (1882). Animal Intelligence Kegan, Paul, Trench.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Romanes, G. J. (1888). Mental evolution in man: Origin of human faculty Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rorschach, H. (1932/1942). Psychodiagnostik Hans Huber. English translation as Psychodiagnostics by P. Lemkau & B. Kronenberg, ed. W. Morganthaler. Grune & Stratton.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Rorty, R. (1965). Mind-brain identity, privacy, and categories. The Review of Metaphysics, xix, 24-54.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Ros, A. (1997). Reduktion, Identität und Abstraktion. Philosophie der Psychologie Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um die These von der Identität physischer und psychischer Phänomene. In M. Astroh, D. Gerhardus & G. Heinzmann (Eds.), Dialogisches Handeln. Eine Festschrift für Kuno Lorenz (pp. 403-425). Spektrum Verlag. Republished in: e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie, 2007, 7. www.jp.philo.at/texte/RosA1.pdf
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rosenblatt, F. (1959). Two theorems of statistical separability in the perceptron. In Mechanisation of Thought Processes: Proceedings of a Symposium held at the National Physical Laboratory, November 1958. Vol. 1, (pp. 421-456). HM Stationery Office.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N. & Bigelow, J. (1943). Behavior, Purpose and Teleology. Philosophy of Science, 10, 18-24.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rossetti, Y. (1997). Implicit perception in action: short-lived motor representations in space. In P.G. Grossenbacher (Ed.), Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rossetti, Y., Rode, G., & Boisson, D. (1995). Implicit processing of somesthetic information: a dissociation between Where and How? Neuroreport, 6(3), 506-510.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rubin, E. (1915). Synsoplevede Figurer. Gyldendalska
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L, & the PDP Research Group (1986). Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Volumes 1 and 2). MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz Allen & Unwin.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1914). The relation of sense-data to physics. Scientia, 16, 1-27. No.4 reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, Longmans and Green, 1917, Chap.VIII.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1918/1919). The philosophy of logical atomism. The Monist, xxviii, 495-­527; xxix, 32‑63; xxix, 190-222; xxix, 345-380. Reprinted in B. Russell (1956), Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950 (Edited by R. C. Marshall). Allen and Unwin.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1940). Inquiry into meaning and truth. Allen and Unwin.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. A. W. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 4, 479-493
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. A. W. (1919). Introduction to mathematical philosophy Allen and Unwin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1938). Categories. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 38, 189-206.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[61 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1954). Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1958). A puzzling element in the notion of thinking. Proceedings of the British Academy, XLIV, 129-144.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Sartre, J. P. (1962). Sketch for a Theory of Emotions Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol Columbia University Press
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Schank, R. C. (1982). Dynamic memory: A theory of reminding and learning in computers and people. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.) (1942). The philosophy of G. E. Moore. North-western University and Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schlick, M. (1932). Positivismus und Realismus Erkenntnis, 3, 1-31
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schlick, M. (1935). Facts and propositions. Analysis, 2, 5.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Gisiner, R. C. (1988). Artificial language comprehension in dolphins and sea lions: The essential cognitive skills. The Psychological Record, 38, 311-348.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Gisiner, R. C. (1989). Please parse the sentence: Animal cognition in the procrustean bed of linguistics. The Psychological Record, 39, 3-18.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Kastak, D. (1993). A California sea lion (Zalophus
californianus) is capable of forming equivalence relations. The Psychological Record, 43, 823-839.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Krieger, K. (1984). California sea lions are capable of semantic comprehension. The Psychological Record, 34, 3-23.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: an essay on the philosophy of mind Cambridge University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind, LXXXVIII, 74-92.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979a). Intentionality and the use of language. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979b). What is an Intentional State? Mind, LXXXVIII, 74-92.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-424.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures. British Broadcasting Corporation.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. M.I.T. Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sekatskaya, M.A., & Kuznetsov, A. (2018). The Philosophy of Ullin Place. From Mysticism to Materialism [in Russian]. Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School
of Economics
, II(4), 181-192. doi:10.17323/2587-8719-2018-ii-4-181-192
Abstract:
Ullin Place was an extraordinary person. From his early interest in mysticism he later turned to anthropology, which in turn brought him to logical behaviorism. While working on the improvement of logical behaviorism Place formulated the thesis of mindbrain identity, and has thereby founded the identity theory, which is still one of the most influential approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time Place continued to see himself as Gilbert Ryle's follower; he insisted that the ongoing discussions about the metaphysics of consciousness are meaningless because the philosophical problem is already solved and the time for empirical research has come. The paper shows how Place's biography was interrelated with the development of his materialistic philosophy, how his article "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" relates to the rest of his work, and how this article has influenced the debates in philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness. Freeman.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sellars, W. (1963). Science, Perception and Reality Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shaffer, J. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy, 58, 813-822.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Shallice, T. (1988). From neuropsychology to mental structure. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
Abstract:
Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Sharpley, A. L., & Cowen, P.J. (1995). Effect of pharmacologic treatments on the sleep of depressed patients. Biological Psychiatry, 37, 85-98.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shaw, J. (2021). Feyerabend Never Was an Eliminative Materialist: Feyerabend’s Meta-Philosophy and the Mind–Body Problem. In K. Bschir & J. Shaw (Eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays (pp. 114-131). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108575102.007 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340065806_Feyerabend_Never_was_an_Eliminative_Materialist
