Place, U. T. (1974-03-13). Lecture 19: Perception, topic neutrality and the properties of experience (13/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Phenomenalism. Topic neutrality of phenomenal descriptions. Introspective reports. The expression of pain. Dream reports. Thesis: the language we use to describe our private experiences and sensations is a metaphorical extension of a language whose basic function is to describe material objects and their properties as they exist and occur in a three dimensionally extended spatial world.
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam lecture 19

Place, U. T. (1974-04-24) Lecture 22: The materialist hypothesis and Leibniz's Law (24/4/1974). Section 6
[Abstract]Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Logical crtieria for identy and Leibniz's Principle or Law. Experiences
[References]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 22.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References]  [4 citing publications]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990e). Critical Notice [Unpublished book review of Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland. MIT Press, l986].
Keywords: conceptual analysis, eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity theory, neurophilosophy
Note:
This critical notice was commissioned by the editor of the Quarterly Journal of Philosophy in 1986 when the book first appeared; but since it was not completed until four years later in 1990, it was never submitted. It was revised in 1999 in anticipation of a meeting with Pat Churchland in Siena, Italy, in October of that year - a meeting that because of the illness of Place never took place.
[References]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1990e Critical Notice.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995b). 'Is consciousness a brain process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner, & J. Shawe-Taylor (Eds.), Consciousness at the crossroads of cognitive science and philosophy: Selected proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project 'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Maribor, Slovenia, 23-7 August, 1994 (pp. 9-15). Imprint Academic.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995b 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process' Some Misconceptions about the Article.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998-06-19). Workshop on 'Consciousness and the Identity Theory'. Conference on 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues', Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 19 June 1998.
[Abstract]This workshop will examine whether the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain differs from other cases of what I call “compositional type-identities“ in science, such as 'Water is H₂O', 'The temperature of a body is its rate of molecular motion', 'Lightning is an electric discharge through the atmosphere', only to the extent that the brain process or processes in question have not yet been precisely specified by neuroscientific research. The rapid development of such research in recent years makes it likely that such exact specification will soon be possible. It is, therefore, imperative that we examine whether the analogy holds good, or whether the alleged disanalogies are such as to rule out such identification. We begin with a brief history of the identity theory, beginning with Boring (1933), Place (1954; 1956), Feigl (1958; 1967), Smart (1959), followed by a glance at subsequent developments, such as eliminative materialism (Feyerabend 1963; Rorty 1965; Churchland 1981), central state materialism (Armstrong 1968), token identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980), Kripke's (1972/1980) intuition, and the qualia problem (Nagel 1974). We shall then examine topics such as the nature of the identity relation, the 'is' of composition versus the 'is' of identity, Boring's claim that perfect correlation is identity, the process whereby compositional type identities become analytic, with a consequent change in the meaning of the common sense concept involved, once they become matters of established scientifc fact, before considering some of the alleged disanalogies between the consciousness brain-process case and standard cases of compositional type-identity.
[References]