Brown, R. (2012). The brain and its states. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, & N. Zach (Eds.), Being in time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 7. Identity, reduction, and explanation
* Within the identity camp there are two broad traditions that roughly correspond to how one thinks about scientific identities. One view, championed by U.T. Place (1956) and J.J.C. Smart (1959), two of the originators of this theory in philosophical circles, is that mind-brain identities are postulated because they are the most parsimonious ultimate theory. Thus on this view the postulated identities are brute facts that cannot be explained by anything else. We identify water with H2O because it allows us to offer the most simple and parsimonious explanation of a wide range of chemical and common sense data.