[pp. 568-580]
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78,67-90.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

[pp. 643-651]
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7-19. doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/1312/TheExtendedMind.pdf
[1 reprinting collections]  

[pp. 116-125]
Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth.
[16 referring publications by Place]  [4 reprinting collections]  

[pp. 219-226]
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
[3 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  

[pp. 55-60]
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [331 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

[pp. 73-79; reprinted as The nature of mental states]
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological Predicates. In W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merill, (Eds), Art, Mind and Religion (pp. 37-48). University of Pittsburgh Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [1 reprinting collections]  

[pp. 60-68]
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]