References of Place (1999h). The picture theory of meaning: A rehabilation [Conference presentation; presented to the IUC Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, 31st May - June 5th 1999].

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature. In R. J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 158-180). Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P. (1662) La logique, ou l'art de penser.
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Baker, M. C. (1992). Thematic conditions on syntactic structures: Evidence from locative applicatives. In I. M. Roca (Ed.), Thematic structure and its role in grammar (pp. 23-46). Foris Publications.
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Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. MIT Press.
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Bloomfield, L. (1933). Language. Holt.
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Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
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Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and Stress. Academic Press.
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Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
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Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58.
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Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press.
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Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1995). Blindsight in monkeys. Nature, 373(6511), 247-249.
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Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67(3), 547-619.
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Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
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Frege, G. (1879). Begriffschrift (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2nd. Ed. Blackwell).
[16 referring publications by Place]  

Frege, G. (1891). Function and concept. Jenaischer Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (2nd. Ed.). Blackwell.)
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Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
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Goldberg, A. E. (1995) Constructions: A construction approach to argument structure. The University of Chicago Press
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Grimshaw, J. (1990). Argument structure. MIT Press.
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Hamilton, W. (1860). Lectures on Logic (H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood
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Hout, A. van (1998). Event semantics of verb frame alternations: A case study of Dutch and its acquisition Routledge.
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Humphrey, N. K. (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study. Perception, 3, 241-255.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Jackendorff, R. (1987). The status of thematic relations in linguistic theory. Linguistic Inquiry, 18(3), 369-411.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Kako, E. (1999). Elements of syntax in the systems of three language-trained animals. Animal learning & behavior, 27, 1-14.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Kant, I. (1781/1787). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (First edition 1781, second edition 1787, English translation as The critique of pure reason). Hartknoch
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Kneale, W., & Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic. Clarendon Press.
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Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel.
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Levin, B. (1993). English verb classes and alternations: A preliminary investigation. The University of Chicago Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
[13 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly, 44 , 1-8.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation Routledge.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and cognition. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1992a). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. In S. C. Hayes,& L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations: The Second and Third International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 9, pp. 135-151). Context Press.
Keywords: behaviour analysis, behavioural contingency semantics, correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning, situation, three-term contingency
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [15 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992a Behavioral Contingency Semantics and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996g). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Dialectica, 50, 91-120. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality . . . all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states." The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's (1983) directedness and Anscombe's (1965) indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states. The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892) indirect reference/Quine's (1953) referential opacity, evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Talks]  [38 citing publications]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1996g Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996j). Linguistic behaviorism as a philosophy of empirical science. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology ( Chapter 9, pp. 126-140). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n9
[Abstract]Linguistic behaviorism is a philosophy of science with application to every empirical science from physics to sociology. It holds that • philosophy, including the philosophy of science, uses conceptual analysis to study the interface between language and the 'reality' it depicts, • conceptual analysis is an empirical investigation of the conventions governing the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language and its technical derivatives, • conformity to linguistic convention is maintained by selective social reinforcement. It endorses the analytic/synthetic distinction, a picture theory of the meaning of sentences, a correspondence theory of synthetic truth and a counterfactual theory of causal necessity.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  [3 citing publications]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1996j Linguistic Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Empirical Science.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996m). Metaphysics as the empirical investigation of the interface between language and reality. Acta Analytica,11(15), 97-118.
[Abstract]The rules of syntax and semantics on conformity to which linguistic communication depends are construed as social conventions instilled and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. That conception argues for the revival of conceptual analysis construed as the empirical investigation of such conventions using the ethnomethodological thought experiment as its primary research tool, and for a view of metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between utterances and the reality they depict.