Abstract:
Most contemporary philosophers of mind cite Feyerabend as an early proponent of eliminative materialism, or the thesis that there are no mental processes. This attribution, I argue, is incorrect. Rather, Feyerabend only showed that common objections against materialism presuppose problematic meta-philosophical commitments. In this paper, I show how Feyerabend’s meta-philosophy leads him to the conclusion that the mind-body problem admits of many different solutions which are to be sorted out as science progresses. Moreover, I show how Feyerabend’s view evolves from a methodological to an ethical view on what a proper solution to the mind-body problem would entail.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Sheinberg, D. L. & Logothetis, N. K. (1997). The role of temporal cortical areas in perceptual organization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. 94, 3408-3413.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sherrard, C. (1987, December). Rhetorical weapons: Chomsky's attack on Skinner [Conference presentation]. Symposium on Discourse Analysis, London Conference of the British Psychological Society.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sherringtion, C. S. (1940). Man on his Nature, Gifford Lectures 1937-8. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self Knowledge and Self Identity Cornell University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of Scientific Research. Basic Books.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1971). Reading and audio-visual equivalences. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 14, 5-13.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1986). Functional analysis of emergent verbal classes. In T. Thompson & M. D. Zeiler (Eds.), Analysis and integration of behavioural units. Erlbaum.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1990). Equivalence relations: Where do they come from? In D. E. Blackman, & H. Lejeune (Eds.), Behaviour analysis in theory and practice: Contributions and controversies (pp. 92-114). Erlbaum.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. & Tailby, W. (1982). Conditional discrimination vs. matching to sample: an expansion of the testing paradigm. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 37, 5-22.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[22 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review, 52, 270-277, 291-294.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior Free Press and Macmillan.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal  behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[29 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1959). Cumulative Record. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Skinner, B. F. (1963). Behaviorism at fifty. Science, 140, 951-958.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1966). An operant analysis of problem solving. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.) Problem Solving: Research, Method and Theory, Wiley. Reprinted as Chapter 6 of Skinner, B.F. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[13 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[20 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. Knopf.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism Knopf.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1975). The shaping of phylogenic behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 7, 117-120.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5, 1-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, 213, 501-504. Reprinted with peer commentary in A. C. Catania and S. Harnad (Eds.) (1984). Canonical papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 477-481.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1984). Coming to terms with private events, author's response to open peer commentary on The operational analysis of psychological terms. In A. C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.),Canonical papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 752-759.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.), The Canonical Papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 583-591.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Skinner, B. F. (1987). Outlining a science of feeling. The Times Literary Supplement, 490, 501-2.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1989). The behavior of the listener. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rulegoverned behavior: Cognition, contingencies and instructional control (pp. 85-96). Plenum.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24). http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.024 http://courses.washington.edu/lingclas/200/Lectures/Biol/Psycoloquy_2000_Gesture,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
Abstract:
The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Slezak P. P. (2002) Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech. [Comments to Carruthers: The Cognitive Functions of Language.] Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 699-700 doi:10.1017/S0140525X02490127 https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/4339/Cognitive.Functions.of.Language.pdf
Abstract:
The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak P. P. (2002). The tripartite model of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 239 - 270. doi:10.1080/0951508021000006085 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248040756
Abstract:
Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak P. P. (2008). The 'Hard' Problem and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 30, 525 https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8751k8j9
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-vu all over again. [Commentary to Pylyshyn’s article: Mental Imagery]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 209–210.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). Thinking about thinking: language, thought and introspection. Language & Communication, 22, 353–373. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00012-5 http://journalpsyche.org/articles/0xc0a7.pdf
Abstract:
I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think ‘in’ language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor’s ‘language of thought’. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the ‘imagery debate’.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak, P. P. (2018). Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously. Philosophy93(4), 529-555. doi:10.1017/S0031819118000232 https://www.academia.edu/42945303/Is_There_Progress_in_Philosophy_The_Case_for_Taking_History_Seriously_1
Abstract:
In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slobin, D. I. (Ed.) (1985). The crosslinguistic study of language acquisition (2 volumes). Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1957) Plausible reasoning in philosophy. Mind, 66(261), 75-78.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. C. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 252-254.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [15 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XL, 68-70.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [4 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1989). C. B. Martin: A biographical sketch. In J. Heil (Ed. ), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 1-3). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1994). Mind and brain In R. Warner, & T. Szubka (Eds.), The mind-body problem: A guide to the current debate (pp. 19-23). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Pelican Record, 41, 123-124. [Corpus Christi College, Oxford]

