Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Sloan.
[Abstract]Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced
undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.
[Citing Place (1993c)] [Citing Place (1999a)]
Citing Place (1993c) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section Three: Comparison and Contrast with Alternative Viewpoints
Chapter 17 Radical Behaviorism and Traditional Philosophical Issues-l
Conceptual analysis
* Place (l993, pp. 28-29; see also Zuriff, 1985, pp. 128- 131) has framed this argument in the following way. If, as the traditional subjectivist theory implies, the statements that are made about the public world are derived from observations of one's private sensory experiences, then the language in which these statements are formulated must consist of words that derive their meaning from what has been called "private ostensive definition," in which speakers resolve to use a particular word to denote a kind of experience which they are currently undergoing, without coming to any agreement with other persons as to the correctness and consistency of this usage. But, as Wittgenstein points out, no one else can learn the language whose words derive their meaning in this way, because no one else can have the experiences to which a particular name has been assigned. It follows that there is no possible way in which such private observation sentences could provide a basis for the kind of knowledge that is public and communicable, and that language cannot be generally construed as a phenomenon in which speakers are presumed to be observing and then describing their own subjective sensory experiences. Thus, the account on which rests the traditional subjectivist theory of everyday Western culture, typically referred to as "folk psychology," is not tenable.
Citing Place (1999a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section Three: Comparison and Contrast with Alternative Viewpoints
Chapter 17 Radical Behaviorism and Traditional Philosophical Issues-l
Conceptual analysis
* Ryle's argument that the traditional Cartesian position represents a "category mistake" is roughly as follows. According to Place (1999, p. 374), conceptual analysis as a technique for elucidating word meaning rests on the principle that the meaning of a
word or expression is the contribution it makes to meanings of those (meaningful) sentences in which it occurs. This principle is derived from the work of such logicians and philosophers as Frege (1884/1960) and Wittgenstein (1922/1974), among others. Therefore, an effective way to study word meanings is to contrast the kinds of sentence in which the word or expression can meaningfully occur with those in which its insertion makes nonsense. A conceptual analysis is carried out by substituting words that are supposed to be of the same logical category. If the words are indeed of the same logical category, then they ought to function equivalently in the same context, and the resulting sentence should be meaningful. If they do not so function and the sentence is not meaningful, then they are not of the same category, and knowledge claims involving these words can be rejected.
* On the basis of such analyses of ordinary language, analytic philosophers argue that traditional psychology makes a category mistake when psychological terms, in particular verbs, are used to designate specially observed mental activities taking place in a special domain apart from the behavioral world. Analytic philosophers argue that such words actually relate to the probability or to a particular way of engaging in publicly observable behavior. In this regard, Place (1999, pp. 367-368) points out that Ryle distinguished among three types of psychological verbs: (a) dispositional verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 116-135); (b) activity verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 135-149); and (c) achievement verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 149-153). A category mistake would consist in taking a verb as belonging to one category when it actually belongs to another. For example, suppose one "believes" that London is the capital of England. If the word "believes" really is an activity verb, in the sense implied by the solipsistic, observational Cartesian doctrine of the "ghost in the machine," then it would make sense to hold that just as one can begin to whistle or stop on demand, where "whistle" is a noncontroversial activity verb, so also should one be able to begin to "believe" or stop on demand. But this locution doesn't make sense. Beliefs just aren't the sort of things that are observed to be switched on and off on demand, as is whistling. Hence, Ryle argued that "believe" is not an activity verb, but rather a dispositional verb. The word indicates a disposition of speakers who say they "believe" to assert that "London is the capital of England," with a high probability, in a loud voice, and in a wide variety of circumstances. Comparable arguments can be made for the use of such terms as "knowing" and "understanding." Ryle's (1949) expert application of this technique was the reductio ad ahsurdum argument, showing that many uses of psychological terms as activities in our everyday language were muddled. The uses were derived from the solipsistic, observational Cartesian doctrine, and just didn't make sense. A conceptual analysis of word usage would therefore establish a sound, coherent approach to language.