Thagard, P. (2022). Energy requirements undermine substrate independence and mind-body functionalism. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 70-88. doi:10.1017/psa.2021.15
[Abstract]Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be living in a computer simulation, the plausibility of transferring minds into computers, and the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 6. Multiple realization and reduction
Place (1956) and Smart (1959) proposed that mental states are identical to brain states, but their proposal was challenged by highly influential arguments from Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1975). Psychology cannot be reduced to neuroscience because mental states such as pain can be realized in different ways, for example, by human brains, non-human brains, and computers. Polger and Shapiro (2016, 2018) provide a thorough critique of this anti-reductionist argument from multiple realization. I largely agree with this critique and will support it with considerations about energy.