Smart, J. J. C. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 432

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/

Smith, D. E. (1987). The everyday world as problematic: A feminist sociology. North Eastern University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Smith, D. E. (2000) A memory of Ullin.
Download: Smith (2000) A Memory of Ullin.pdf

Smoke, K. L. (1932). An objective study of concept formation. Psychological Monographs, 42, No. 191.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, 1-59.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Snowdon, P. (1995) Perception and attention [Paper presented to a one-day conference on `Attention and Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Issues', Department of Philosophy, University College London, 26th May 1995].
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Snowdon, P. (1995). Perception and Attention. [Paper presented to a one-day conference on Attention and Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Issues. Department of Philosophy, University College London, 26th May 1995].
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Snowdon, P. F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 137-158). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4703_f0d504246b1f883cd588a350bb6f438a.pdf
Abstract:
U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf

Spence, K. W. (1951). Theoretical interpretations of learning. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sperling, G. (1967). Successive approximations to a model of short term memory. Acta Psychologica, 27, 285-292.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Spielberger, C. D., & Levin, S. M. (1962). What is learned in verbal conditioning? Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1, 125-132.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Spinoza, B. (1677). Ethica (Translated as Ethics).
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Stanovich, K. E., & West R. F. (2000). Behavioral and brain sciences, 23,(5), 645-665. www.keithstanovich.com/Site/Research_on_Reasoning_files/bbs2000.pdf
Abstract:
In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate. Note: System 1 an system 2. Table 3: The terms for the two systems used by a variety of theorists and the properties of dual-process theories of reasoning.

Steele, D. L., & Hayes, S. C. (1991). Stimulus equivalence and arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 519-555.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stein, B. E., & Meredith, M. A. (1993). The Merging of the Senses. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Stemmer, N. (1987). The learning of syntax: an empiricist approach. First Language, 7, 97-120.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stemmer, N. (1988). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: the superiority of empiricist over cognitivist theories. Behaviorism, 17(1), 41-63
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149. www.jstor.org/stable/41236095
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
Abstract:
Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf

Steriade, M., CurróDossi, R., Paré, D., & Oakson, G. (1991). Fast oscillations (20-40 Hz) in thalamocortical systems and their potentiation by mesopontine cholinergic nuclei in the cat. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the U.S.A., 88, 4396-4400.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and Language Yale University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Stoerig, P., & Cowey, A. (1997). Blindsight in man and monkey. Brain, 120, 535-559.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Stout, G. F. (1898). A manual of psychology.. University Tutorial Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stowell, T. (1992). The role of the lexicon in syntactic theory. In T. Stowell & E. Wehrli (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (Vol. 26, pp. 9-20). Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On referring. Mind, 59, 320-344.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to logical theory Methuen.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. Methuen.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1970). Categories. In O.P. Wood & G. Pitcher (Eds.), Ryle (pp. 181-211). Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
Abstract:
Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tarski, A. (1930-1/1936/1956). O pojeciu prawdy w odniesieniu do sformalizowanych nauk dedukcyjnych (On the notion of truth in reference to formalized deductive sciences) Ruch Filozoficzny xii. Revised version in German translation as Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. Studia Philosophica 1: 261-405. English translation of the German text by J. H. Woodger as The concept of truth in forma
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Tartaglia, J. (2005). Place, Ullin Thomas (1924-2000). In S. Brown (Ed.)., The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers (pp. 785-789). Bristol: Thoemmes. doi:10.5040/9781350052437-0328

