References of Lecture (06.1). Lecture 6.1: Cosmology 3. Dispositions (7/11/1973)

Austin, J. L. (1961). Philosophical papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1962a). Sense and sensibilia (Reconstructed by G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1962b). How to do Things with Words (Edited by J. O. Urmson). Oxford University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1969). The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel pp. 216-234). Reidel. Reprinted in D. Davidson (1980), Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 163-180). Clarendon Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[21 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [11 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf  1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1969b). Collected papers on brain, mind and consciousness [Doctoral thesis submitted 1969 for the degree of D.Litt, degree awarded in 1972]. University of Adelaide.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1969b Brain, Mind and Consciousness - Introduction DLitt Thesis.pdf [includes editorial changes by UTP]

Place, U. T. (1997e). On the nature of conditionals and their truthmakers. Acta Analytica, 12(18), 73-88.
Abstract:
Standard propositional and predicate logic fails both as a model for natural language and, since it cannot handle causation, as a language for science. The failure to handle causation stems from a misconstrual of the causal conditional as a relation between the truth of two propositions (If p, then q). What the causal conditional in fact specifies is a 'relation' between the possible existence or non-existence of two situations made true by the existence of the dispositional properties of the concrete particulars involved.
[References]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997e On the Nature of Conditionals and Their Truthmakers.pdf

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[61 referring publications by Place]