Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature. In R. J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 158-180). Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
[19 referring publications by Place]  

Brentano, F. C. (1911/1973). Appendix to the classification of mental phenomena. In O.Kraus (Ed.), Psychology from an empirical standpoint (English translation L. L. McAlister (Ed.)). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Brentano, F. C. (1930). Wahrheit und Evidenz: Erkenntnistheoretische Abhandlungen und Briefe, ausgewählt erläutert und eingeleitet von Oskar Kraus. Felix Meiner Verlag.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Carnap R. (1932). Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache [Psychology in Physical Language]. Erkenntnis, 3, 107 – 142.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Carnap R. (1934). Logische Syntax der Sprache [Translated by Amethe Smeaton asThe Logical Syntax of Language, London: Routledge, 1937]. Springer.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton.
[19 referring publications by Place]  

Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58.
[28 referring publications by Place]  

Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Murray.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth.
[16 referring publications by Place]  [4 reprinting collections]  

Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on the mind and psychology. Bradford.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
[20 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[30 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1962). Reference and Generality. Cornell University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, fiction and forecast (2nd Edition, first edition 1955). Bobbs-Merrill.
[19 referring publications by Place]  

Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of Behavior. Appleton Century.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Hume, D. (1777). Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed. (1902), 2nd Edition. Clarendon Press).
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Kneale, W. (1968). Intentionality and intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42, 73-90.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Kneale, W., & Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic. Clarendon Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Lycan, W. G. (1969). On "Intentionality" and the Psychological. American Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 305-311.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1962). Counterfactuals and Causal Laws. In R. J. Buttler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 66-80), Blackwell.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
[13 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

McAlister, L. L. (1973). Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality. In L. L. McAlister, The Philosophy of Brentano. Humanities Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [23 citing publications]  [29 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [320 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1978a). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. De Psycholoog, 13, 611-621.
[Abstract]The application of Kuhn's concept of "incommensurable paradigms" to the science of psychology is discussed. Two such paradigms, the behaviorist or behavior analytic paradigm and the cognitive/mentalist paradigm, are distinguished. It is suggested that the choice of paradigm will depend on the method of behavior modification to be employed. If behavior is to be modified by stimulus control and contingency management, a version of the behaviorist paradigm will be selected. If behavior is to be modified by changing the individual's self-directed verbal behavior, the mentalist/cognitive paradigm is to be preferred.
Note:
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy at the Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport in July 1974 and was in 1978 published in De Psycholoog, in English The Psychologist, a journal of the Dutch Society of Psychology. The present revision is from 1986.
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1978a 1986 Psychological Paradigms and Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - why we need it. Behaviorism, 9, 1-24. www.jstor.org/stable/27758970
[Abstract]To explain behaviour in terms of intension­al or mentalistic concepts is to explain the behaviour in question on the assump­tion of a consistent and rational connection between what the agent does and what he says or what is said to him and that therefore any general account of verbal or linguistic behaviour which employs such concepts is necessarily circular, since it explains the acquisition of linguistic skills on the assumption that the speaker already possesses such skills. It follows that this circularity can only be avoided by developing a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which is stated entirely in a nonintensional or extensional language. At the present time, the most developed conceptual system for description and explanation of the behav­iour of organisms at the molar level in purely extensional terms is that provided by the so-called ‘Radical Behaviorism’ of B. F. Skinner and his followers. Fur­thermore, in his book Verbal Behavior Skinner (1957) has used this conceptual framework to develop a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which repre­sents the most ambitious attempt made so far to formulate a theory of linguistic behaviour in nonintensional or extensional terms.
Note:
Revised version is from 1999.
[References]  [7 citing publications]  [11 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1981a 1999 Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - Why We Need It - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1983d). Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - how to improve Part IV, Skinner's account of syntax. Behaviorism, 11, 163-186. www.jstor.org/stable/27759026
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics, Skinner, verbal behavior
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [15 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1983d Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - How to Improve Part IV - Skinner's Account of Syntax.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [11 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Plato (1961). Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophist, Statesman (English translation with introduction by John Warrington). Dent.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953). Reference and modality. In From a Logical Point of View (chapter VIII, pp. 139-159). Harvard University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and Object. M.I.T. Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Romanes, G. J. (1882). Animal Intelligence. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1918/1919). The philosophy of logical atomism. The Monist, xxviii, 495-­527; xxix, 32‑63; xxix, 190-222; xxix, 345-380. Reprinted in B. Russell (1956), Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950 (Edited by R. C. Marshall). Allen and Unwin.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979). Intentionality and the use of language. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: an essay on the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures. British Broadcasting Corporation.
[4 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Sellars, W., & Chisholm, R. M. (1958). Appendix: Intentionality and the mental. In Concepts, theories, and the mind-body problem. Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Volume 2, pp. 507-539). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review, 52, 270-277, 291-294. doi:10.1037/h0062535
[Abstract]The major contributions of operationism have been negative, largely because operationists failed to distinguish logical theories of reference from empirical accounts of language. Behaviorism never finished an adequate formulation of verbal reports and therefore could not convincingly embrace subjective terms. But verbal responses to private stimuli can arise as social products through the contingencies of reinforcement arranged by verbal communities. In analyzing traditional psychological terms, we need to know their stimulus conditions (“finding the referent”), and why each response is controlled by that condition. Consistent reinforcement of verbal responses in the presence of stimuli presupposes stimuli acting upon both the speaker and the reinforcing community, but subjective terms, which apparently are responses to private stimuli, lack this characteristic. Private stimuli are physical, but we cannot account for these verbal responses by pointing to controlling stimuli, and we have not shown how verbal communities can establish and maintain the necessary consistency of reinforcement contingencies. Verbal responses to private stimuli may be maintained through appropriate reinforcement based on public accompaniments, or through reinforcements accorded responses made to public stimuli, with private cases then occurring by generalization. These contingencies help us understand why private terms have never formed a stable and uniform vocabulary: It is impossible to establish rigorous vocabularies of private stimuli for public use, because differential reinforcement cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy. The language of private events is anchored in the public practices of the verbal community, which make individuals aware only by differentially reinforcing their verbal responses with respect to their own bodies. The treatment of verbal behavior in terms of such functional relations between verbal responses and stimuli provides a radical behaviorist alternative to the operationism of methodological behaviorists.
Note:
Reprinted in Skinner (1959). Cumulative Record. Reprinted: (1984). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7(4),  547-553. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321 Reprinted in Catania & Harnad (1988). The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences.
[5 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. Free Press and Macmillan.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Urmson, J. (1968). Criteria of Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, XLII, 107-122.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Urmson, J. O., & Cohen, J. (1968). Symposium: Criteria of Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42(1).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1971). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Annalen der Naturphilosophie. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. With second English translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[26 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1930/1964). Philosophische Bemerkungen. Edited by R. Rhees from his posthumous writings; translated into English as Philosophical Remarks by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books Blackwell.
[16 referring publications by Place]