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
Abstract:
Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Taylor, C. (1964). The Explanation of Behaviour Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Taylor, R. (1966). Action and purpose Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tervoort, B. T. (1961). Esoteric symbolism in the communication behaviour of young deaf children. American Annals of the Deaf, 106, 436-480.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Thompson, R. F. (1993). The brain: A neuroscience primer (2nd Ed.). Freeman.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: an experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Monographs, 2(8).
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence Macmillan.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Tinbergen, N. (1948). Social releasers and the experimental method required for their study. Wilson Bulletin, 60, 6-52
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tinbergen, N. (1951). A study of instinct Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E. B. (1897). An outline of Psychology. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E.B. (1909). Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought processes Macmillan.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Tolkien, J. R. R. (1954) The Lord of the Rings.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men. University of California Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Tolman, E. C. and Honzik, C. H. (1930), Introduction and removal of reward, and maze performance in rats. <em>University of California Publications in Psychology</em>, <em>4</em>, 257-275.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Toulmin, S. (1950). The Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Toulmin, S. (1961). Concept Formation in Philosophy and Psychology. In S. Hood (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind (pp. 191-203). Collier.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Knowledge without awareness: an autonomic index of facial recognition by prosopagnosics. Science, 228, 1453-1455.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Treffner, P. & Peter, M. (2002). Intentional and attentional dynamics of speech–hand coordination. Human Movement Science, 21(5–6), 641-697. doi:10.1016/S0167-9457(02)00178-1 http://metaffordance.com/papers/gestures-HMS-2002.pdf?origin%3Dpublication_detail
Abstract:
Interest is rapidly growing in the hypothesis that natural language emerged from a more primitive set of linguistic acts based primarily on manual activity and hand gestures. Increasingly, researchers are investigating how hemispheric asymmetries are related to attentional and manual asymmetries (i.e., handedness). Both speech perception and production have origins in the dynamical generative movements of the vocal tract known as articulatory gestures. Thus, the notion of a “gesture” can be extended to both hand movements and speech articulation. The generative actions of the hands and vocal tract can therefore provide a basis for the (direct) perception of linguistic acts. Such gestures are best described using the methods of dynamical systems analysis since both perception and production can be described using the same commensurate language. Experiments were conducted using a phase transition paradigm to examine the coordination of speech–hand gestures in both left- and right-handed individuals. Results address coordination (in-phase vs. anti-phase), hand (left vs. right), lateralization (left vs. right hemisphere), focus of attention (speech vs. tapping), and how dynamical constraints provide a foundation for human communicative acts. Predictions from the asymmetric HKB equation confirm the attentional basis of functional asymmetry. Of significance is a new understanding of the role of perceived synchrony (p-centres) during intentional cases of gestural coordination.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Treisman, A. (1988). Features and objects: The Fourteenth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, 201-237.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Treisman, A., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature integration theory of attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Treisman, A., & Gormican, S. (1988). Feature analysis in early vision: Evidence from search asymmetries. Psychological Review, 95, 15-48.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Trentman, J. (1970). Ockham on mental. Mind, 79, 586-590.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Turing, A. (1937). On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42, 230-265.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tylor, E. B. (1868). On the origin of language. Fortnightly Review, 1, 22.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture. John Murray.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ulrich, R. E., & Azrin, N. H. (1962). Reflexive fighting in response to aversive stimulation Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 5, 511-520.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Ungerleider, L. G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In D. J. Ingle, M. A. Goodale, & R. J. W. Mansfield (Eds.), Analysis of Visual Behavior. M.I.T. Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Urmson, J. (1968). Criteria of Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, XLII, 107-122.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Uvarov, E. B., & Chapman, D. R. (1951). A dictionary of science (Rev. ed., first edition 1943). Penguin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Valentine, E. (2000). Ullin Place (1924-2000). History & Philosphy of Psychology, 2,(1), 72-74.

