Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press.
[Abstract]This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 2 Tools
Section 2.2 From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience
* [I]f we talk about the contents of subjective experience, we do not talk about the underlying process under a neuroscientific description. What we talk about are phenomenal "content properties," abstract feature of concrete states in the head. At least under a classic conception of representation there is a difference between vehicle properties and content properties.
... [W]e almost always forget about or abstract from the temporal dynamics of this process and treat individual time slices as objects - particularly if their content properties show more invariance over time. I call this the "error of phenomenological reification." There exists a corresponding and notorious grammatical mistake inherent to folk psychology, which as a logical error, possesses a long philosophical tradition. In analytical philosophy of mind, it is known as the "phenomenological fallacy." Fn 8: Cf. an early formulation by Place 1956, section V: "This logical mistake, which I shall refer to as the 'phenomenological fallacy,' is the mistake ..."