Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185. www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0913/ijsrp-p2125.pdf
[Abstract]U. T. Place is rightly called the forerunners of Physicalism or Identity Theory of Mind. But he also claims himself to be a behaviourist. Like the behaviourist he believed that mental events can be elucidated purely in terms of hypothetical propositions about behaviour. These can also be elucidated by the reports of the first person’s experiences. He has many arguments in favour of behaviourism for which he is called a behaviourist. In this article I shall give a glimpse of behaviourism, particularly of logical behaviourism and then explain the circumstances under which Place is called a behaviourist.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
[Abstract]In the history of philosophy different philosophers have extended their efforts to give a solution of mind body problem. In modern period Rene Descartes explained the mind –body problem from the dualistic point of view. Behaviourism, on the other hand, does not believe [in] the existence of [the] mind. This theory emphasises only on behaviour. But none could give a satisfactory solution of the problem. Identity theory of mind also attempted to give a solution from the materialistic point of view. This theory is developed by U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart,H. Feigl and some other thinkers. This theory came into existence as a reaction to the behaviourism. The main thesis of the theory is - the mental states and processes and the brain states and processes are  identical. Before the establishment of his own theory Smart tries to answer some of the possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory. But this does not mean that Smart accepts Place‟s theory to the full extent. Rather he claims that his arguments for identity theory is very much different from that of Place and this he very sharply stated in his article “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959). In this paper I shall try to explore some possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory as well as answers given by Smart and subsequently tries to show the issues on which Smart agrees with Place. Finally, efforts will be made to highlight Smart‟s difference from that of Place and his own view on the Identity Theory.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  [Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia. philarchive.org/archive/OPIC
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Smart (2007) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf