Coates, A. (2022). Unmanifested powers and universals. Synthese, 200. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03476-6
[Abstract]According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this response fails, because no version of the response can adequately accommodate dispositions of the sort that follow from Coulomb’s law. This result both defeats an important argument that dispositional essentialists ought to be realists about universals and appears to leave dispositional essentialists with a problematic commitment to either non-relational connections or a Meinongian ontology.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  
Citing Place (1996g) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 2 The problem of unmanifested powers
* The only real extant attempt to further develop this non-relational conception of directedness is in terms of the notion of ‘physical intentionality’ (Place 1996; Molnar 2003). Mental intentionality, just like dispositional directedness, involves a kind of directedness at potentially non-existent entities. The guiding idea behind the physical intentionality view is that this similarity is indicative of the fact that dispositional directedness is, in fact, a kind of intentionality. So, a power’s non-relational directedness towards potentially non-existent objects is actually a species of the intentional directedness that is familiar from mental states. This view, though, does little to defuse the concern that the non-relational conception of dispositional directedness is objectionably obscure. The problem is that intentionality, and its capacity to be directed at non-existent entities, is widely taken to be mysterious and, so, in need of some non-mysterious reduction or grounding. For this reason, in simply assimilating dispositional directedness to a kind of primitive intentionality, the physical intentionality view does not provide a way around the apparent mysteriousness of the non-relational conception of directedness.