Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 3.2 Epistemology versus Metaphysics
* p. 75: The initial target of Saul Kripke's modal argument was early post-war materialism as defended by figures like U. T. Place (1956) and J. J. C. Smart (1959). These early materialists were fond of saying that the identification of mental states with brain processes is a contingent identity.