Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* _{Note 22: This is roughly the same move attempted by U.T. Place in his seminal piece on the central state identity theory, “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956). According to Place, there is a “Phenomenological Fallacy” in supposing phenomenal properties to be properties of consciousness.","In context, Place is clearly attempting to relieve identity theory of the burden of phenomenal qualities.}