D'Oro, G. (2023). Why Collingwood Matters: A Defence of Humanistic Understanding. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 3 Causal exclusion and the elephant in the room
Section Reframing the questions of the philosophy of mind
* Much contemporary philosophy of mind has been preoccupied by the problem of causal exclusion. Consider the question ‘Why did Paul go to the fishmonger?’ and the explanation ‘because he has guests for dinner’. Do explanations of this kind conflict with neurophysiological explanations? The problem of causal exclusion arises because it is assumed that explanations at the physical level aspire to be complete, to answer all questions and solve all problems, including that of why Paul went to the fishmonger. Given the aspiration of physics to provide complete explanations of reality, the reply ‘because he has guests for dinner’ becomes problematic unless it can be accommodated within a naturalistic story. To accommodate the way actions are ordinarily explained (by showing what the point of doing them is) within the neurophysiological story, the ordinary explanation must be rewritten in nomological form.
Section The question of the place of mind in nature
* Reductive physicalism as defended by Place (1956) J. J. C. Smart (1959) and H. Feigl (1958) solved the problem of causal exclusion by adopting a hierarchical model of the sciences in which the explanations of physics enjoy ontological primacy ...