References of Lecture (04). Lecture 4: Cosmology 1. Reductionism (24/10/1973)

Bromberger, S. (1965). An approach to explanation. In R.J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series (pp. 72-105). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs Norton.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel.
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Oppenheim, P. & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (II, pp. 3-36). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97. 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked to provide a version of the the causal theory of the reference of natural kind terms and proper names which rejects Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation and retains the Port Royal-Hamilton thesis that the extension of a general term is determined by its comprehension or intension, together with Frege's thesis that the reference (Bedeutung) of a singular term is determined by its sense (Sinn).
[References]  [Talks]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References]  [1 citing publications]  [12 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Putnam, H. (1975b). The meaning of 'meaning'. In K. Gunderson (Ed.) Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (VII). University of Minnesota Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953a). From a logical point of view Harvard University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]