References of Place (1996d). A conceptualist ontology.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism (two volumes). Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, fiction and forecast (2nd Edition, first edition 1955). Bobbs-Merrill.
[19 referring publications by Place]  

Hume, D. (1777). Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed. (1902), 2nd Edition. Clarendon Press).
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Molière (1673). Le Malade Imaginaire.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [261 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Russell, B. (1918/1919). The philosophy of logical atomism. The Monist, xxviii, 495-­527; xxix, 32‑63; xxix, 190-222; xxix, 345-380. Reprinted in B. Russell (1956), Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950 (Edited by R. C. Marshall). Allen and Unwin.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1966). An operant analysis of problem solving. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.) Problem Solving: Research, Method and Theory, Wiley. Reprinted as Chapter 6 of Skinner, B.F. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. Reprinted as Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. Behavioral and brain sciences7(4), 583-591. Reprinted with peer comments and a reply in A. C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.), The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218-236.
[Abstract]Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of (1) a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; (2) the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; (3) rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and (4) the behavior occasioned by the rules.
[23 referring publications by Place]