Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* We seem to be immediately aware of pains and after-images, and we seem to be immediately aware of them as something different from a neurophysiological state or process. For example, the after-image might be green speckled with red, whereas the neurophysiologist looking into the brain would be unlikely to see something green speckled with red. However, if we object to materialism in this way we are victims of a confusion which U. T. Place has called "the phenomenological fallacy." To say that an image or sense datum is green is not to say that the conscious experience of having the image or sense datum is green. It is to say that it is the sort of experience we have when in normal conditions we look at a green apple, for example. [...] images and sense data are not constituents of the world, though the process of having an image or sense datum are actual processes in the world. The experience of having a green sense datum is not itself green ...