Miller, S. M. (2001). Binocular rivalry and the cerebral hemispheres with a note on the correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. Brain and Mind, 2(1), 119-149. www.researchgate.net/publication/45657840_Binocular_Rivalry_and_the_Cerebral_Hemispheres_With_a_Note_on_the_Correlates_and_Constitution_of_Visual_Consciousness
[Abstract]In addressing the scientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, “It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them?” (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bihemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness.
[Citing Place (1990a)]  
Citing Place (1990a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
10. The Correlates and Constitution of Visual Consciousness
* [...] the scientific study of visual consciousness faces a serious problem. Not every neuronal correlate of an experienced visual state will be constitutive of that state. As Revonsuo notes (2000, p. 60, original italics), “What is the relation between the neural correlates of consciousness and the actual neural constituents of consciousness?” Consider optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) accompanying motion rivalry (Enoksson et al., 1963; Fox et al., 1975; Wei and Sun, 1998). The eyes follow perceived alternations in motion direction and thus exhibit alternating patterns of OKN. The nucleus of the optic tract and the dorsal terminal nucleus of the accessory optic tract are implicated in such oculomotor activity (Cohen et al., 1992; Fuchs et al., 1992) and are lateralized. It is likely therefore, that these structures would demonstrate activity correlated with the subject’s perceptual alternations during motion rivalry. Yet this correlated activity is unlikely to play a constitutive role in the rivalling visual states. It is therefore the neuronal constitution, rather than the neuronal correlates, of visual consciousness that we seek to understand. Fn 36: Objections to the ‘neural correlates’ terminology have also been raised on philosophical grounds. Smart’s (1959) concern was that you cannot correlate something with itself and given that consciousness and (the relevant) brain processes refer to the same thing, you cannot have neural correlates of consciousness. For a related objection, see Mahner and Bunge (1997). Place (1990) on the other hand, draws on Boring (1933), holding that a perfect correlation is identity.