Chalmers, D. J. (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend a form of strong artificial intelligence and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Part I Preliminaries
Chapter 1 Two Concepts of Mind
Section 1.3 The double life of mental terms
Subsection The co-occurrence of phenomenal and psychological properties
* When we talk of a green sensation, this talk is not equivalent simply to talk of “a state that is caused by grass, trees, and so on”. We are talking about the phenomenal quality that generally occurs when a state is caused by grass and trees. If there is a causal analysis in the vicinity, it is something like “the kind of phenomenal state that is caused by grass, trees, and so on”. Note 13 This is a “topic-neutral” analysis of specific phenomenal notions not unlike those advocated by Place 1956 and Smart 1959. To be an orange experience, very roughly, is to be the kind of experience that is generally caused by oranges. (Place: “...when we describe the after-image as green...we are saying that we are having the sort of experience which we normally have when, and which we have learned to describe as, looking at a green patch of light” (p. 49). Smart: “When a person says ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’, he is saying something like this: ‘There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me”’ (p. 150).) But because of the occurrence of the unanalyzed notion of “experience”, this analysis is not sufficient to immediately establish an identification between phenomenal and physical states, in the way that Place and Smart suggested. Smart’s account avoids this problem by leaving “experience” out of the analysis in favor of the equivocal phrase “something going on”. If “something going on” is construed broadly enough to cover any sort of state, then the analysis is inadequate; if it is construed narrowly as a sort of experience, the analysis is closer to the mark but it does not suffice for the conclusion. The phenomenal element in the concept prevents an analysis in purely functional terms.
Part II The Irreducibility of Consciousness
Chapter 4 Naturalistic Dualism
Section 4.3 Other arguments for dualism
Subsection Kripke’s argument
* Kripke’s argument was directed at a particular form of materialism, the contingent identity thesis put forward by Place (1956) and Smart (1959) ...
According to the contingent identity thesis, certain mental states (such as pains) and brain states (such as C-fibers firing) are identical, even though “pain” and “C-fibers firing” do not mean the same thing. The identity here is supposed to be contingent, rather than necessary, just as the identity between water and H2O is contingent. Against this, Kripke argues that all identities are necessary: if X is Y , then X is necessarily Y , as long as the terms X and Y designate rigidly, picking out the same individual or kind across worlds. ...
... the argument from disembodiment does not establish a conclusive case against materialism. It might refute a type-identity thesis of the kind put forward by Place and Smart, but materialism does not require such a thesis. ...
Kripke’s apparatus of rigid designation and the like is not central, although it is required to answer a certain sort of objection. Note 26 Although the argument is often taken to be an application of Kripke’s theory of rigid designation, a version of it could in principle have been run ten years earlier, before the theory was developed. One could have asked Place and Smart why the physical facts about H2O necessitate that it be water (or watery), whereas the physical facts about brain states do not seem to necessitate that there is pain.