Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y philpapers.org/archive/KAMTIO-4.pdf
Abstract:
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 4 Solving the illusion meta-problem
* it seems to us that we are phenomenally conscious (and “seeming” here has to be understood in a purely functional sense: we undergo a momentary and non-cognitively penetrable disposition to believe that we are phenomenally conscious). [...] Illusionismm still is coherent and true, if formulated carefully: it seems to us that we are phenomenally conscious (in the functional sense of seeming), but we are not phenomenally conscious, and (crucially) it does not seem to us that we are conscious (in the intuitive and innate sense of seeming). Fn 27: An anonymous reviewer pointed out that my view of phenomenal introspection, according to which we conceive of experiences as making states of affairs appear to subjects in virtue of their resemblance with these states of affairs, bears some similarities with U.T. Place's idea according to which we commit a “phenomenological fallacy” about consciousness: Place states that we mistakenly suppose that when a subject “describes his experience, when he describes how things look, sound smell, taste of feel to him, he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen” (Place 1956, pp. 49-50). This fallacy [that Chalmers Chalmers (2018, pp. 29-30) analyzes as a particular case of what Avenarius (1891) called "introjection"] is, according to Place, what explains our intuitive resistance to materialism regarding consciousness. However, there are important differences between my view and Place's view. First, I think that we are not led to think that there is such resemblance between experiences and the states of affairs they make appear because we commit a fallacy (a kind of reasoning mistake), but because of some inescapable low-level and modular features of our introspective mechanisms [and I argued against attempts at explaining our problematic intuitions regarding consciousness as resulting from a fallacy elsewhere (Kammerer 2018b)]. Second, I think that the idea according to which experiences make states of affairs appear to subjects in virtue of their resemblance with these states of affairs crucially creates problematic intuitions regarding consciousness because it leads us to ascribe a special epistemological status to consciousness (self-intimation, introspective infallibility). This point is crucial in my account, while it does not play a similar role in Place's view.