Burton, M. (1982). Theses on the verbal community. Behaviour Analysis, 3(3), 26–29.
[Abstract]Suggests that consciousness be examined in a materialistic way that recognizes the influence of societal forces, neither reducing phenomenon to biological processes nor invoking speculative metaphysics (Freudian or otherwise). This argument is presented as a set of theses, and references for each thesis are included.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Corriveau, M. (1972). Phenomenology, psychology, and radical behaviorism: Skinner and Merleau-Ponty on behavior. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 3(1), 7–34. doi:10.1163/156916272X00029
[Abstract]Defines radical behaviorism and differentiates it from conventional behaviorism, emphasizing the different manner in which they understand or methodologically define human behavior. The radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner is compared with the phenomenological and psychological thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These comparisons include the presuppositions of Skinner's psychology, the subject-object dichotomy, the meaning of man's having a world and being in the world, and the nature of human behavior as seen in the light of the outcome of these analyses. It is concluded that there is a fundamental incompatibility between their presuppositions and that phenomenological psychology offers a broader and deeper viewpoint of human behavior.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Costall, A. (1980). The limits of language: Wittgenstein's later philosophy and Skinner's Radical Behaviorism. Behaviorism, 8, 123-131. www.jstor.org/stable/27758959
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Day, W. F. (1969). On certain similarities between the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the operationism of B. F. Skinner. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12, 489-506.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Day, W. F. (1969). Radical behaviorism in reconciliation with phenomenology. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12(2), 315–328. doi:10.1901/jeab.1969.12-315
[Abstract]Discusses a symposium on behaviorism and phenomenology which focuses on the "current state of affairs of psychology as a science." An attempt is made to prove B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism "capable of encompassing a productive phenomenology." Basic dimensions of radical behaviorism are described, "the way in which radical behaviorism might profitably proceed to interact with problems that are often considered phenomenological in nature" is illustrated, and a discussion of the problems which are incurred in establishing an "effective reconciliation of radical behaviorism and phenomenology" is presented.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Evans, R. I. (1968). B. F. Skinner: The Man and his ideas. Dutton.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
[22 referring publications by Place]  

Freud, S. (1916-1917). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (English translation as Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis),
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Gasking, D. A. T. (1960). Learning theory, language and reality, Australian Journal of Science, 22, 324-330.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Giorgi, A. (1975). Convergences and divergences between phenomenological psychology and behaviorism: A beginning dialogue. Behaviorism, 3(2), 200–212.
[Abstract]Convergences between phenomenological psychology (PP) and behaviorism include opposition to dualism between the physical world and mental representations, and between a real visible man and an "inner" man with conscious states of which he alone is aware. Additionally, both views favor cautious use of theories, especially those which utilize hypothetico-deductive methodology, and a careful, descriptive, rather than inferential approach to behavior. Behaviorism and PP also share opposition to physiological reductionism. The 2 viewpoints diverge regarding their understanding of science. PP is more sensitive to the difference between natural and human phenomena and contends that the latter cannot be adequately dealt with by means of the scientific approach applicable with the former. Rather, a broader and more naively descriptive approach must be adopted. A further difference is that PP accepts intentionality in man's viewpoint of the world while behaviorism accounts for man strictly in terms of external relations. Finally, the phenomenologist is more likely to eschew the language of control in describing man and, instead, emphasize a careful description of the meanings man imposes on his world.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Humphrey, G. E. (1951). Thinking, an introduction to its experimental psychology Methuen.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Kvale, S., & Grenness, C. E. (1967). Skinner and Sartre: towards a radical phenomenology of behavior, Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 7, 128-150.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Nye, R. D. (1975). Three views of man: perspectives from Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers. Brooks Cole.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [213 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1982). Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - how to improve Parts I and II. Behaviorism, 10, 117-136. www.jstor.org/stable/27759002
[References]  [2 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1982 Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - How to Improve Parts I and II

Ryle, G. (1958). A puzzling element in the notion of thinking. Proceedings of the British Academy, XLIV, 129-144.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. Free Press and Macmillan.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal  behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[43 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1959). Cumulative Record. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E.B. (1909). Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought processes Macmillan.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Waller, B. (1977). Chomsky, Wittgenstein, and the behaviorist perspective on panguage. Behaviorism, 5(1), 43-59. www.jstor.org/stable/27758883
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wann, T. W. (Ed) (1964). Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting bases for modern psychology. University of Chicago Press.
[Abstract]This volume in the Rice University Semicentennial Series includes a series of papers which examine the places of behaviorism and phenomenology in psychology. The papers are as follows: Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary, S. Koch; Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology, R. B. MacLeod; Behaviorism at Fifty, B. F. Skinner; Toward a Science of the Person, C. R. Rogers; Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology, N. Malcolm; and Views of Human Nature, M. Scriven. These papers disclose considerable conciliation between behaviorism and phenomenology. Koch and Skinner, however, are not convinced that coexistence is possible.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[54 referring publications by Place]