References of Place (1997e). On the nature of conditionals and their truthmakers.

Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B., Place, U. T., & Crane, T. (Ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A debate. Routledge.
[8 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P. (1662) La logique, ou l'art de penser.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Austin, J. L. (1956). Ifs and cans. Proceedings of the British Academy. Reprinted in J. L. Austin (1961), Philosophical Papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson, & G. J. Warnock, pp. 205-232). Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
[13 referring publications by Place]  

Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Gehrz, R. D., Black, D. C., and Solomon, P. M. (1984). The formation of stellar systems from interstellar molecular clouds. Science, 292, 327-338.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, fiction and forecast (2nd Edition, first edition 1955). Bobbs-Merrill.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Hamilton, W. (1860-1861). Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (2nd Ed., H.L.Mansel and J.Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation Routledge.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
Abstract:
The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[5 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992a). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. In S. C. Hayes,& L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations: The Second and Third International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 9, pp. 135-151). Context Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1951b). Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review, LX. Reprinted in W. v. O Quine (1953), From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[18 referring publications by Place]