DiFrisco, J. (2018). Token physicalism and functional individuation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8, 309–329. doi:10.1007/s13194-017-0188-y
[Abstract]Token physicalism is often viewed as a modest and unproblematic physicalist commitment, as contrasted with type physicalism. This paper argues that the prevalence of functional individuation in biology creates serious problems for token physicalism, because the latter requires that biological entities can be individuated physically and without reference to biological functioning. After characterizing the main philosophical roles for token physicalism, I describe the distinctive uses of functional individuation in models of biological processes. I then introduce some requirements on token identity claims that arise from a position on individuation and identity known as sortalism. An examination of biological examples shows that these sortalist requirements cannot be plausibly met due to differences between individuation by functional biological criteria and by physical criteria. Even without assuming sortalism, token physicalism faces the more basic problem of excluding functionally irrelevant detail from the individuation of biological tokens. I close by suggesting that the philosophical roles for token identity are better fulfilled by a notion of token composition, which promotes a hierarchical picture of individuality.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 2 Token physicalism
* The distinction between type and token physicalism originates in Fodor’s (1974) classic article, "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" (see also Fodor 1979). Type physicalism is the view that all properties appearing in the special sciences (biology, psychology, sociology, economics, etc.) are identical to physical properties:

Type physicalism: For every genuine nonfundamental or special science property B, there is some physical property P such that B = P.

This thesis is attributed to the mind-brain identity theory that originated in the 1950s with Place (1956) and Feigl (1958) (see also Smart 1959). Type physicalism is a very strong physicalist thesis: it implies that the types or kinds that appear in non-physical theories are identical to certain physical kinds, since the properties definitive of the nonphysical kinds are identical to physical properties. Famously, Fodor argued that the multiple realizability of special science kinds makes it impossible to identify them with physical kinds in the way required by the identity theory.