Graham, G, (2019). Behaviorism. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/behaviorism/
[Abstract]It has sometimes been said that “behave is what organisms do.” Behaviorism is built on this assumption, and its goal is to promote the scientific study of behavior. The behavior, in particular, of individual organisms. Not of social groups. Not of cultures. But of persons and animals. In this entry I consider different types of behaviorism. I outline reasons for and against being a behaviorist. I consider contributions of behaviorism to the study of behavior. Special attention is given to the so-called “radical behaviorism” of B. F. Skinner (1904–90). Skinner is given special (not exclusive) attention because he is the behaviorist who has received the most attention from philosophers, fellow scientists and the public at large. General lessons can also be learned from Skinner about the conduct of behavioral science in general. The entry describes those lessons.
[Citing Place (2000b) in context]  

Jong, M., de & Prey, R. (2022). The Behavioral Code: Recommender Systems and the Technical Code of Behaviorism. In D. Cressman (Ed.), The Necessity of Critique: Andrew Feenberg and the Philosophy of Technology (pp. 143-159). (Philosophy of Engineering and Technology; Vol. 41). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-07877-4_8
[Abstract]Our lives are increasingly mediated, regulated and produced by algorithmically-driven software; often invisible to the people whose lives it affects. Online, much of the content that we consume is delivered to us through algorithmic recommender systems (“recommenders”). Although the techniques of such recommenders and the specific algorithms that underlie them differ, they share one basic assumption: that individuals are “users” whose preferences can be predicted through past actions and behaviors. While based on a set of assumptions that may be largely unconscious and even uncontroversial, we draw upon Andrew Feenberg’s work to demonstrate that recommenders embody a “formal bias” that has social implications. We argue that this bias stems from the “technical code” of recommenders – which we identify as a form of behaviorism. Studying the assumptions and worldviews that recommenders put forth tells us something about how human beings are understood in a time where algorithmic systems are ubiquitous. Behaviorism, we argue, forms the episteme that grounds the development of recommenders. What we refer to as the “behavioral code” of recommenders promotes an impoverished view of what it means to be human. Leaving this technical code unchallenged prevents us from exploring alternative, perhaps more inclusive and expansive, pathways for understanding individuals and their desires. Furthermore, by problematizing formations that have successfully rooted themselves in technical codes, this chapter extends Feenberg’s critical theory of technology into a domain that is both ubiquitous and undertheorized.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Robinson, Z., Maley, C., & Piccinini, G (2015). Is Consciousness a spandrel? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365-383. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.10
[Abstract]Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf