Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section I
* In the past I have suggested that statements like 'I have a yellow sense-datum' should be analysed in some such a way as 'What is going on in me is like what goes on in me when I see (say) a lemon'. Fn 1: See e.g. Smart (1963) Chapter 5. That is, the experience is described by reference to a typical stimulus which causes experiences of that sort. Fn 2: Here I was indebted to U. T. Place. See the penultimate paragraph of his 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' ...
Section III
* 'Pain', 'irritation', 'ache', 'after-image', and the like are to be thought of as part of the quasi-theoretical terms of common sense psychology, and can be replaced by existentially quantified variables if this is Ramseyfied. ... What these terms are true of are things or processes which explain behaviour. If it is found ... that brain processes and brain states are sufficient to explain the behaviour, then we are compelled by the normal canons of scientific method to identify these psychological entities with their neurophysiological ones in a wider theory. ... (U. T. Place earlier took the view that the identification was a matter of normal scientific method. Fn 12: U. T. Place, op. cit., and 'Materialism as a Scientific Method' ... Place has very slightly qualified his view in his 'Psychological Predicates' ... (See especially, p. 62.))
Comments by Place (personal communication to Smart; May or June 1970):
* I was delighted that you have now found a way of accepting that colours are primary and not secondary qualities.
* My only difficulty with your paper which I think irons out all the difficulties I had with your original topic neutral formula relates to the passage where you refuse to allow us to talk about observing our sensations 'for well known Rylean reasons'. I confer that on re-reading Ryle I find these reasons remarkably unconvincing. They appear to consist in anything more than the dogmatic assertion that we can never speak of observing or witnessing our sensations. But the fact that we seldom if ever feel the need to talk like this in ordinary language is not a very good reason for forbidding us ever to do so. Afterall systematic introspective observation is not an activity that ordinary people very often have the occasion to engage in, so it is hardly surprising that they don't ordinarily talk about it. But how else would you propose talking about the kind introspective observation in which the fashioned introspective psychologist used to engage. It seems to me quite proper to say that when Purkinje first observed the effect that bears his name he carried out a particularly acute piece of scientific observation. Yet what he observed was not something about the flowers he was looking at, but about the way they looked to him as the light faded. What he observed was a feature of his visual experience. One which, as it turns out, is a feature of the experience of everyone with normal colour vision, if they choose to observe their experience in the way Purkinje did.
I cannot see that this point about the unobservability of sensations is one that helps your argument in the paper. Indeed you are only ??? yourself against possible Rylean criticism when you go on, as you do, to compare the having a sensation to "seeing" an electron in the hypothetical case where someone directly witnesses electrons instead of witnessing only their effects. The only important principle that in having, being conscious of or observing a sensation or other form of experience then are not two things the experience and the having, being conscious of is something that exists in the physical world independently of the mind of the observer.
Citing Place (1960) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place (1956)
Citing Place (1967) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place (1956)