Chalmers, D. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9-10), 6-61.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.
... the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience?
There is ... one behavioural function that has an especially close tie to the hard problem. This behavioural function involves phenomenal reports: the things we say about consciousness (that is, about phenomenal consciousness). More specifically, many people make problem reports expressing our sense that consciousness poses a hard problem. ...
The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a second approximation) the problem of explaining these problem reports. ...
Like the hard problem, the meta-problem has a long history. One distinguished tradition involves materialists, who hold that the mind is wholly physical, trying to undermine dualist opponents by explaining away our intuitive judgment that the mind is non-physical. One can find versions of this strategy in historical philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume, Spinoza, and Kant. For example, in the first paralogism in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1999), Kant argues that a ‘transcendental illusion’ is responsible for our intuition that the self is a simple substance. More recently, U.T. Place (1956) diagnoses dualist intuitions about consciousness as resting on a ‘phenomenological fallacy’, David Armstrong (1968a) diagnoses them as resting on a ‘headless woman illusion’, and Daniel Dennett (1992) diagnoses them as resting on a ‘user illusion’.
Section 2. Potential Solutions to the Meta-Problem
* I move now to extant ideas about the meta-problem that I am less inclined to endorse.
8. Introjection and the phenomenological fallacy. U.T. Place (1956) diagnoses resistance to materialism as lying in the phenomenological fallacy: ‘the mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience, when he describes how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen.’ The phenomenological fallacy is closely related to the traditional sense-datum fallacy: the idea that when we have an experience of a red square there must be some sort of internal red square sense-datum of which we are aware. If there were such sense-data, they would be hard to physically explain, so the fallacy (if we commit it) provides a potential explanation of problem intuitions.
An obvious objection is that many people explicitly reject the sense-datum fallacy, but their problem intuitions remain as strong as ever. On the face of it, an experience as of a red square raises the hard problem whether or not anything is red or square. Even if one is a representationalist who holds that one’s experiences represent a red square that may not exist, or a naïve realist who holds that the experience is a direct perception of a red square in the external world, the hard problem seems as hard as ever. Why should the physical processes associated with perception and representation yield any experience at all? Perhaps Place could argue those who ask this question are still in the grip of the fallacy despite explicitly rejecting it. But I think it is more plausible that he has misdiagnosed the roots of our problem intuitions.
The phenomenological fallacy is an instance of what Richard Avenarius (1891) called ‘introjection’: roughly, perceiving something outside the head as being inside the head. Introjection has been used in various other ways to deflate problem intuitions. Frank Jackson (2003) suggests that we mistake intensional properties (e.g. experiences’ representing redness) for instantiated properties (e.g. experiences’ being red). Instantiated phenomenal properties would give rise to a hard problem, but mere representations of them do not. David Rosenthal (1999) suggests that when we ‘relocate’ perceived qualities in the mind, we falsely infer that these qualities must always be conscious. These moves are perhaps most promising for deflating the explanatory gap tied to qualities such as redness: if these qualities are merely represented or can occur unconsciously, they pose less of a gap. As before, however, the core of the hard problem is posed not by the qualities themselves but by our experience of these qualities: roughly, the distinctive phenomenal way in which we represent the qualities or are conscious of them. Recognizing the introjective fallacy for qualities does little to deflate the problem of explaining our experience of them.