References of Lecture (08). Lecture 8: Sentence frame analysis (21/11/1973).

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
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Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
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Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. Journal of Philosophy, LX, pp. 685-700. Reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 3-19). Clarendon Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logische-mathematische Untersuchung ueber den Begriff der Zahl (English translation as The foundations of arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number by J. L. Austin, 1950. Philosophical Library).
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Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
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Geach, P. T. (1972). Logic Matters Blackwell
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Kneale, W. (1968). Intentionality and intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42, 73-90.
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Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
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Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [1 citing publications]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996g). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Dialectica, 50, 91-120. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality . . . all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states." The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's (1983) directedness and Anscombe's (1965) indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states. The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892) indirect reference/Quine's (1953) referential opacity, evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [23 citing publications]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1996g Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.pdf

Prior, A. N. (1957). Time and modality Clarendon Press.
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Quine, W. v. O. (1953b). Reference and modality. In From a Logical Point of View (chapter VIII, pp. 139-159). Harvard University Press.
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Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
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Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to logical theory Methuen.
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