Koksvic, O. (2010). Metaphysics of consciousness. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (Eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash ePress.
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section: The Identity Theory
* The identity theory of the mind was developed at the University of Adelaide by Ullin Place, an English psychologist who was a lecturer there from 1951 to 1954. Place was strongly influenced by discussions with J.J.C. Smart (on whom more below) and C.B. Martin. [...]
Place (1956) argues that a reasonable scientific hypothesis is that the
“intractable residue” of conscious experience is identical with processes in the brain. While the metaphysical independence of (kinds of) entities can often be inferred from the logical independence of statements about them, this is not always so, and conscious states and brain processes constitute one of the exceptions. (On this inference, see also Putnam 1973: 73-74.) In general, commonsense observations and scientific observations should be taken to be observations of the very same phenomenon whenever the latter, together with relevant theory, provide “an immediate explanation” of the former (Place 1956: 58). That is precisely what Place expects to see as our understanding of the brain advances: patterns emerging in the study of brain processes will eventually allow us to explain all our introspective observations.
J.J.C. (“Jack”) Smart, born in Cambridge and educated at the Universities of Glasgow and Oxford, held a chair at the University of Adelaide from 1950 to 1972. Originally a behaviourist view, he was convinced by Place (and also influenced by Feigl 1958) to adopt the identity theory.
[...]
Another aspect of Smart's article is worth noting, because it may partially
explain why it became so influential, even though it was largely concerned with defending a claim already made by another. Place had called the sense of identity he employed “the ‘is' of composition” and had introduced it by means of analogies with cases such as someone's table being an old packing case and someone's hat being a bundle of straw (Place 1956: 56). This seems to leave at least some room for a distinction between the experience and the brain process: if four legs plus a tabletop compose a table, the result is usually taken to be six, and not five, distinct objects in total.","In contrast, Smart insists that sensations and brain processes are strictly identical (Smart 1959: 62).