Block, N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1111–1122). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[Abstract]This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists: the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective, and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the "explanatory gap", the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than do the global workspace or higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or "panpsychist" accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter. Nor does it discuss the "representationist" proposals that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section Three theories of consciousness
Sub-section The Biological Theory
The third of the major theories is the biological theory, the theory that consciousness is some sort of biological state of the brain. It derives from Democritus (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983) and Hobbes (1989), but was put in modern form in the 1950s by Place (1956), Smart (1959), and Feigl (1958). (See also Block, 1978; Crane, 2000; Lamme, 2003.) I will explain it using as an example the identification of the visual experience of (a kind of) motion in terms of a brain state that includes activations of a certain sort of area MT+ in the visual cortex. Although this explanation is useful as an example, we can expect that any theory of visual experience will be superseded.