Curry, D.S. (2021). How beliefs are like colors. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03144-1
Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* Fn 5: Unlike Smart, U.T. Place (1956) developed his pioneering version of the identity theory about consciousness as a supplement to his staunchly anti-paramechanical Rylean view of belief.