3 publications that cite Place (2000d). The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation.

Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(3), 159-176. doi:10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x
[Abstract]Objective: In the past decade, much has been written about the hard problem of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.
Methods: Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.
Results: The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the NCC acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to the hard problem, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.
Conclusion: In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.

[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf