Azzano, L., & Raimondi, A. (2022). New foundations of dispositionalism - introduction. Synthese, 200, 384. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03847-z
[Citing Place (1996g)]  
Citing Place (1996g) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 2 Foundational issues to power metaphysics
Subsection 2.2 2.2 Directionality
* one may fall back onto the claim that directionality is not exactly a relational phenomenon, but a pseudo-relational one, something akin to a kind of physical intentionality; just as dispositional directionality, intentionality may sometimes lack an intentional object. This has been advocated in Place (1996) and Molnar (2003). On the face of it, this is a foggy position, if anything because intentionality is presumably more obscure than dispositional relationality: thus, explaining the latter with the former would be a case of obscurum per obscurius.