Azevedo Leite, D. (2018). The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Appraisal [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Trento.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
PART I: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MECHANISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN COGNITION
CHAPTER 2: THE MECHANISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN COGNITION
1. Central Theoretical Components of MTHC
1.3. Neuro-Cognitive Identity Relations
* In a more clear and systematical way, the idea of establishing identity relations between cognitive and neural phenomena was spelled out through a traditional well-known program in philosophy of mind developed at the end of the 1950s, namely the classic mind-brain identity theory, whose most prominent advocates are Place (1956), Feigl (1958) and Smart (1959). The identity theory became unpopular during the 1960s and 1970s, but with the advancements and success of neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience and the turn of cognitive psychology and cognitive science towards brain research in the end of the last century, among other reasons, the identity thesis became once again a major option, but with modifications (cf. Gozzano and Hill, 2012; Thagard, 2014).
PART II: MAJOR CHALLENGES TO THE MECHANISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN COGNITION
CHAPTER 3: MOLECULAR AND CELLULAR THEORY OF HUMAN COGNITION
1. MCTHC against MTHC
1.1. The Challenge to Neuro-Cognitive Pluralist Integration
* _{fn 32: More systematical discussions about reduction in science lead back to the logical empiricists, with their emphasis on linguistic analysis (coming from the popular at the period philosophy of language) and their model of reduction as translation (cf. Carnap, 1934). This provided the basis (cf. Bickle, 2012, p. 89ff) for ontological reductive attempts concerning mind and brain, such as logical behaviorism (e.g. Ryle, 1949) and psycho-neural type identity theory (Place, 1956; Feigl, 1958; Smart, 1959).}
* p. 85: Place, for instance, in arguing for the identity of conscious processes and neural processes, discusses examples such as ‘lightning' being identical to ‘large scale atmospheric electrical discharges' (1956, p. 47).