Valentine, E. R. (1978). Perchings and flights: introspection, In J. Radford &amp; A. Burton (Eds.), <em>Thinking in perspective</em> (pp. 1-22). Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Van Rysewyk, S (2013, April 30). Philip Ball on neuroaesthetics. Simon van Rysewyk. simonvanrysewyk.com/tag/philip-ball/
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vanni, S., Revonsuo, A., & Hari, R. (1997). Modulation of the parieto-occipital alpha-rhythm during object-detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 17(18), 7141-7147.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Vauclair, J. (2004). Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language. Interaction Studies, 5(3), 363-384. https://centrepsycle-amu.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Vauclair-Interaction-Studies-041.pdf https://www.academia.edu/12007254/Lateralization_of_communicative_signals_in_nonhuman_primates_and_the_hypothesis_of_the_gestural_origin_of_language
Abstract:
This article argues for the gestural origins of speech and language based on the available evidence gathered in humans and nonhuman primates and especially from ape studies. The strong link between motor functions (hand use and manual gestures) and speech in humans is reviewed. The presence of asymmetrical cerebral organization in nonhuman primates along with functional asymmetries in the perception and production of vocalizations and in intentional referential gestural communication is then emphasized. The nature of primate communicatory systems is presented, and the similarities and differences between these systems and human speech are discussed. It is argued that recent findings concerning neuroanatomical asymmetries in the chimpanzee brain and the existence of both mirror neurons and lateralized use of hands and vocalizations in communication necessitate a reconsideration of the phylogenic emergence of the cerebral and behavioral prerequisites for human speech.
Keywords: evolution, communication, primates, gesture, language, vocalization, mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Vaughn, C. J. (1964) The development and use of an operant technique to provide evidence for visual imagery in the rhesus monkey under `sensory deprivation' [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Pittsburgh
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Velmans, M. (1987). Why a mind/body group? The British Psychological Society: History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 5, 8-9.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Velmans, M. (2002). How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(11), 2002, pp.3-29.
Abstract:
In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other mental interventions can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that conscious mental control needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding consciousness (2nd Edition). Routledge. Understanding_Consciousness_(2nd_ed__Routledge__2009).pdf
Abstract:
Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years. The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers. Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2021). Is the universe conscious? Reflexive monism and the ground of being. In E. Kelly, & P. Marshall (Eds.), Consciousness Unbound (pp. 175-228). Rowman & Littlefield. Is-the-Universe-Conscious-Reflexive-Monism-and-the-Ground-of-Being.pdf
Abstract:
This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vendler, Z. (1967). Linguistics in Philosophy Cornell University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Verplanck, W.S. (1955). The control of the content of conversation: reinforcement of statements of opinion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 668-676.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Vesey, G. N. A. (Ed.) (1964). Body and mind. Readings in philosophy. George Allen and Unwin ltd
[Reprints in this collection]  

Vickers, G. (1973). Motivation theory - A cybernetic contribution. Behavioral Science, 18, 242-249.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Vogel, G. W., Vogel, F., McAbee, R. S., & Thurmond, A. J. (1980). Improvement of depression by REM sleep deprivation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 37, 247-253.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

von Uexkull, J. (1926). Theoretical biology Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Vygotsky, L. (1934/1986). Thought and Language (English translation by A. Kozulin). MIT Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Wallace, A. R. (1881). Review of Anthropology by Edward B. Tylor. Nature, 24, 242-245.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wallace, A. R. (1895). Expressiveness of speech, the mouth gesture as a factor in the origin of language. Fortnightly Review, 64, 528-543.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Warburton, N. (Ed.) (1999). <em>Philosophy: Basic Readings</em>. Routledge.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Watson, A. J. (1966) Consciousness and perception in psychology I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 85-100. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist Lippincott.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-177.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1914). Behavior, an Introduction to Comparative Psychology. Holt.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1924). Behaviorism. Chicago University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1-14
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wearden, J. (1987). Presentation to a symposium on 'Rules and rule‑governed behaviour'. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Manchester, April 1987.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weber, E. H. (1834). De pulsu, resorptione, auditu et tactu. Köhler.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications Clarendon Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Wetherick, N.E. (2000). U. T. Place (1924-2000). The Psychologist, 13, 233.

