Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b)]  
Citing Place (1999b) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 1. The moderns’ war on powers
* ... the debate over physical intentionality. Like minds, powers seem to have the ability to point to non-actual states of affairs: powers are directed toward their possible (even if never actual) manifestations. George Molnar and Ullin Place argue that such ‘being toward’ deserves to be counted as intentionality. Mumford, for his part, sees physical intentionality as bringing panpsychism in its wake ...
In one way, the debate is something of a distraction from the real issue. The charge of panpsychism sticks only if intentionality is the mark of the mental. Since Place explicitly denies Brentano’s thesis, he cannot be accused of imbuing the physical world with mental attributes. As it turns out, the parties to this particular debate end up reconciling in an unexpected way: Place demands to know just how Mumford’s own theory avoids physical intentionality, and Mumford ‘leaves open’ whether his functionalist theory of dispositions is ‘really at odds’ with Place’s. Fn 17: See Place (1999, 231) and Mumford’s preface to the 2008 paperback edition of his 1998.