[References]  [Talks]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996m Metaphysics as the Empirical Study of the Interface between Language and Reality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999b). Intentionality and the physical - a reply to Mumford. Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 225-231. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00139
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) claim "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality" proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they and Mumford do, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. To my contention that the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin's (1994) argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin's argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance are of the form 'If p then q'.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [10 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999b Intentionality and the Physical - A Reply to Mumford.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999d). Connectionism and the problem of consciousness. Acta Analytica, 14(22), 197-226.
[Abstract]This paper falls into three parts. In Part 1 I give my reasons for rejecting two aspects of Horgan and Tienson's position as laid out in their book, the language of thought and belief-desire explanations of behaviour, while endorsing the connection they see between linguistic syntax and the syntax of a motor skill. In Part 2 I outline the theory that the brain consists of two input-output transformation systems consciousness whose function is (a) to categorise problematic inputs, (b) to select a response appropriate to such inputs once they have been categorised and (c) to initiate and monitor the execution of such response once selected, and the "zombie-within" whose function is (a) to identify and alert consciousness to any inputs that are problematic either because they are unexpected or because they are significant relative to the agent's current or perennial motivational concerns. In Part 3 I consider how far the properties of the two systems outlined in Part 2 can be understood in terms of the known properties of connectionist networks.
Keywords: connectionism, consciousness, problematic input, zombie-within
Note:
The download file contains some text added by the author after publication. Footnote 2 is added.
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  [3 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999d Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999f). Vagueness as a mark of dispositional intentionality. Acta Analytica, 14(23), 91-109.
[Abstract]Vagueness (within rather than at the boundaries of a concept) is one of the "three salient things about intention" listed by Elizabeth Anscombe (1965) in her paper ‘The intentionality of sensation’. In an unpublished paper John Burnheim has claimed that "physical causal dispositions" satisfy these "three marks of intentionality given by Anscombe." Subsequent discussion by C. B. Martin and K. Pfeifer (1986) and Place (1996) shows that if the various marks of intentionality proposed by Brentano, Chisholm, Anscombe, Lycan and Searle are sorted according to Kneale's (1968) distinction between intenTional states and intenSional locutions it turns out that all of the former (Anscombe's three marks plus Searle's/Brentano's directedness) are found in physical dispositions, while the latter (Chisholm's second and third marks) are marks of a quotation.
[References]  [Talks]  [4 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999f Vagueness as a Mark of Dispositional Intentionality.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000a). Consciousness and the zombie-within: a functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. In Y. Rossetti, & A. Revonsuo (Eds.), Beyond dissociations: Interaction between dissociated implicit and explicit processing (pp. 295-329). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.22.15pla
[Abstract]Cowey & Stoerig's (1995) demonstration that the phenomenon of blindsight applies to monkeys with striate cortical lesions in the same way as it does to humans with similar lesions makes it plausible to argue that the behaviour of mammals and probably that of other vertebrates is controlled by two distinct but closely interdependent and interacting systems in the brain which I shall refer to respectively as 'consciousness' and the 'sub-conscious automatic pilot or "zombie" within'. On this hypothesis, consciousness has three functions, (a) that of categorizing any input that is problematic in that it is either unexpected or significant relative to the individual's current or perennial motivational concerns, (b) that of selecting a response appropriate both to the presence of a thing of that kind and to the individual's motivational concerns with respect to it, and (c) that of monitoring the execution of that response. Conscious/phenomenal experience, on this view, is the first stage in the process whereby problematic inputs are processed by consciousness. Its function is to modify the figure-ground relations within the central representation of a problematic input until an adequate categorization is selected. The sub-conscious automatic pilot or “zombie-within” has two functions (a) that of continuously scanning the total current input and alerting consciousness to any input it identifies as problematic, (b) that of protecting consciousness from overload either by ignoring those non-problematic inputs which require no response or by responding appropriately but automatically to those for which there already exists a well practised skill or other “instinctive” response pattern.
Keywords: consciousness
[References]  [Talks]  [5 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000a Consciousness and the Zombie-within a Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence.pdf

Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and Object. M.I.T. Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
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Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal  behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
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Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
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Stowell, T. (1992). The role of the lexicon in syntactic theory. In T. Stowell & E. Wehrli (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (Vol. 26, pp. 9-20). Academic Press.
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Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: an experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Monographs, 2(8).
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications Clarendon Press.
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Whellan, T., and Co. (1859). History and topography of the City of York and the North Riding of Yorkshire (Volume II). John Green
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Whorf, B. L. (1940). Science and linguistics. Technology Review, 44, 229-231, 247, 248.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1971). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Annalen der NaturphilosophieTractatus Logico-philosophicus. With second English translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[26 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[55 referring publications by Place]