References of Place (1986d). Can a psychologist make sense of natural kind terms as rigid designators? [Paper presented at the Course on 'Meaning and Natural Kinds', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugo-slavia, 15-25 September 1986].

Hamilton, W. (1860). Lectures on Logic (H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Kimble, G.A., & Garmezy, N. (1963). Principles of general psychology Ronald.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

McGinn, C. (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis, 37(2), 78-80. doi:10.1093/analys/37.2.78
[Abstract]I am going to argue that Davidson's anomalous monism1 is not imperilled by Kripke's animadversions on the identity theory. The argument will turn crucially upon a sharp distinction between type-type and token-token identity theories.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [261 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1975). The shaping of phylogenic behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 7, 117-120.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Smoke, K. L. (1932). An objective study of concept formation. Psychological Monographs, 42, No. 191.
[5 referring publications by Place]