2 publications that cite Place (1989c). Concept acquisition and ostensive learning: a response to Professor Stemmer.

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149. www.jstor.org/stable/41236095
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989c)]  
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf