Lau, H. (2022). In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856771.001.0001
[Abstract]This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This is discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 2 The Unfinished NCC Project
Section 2.2 Mere Correlates?
* In cognitive neuroscience, we look for neural mechanisms for psychological phenomena. Rarely do we say we are merely looking for correlates. When we say a certain neuronal circuit provides a mechanism for a psychological phenomenon, we mean they are causally or constitutively relevant (Craver 2007). [...]
But for consciousness, things are trickier. Some may think that such mechanistic explanations won’t ever be possible. Perhaps certain neural pattern is just one and the same as the conscious experience itself (Place 1956). This identity view is somewhat different from the causal view, because logically speaking, a thing cannot cause itself. But to say we are looking for the neural identities or identifiers for consciousness may be too strong; not everyone is happy with the identity view either. This can lead to endless debates about metaphysics. In order to sidestep the issues, the more neutral term of correlates was adopted.