Polák, M. (2022). Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18(2), A1-31. doi:10.31820/ejap.18.2.1
[Abstract]Even after many years of empirical and conceptual research there are underlying controversies which lead scholars to dispute identity theory. One of the most influential examples is Kripke’s modal argument leading to the rejection of the claim that pain and C-fibres firing are identical. The aim of the first part of the paper is to expose that Kripke does not rigorously distinguish the meaning of individual relata entering the identity relation, and therefore his claim about the faultiness of the analogy between propositions “heat is molecular motion”, and “pain is C-fibres firing”, is mistaken. Moreover, whilst much emphasis within metaphysics of mind-brain relations has been placed upon conscious phenomenal states, it might be worthwhile to also consider cases of unconscious phenomenal states. If one admits the unconscious phenomenal states, such as unconscious pain, then, Kripke’s claim is further discredited by the fact that even pain can be individuated through its contingent property. Identity statements about pain could therefore be analogous to any other identity statements. The second part of the paper focuses on the relevance of the modal argument in confrontation with empirical evidence. It argues against the assumption embedded in the modal argument that an identical neurobiological pattern occurs regardless of whether conscious pain is present or completely absent.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 7 Conclusion
* It should be emphasized that even my strategy does not explain how the feeling of pain or heat fits into the physical world. I have not tried to argue for a particular formulation of the identity thesis. I do not know what it might or should look like. But I believe that future research will help to find principles that allow for an acceptable formulation of identity that does not at the same time give the sense that phenomenal concepts and the experiences themselves have been reduced. After all, even Ullin Place (1956), the pioneer of the type-identity theory, maintained that phenomenal predicates denote properties of brain states in a way that is quite different from how physical predicates refer to the same properties.