References of Place (1994a). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism.
Ayer, A. J. (1947). Thinking and Meaning: Inaugural Lecture. H. K. Lewis.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58.
[28 referring publications by Place]
Churchland, P. M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness (Revised Edition). MIT Press.
Note:
First edition: 1984
[Citing Place (1956)] [7 referring publications by Place]
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on the mind and psychology. Bradford.
[11 referring publications by Place]
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
[22 referring publications by Place]
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Greenspoon, J. (1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of two responses. American Journal of Psychology, 68, 409-416.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C. (Ed.) (1989). Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control Plenum.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. (1979). Determinants of human operant behaviour. In M. D. Zeiler, & P. Harzem, P. (Eds.), Advances in the analysis of behaviour. Vol. 1 Reinforcement and the organisation of behaviour (pp. 159-192). Wiley.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. (1983). Radical behaviourism and human psychology. In G. C. L. Davey (Ed.), Animal models and human behaviour (pp. 71-93). Wiley.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (English translation by G. V. Anrep). Oxford University Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1987a). Skinner re-skinned. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 235-243). Falmer Press.
[Abstract]In 'Skinner Skinned' Dennett (1978, chapter 4) discusses two arguments, the virtus dormitiva and intentionality arguments, which he sees as the only solid ground underlying the various arguments which Skinner gives for repudiating the use of mentalistic explanations in a scientific psychology; and of these he endorses only the intentionality argument. I argue (a) that what Skinner finds objectionable in mentalistic idioms is their dispositional character, (b) that both the virtus dormitiva and intentionality argument are arguments against the use of dispositional property ascriptions in scientific explanation, and (c) that, since dispositional property ascriptions are essential to any causal explanation, Dennett has failed to provide any good reason for endorsing Skinner's repudiation of mentalism. It is suggested that mentalism is objectionable only insofar it involves the use of idioms which presuppose what Skinner (1969) calls 'rule-governed' behaviour to explain behaviour that is 'contingency-shaped'.
[References] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1987a Skinner Re-skinned.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
[Abstract]The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behavior (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
[References] [Talks] [5 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1988b Skinner's Distinction Between Rule Governed and Contingency Shaped Behaviour.pdf
Place, U. T. (1992c). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 21-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759268
[Abstract]For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the differences between the two models suggests that that the effect of such a development would be to steer linguistic theory towards a return to the empiricism and behaviorism which prevailed before it was driven by Chomsky towards nativism and mentalism. Linguists, however, will not be persuaded to return to such a theory unless and until it can deal with the phenomenon of novel sentence construction as effectively as its nativist/mentalist rival.
[References] [Talks] [1 citing publications] [8 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1992c Eliminative Connectionsm -Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist-Behaviorist Linguistics.pdf
Place, U. T. (1993c). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 25-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759281
[Abstract]Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two or more observers which those observers confirm as a correct description provide a far more objective and secure foundation for empirical knowledge than statements describing private events in the experience of a single individual. In the course of this argument, I also invoke Wittgenstein's (1953) demonstration — his 'private language argument' — of the incoherence of traditional subjective empiricism. Regarding the second deficiency, I argue that observation statements describing private events can serve as data for an objective study, provided that (a) the verbal behavior in which they consist and its context are objectively observed and recorded, and (b) an explanation is given of how this verbal behavior is generated by the events it reports.
Keywords: methodological behaviorism, objectivity principle, private events, private language argument, radical behaviorism
[References] [Talks] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1993c A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events.pdf
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[43 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1966). An operant analysis of problem solving. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.) Problem Solving: Research, Method and Theory, Wiley. Reprinted as Chapter 6 of Skinner, B.F. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. Reprinted as Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. Behavioral and brain sciences, 7(4), 583-591. Reprinted with peer comments and a reply in A. C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.), The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218-236.
[Abstract]Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of (1) a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; (2) the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; (3) rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and (4) the behavior occasioned by the rules.
[23 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5, 1-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.), The Canonical Papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 583-591.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Skinner, B. F. (1987). Outlining a science of feeling. The Times Literary Supplement, 490, 501-2.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Verplanck, W.S. (1955). The control of the content of conversation: reinforcement of statements of opinion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 668-676.
[7 referring publications by Place]