Whellan, T., and Co. (1859). History and topography of the City of York and the North Riding of Yorkshire (Volume II). John Green
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Whipple, G. M. (1914-1915). Manual of Mental and Physical Tests, Part I and Part II. Baltimore, MD: Warwick and York.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

White, A. R. (1963). Attending and noticing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII, 103-126.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1964). Attention. Blackwell
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Whorf, B. L. (1940). Science and linguistics. Technology Review, 44, 229-231, 247, 248.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Widrow, G., & Hoff, M. E. (1960). Adaptive switching circuits. Institute of Radio Engineers, Western Electronic Show and Convention, Convention Record, Part 4, 96-104.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wilkes, K. V. (1978) Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Wilkes, K. V. (1984) Is consciousness important? British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. 35,  223-243. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. 35,  223-243.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The project of pure enquiry. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1971). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Annalen der NaturphilosophieTractatus Logico-philosophicus. With second English translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[17 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[41 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books Blackwell.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (2 volumes G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman (Eds.) English translation C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wu, J. C., & Bunney, W. E. (1990). The biological basis of an anti-depressant response to sleep deprivation and relapse: Review and hypothesis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 15-21.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1896). Grundriss der Psychologie. Engelman.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of Psychology [English translation by C. H. Judd of the Grundriss der Psychologie.] Engelmann.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1900). Völkerpsychologie, Vol. I: Die Sprache. Engelmann
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1907). Über Ausfrageexperimente und über die Methoden zur Psychologie des Denkens. Psychol. Stud., 3, 301-360.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Xitco, M. J., & Roitblat, H. R. (1996). Object recognition through eavesdropping: passive echolocation in bottlenose dolphins. Animal Learning and Behaviour, 24, 355-365.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ylikoski, P. (1999). Review of Dispositions: A Debate. D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place Tim Crane, editor London: Routledge, 1996, viii 197 pp. doi:10.1017/S0012217300010258
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Ylikoski (1999) Review of Dispositions - A Debate.pdf

Zahnoun, F. (2018). Mind, mechanism and meaning: Reclaiming social normativity within cognitive science and philosophy of mind [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Antwerp. www.academia.edu/37116459/Mind_Mechanism_and_Meaning
Abstract:
The dissertation, titled Mind, Mechanism and Meaning, critically investigates two central assumptions of mainstream cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the commitment to the notion of internal representation on the one hand, and to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental on the other. With regard to the notion of internal representation, the dissertation argues that this notion is ultimately untenable in that, to the effect that internal representations are understood as content-carrying vehicles with causal explanatory power, the notion is grounded in a confusion between the descriptive and the prescriptive/normative. The thesis is defended that all content-carrying entities, including representations, are socio-normatively constituted and should therefore be excluded from non-normative causal explanations of cognition. The results of the research support a non-representational approach to mind and cognition, as exemplified in various forms of E-Cognition, particularly in radical enactive/embodied approaches. Understanding human cognition requires taking into account the whole subject, that is, the subject as ‘embrained', embodied, and embedded within an enacted normative intersubjective niche. With regard to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental, the dissertation argues that the idea can only be made intelligible against a particular metaphysical background, one that does not sit well with the intersubjective normative notions the idea of multiple realization conceptually relies on (types). Furthermore, it is argued that, even if we were to accept such a metaphysics, multiple realization is still not capable of providing the argument against identity theory which has come to be so widely accepted. The thesis is defended that there really is no strong argument against an identity theory, and that, in addition, assuming a strict identity between the mental and the physical is still a viable, perhaps even the only viable approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Zettle, R. B., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behavior: A potential theoretical framework for cognitive behavior therapy. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive-behavioral research and therapy (Vol. 1, pp. 73-118). Academic Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Zihl, J., Tretter, F., & Singer, W. (1980). Phasic electrodermal responses after visual stimulation in the cortically blind hemifield. Behavior and Brain Research, 1, 197-203.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Zimmerman, D. W. (1957). Durable secondary reinforcement: method and theory. Psychological Review, 64, 373-383.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Zimmerrnan, D. W. (1959). Sustained performance in rats based on secondary reinforcement. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psycholology, 52, 353-358.
[1 referring publications by Place]