References of Place (1996e). Structural properties: categorical, dispositional or both?

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[30 referring publications by Place]  

Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Hume, D. (1740). An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature. Reprinted in type facsimile with an introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa. Cambridge University Press, 1938
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (1987). Proto-language Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65, 277-289.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Molière (1673). Le Malade Imaginaire.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [261 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [11 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Price, H. H. (1953). Thinking and experience Hutchinson.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1948). On what there is, Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, 1953, Chapter I.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]