References of Place (2000f). Identity theories.
Austin, J. L. (1962a). Sense and sensibilia (Reconstructed by G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[15 referring publications by Place]
Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [3 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Boring, E. G. (1933). The Physical Dimension of Consciousness. Century.
[17 referring publications by Place]
Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 referring publications by Place]
Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 referring publications by Place]
Descartes, R. (1641/1954). Meditations on First Philosophy, 2nd Edition. In G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Trs. & Eds.), Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Nelson.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)] [14 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Feigl, H. (1967). The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript. University of Minnesota Press.
[Reprints in this collection] [4 referring publications by Place]
Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bassett.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References] [21 citing publications] [29 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf 1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g).
Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References] [261 citing publications] [57 referring publications by Place] [15 reprinting collections]
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf 1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References] [Is reply to] [17 citing publications] [8 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [6 citing publications] [7 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf
Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References] [3 citing publications] [14 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1960)] [24 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by] [7 reprinting collections]
Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XL, 68-70.
[2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [6 referring publications by Place]
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[55 referring publications by Place]