Nannini, S. (2023) The mind-body problem in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 14(1-2), 118-134. doi:10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
[Abstract]Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1998a)]  
Citing Place (1954) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 6 Materialism: The mind-brain identity theory and physicalism
More specifically, according to the first version of mind-brain identity theory proposed by U.T. Place in 1954 and 1956, “cognitive concepts” such as “knowing” and “believing” and “volitional” concepts such as “wanting” and “intending” refer to behavioral dispositions, as Ryle thought, but this is not the case for mental events such as being conscious or having sensations. This is because mental events, unlike mental states, are not behavioral dispositions but the inner bodily causes of behavior, that is, they are brain processes.
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place (1954)
Citing Place (1988a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 6 Materialism: The mind-brain identity theory and physicalism
As Place reiterated in a later essay, «material-ism as applied to mental events is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, which cannot be ruled out of court by a priori philosophical argument». >fn 91: U.T. PLACE, Thirty years on – Is consciousness still a brain process?, p. 211; cf. also U.T. PLACE, From mystical experience to biological consciousness. A pilgrim’s progress?. In conclusion, Place and other supporters of both mind-brain identity (in particular J.J.C. Smart and D.K. Lewis) and the similar “materialism of the central state” theory (D. Armstrong), led the philosophy of mind from philosophical-analytical behaviorism to materialism.
Citing Place (1998a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place(1988a)